Time,social justice and UK welfare reform

While analyses of time have never strayed too far away from those of social justice, and vice versa, this article's premise is that they have so far failed to converge as directly and coherently as they might. The aim of this article is to facilitate a greater degree of convergence by working within a framework of liberal equality and establishing similarities in the work of the two theorists who have gone furthest in bringing the various debates together. These are Robert Goodin and André Gorz, and the article explores the respective strengths and weaknesses of their ideas. A liberal theory of socio-temporal justice is derived from their work and is then used to critique some recent developments in UK welfare reform.     

Governments and unpopular social policy reform: Biting the bullet or steering clear?

Abstract. Under which conditions and to what extent do governments pursue unpopular social policy reforms for which they might be punished in the next election? This article shows that there exists substantial cross‐cabinet variation in the degree to which governments take unpopular measures and argues that current studies cannot adequately explain this variation. Using insights from prospect theory, a psychological theory of choice under risk, this study hypothesises that governments only engage in unpopular reform if they face a deteriorating socio‐economic situation, a falling political position, or both. If not, they shy away from the risk of reform. A fuzzy‐set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) of the social policy reform activities pursued by German, Dutch, Danish and British cabinets between 1979 and 2005 identifies a deteriorating socio‐economic situation as necessary for unpopular reform. It is only sufficient for triggering reform, however, if the political position is also deteriorating and/or the cabinet is of rightist composition. This study's findings further the scholarly debate on the politics of welfare state reform by offering a micro‐foundation that helps one to understand what induces political actors aspiring to be re‐elected to engage in electorally risky unpopular reform.     

Local Government and Welfare Generosity: Municipality Spending on Social Welfare

Although it is difficult for local governments to give support for social welfare recipients top political priority, there are huge variations in the support recipients actually receive among Norwegian municipalities. However, local governments representing different party ideologies may prefer to support different dimensions of generosity. Some municipalities could have a liberal attitude to eligibility rules but be strict on time limits and the amount of money provided. Others may be generous regarding time limits or amounts received once one is accepted as a welfare client. Data from the mid 1990s indicate the variation in support is related to different generosity dimensions for different party groups. While the total number of clients seems unrelated to politics and basically correlates with local social problems, the duration and amount of support are related to the political composition of the municipality assembly. Devoid of any large variation, both time limits and the amount of support increase in accordance with socialist leanings, and the total budget used for social welfare support also increases with the proportion of women in the municipality assembly.     

Child Care and the Liberal Welfare Regime: A Review Essay

A Review Essay of Vicky Randall, The Politics of Child Daycare in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Sally S. Cohen, Championing Child Care (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Deborah Brennan, The Politics of Australian Child Care, 2d. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).     

Rent dissipation through self-regulation: The social cost of monopoly under threat of reform

This piece offers an alternative perspective on the social cost of monopoly and rent seeking. An existing monopolist whose right is contested in a political market has an incentive to expend resources on direct lobbying efforts while also attempting to defuse reformist opposition. Because the strength of reformist opposition will generally be a function of the monopolist's past, present, and expected future pricing/output decisions, such opposition is endogenous. The probability that an existing monopoly right will be retained depends on both direct lobbying efforts by the monopolist as well as the strength, resolve, and cohesiveness of the reformers. By modifying its output/pricing decision and, in effect, engaging in self-regulation, the monopolist gives up current profits in exchange for the expected future profits associated with retaining its monopoly rights. Such opposition dissipating effort is a form of indirect rent seeking that is complementary to direct lobbying efforts. And unlike the Tullock costs implied by the incumbent's direct lobbying, this form of indirect rent seeking may imply a reduction in the social cost of monopoly.     

Education finance reform: A dynamic perspective

We use a dynamic Tiebout model to analyze the consequences of moving from a pure local system of education finance to a pure state system of finance in which each student receives the same resources. While much of the education finance literature focuses on the static or immediate effects of such a change, our analysis also examines the dynamic effects. Numerical simulations for a calibrated version of our model indicate that these dynamic effects are very important. Comparing steady states, we find that aggregate welfare increases on the order of 10 percent following the switch to a state system. The key to this welfare gain is that a local system yields inefficiently low investment in human capital of children from low-income families.