Paving the Way: the Rise of Direct Action against Road-building and the Changing Character of British Environmentalism

Sustained protests against the building of new roads in Britain since 1992 signal the emergence of a new social movement dimension in British environmentalism. The growth of direct action has occurred outside the existing environmental pressure groups and this more radical green politics has undermined the view that the British state was able to prevent confrontational environmental protest. Small numbers of protesters have been able to make a major impact on the political agenda through a combination of technical ingenuity, tactical astuteness and determination. Models of political opportunity structures have become dominant in explaining the emergence and character of social movements but because they lay too much emphasis on the calculation of costs and benefits by movement actors they are of little help in analysis of this case. Rather, the case of the anti-roads movement suggests that further attention needs to be paid to the identities of the movement's founders in explaining their actions and lends credibility to the (much criticized) claim that new social movements are qualitatively new.     

Federal Use of Implied Guarantees: Some Preliminary Lessons from the Current Financial Distress

The U.S. financial crisis and recession that began in 2007 poses profound challenges for public policy and administration. It also provides useful information about the effects of economic policies. This paper considers the implications of current developments for the use of implied guarantees as an instrument of public policy. It draws on experience with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to argue that implied federal guarantees have a severe disadvantage. Their costs are largely unmeasured, unrecognized in the budget, and unmanaged. Yet their use appears to be increasing in the current crisis. To minimize the costs of the expanded financial safety net, government should measure and manage those costs more effectively. To that end, this paper proposes new budgetary treatments of federal implied guarantees.     

Benefits and costs of the 55 mph speed limit: New estimates and their implications

The national 55 mile-per-hour speed limit was in effect from 1974 to 1987, and over the years many analysts have attempted to measure and compare its costs (enforcement and travel time) and benefits (safety and fuel economy). In 1984 a committee of the National Research Council completed a major study of the speed limit. The following article completes the committee's calculations; summarizes the results in units of money, lives, and travel time; and divides these effects between rural interstates and all other roads. Over a range of plausible dollar values for extra travel time, the cost of saving a life is estimated to be much higher on rural interstates than on other affected roads—and higher than the cost of saving a life by other highway safety measures as well. Hence, proponents of higher speed limits on the rural interstates have a strong case in the debate, which continues in the state legislatures.     

Assessing the national 55 m.p.h. speed limit

This paper evaluates the desirability of the new national speed limit using tools of normative and positive economic analysis. The theoretical case for a speed limit is analyzed, and it is concluded that externalities in driving may justify the use of a speed limit, among other policies. The principal costs and benefits of the present speed limit are then discussed, and available data are used in order to suggest the reasonable orders of magnitude of costs and benefits. A number of conceptual and empirical limitations of the analysis are emphasized. Finally, several alternatives to the national speed limit are noted.     

Preserving the Public Interest in Highway Public–Private Partnerships: A Case Study of the State of Texas

Faced with existing revenues sources that are insufficient to finance highway maintenance and construction needs, some state and local governments are using or considering highway public–private partnerships. These partnerships may be attractive as a way for a government to obtain upfront revenues from the long‐term lease of a road and to shift some of the construction and operations risks to a private firm. However, with these benefits, comes the need to preserve the public interest. This paper discusses issues related to preserving the public interest in highway public–private partnerships and presents a case study of the State of Texas. The case study focuses on an analysis of the strengths and limitations of Texas’ policies and procedures to protect the public interest in the use of long‐term leases for the financing, construction, and operation of new toll roads. The case study also discusses what other governments may be able to learn from Texas’ experiences.     

ROAD GRANTS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMPETITION AND THE BENEFITS OF DUPLICATION

Abstract: This article argues that direct commonwealth involvement in road funding and road policy has benefited the states and local government. Although inefficiencies and friction are evident as a result of joint funding, the benefits of multiple accountability outweigh the costs. A competitive dynamic underlies the involvement of all three levels of government, producing outcomes that no single government dominates, but which reflect in part the responses of each to their respective constituencies. The commonwealth has been driven to more intrusive forms of intervention as existing controls failed to achieve the commonwealth's objectives, and to expanding its financial contributions to counter the diversion of funds by state governments. Its commitment to funding the road program is likely to be highest when its specific purpose grants can be identified closely with the provision of roads in particular regions and localities. In sum, joint funding of the road program produces a system that is responsive to competing conceptions and interests, and the commonwealth's "voluntary vacancy" from all but "national" roads is on balance likely to be detrimental to the program.     

Comparing the Life-Cycle Costs of New Construction and Acquisition-Rehab of Affordable Multifamily Rental Housing

The cost of producing multifamily affordable housing may differ based on development type. Past attempts to compare the costs of producing multifamily housing through new construction or acquisition-rehab have been limited by an inability to adjust for variations in unit quality among different projects. The authors overcome this challenge by estimating the costs of developing and maintaining a property over a 50-year life cycle. Applying this approach to a convenience sample of 269 properties, the authors find new construction associated with life-cycle costs that are 25% to 45% higher than those of acquisition-rehab.     

Municipal Bond New Issue Transaction Costs

As with any market, there are transaction costs associated with the sale of municipal bonds. Only a small number of studies have examined this topic, and therefore we have only a limited understanding of the magnitude and determinants of new issue municipal bond transaction costs. We use data on California municipal bond transaction costs from 2007 to 2009 to test whether scale economies exist. We find that there are considerable transaction cost scale economies for California municipal bonds and that pooling bond sales would likely save substantial amounts of money.     

Protecting Sovereignty,Protecting the Planet: State Delegation to International Organizations and Private Actors in Environmental Politics

As global interdependence grows, states often use international organizations to achieve both domestic and foreign policy goals. One way states respond to demands for cooperation is to delegate to international organizations and private actors. In this article, we use new data spanning a century of international environmental law to understand when and why states delegate to international organizations to manage environmental problems. We find that delegation is a persistent phenomenon that facilitates the implementation of states' preferences. However, they make this decision with care: States tend to delegate functions with lower sovereignty costs, such as implementation and monitoring, but rarely delegate rule making and enforcement. We also find that heterogeneous preferences among states increases the likelihood of delegation. Overall, our results suggest that states seek to delegate out of a motivation both to reduce transaction costs and to establish credible commitments.     

Illegal markets and the social costs of rent-seeking

This paper argues that making goods or services illegal results in an increase in the social costs associated with rent-seeking. The increased social cost is in the form of negative externalities that result from market participants use of coercion and violence in attempts to control trade in the illegal good. Consequently, the social costs of rent-seeking will exceed the value of resources dissipated in rent-seeking competition. And, where the external costs exceed the undissipated portion of the Tullock cost, the social cost of rent-seeking is greater than the sum of Tullock and Harberger costs.     

On the accuracy of regulatory cost estimates

This study compares ex ante estimates of the direct costs of individual regulations to ex post assessments of the same regulations. For total costs the results support conventional wisdom, namely that the costs of regulations tend to be overestimated. This is true for 14 of the 28 rules in the data set discussed, while for only 3 rules were the ex ante estimates too low. For unit costs, however, the story is quite different. At least for EPA and OSHA rules, unit cost estimates are often accurate, and even when they are not, overestimation of abatement costs occurs about as often as underestimation. In contrast, for those rules that use economic incentives, unit costs are consistently overestimated. The difference between the total‐cost and the unit‐cost results is caused by frequent errors in estimates of the effects of individual rules, which suggests, in turn, that the rule's benefits may also be overestimated. The quantity errors are driven both by difficulties in determining the baseline and by incomplete compliance. In cases of unit‐cost overestimation, unanticipated technological innovation appears to be an important factor — especially for economic incentive rules, although procedural and methodological explanations may also apply. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy and Management.     

Housing vouchers versus housing production: Assessing long‐term costs

Abstract

Possibly the single largest debate in the field of affordable rental housing concerns the use of tenant‐based assistance versus project‐based assistance. The accepted wisdom is that project‐based assistance costs anywhere from 50 to 100 percent more than tenant‐based assistance. This premium for project‐based housing is based on a comparison of subsidy costs at the start of a project's life rather than on a comparison of the discounted present value of the costs over the long term.

The subsidy costs of samples of Section 8 new construction projects have been compared to those of Section 8 certificates over a long period of time. The results indicate that the cost premium associated with project‐based assistance may be lower than conventionally believed, around 40 percent, and may get even lower if the cost comparison could extend to longer time periods and could control for the quality of the housing units.     

Price competition and the acquisition of weapons systems

The acquisition of major weapons systems by the Department of Defense shares many elements of traditional “natural monopoly” problems in that efficiency considerations often require that only a single producer exist. This article examines the costs and benefits associated with introducing added producers as a means of stimulating competition. The costs are largely those entailed in transferring technology from the firm that originally developed the system to other potential producers, costs that are concentrated at the beginning of the acquisition period. The benefits are manifested primarily in the form of possible reduced acquisition costs spread over the acquisition period. Under appropriate circumstances, the use of price competition to allocate production contracts can be cost-effective. Some familiar analytical techniques help program managers to recognize such circumstances.     

Implications of GASB's New Reporting Model for Municipal Bond Analysts and Managers

This article explores the implications of the new Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) Statement No. 34 reporting model for municipal bond analysts and managers. Bond analysts and state and local government managers have overlapping objectives for the use of governmental financial information, but managers also face the costly task of implementing the new model. The new and improved financial information provided by the new reporting model will permit users of the information to better understand a government's long-term and short-term financial position and changes in financial position. The new model also has important ramifications for evaluating performance, particularly regarding the reporting of net costs for each program or function.     

Self-regulation and the enforcement of professional codes

This study examines society's choice of inputs for the creation of trust in professional services. Professional codes and their enforcement are only one possible input that society has at its disposal for the production of this trust. Other inputs include civil and criminal codes. If society is modeled as a multi-input “firm,” then it will tend to use less of any input as that input grows less productive or more costly. To identify factors that might impact society's future use of professional self-regulation as a trust-producing input, the productivities and costs of enforcing professional codes are modeled. The effectiveness of professional enforcement is seen to have its origin in the losses members face if they leave the profession. These “exit costs” are analyzed in detail. Other factors affecting professional enforcement are also evaluated. A mathematical model of society's choice problem, contingent on exit costs and other factors, permits formal derivation of several results. Among these are the ideas that monopoly rents and specificity of skills are important in creating the conditions that make professional enforcement possible. As these deteriorate, society's reliance on professional enforcement will decline, and its dependence on courts will rise.     

Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory

According to a growing tradition in International Relations, one way governments can credibly signal their intentions in foreign policy crises is by creating domestic audience costs: leaders can tie their hands by publicly threatening to use force since domestic publics punish leaders who say one thing and do another. We argue here that there are actually two logics of audience costs: audiences can punish leaders both for being inconsistent (the traditional audience cost), and for threatening to use force in the first place (a belligerence cost). We employ an experiment that disentangles these two rationales, and turn to a series of dispositional characteristics from political psychology to bring the audience into audience cost theory. Our results suggest that traditional audience cost experiments may overestimate how much people care about inconsistency, and that the logic of audience costs (and the implications for crisis bargaining) varies considerably with the leader's constituency.     

Transaction costs and inter‐jurisdictional cooperation: an application to land use collaboration

• The costs and benefits of inter‐jurisdictional cooperation and how these impede strategic alliances among jurisdictions is an issue of growing importance worldwide. The reason is the potential cost savings, efficiency increase and economic development benefits that can be realized through cooperation. The literature has increasingly mentioned transaction costs as obstacles that mitigate cooperation and as a key component of cooperation costs, which must be outweighed by cooperation benefits in order for communities to perceive advantageous strategic alliances. However, a framework is lacking in the literature for evaluating the implications of transaction costs for inter‐jurisdictional cooperation. This paper develops a framework for evaluating the nature and dynamics of transaction costs and their implications for inter‐jurisdictional cooperation, with an application to land use. A simple cost function model is used to explain the costs and challenges associated with managing coordinated, cooperative or consolidated relationships, and the dynamics of such costs. The analysis highlights the importance of such things as degree of complexity, inter‐party diversity and the relative sizes of collaborating partners. An application to land use cooperation in Michigan suggests that policies to eliminate transaction costs could help reduce the barriers to cooperation of various types.

Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The life satisfaction approach to valuing public goods: The case of terrorism

Terrorism has large social costs that are difficult to quantify for the well-known problems of eliciting people’s preferences for public goods. We use the LSA to assess these costs in utility and monetary terms. Based on combined cross-section time-series data, we estimate the costs of terrorism for France and the British Isles. We find large negative effects of terrorism on life satisfaction that translate into considerable compensating surpluses for a hypothetical reduction in terrorism, in particular for the serious conflict in Northern Ireland. The effects of terrorism are robust and differ across groups in accordance with prior expectations.     

Medicaid costs and birth outcomes: the effects of prenatal WIC participation and the use of prenatal care.

This study examines the effects of prenatal WIC participation and the use of prenatal care on Medicaid costs and birth outcomes in five states--Florida, Minnesota, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. The study period is 1987 for Florida, Minnesota, North Carolina, and South Carolina and January-June 1988 for Texas. Prenatal WIC participation was associated with substantial savings in Medicaid costs during the first 60 days after birth, with estimates ranging from $277 in Minnesota to $598 in North Carolina. For every dollar spent on the prenatal WIC program, the associated savings in Medicaid costs during the first 60 days ranged from $1.77 to $3.13 across the five states. Receiving inadequate levels of prenatal care was associated with increases in Medicaid costs ranging from $210 in Florida to $1,184 in Minnesota. Prenatal WIC participation was associated with higher newborn birthweight, while receiving inadequate prenatal care was associated with lower birthweight.     

The Variable Incumbency Advantage: New Voters, Redistricting, and the Personal Vote

In this article we explore the personal vote costs of redistricting. After redistricting, incumbents often face significant numbers of new voters—voters that were previously in a different incumbent's district. Existing conceptualizations of the incumbency advantage suggest that the cost to incumbents of having new voters should be relatively small and predictable. We propose a different formulation: a variable incumbency advantage. We argue that any incumbency advantage among the electorate is a function of short-term effects, partisanship, and electoral saliency. We use a massive untapped dataset of neighborhood-level electoral data to test our model and to demonstrate how the intersection of the personal vote, redistricting, and short-term environmental variables can provide a healthy margin to incumbents—or end their careers.