Disbursement,decentralization and development: Lessons from the first rural health services project in Papua New Guinea

In 1983 the Department of Health in Papua New Guinea decentralized the control of health services to provincial governments. In the same year a major rural health development project commenced in six of the nineteen provinces. Conflict arose between the centralized control required by the project and the decentralized health system. This article reviews the experience of the project implementators in trying to reconcile the philosophy and reality of decentralization with the centralized project design. Lessons point to the need for closer collaboration with beneficiaries during project design, formal clarification of responsibilities of national and provincial governments in implementation, institutional strengthening as a project input and the development of mechanisms for review and change during the course of implementation.     

Local Government and political development in Papua New Guinea

The paper examines the history of local government in Papua New Guinea and prospects for it, and offers some comparisons with Commonwealth Africa, particularly East Africa. The P.N.G. system of local government was influenced by that of Tanganyika but grew to greater proportional significance. Although challenged by the rise of nationalism, as in East Africa, local government has played a much greater role in political development. A significant anti-council movement challenged the new system, but mirrored its forms. The regional nature of these protests accompanied by a weak nationalist movement, led to strong pressures for decentralization after independence. The 1976 constitutional settlement has established provincial governments with complete control over local government and has posed fundamental questions about the future shape of local government in P.N.G.     

Power to the people? Decentralizationin Papua New Guinea

Since 1977, after pressure from secessionists, Papua New Guinea has, with both boldness and hesitancy, sought to decentralize its unitary state. Nineteen elected provincial governments, which are financially dependent on the centre, now control the former colonial districts and the national government public servants within them. National parliamentarians, while competing with provincial governments, have gained strong influence over some of these nominally autonomous bodies. The hoped-for popular mobilization and the intended sensitization and improved co-ordination of the public service have not occurred widely, but rather abuses of position, waste of resources and a decline in the legitimacy of the state have resulted. This scheme, which was ill-suited to the political culture, the country's economic and financial balance and the available human resources, is being re-assessed at the national level.     

Administrative problems of the provincial sales tax on beer in Papua New Guinea

With the establishment of provincial government in Papua New Guinea, the Organic Law has conferred on the provincial governments the authority to raise revenue using local revenue bases including retail sales taxes. These taxes have significant advantages and a sales tax on beer has particular benefits in P.N.G. in terms of potential yield and ease of administrative management. The tax is levied on the two breweries and the breweries collect the tax at their breweries and wholesale warehouses on behalf of the provincial governments. For the brewery with the dominant share of the market the arrangement under which it collects the tax for a commission and pays over quarterly to the provincial governments brings financial advantage. The brewery with a smaller share of the market and localized sales is less likely to be benefitting by the arrangement. For the future given expected beer consumption a change from a quantity based tax to ad valorem rates would be financially advantageous to the provincial governments, and would reduce the need for some provinces to seek tax sources elsewhere, but experience shows the general benefit of raising the tax, not at the point of final sale, but on the wholesaler or manufacturer.     

Decentralization for regional development: A comparative study of Tanzania,Zambia and Papua New Guinea

Decentralization has been a common aim in administrative reform and this article points to common themes in the decentralization programmes of Tanzania, Zambia and Papua New Guinea. The programmes involve both developing field administrative structures on an area basis in which horizontal links between the field staff of different ministries are at least as important as the vertical lines of authority linking field staff with headquarters' departments, and also decentralizing authority over planning and implementing development programmes to local decision making bodies. The impact of these decentralization programmes has not hitherto been adequately monitored or evaluated, and experience of attempts at doing this in Tanzania emphasizes the importance of building into a decentralization programme a method of monitoring it which produces usable information. The article points to the plans for monitoring to be pursued in Zambia.     

‘Trainingism’ revisited in Papua New Guinea

Despite much training in public administration over the past 20 years there has been little improvement in public service management in the Third World. This was anticipated in Schaffer's critical notion of ‘trainingism’. This concept, when applied to Papua New Guinea, helps us to understand why training has been unable to produce dramatic changes in public service performance. Training has been used to perform latent functions and has not been evaluated. The situation is currently under review as new initiatives are taking place to improve training's contribution to public service efficiency and effectiveness.     

Decentralization,provincial policy making and the law in Papua New Guinea

Shortly after independence in 1975 Papua New Guinea decided to decentralize political power by creating nineteen provincial governments, complete with legislatures and executives. The division of powers between the two levels of government was set down in the Organic Law on Provincial Government and subsequent delegations of power by the National Executive Council (cabinet). The ability of provincial governments to fulfil the role in policy making set out for them depends on a number of political, financial and legal factors at both the national and provincial levels. A close examination of the legal base of provincial policy making reveals a number of shortcomings and incoherencies in the legal arrangements which pose obstacles to the realization of effective decentralized policy making. There are several possible approaches to resolving these problems, but the most appropriate one requires co-ordination between the National Government and provincial governments in replacing delegated powers with provincial legislation.     

Bougainville and Papua New Guinea: Complexities of Secession in a Multi-ethnic Developing State

The claims made by Bougainville's secessionist leaders correspond with five theoretical perspectives on the morality of secession – based, respectively, on notions of political consent, national identity, cultural preservation, distributive justice and territorial title. Each is tackled in turn, as a means to both assessing the justness of the Bougainvillean case, while also testing the limits of applicability of the moral perspectives themselves. Overall, it is concluded that the complexities of the Bougainville/Papua New Guinea case militate against outright separation. Rather, a balanced resolution of injustices is more likely to be attained by modifications to institutions and patterns of distribution within the existing state. Furthermore, this highly complex case throws up important challenges from which normative theory can profitably learn.     

The decentralization of primary health care delivery in Chile

The article argues that during the 1980s the process of decentralization in Chile under the military government of General Pinochet shifted the delivery of primary health care to the municipal level. Despite the return to more democratic forms of government in 1990 the overall structure of local‐level service delivery has remained largely unchanged. The municipalities have retained responsibility for service delivery but resources remain centrally determined. In an attempt to enhance accessibility, choice and the responsiveness of the system to individual and local need, reform has been made to the financial transfer mechanisms and a new model of primary health care delivery has recently been introduced. However, problems of resourcing and implementation limit the effectiveness of some of the changes that have accompanied decentralization. Problems have resulted in primary health care delivery because administrative decentralization has not been accompanied by fiscal decentralization, nor effective political decentralization. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The decentralization of health care in developing countries: organizational options

The complex ways in which decentralization is practised in the field of government health services are examined. Organizationally, decentralization means a choice between different types of public institution, which vary in terms of: the areas over which they have jurisdiction, the functions delegated to local institutions; and the way decision-makers are recruited, so producing institutions. There is little agreement about the optimum size of areas, either in terms of population or territory. Areas cannot be delimited without consideration being given to the powers to be exercised at each level. The specification of functions always assumes certain things about who will exercise the delegated powers. The two issues cannot be separated. Five structures of decentralization are distinguished, each of which could in principle be created at regional, district and village/community level: the multi-purpose local authority, the single-purpose council, the hybrid council, the single purpose executive agency, the management board, field administration, health teams, and interdepartmental committees. Whatever the institutions used for decentralization, the choice of structures and the ensuing process of decision-making will be highly charged politically. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dynamics and tensions of implementing agencification reforms: Experiences of District Development Authorities in Papua New Guinea

Agencification reforms aimed at reducing centralised control and enhancing efficiency by creating arm's-length autonomous agencies. This paper examines the creation of District Development Authorities (DDA) in Papua New Guinea (PNG). DDAs are typical agencification reforms seeking to empower local governments with greater administrative and financial authority. Using a principal-agent framework, the experiences of the two DDAs in East New Britain, Kokopo, and Rabaul highlight some of the key challenges and strategies in implementing agencification reforms. Findings of the study revealed that the DDAs in East New Britain adapted the new system while retaining some aspects of the older system, which helped in navigating through the structural changes and the multiple principal-agent relationships. As a key component of agencification process, these DDAs have also started engaging in revenue generation activities. Such economic activities have the potential to shift the dominant principal-agent relationship from the national to the local level.     

Fostering subnational autonomy and accountability in decentralized developing countries: lessons from the Papua New Guinea experience

Using the experience of Papua New Guinea as a case study, this article examines the importance of political and administrative organization, electoral politics and revenue assignments for fostering subnational autonomy and accountability in decentralized developing countries, and hence the success of fiscal decentralization programmes. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of fiscal decentralization on economics performance in high-income OECD nations: an institutional approach

This paper examines the impact of public sector decentralization on per capita income. Controlling for differences in institutional arrangements among countries, panel data regressions on a sample of observations from 20 high-income OECD nations spanning the years 1972 to 2005 indicate that decentralization is positively related to income. The empirical analysis shows that institutions consistent with economic freedom enhance the positive income effects of decentralization. Thus, the impact of public sector decentralization is dependent upon a nation??s institutional environment.