法律原则在法律推理中的地位和作用——一个比较的研究

我国关于法律原则的讨论一般集中在立法过于笼统与立法所规定的法律基本原则这两个方面。这种意义上的法律原则与德沃金所说的法律原则存在重要区别。德沃金关于法律原则的讨论其目的是强调法律的确定性 ,而我们关于法律原则的讨论却在强化法律的模糊性。法律原则的讨论主要涉及法律推理过程中原则与规则之间的关系。基于法治的原因 ,法律推理必须坚持将法律规则作为法律推理的大前提 ;在法律规则含义不明确、模糊或者相互矛盾时 ,可以使用法律原则 ,但是 ,必须经过一定的法律原则的认定程序。     

司法判决与其他案例中的法律推理方法研究──说理的艺术

法律推理是一种说理的艺术。法律推理的难题是在不可能讲理的情况 下讲理、与“不讲理的人”讲理;既要法官能动地审理案件,又要防止法官专横审理。法律 推理的目的是寻求以法律为根据的正当理由。演绎推理、归纳推理、辩证推理是法律推 理的基本方法;它们按照不同的思维路径与规则寻求推理结论,但都面临其自身无法解 决的问题。法律价值在解决这些问题中具有主导性、基础性的作用。法官的法律价值判 断行为非常重要,从人类学的角度看这是一种四维框架中的判断行为。规范说理的艺术 可以防止法官在法律推理中的任意、专断,其方法包括培养法律感觉、进行法律价值判断 的合理化作业,养成法律惯例和法律信念,完善法律推理的制度与规则保证等,最终,法 律推理应当以人为本。     

On universal relevance in legal reasoning

The purpose of this essay is to defend a claim that a certain consideration, which I call unworkability, is universally and necessarily relevant to legal reasoning. By that I mean that it is a consideration that must carry legal weight in the justification of some judicial decisions in every legal system in which (1) all disputed matters of law can be adjudicated, and (2) all judicial decisions are to be legally justified. Unworkability's necessary relevance has important implications for a theory of relevance presented by Rolf Sartorius. On this theory, nearly all considerations that are relevant to a judicial decision are supplied by legal principles embedded in the legal rules and decisions, or by extralegal principles dependent, in some way, on the legal principles. (The exceptions to the embedding thesis that Sartorius would, no doubt, recognize are elaborated in the text but can be set aside here.) But there are possible legal systems which do not contain an embedded legal principle concerning unworkability; and nonetheless, unworkability is relevant to judicial reasoning in those systems. Hence, a theory of relevance that relies on principles embedded in the content of rules is too simplistic. Some substantive considerations are relevant for other reasons.     

On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning*

Abstract The paper argues that reasoning according to law is an instance of moral reasoning. Several ways of understanding this claim are distinguished. A number of arguments to the effect that because of the internal logic of the law, or the special skills it involves legal reasoning should be seen as immune to moral considerations are rejected. Nevertheless, the paper affirms the relative and limited autonomy of legal reasoning, and the sui generis role of doctrine in it which is manifested in the many cases in which the moral considerations pertaining to the case underdetermine its result.     

Everyone Knows the Game: Legal Consciousness in the Hawaiian Cockfight

Past legal consciousness research has revealed a great deal about what individuals think and do with regard to law, but less attention has been paid to the social processes that underpin these attitudes, beliefs, and actions. This article focuses particularly on a “second‐order” layer of legal consciousness: people's perceptions about how others understand the law. Ethnographic observations and in‐depth interviews with cockfighters in rural Hawaii reveal how law enforcement practices not only affect cockfighting rituals, but are embedded within them. Police practices and informal rules work in concert to shape fighters' second‐order beliefs. These beliefs have implications for participants' understanding of central concepts, including order, disorder, and illegality. Examining legal consciousness from a second‐order perspective also underscores that notions of legitimacy are constantly created and recreated. Recognizing legitimacy's inherently relational nature helps us understand how experiences of law are synthesized into beliefs—for example, when an unusual police action directed toward a subgroup of fighters compromised the law's legitimacy for them. Foregrounding the relational nature of legal consciousness offers scholars a means to better understand and operationalize the dynamic nature of human relationships to law.     

Rights,goals, and hard cases

Rights have two properties which prima facie appear to be inconsistent. The first is that they are conditional in the sense that one some occasions it is always justifiable for someone to act in a way which appears to be inconsistent with someone else's rights, such as when the defence of necessity applies. The second is that rights are indefeasible in the sense that they are not subject to being defeated our outweighed by utilitarian or policy considerations. If we view rules and the rights which they establish as being subject to a ceteris paribus clause, the form of which generates out the exceptions, the conditionality of rights becomes reconcilable with their nondefeasibility. Such a view of rules and rights would entail that the goals of the law and their orderings be considered as a part of the law. When so viewed, propositions about goals and their orderings become legitimate premises for legal reasoning, furnishing solutions to hard cases in the law of torts, without resort to balancing of interests or judicial discretion.     

法官视角中的能动司法

能动司法是司法创造力的体现。在美国,这种司法能动的突出表现形式是司法审查权,通过多年的案例发展,美国已经形成了较为完备的司法审查体制。在英国,至今法院尚无对立法的审查权。但在英美法系国家,由于有判例法传统,法官的司法能动性相对较大,在案件审理中,区分相似案件事实和不断发展法律规则是法官司法技术的重要组成部分。英美法系的司法能动对我国司法实践具有积极的借鉴意义。在我国,司法能动在审判领域的主要表现形式是最高法院司法解释、个案法官法律论证,其主线是政策考量与法律考量,也可称之为社会效果考量与法律效果考量。     

The Concept of Jurisprudence*

Abstract. The first part of this article contains (i) considerations as to the relationship between jurisprudence and legal dogmatics, legal philosophy, and sociology of law; (ii) considerations about the status of jurisprudence both as a meta- and an object-theory. These lead to the suggestion that jurisprudence should be defined as a general juristic theory of law and legal science. In the second part, the character and elements of this definition are explained systematically. The article's main thesis is that jurisprudence is not distinguished from legal philosophy and sociology of law by its subject or its method, but by the specifically juristic research aspect or perspective it is based upon.     

In Defense of the Practice Theory

Hart proposed that law is made possible by the practice among legal officials of observing conventional social rules, the most important being rules of recognition. This view has been dubbed the practice theory, and it has been attacked by many legal theorists. This paper argues that many criticisms of the practice theory fail because they misunderstand the nature of the organizational challenge to which rules of recognition are the solution. The challenge of constituting a legal system is essentially the challenge of constituting a group agent, and when viewed through Pettit’s account of group agency, the practice theory can easily be defended.     

Dazed and Confused: Accidental Mixtures of Goods and the Theory of Acquisition of Title

This paper explores the law of accidental mixtures of goods. It traces the development of the English rules on mixture from the seminal nineteenth century case of Spence v Union Marine Insurance Co to the present day, and compares their responses to those given by the Roman law, which always has been claimed as an influence on our jurisprudence in this area. It is argued that the different answers given by English and Roman law to essentially the same problems of title result from the differing bases of these legal systems. Roman a priori theory is contrasted with the more practical reasoning of the common law, and while both sets of rules are judged to be coherent on their own terms, it is suggested that the difference between them is reflective of a more general philosophical disagreement about the proper functioning of a legal system, and the relative importance of theoretical and pragmatic considerations.     

Questioning Fundamentals: Leyland Daf and the 'Ownership' of Charged Property

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Retraction . Modern Law Review 67: 6, 1046‐1046 .
Online publication date: 1‐Oct‐2004. Although the House of Lords decision in Leyland Daf was primarily concerned with the order for distribution of assets in a winding‐up, it has several other far‐reaching ramifications and repercussions. The reasoning of their Lordships in the case alters our understanding of the very nature and operation of a charge over a company's assets. This reasoning strikes at the heart of the law of security interests, bringing into question the fundamental distinction between a charge and a mortgage. Furthermore the decision has given a whole new complexion to the concept of a floating charge which will have tremendous consequences for its application in commercial practice. This paper analyses the decision firstly on the basis of its legal principle and then on the basis of its policy considerations and concludes that its reasoning is neither sound nor justifiable on either ground.     

一个结合时态的法律规范推理系统TDWL’0

义务冲突问题的存在，使法律规范推理的应用功能受到限制，让其成为规范逻辑研究中必需解决的问题。通过对义务的具体语境进行分析，提出结合义务的时态因素建立法律规范推理系统TDWL’0的新主张，这不但可以有效处理义务冲突问题，并且有利于增强规范逻辑在法律实践领域中的应用价值。     

哈特社会规则理论的限度

哈特以社会规则理论为核心阐释法律的概念,使规则区别于习惯,并将法律视为初级规则与次级规则的结合。同时,社会规则理论也具有一定的限度,这集中表现在,根据哈特的理论,在法体系之下,作为法律规则的初级规则的成立并不以其具有社会规则这一身份为必要条件。被制定出来的法律规则能够经由通过法体系效力判准的检验而在其被真正实践之前就成立,因此,有些法律规则不是社会规则,社会规则理论不能适用于所有的法律规则。     

防空识别区:剩余权利原则对天空自由的限制

防空识别区是一国为国家安全目的而设置的对航空器进行识别的特殊区域,是国家行使管辖权的结果。其在国际法上的依据基于剩余权利原则,也可以部分地基于专属经济区的规定,但其规范形式主要是国内法,其规范性质不属于国际习惯。其法律性质不同于领空,也不等同于专属经济区、公海。中国设置东海防空识别区,表明了对长期以来国际社会存在的做法的认可,丰富、推动着相关国际实践向前发展,成为国际通例乃至国际习惯。东海防空识别区与其他国家防空识别区的重叠,并不与现行国际法冲突。     

The pedagogy of legal reasoning: democracy,discourse and community

Learning legal reasoning is a central part of any undergraduate law degree and remains a threshold concept: one which is vital for any law student to grasp, but which is often difficult to explain. It is a form of reasoning which is very distinctive to the discipline. This article explores the applicability of learning theories typically used to ground pedagogy in higher education to the specific task of teaching legal reasoning. Constructivist or experiential theories of learning are widely used in higher education, but they need to be used with a clear focus on the specific nature of legal reasoning, which does not fit neatly within the assumptions about learning which underpin many constructivist approaches. Situated learning theories, which place emphasis on the role of the community in constructing knowledge, can also be of value. However, steps need to be taken to avoid replicating the hierarchy of the legal community within educational communities. Overall, the pedagogy of legal reasoning needs to pay attention to the specific nature of legal reasoning, to enable students to access the discourse of the legal community to use as a model, and to take students seriously as members of that community.     

IT and Law,and Law Schools

If 'computing and law' as a discipline is to push forward and develop, it will do so best within the context of the law school rather than as a joint enterprise between law and other disciplines. It is in the law school that the understanding of the nature of law is at its height. Yet there are problems here-law schools have a strained relationship with technology and their concept of the breadth of 'legal scholarship' can be limited by conventional (or ideologically-biased) views of law and an undergraduate-oriented view of the law school's purpose. There are also problems arising from the nature of communications between lawyers and computer scientists. In this article, I highlight these problems and also argue for a more developed and extended view of legal scholarship which will be able to incorporate study and research of the impact of the computer upon legal society as well as the legal control of the unwanted elements arising from these new technologies. Most writings on IT and the law school concentrate upon its use as an educational tool. My interest here is not so much in this side of things, but in the research culture of the law school. Whilst there is sometimes a view that the linkage of law school and IT is purely related to the use of technology in legal education, the remit is wider and includes the understanding of the link between substantive law and the context of the new computerized world and also the impact of the computer in the practice of law. This latter aspect is becoming increasingly important with the Woolf reforms and computerization of the procedural elements of law, but also in substantive law: for example, administrative systems are becoming more and more mediated by technology, and administrative law must be reviewed and re-worked in this context.     

Learning legal reasoning while rejecting the oxymoronic status of feminist judicial rationalities: a view from the law classroom

One misconception accompanying the idea of a feminist judgment is that feminist judgment is inherently at odds with the putative neutrality of the “judge” as a “neutral” adjudicator. Many lawyers, scholars and law students tend to assume that when deliberating as a judge, feminism(s) simply has/have no rightful or rational place, relevance or bearing upon the process or the outcome and that such a “non-neutral” view will necessarily deviate from the standard canons of judicial reasoning by embodying an unacceptable bias. Introducing students to the “grammar” of reasoning in an undergraduate course dedicated to both general critical reasoning and legal reasoning, however, presented an ideal opportunity for students to encounter in greater intimacy the interpretive openness of law and the indeterminacies that argument alone can never ultimately resolve without recourse to deeper positional commitments. By stepping into the role of judge, having studied the techniques, inherent malleability and limitations of legal argument, students could explore for themselves the range of argumentatively defensible interpretations and outcomes possible in any given legal case. In the process, the students could appreciate not only the open textured nature of judgment and legal reasoning more richly, but also see the “rationality” of feminist judgment as a fully plausible alternative to non-feminist “rationality” and judgment.     

Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory Revisited

This article deals with the relation between a theory of law and a theory of legal reasoning. Starting from a close reading of Chapter VII of H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law, it claims that a theory of law like Hart's requires a particular theory of legal reasoning, or at least a theory of legal reasoning with some particular characteristics. It then goes on to say that any theory of legal reasoning that satisfies those requirements is highly implausible, and tries to show that this is the reason why not only Hart, but also writers like Neil MacCormick and Joseph Raz have failed to offer a theory of legal reasoning that is compatible with legal positivism as a theory of law. They have faced a choice between an explanation of legal reasoning that is incompatible with the core of legal positivism or else strangely sceptical, insofar as it severs the link between general rules and particular decisions that purport to apply them.     

处理银行卡盗刷纠纷的法理基础及实务要点

对于银行卡盗刷纠纷的法律处理,在迄今为止的司法实践中基本是沿着合同法思路展开。这种惯常思路固然能够给当事人以法律安抚而致银行卡应用实践以法律秩序,但实际上是以耗损效率和弱化公正为代价的。银行卡是代表持卡人财产权利的资格证券,因其使用中权利人识别机制的特点,相关义务人的识别义务、归责模式及免责事由均有本属规则,并非通常合同法规则所能涵盖,如银行卡上的证券关系与据以形成的合同关系相分离,对卡权利人的识别义务与卡的占有状态及持卡人的过错无关等。因此在处理银行卡盗刷纠纷的司法实践中,应当把握银行卡作为权利凭证的法律性质及应用规则,以此作为伪卡盗刷与网络盗刷的本质区别,并由此展开银行卡盗刷案件的情形类别设定及相应处理规则。     

司法裁判中的隐性知识论纲

作为现代认识论的重要课题的隐性知识论的价值不仅在于揭示了隐性知识的存在,更在于论证了知识的本质是隐性的。司法隐性知识问题在当代英美法系司法实践中得以显现并在相关法学著述中多有表述。在我国大陆,司法隐性知识也广泛存在于案件裁判的事实建构与法律发现诸环节中,并在司法判案中有它特定的位置。司法前见、一般推理、事实解释、图式加工、事实剪裁、经验参与、结果导向、观念辐射等都是对司法隐性知识的艰难表述。连接隐性知识与既定法律规范依赖于法律修辞,裁判凭藉判决修辞而获得形式正当性并为公众更好地接受。现代诉讼程序规则是激励与规制司法隐性知识运用的制度环境,司法隐性知识的研究对当前我国大陆法治文化建设具有特别重要的启示意义。