Credibility and Flexibility: Political Institutions,Governance, and Foreign Direct Investment

This article argues that the relationship between political institutions and foreign direct investment is both nonlinear and conditional upon status quo policies. The empirical analysis demonstrates an inverted U-shaped relationship between political institutions and foreign direct investment in developing countries, with four veto players being the most attractive institutional arrangement. Countries with too few or too many veto players are not favored because of either high policy uncertainty or high policy rigidity. In addition, the benefits and costs of credibility and flexibility vary in good times and hard times. The benefits of maintaining status quo tend to outweigh the costs in countries with good initial regulatory environment. The costs of maintaining status quo tend to outweigh the benefits when countries are more vulnerable to exogenous shocks.     

中亚国家政党体制的形成与发展

政党制度的改变是中亚国家独立以后政治体制变化的主要表现之一。经过十几年的发展,中亚各国基本上已经形成了和本国实际情况相适应的政党体制:哈萨克斯坦形成了“祖国”党主导下的多党制;乌兹别克斯坦形成了只有少数几个合法政党存在的有限多党政治体制;没有能起主导作用的政党是吉尔吉斯斯坦政党体制的显著特征;民主党一党执政是土库曼斯坦政党政治的一个特点;允许具有宗教性质的伊斯兰复兴党合法存在并在议会中占有席位使塔吉克斯坦多党政治体制有别于中亚其他国家。     

Domestic Political Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments in the Developing World

Policymakers use a fixed exchange rate regime to signal their commitment to low inflation and to exchange rate stability. Increasing economic integration and the rise of democratic institutions make it more difficult for policymakers to maintain the credibility of this commitment. We use binary probit (with a variety of corrections for autocorrelated and heteroscedastic disturbances) to test hypotheses relating democratic institutions to exchange rate regime choice on a sample of 76 developing countries over the period 1973–1994. The empirical analysis indicates that domestic political preferences—as measured by the structure of domestic political institutions and the fractionalization of the party system—influence exchange rate regime choice. We find that floating exchange rate regimes are more likely in democratic than in nondemocratic polities and that democratic politieswith majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to fix their exchange rates than those with systems of proportional representation.     

发展中国家劳务输出的经济学：以越南为例

本文主要对越南开展国际劳务合作情况进行研究,主要回顾越南20多年来参与国际劳务输出的历程,对越南劳务输出采取的举措、劳务输出的特点、劳务输出对越南经济社会发展的贡献进行较为全面的分析,同时认为越南对外劳务合作机遇与挑战并存,如果加强统筹规划,对外劳务合作定将大有作为。     

日本政坛动荡对其内政和外交的影响

日本民主党上台后,背弃竞选时向选民许下的诺言,支持率很快下滑。同时,原执政多年的自民党并未从中获利进而东山再起,反而继续衰退下去。而不断涌现的小党形成了日本政党政治的第三极力量。日本政局不稳,不仅使日本在寻求国家发展方向的道路上继续徘徊,而且增加了日本对外政策的不确定性。     

Political Markets, Bond Markets, and the Effects of Uncertainty: A Cross-National Analysis

One of the critical challenges of contemporary democracy is securing a balance between the markets of representation and the markets of exchange and capital within democracies. This article explores the effect that political markets have upon capital markets' performance as measured by the market risks within the long-term government bond markets in nineteen democracies of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) between 1955 and 1992. Our theory linking political markets and capital markets will be developed around the logic of transaction cost economics. We will argue that critical aspects of transaction costs within political markets generate corresponding transaction costs and risks within capital markets thereby reducing market efficiency. Specifically, we demonstrate that, based on cross-national evidence drawn from three panels over the time period 1955–1992, stochastic political markets generate transaction costs within long-term government bond markets, the consequences of which are reflected in rising market risk within these capital markets. Our pooled cross-sectional sample confirms that stochasticity in institutional structure presents trade-offs for democracy. Stochasticity may reflect more responsive and generally sensitive representative institutions, but often at the price of risk-laden capital markets. We consider the implications of these findings at the conclusion of the article.     

修正结构主义批判--冷战后发展中国家国际制度偏好的理论评估

修正结构主义关于南北关系研究的一个基本命题是,发展中国家由于在国际上和国内的脆弱性而倾向于支持和建立权威导向分配的国际制度.本文首先从国际制度特征、国家偏好与政策选择三个方面对该命题的理论基础进行批评,然后从实证的角度对它进行了经验分析,最后从单位结构、体系特征和制度功能三个方面初步探讨了冷战后发展中国家的国际制度偏好和行为发生变化的原因.     

转型国家的政治发展:中国与中东欧国家的对比分析

当代中国和剧变以后的中东欧国家同为转型国家,在政治发展的历史进程中背倚着共同的出发点,即苏联社会主义的政治模式,但是二者在政治发展的启动背景上面临的国内外环境,摆脱传统政治模式的方式,政治发展的路径选择和目标模式设定上截然不同,因此两种政治发展的实践效果差异也比较大,分别构成当今世界转型国家比较有代表性的政治发展的不同图景。     

The Political Enforcement of Liberalism: Bargaining, Institutions, and Auto Multinationals in Hungary

The demise of communism triggered large flows of foreign direct investment into Eastern Europe. This article examines the impact of recent changes in the international environment—the transformation of world production systems and the rise of neoliberalism—on bargaining between multinational corporations and post-communist governments. It focuses on the Hungarian automobile industry, one of the region's largest recipients of FDI. The Hungarian case illustrates the ability of small, open, and geopolitically weak states to parlay shifts in the global environment into a bargaining asset. The ascent of lean production heightened pressure on auto MNCs to develop local supplier systems capable of fast delivery of components to East European subsidiaries. The pull of backward integration was particularly strong for Japanese producers, whose non-European status enabled Hungarian state authorities to secure commitments to raising domestic content. Transplanting Japanese-style production in Eastern Europe proved less vexing for European MNCs, whose status as EU-based companies freed them of local-content requirements and whose preexisting supplier networks obviated heavy investments in the Hungarian components industry. But while Western auto producers enjoyed highly favorable terms of entry into Eastern Europe, even they could not elude the paradoxical effects of global changes on MNC/host state relations. The very eastward extension of the European Union's nondiscriminatory rules that facilitated EU-based firms' entry into Hungary also permitted host state authorities to parry efforts by MNCs to obtain particularistic concessions after entry. The Hungarian case thus demonstrates that MNC/host state bargaining in the post–Cold War period hinges more on the global positions of multinationals than on the structural vulnerabilities of capital-importing states ( per dependency theory) or the internal capacity of host states ( per statist theories).     

东欧国家10年政治体制转轨

从1989年至今,整个东欧国家实行政治经济变革已走过10个年头.在政治转轨方面,虽然各国发展极不平衡,但它们的政治体制已一改日貌.可以说,所有东欧国家都基本确立了新的政治体制,即实行西方式的多党议会民主制.由于西方国家的政治制度在具体体制上千差万别,东欧国家的现行政治制度在具体体制上也不尽相同.例如,在政体方面,东欧国家都实行内阁制,但各国政府(总理)的产生方式及其权限,立法机关组成的类型及其权限,以及总统的产生方式、任期和权限等都各不相同.另外,虽然大多数东欧国家现行政治体制已开始正常运作,但仍存在许多亟待解决的问题.因此,在政治转轨方面,特别是要使现行政治体制完全成为西方式的民主体制,整个东欧国家还有很长的路程要走.     

Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism,Government Credibility,and Foreign Direct Investment

Political risk is an important factor in the decision to invest abroad. While the investment potential might be lucrative, there is always the risk that the host government will expropriate the profits and assets of the foreign investor. Political institutions, however, can serve as constraints on the actions of political actors in the host country. We argue that federal structures lower political risk. Joint-reputational accountability in overlapping political jurisdictions increases the likelihood that investment contracts will be honored. Empirical analyses of cross-sectional time-series data for 115 countries, from 1975–1995, are used to study how political institutions affect foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. After controlling for the effect of relevant economic and political variables, we find that both democratic and federal institutions help attract FDI, although the additive effect of democracy and federalism is small. This is not surprising; democratic systems already have low political risk; they do not need the additional credibility that the federal system provides to attract FDI. In contrast, we expect that federal structures significantly improve the trustworthiness of less democratic states. Empirically, we find that less democratic countries with federal political systems attract some of the highest levels of FDI.     

发展中国家经济脆弱性的根源及其化解

20世纪80年代以来,世界经济出现了一种“边缘震荡”的新现象,发展中国家维护经济安全的难度明显增大,其中有相当一部分国家的经济发展甚至陷入了某种恶性循环,并成为国际经济体系周期性调节的减震阀。发展中国家经济脆弱性的根本原因在于缺少控制资本积累过程的能力,而国际经济体系的惯性制约更强化了对这些国家经济安全的威胁。发展中国家经济未来发展不仅取决于经济体制的创新,而且也取决于在适应全球化趋势的同时保持内部经济结构的自我协调。对于中国的现代化进程,也要充分考虑诸多可能遇到的困难和风险,避免过于简单的线性思维,以求立于不败之地。     

日本政治经济外交形势及政策取向

一2 0 0 0年仍是日本多事的一年。政局乱 ,改革难 ;经济“有景无气” ,缺乏活力 ;外交虚多实少 ,重点突而不破。“朝大野小”的格局被打破 ,自民党与民主党两大阵营形成对峙 ,多党参政的联政框架继续维持。 6.2 5大选之后 ,日本朝野在众议院势力分布发生明显变化。自民党 2 34席、民主党 1 2 9席、公明党 31席、自由党 2 2席、日共 2 0席、社民党 1 9席、保守党 7席、无党派 2 1席。这便形成了自民、公明、保守三联合执政党与民主、自由、日共、社民四在野党的直接对抗的局面。执政三党的议席数较选前大幅度减少 ,由 335席骤减至 2 72席 ,自…     

国际关系格局变化中发展中国家的地位与作用及对中国政策的思考

发展中国家是第二次世界大战后出现的一个国家群体,在冷战时期被称为第三世界国家,开始的界定是帝国主义阵营为第一世界,社会主义阵营为第二世界。1974年2月,毛泽东对三个世界划分又提出,苏、美为第一世界,亚非拉广大发展中国家为第三世界,介于两者之间的为第二世界。无疑后一种划分强调了反两霸的思想,政治上的针对性更强。上个世纪的八、九十年代,人们习惯称这些国家为发展中国家,则是更多地强调了经济、社会和发展。发展中国家一直是国际政治中不容忽视的一支重要力量,在冷战结束以后,对发展中国家在国际关系格局中的地位与作用存在着不同的认识和观点。本文拟对当前发展中国家面临的问题、它们在国际关系格局中的地位及作用,以及中国同这些国家的关系进行一些探讨。     

中国对非洲直接投资的国别、路径及策略选择

中国对非洲直接投资起步于改革开放初期,在前20年间发展比较缓慢.进入21世纪以来,特别是形成中非合作论坛机制和确立中非新型战略伙伴关系后,中国与非洲国家从政府到民间都进一步增强了深化投资合作的意愿,加之非洲国家经济改革取得明显成效,政治稳定性也逐渐增强,尤其是在全球经济增速日趋放缓的今天,对非洲的投资前景引起中国乃至世界的关注.尽管如此,对非洲的投资仍将长期面临政治、经济、安全等诸多方面的风险和挑战,中国对非洲投资要更加谨慎地选择投资国别、进入模式、企业应对投资风险与国际竞争的策略,中国政府应加强鼓励企业投资非洲的政策和措施,以保障中非投资合作健康和持久的发展.     

对越南国际直接投资法律政策问题研究

2014年以来,越南对以《投资法》为代表的投资法律制度进行了大幅度的修订。这些体现了越南政府改善本国商业环境的决心,同时也增强了外国投资者的投资信心。但是这些新的政策法规在执行过程中也存在困难和障碍。中国投资者到越南从事直接投资活动应注重对当地现行法规政策的了解、加强对项目的风险评估,从而降低投资风险。     

俄罗斯与立陶宛等国政党法比较

本文对苏联解体以后俄罗斯和立陶宛、爱沙尼亚、哈萨克斯坦等国的政党法进行了比较.这些国家政党法的制定,一方面反映了利用各种法律形式规制政党活动使之纳入法制化的轨道是当今世界的大势所趋,另一方面也和这些国家面临的政治形势和社会需要密切相关.各国的政党法既有很多相似之处,又根据自己国家的国情以及执掌政权的政党和社会力量的自身利益需要有所不同.