Otherness in the Pratyabhijñā philosophy

Idealism is the core of the Pratyabhijñã philosophy: the main goal of Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–950 AD) and of his commentator Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025 AD) is to establish that nothing exists outside of consciousness. In the course of their demonstration, these ?aiva philosophers endeavour to distinguish their idealism from that of a rival system, the Buddhist Vijñānavāda. This article aims at examining the concept of otherness (paratva) as it is presented in the Pratyabhijñā philosophy in contrast with that of the Vijñānavādins’. Although, according to the Pratyabhijñā, the other subjects are not ultimately real since all subjects are nothing but limited manifestations of a single absolute subject, the fact that we are aware of their existence in the practical world has to be accounted for. The Vijñānavādins explain it by arguing the we infer the others’ existence. The Pratyabhijñā philosophers, while refuting their opponents’ reasoning as it is expounded in Dharmakīrti’s Santānāntarasiddhi, develop a particulary original analysis of our awareness of the others, stating that this awareness is neither a perception (pratyak?a) nor an inference (anumāna), but rather a guess (ūha) in which we sense the others’ freedom (svātantrya).     

Shifting Concepts: The Realignment of Dharmakīrti on Concepts and the Error of Subject/Object Duality in Pratyabhijñā Śaiva Thought

Contemporary scholars have begun to document the extensive influence of the sixth to seventh century Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti on Pratyabhijñā ?aiva thought. Utpaladeva (925–975) and Abhinavagupta’s (975–1025) adaptation of Dharmakīrti’s apoha (exclusion) theory provides a striking instance of the creative ways in which these ?aivas use Dharmakīrti’s ideas to argue for positions that Dharmakīrti would emphatically reject. Both Dharmakīrti and these ?aivas emphasize that the formation of a concept involves both objective and subjective factors. Working within a certain perceptual environment, factors such as a subject’s desires, habits, and conditioning lead him or her to form a concept (vikalpa) based on excluding what is not relevant to the accomplishment of his or her goal. However, the two differ in their account of the relationship between concepts and subject/object duality itself. While Dharmakīrti claims that the division of a cognition into subject, object, and awareness is nonconceptual, the subtly shifted definition of a concept that these ?aivas employ allows them to claim that the error of subject/object duality is actually conceptual. This seemingly small difference in their respective evaluations of the nature of subject/object error has surprisingly large consequences. If, as these ?aivas claim, any awareness involving a duality is conceptual, then subject and object are concepts. Moreover, if the formation of a concept requires desire, then some kind of desire must be inherent to consciousness itself before the formation of a limited subject/object pair. In short, ultimate consciousness must be ?iva, who possesses the freedom to will any and all possible realities.     

A Śaiva Interpretation of the Satkāryavāda: The Sāṃkhya Notion of Abhivyakti and Its Transformation in the Pratyabhijñā Treatise

It is a well-known fact that the ?aiva nondualistic philosopher Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975) adopted the Sā?khya principle according to which the effect must exist in some way before the operation of its cause (satkāryavāda). Johannes Bronkhorst has highlighted the paradox inherent in this appropriation: Utpaladeva is a staunch supporter of the satkāryavāda, but whereas Sā?khya authors consider it as a means of proving the existence of an unconscious matter, the ?aiva exploits it so as to establish his monistic idealism, in perfect contradiction with the Sā?khya dualism of matter and consciousness. How does Utpaladeva achieve this complete reversal of meaning of the satkāryavāda? The present article argues that the elliptical verses of the ī?varapratyabhijñākārikā dealing with this issue have been partly misunderstood so far due to the loss of Utpaladeva’s own detailed commentary (Vivr?ti) on this passage: Abhinavagupta’s two commentaries, however terse in this respect, clearly show that a crucial part of Utpaladeva’s reasoning remains implicit in the verses. The article therefore attempts to reconstruct the gist of Utpaladeva’s strategy by having recourse to various other ?aiva sources, including Somānanda’s ?ivadr???i and Utpaladeva’s own commentary thereon. This examination shows that Utpaladeva’s appropriation of the satkāryavāda rests on a profound transformation of the Sā?khya notions of manifestation (abhivyakti) and potentiality (?akti), and that his criticism of the Sā?khya understanding of causality might target the ?aiva dualists as well as Sā?khya authors.     

Lak?a?ā as a Creative Function of Language

When somebody speaks metaphorically, the primary meanings of their words cannot get semantically connected. Still metaphorical uses succeed in conveying the message of the speaker, since lak?a?ā, a meaning-generating faculty of language, yields the suitable secondary meanings. Ga?ge?a claims that lak?a?ā is a faculty of words themselves. One may argue: “Words have no such faculty. In these cases, the hearer uses observation-based inference. They have observed that sometimes competent speakers use the word w in order to mean s, when p, the primary meaning of w does not make any semantic sense. In all such cases, s is actually related to p. After having observed this, when the hearer hears the utterance of w, and realizes that w’s primary meaning p is semantically unfit for the sentence-meaning, they infer on the basis of their prior observation that ‘the competent speaker must mean s by uttering w’. Thus lak?a?ā becomes a success.” This apparently well-argued reduction does not stand the critical examination; neither in Ga?ge?a’s framework, nor even in the general theory of language. For one can compose and interpret potentially infinite novel sentences based on lak?a?ā while the observational inferences one can make are finite. Ga?ge?a says very clearly that as far as the secondary meaning is concerned, no prior observation is required. This paper will argue that not only does language yield secondary meanings through lak?a?ā, but it also restricts the use of secondary meanings; for one cannot mean just anything by saying something. Lak?a?ā is a creative function with infinite potential within the limits set up by the language faculty.     

Digitised Justice: The New Two Tiers?

Criminal Law Forum - Prevailing conditions of access to justice and due process in the Singapore courts are criticised through McBarnet’s two-tier lens and Carlen’s dramaturgical...     

The Elective and Automatic Theories of Termination in the Common Law of the Contract of Employment: Conundrum Resolved?

If a party to an employment contract commits a repudiatory dismissal or resignation, it has long been unclear whether the other party has the option either to terminate or affirm the contract (the elective theory) or whether the former's breach operates to bring the contract of employment to an end (the automatic theory). The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Société Générale (London Branch) v Geys has finally resolved this question. By a majority, the Supreme Court held that the elective theory also applies in the context of a wrongful repudiation of the employment contract by express dismissal or resignation. This note examines the significance of Geys in the context of the common law of the contract of employment and evaluates whether a number of related issues surrounding the breach and termination of the employment contract have been resolved.     

Theories of Rights: Is There a Third Way?

Some important recent articles, including one in this journal,have sought to devise theories of rights that can transcendthe longstanding debate between the Interest Theory and theWill Theory. The present essay argues that those efforts failand that the Interest Theory and the Will Theory withstand thecriticisms that have been levelled against them. To be sure,the criticisms have been valuable in that they have promptedthe amplification and clarification of the two dominant theoriesof rights; but their upshot has been to reveal the need forthe improvement, rather than the abandonment, of those theories.     

Due North? Do American Theories of Legislative Committees Apply to Canada?

Several theories of legislative organisation have been proposed to explain committee selection in American legislatures, but do these theories travel outside the United States? This paper tests whether these theories apply to data from the Canadian House of Commons. It was found that the distributive and partisan models of legislative organisation explain committee composition in Canada. In many cases, committees in the House of Commons are made up of preference outliers. As predicted by partisan models, it was also found that the governing party stacks committees with its members, but this is conditional upon the strength of the governing party.     

The Error in “Error Rate”: Why Error Rates Are So Needed,Yet So Elusive

Establishing error rates is crucial for knowing how well one is performing, determining whether improvement is needed, measuring whether interventions are effective, as well as for providing transparency. However, the flurry of activities in establishing error rates for the forensic sciences has largely overlooked some fundamental issues that make error rates a problematic construct and limit the ability to obtain a meaningful error rate. These include knowing the ground truth, establishing appropriate databases, determining what counts as an error, characterizing what is an acceptable error rate, ecological validity, and transparency within the adversarial legal system. Without addressing these practical and theoretical challenges, the very notion of a meaningful error rate is limited.     

Trial and Error at the End of Life--No Harm Done?

English law gives the competent patient the right to refuselife-saving medical treatment, either contemporaneously or inan advance directive, and a physician commits a battery whentreating a patient who validly refused treatment. However, withregard to the details of a physician's liability, many questionsremain unanswered, and it is not at all clear under what circumstancesa patient's tort action for unwanted life-saving treatment willsucceed, and what remedies would be available to the patient.The article suggests that a physician should be liable in batteryfor administering life-saving treatment, even if he/she haddoubts about the validity of the patient's treatment refusal,unless a defence of reasonable mistake can be established. Furthermore,in case of a battery which resulted in keeping the patient alive,the patient should not only be able to claim nominal damages,but general and special damages, including mental and physicalpain and suffering caused by the prolongation of the patient'slife, should equally be available.     

Police Officers’ Theories of Crime

What factors do police officers point to in explaining offending and victimization? A limited amount of prior research has addressed this question, despite the possibility that such theories impact police practice. Moreover, the findings that do exist are based solely on municipal police; yet a different socio-environmental context could lead officers to adopt different explanations. In the present paper, we draw on qualitative data obtained in interviews with campus police officers to explore how they explain common crimes on campus. They theorized petty larceny, underage drinking, and drug possession to result from a variety of factors, including opportunity, social learning, supervision, culture, peer pressure, the psychopharmacological effect of alcohol on crime, and deterrence; as a collective, these ideas form officers’ rational choice theories. After presenting our findings, we suggest how officers’ explanations of crime may be shaped by working in particular contexts and also affect how they police; implications for future research and police practice are discussed.     

Do Theories of Punishment Necessarily Deliver a Binary System of Verdicts? An Exploratory Essay

Scholars writing on theories of punishment generally try to answer two main questions: what human behaviour should be punished and why? Only cursorily do they concern themselves with the question as to how confident in the occurrence of criminal behaviour we must be prior to punishing—i.e., the question of the criminal standard of proof. Theories of punishment are ultimately theories about choices of action—in particular, about how to treat individuals. If this is correct, it seems that they should not overlook one of the fundamental variables governing human decision-making: the uncertainty about the facts relevant to our acting. Now, the question as to whether existing theories of punishment require a standard of proof as high as ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ is gaining increasing attention in the scholarship. However, scholars working on theories of punishment give little attention to a particular way in which human decision-making handles the problem of uncertainty. In our everyday lives, we often decide in a many-valued, rather than a binary, fashion. Instead of having a single evidential threshold, the satisfaction of which determines whether we act or stay put, we tend to adjust our actions to our degree of confidence in certain states of affairs. In other words, we decide based on a ladder of evidential thresholds: the features of our actions vary according to the evidential threshold that we have satisfied. Notably, criminal trials do not follow this structure and theorists generally take this departure for granted. Why shouldn’t trials work as ‘ex post facto bets,’ whereby the response that the state is willing to ‘wager’ correlates with the fact finder’s confidence in the defendant’s guilt? The paper explores this question; in particular, it assesses whether the main theories of punishment (consequentialist, retributive, and communicative) necessarily deliver a binary system of verdicts. The work is part of a long-term research project on the comparison between the binary and the many-valued models of the system of criminal verdicts.     

The End of the Beginning? The Freedom of Information Bill 1999

With the publication of its plans for a Bill on Freedom of Information, the new Labour government has been accused of abandoning its promise of greater openness in the way government is conducted in this country and its proposals are seen as a departure from the highly applauded contents of the White Paper published in December 1997. The draft Bill has been pilloried by friend and foe alike. It is seen as a litmus test of Blair's government and where it really stands on the citizen/state relationship and how the future balance will lie between the executive and Parliament. The authors examine the events surrounding the publication of the Bill and its scrutiny by the pre-legislative select committees in the Commons and Lords. The Home Secretary has hinted at possible concessions in the light of fierce criticism. Is this a Bill worth saving and how can it be improved to capture a more appropriate balance between confidentiality, secrecy, and openness in the conduct of modern governance?     

On the function of saṁhitā in the Saṁhitā Upaniṣad

Journal of Indian Philosophy - The Sa?hitā Upani?ad [SU] is a little-known Vedic text that presents ‘typical’ Upani?adic teachings on the truth of identity...     

Philemon and Baucis Death? Two cases of double deaths of married couples

When two human corpses are found in temporal and locational context the assumption of a non-natural cause of death is close at hand. Suicide, extended suicide, homicide or accident (particularly with carbon monoxide) come to mind. When, however, a natural cause of death emerges for both after autopsy and further examinations, this provokes the question whether this incidence is coincidental. In our two presented cases, a married couple each was found dead together. In both cases, the wife needed nursing and was being cared for by a husband who died of cardiac disease shortly before the wife died. In one case, the wife died of acute uncompensated chronic congestive heart failure. In the other case, the cause of death of the wife was hypovolemic shock due to acute gastrointestinal bleeding from recurrent gastric mucosal erosion. It is to be discussed for both cases whether, given the pre-existing illness, the acute stress of the situation in view to the husbands' death may at least have favored the occurrence of death and may, thus, have led to the criminologically conspicuous situation of finding.