Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal Justification

In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study of law's normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader viewpoint of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory. I begin by introducing the subject of jurisprudence (section 1). I then introduce the natural law/legal positivism debate, suggesting that we ought to understand it as a debate about the proper way to explicate the concept of law (section 2). I proceed to argue that legal decision-making is a matter of applying legal norms to facts, and that syllogistic reasoning plays a prominent role in legal decision-making thus conceived (section 3). Having done that, I discuss law's normativity (section 4), the normative force of legal justification (section 5), and the relation between the former and the latter (section 6). I conclude with a critical comment on Joseph Raz' understanding of the question of law's normativity (appendix).     

Legal Validity as Doxastic Obligation: From Definition to Normativity

The paper argues for viewing legal validityas a doxastic obligation, i.e. as the obligation toaccept a rule in legal reasoning. This notion of legalvalidity is shown to be both sufficient for thelaywers' needs and neutral in regard to varioustheories of the grounds of validity, i.e. theoriesintended to identify what rules are legally valid, byproposing different grounds for attributing validity.All of these theories, rather then being alternativedefinitions of validity, presuppose the notion hereprovided.This notion is purely normative, but it allows for theconstruction of theories of the grounds of validitywhich give due importance to social expectations andinstitutions. As an example of how this may happen,one such theory is also provided. This theory, whichis presented through a detailed example of a judicialdebate, is based upon the recognition of the(instrumental) value of co-ordination, as thenecessary way to achieve the most valuable purposes ofthe law.     

The Problem of Law's Authority: John Finnis and Joseph Raz on Legal Obligation

Law and Philosophy -     

Associative Obligation and Law's Authority

Abstract.  Most attempts to explicate the authority of law dismiss the possible analogy of such authority with the less pretentious authority of parents, professional bodies, academic faculties, and other similar groups. This article explores that analogy, drawing on discussions of related themes by Ronald Dworkin and others. If agents are sometimes bound without their consent by such limited authority, the authority of law, though broader, may have similar features. Law's claim to peremptory obedience would fail, but the more modest account could still satisfy some long recognized desiderata.     

Two Schools of Legal Idealism: A Positivist Introduction*

Abstract. The author focuses his attention on two schools of legal idealism: the so‐called Sheffield School and the “discourse ethics” school. In order to emphasize the valuable facets of each school, the author analyzes four different points: (1) the claim to correctness as a necessary feature of law, (2) the connection between correctness and validity, (3) the qualifying or classifying status of this connection, (4) and the desirability of adopting the “Radbruch’s Formula.” Finally, the author analyzes the weaknesses of each theory. **     

法律义务新论——兼评张恒山教授《义务先定论》中的义务观

本文在评析了一般意义上的义务概念和几种似是而非的法律义务观之后 ,提出 :法律义务是为保障权利和权力的有效运行或实现 ,而由法律设定或当事人约定并通过预设一定的法律责任来保障的、相关主体在一定条件下必须作或不能作的某种行为。它有四大表现形态 :即权利对权利的义务 ,权利对权力的义务 ,权力对权利的义务和权力对权力的义务 ;其中每一形态又包含若干亚类。人们之所以履行义务 ,有多种原因 ,但归根结底是为了自我权利的实现。     

法律原则的规范性研究

规范性主要是对合法权威与守法主体之间相互关系的一种认识。对理解规范性问题来说,规范性强度是一个重要的概念。法律原则的规范性追问这样两个问题：原则何以成为法律？为何具有指引、约束司法裁判的规范效力？法律原则的规范性包括形式渊源、价值理据、规范特征三个方面的意涵。对法律原则规范性的追问,考问着国家司法权威的公信力。法律原则构成了人之为人的主体性根基。晚近学界对分类式法概念的批判不能替代也不应阻断对法律原则的定性,即对法律原则规范性的追问。     

A Conventionalist Theory of Obligation

Law and Philosophy -     

A Quasi-Contract Theory of Political Obligation

Law and Philosophy - Whether there is a general moral obligation to obey the law, often referred to as ‘political obligation’, is an enduring question in contemporary legal and...     

Legal Positivism and the Nature of Legal Obligation

Law and Philosophy -     

行政法律责任的规范分析——兼论行政法学研究方法

本文从行政法律责任概念的语义分析入手,在法规范的语境中从逻辑形式、社会事实和价值评价机制三个方面阐释了行政法律责任概念完整的构造,进而展开对行政法研究方法的思考。文章认为,作为法律学分支的行政法学之研究方法,应当在综合考量法的各组成要素的前提下,以法规范为其核心研究对象,着重于法规范本身的逻辑及形式层面的阐释,同时又不排斥法律中的价值考量,在实证规范的约束下寻求价值的客观化,从而避免沦为极端的法律实证主义。另外,行政法学还应该是一门具有教义性质的学科,它要求研究者的认知过程必须受到预置规则的限制,而不能流于形而上或本体论或社会学意义上的探究。文章指出,中国大陆行政法学上行政法律责任的误区在于:忽视了这一法律基本概念的教义性和规范性,从而将法律责任的研究导入非法律学的歧途。     

法律援助:政府责任与律师义务

在法律援助的实践中,政府和律师基于不同的根据承担法律援助的责任和义务。对律师提供法律援助义务的强制性规定有可能导致政府责任虚化或为政府转嫁其责任提供根据。倡导律师的职业伦理,建立人权律师制度,有助于强化律师法律援助的义务。     

诉讼证明原理新论

本文以刑事诉讼为中心,对诉讼证明原理进行了新的阐述,指出外在实在证据和共享知识模式是证明的两个基本要素,客观证明与情理推断是证明的两种主要模式,澄清了学界关于诉讼证明原理方面的一些似是而非的说法。     

重审与重判的法文化分析

西方的当事人主义诉讼模式审判重审 ,中国职权主义诉讼模式审判重判。立足于比较法律文化 ,认为重审与重判只是相比较而言的 ,究竟是重审还是重判是两种不同的文化传统、不同的价值取向所造成的 ,是有其深厚的法律文化基础的 ,是渊源流长的法律文化所塑造的。当代中国司法制度的建设和完善 ,审判制度的变革和发展应以与时代精神相一致的法治文明建设为基础 ,以人权保障、正当程序、司法公正为目的 ,形成制度化、理性化、规范化的审理与裁判并重的机制     

哈特/德沃金之争与法律实证主义的分裂——基于“分离命题”的考察

哈特与德沃金之争及其所开放出来的问题构成了当今英美法律哲学研究的理论坐标。哈特/德沃金之争的核心在于法律与道德有无必然的关联,哈特认为法律与道德不存在必然的关联;而德沃金认为,承认规则既无法识别原则也不是一个社会规则,法律与道德存在必然的关联。法实证主义在回应德沃金的批判时,在承认规则识别法律之判准的内容上发生了分歧,分裂为排他性与包容性的法实证主义。     

Remarks on a Legal Positivist Misuse of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy

Law and Philosophy -     

H. L. A. Hart on Legal Obligation*

Abstract. The author discusses Hart's concept of legal obligation, especially his contention that there is an obligation to obey the law which is peculiarly legal, i.e., non-moral. This view is held to be mistaken. What is denied is that legal rules, merely by their being issued, offer a justification for the use of coercion to ensure compliance with them. Although moral and other social (customary) rules are considered self-justifying, that is not the case of legal rules. Any analogy between these two types of rules in justifying their implementation by force is deemed wrong.**     

Law's Polyarchy: A Comment on Cohen and Sabel

This comment links Cohen/Sabels' idea of a 'directly-deliberative polyarchy' to the contemporary debate on the deficit in democratic legitimation of the European Union. Within this constitutional-legal debate the conventional options are either to defend a vision of the EU which separates global economic law from national sovereignty, and thus relies on the legitimising powers of free markets, or to regard the legitimation problem (at least under present conditions) as beyond solution: that is to say that any further progress towards an 'ever closer union' would inevitably increase the legitimation deficit, and to suggest that the capacity for political action of the nation state should be protected or restored. This comment seeks to show that the concept of a 'directly-deliberative polyarchy' offers an attractive alternative to these traditional positions because it breaks the stranglehold of the false dichotomy 'global market vs national democracy' and thus permits an extension of the idea of radical democracy to European Supranationalism.