The impact of changes in couples' earnings on married women's Social Security benefits

Women's labor force participation and earnings dramatically increased after World War II. Those changes have important implications for women's Social Security benefits. This article uses the Social Security Administration's Modeling Income in the Near Term (version 6) to examine Social Security benefits for current and future beneficiary wives. The projections show that fewer wives in more recent birth cohorts will be eligible for auxiliary benefits as spouses because their earnings are too high. If their husbands die, however, most wives will still be eligible for survivor benefits because, despite the increase in their earnings over time, they still typically have lower earnings than their husbands. Even so, the share of wives who would be ineligible for widow benefits is projected to double between cohorts.     

Older workers' progression from private disability benefits to Social Security disability benefits

People with medical conditions that limit their ability to work tend to receive short-term disability benefits initially and may then move to long-term and eventually to permanent disability benefits. The progression of older workers (those aged 55 to 64) along that continuum of benefits is documented here with data from a large disability insurance company. The data show that older workers who receive short-term medical disability benefits are three times as likely as younger workers to progress to receipt of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits, although a slight reversal of that trend occurs as workers pass age 62. Musculoskeletal conditions are the most frequent basis of short-term disability claims among older workers, with circulatory conditions running a close second. Furthermore, although all medical conditions are more likely to lead to SSDI benefits among older workers, circulatory conditions do so most frequently. This article discusses industry standards for the management of disability claims at each level of severity. It also addresses common and emerging disability management practices that may reduce the likelihood of impaired workers developing long-term or permanent financial dependence on disability benefits programs.     

Disabled workers and the indexing of Social Security benefits

We examine how benefit amounts and family income would change in response to changing the Social Security (Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, OASDI) benefit indexing scheme. We are interested in a class of reform options designed to gradually slow the growth of benefits across the board. These options include the "price indexing" and "longevity indexing" proposals that have been part of the recent Social Security reform debate in the United States as well as a range of proposals developed in Europe. In this article, we focus on the distributional effects on the disabled. This focus leads to two comparisons. First, we compare disabled-worker beneficiaries to another group that would be affected by the changes, retired-worker beneficiaries. Second, we examine relative changes for particularly vulnerable subgroups of disabled workers. In the empirical analysis, we use two illustrative examples of potential indexing changes: Shifting from wage indexing to price indexing of the initial level of OASDI benefits; and Adjusting the initial benefit level for changes in life expectancy at retirement, that is, longevity indexing. We employ a historical counterfactual simulation to evaluate outcomes that would have resulted from changing the indexing scheme at one particular point in time. The hypothetical implementation period begins with the historical start of the current regime of indexing in 1979 and ends with one of the reference periods of the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a 17-year period. However, we briefly assess the extent to which the results would be applicable to other time horizons. The analysis uses a cross-sectional sample of OASDI beneficiaries from the 1996 SIPP matched to Social Security administrative records. Further, we use total income from the SIPP (as adjusted to correspond to the calculated OASDI benefit amounts) to simulate eligibility for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and SSI benefit amounts. Our overall findings pertain to three outcomes: (1) effects on OASDI benefits viewed in isolation, (2) the offsetting role of SSI, and (3) the diluting effect of other sources of family income. We find that a broader perspective incorporating all three measures is necessary to obtain an appropriate picture of distributional outcomes. Even though the proposals were designed to have proportional effects, differences between groups--such as disabled and retired workers--can arise from differences in the timing of benefit claiming, mortality, and other factors. Specifically, our cross-sectional estimates suggest that the average change in OASDI benefit levels would be higher for disabled-worker beneficiaries than for retired-worker beneficiaries. These differences are attributable to the fact that a higher proportion of the stock of disabled beneficiaries have been on the Disability Insurance (DI) program rolls for a relatively short period of time and therefore have been affected by the shift in indexing scheme for a longer period of time. These results must be interpreted within the context of the methodology that was used. Further, other methodologies may lead to different results. For example, in previous studies that restricted the sample to a particular birth cohort, a higher proportion of disabled workers than retired workers were observed to have been on the DI program rolls for a relatively long period of time. Longer time on the beneficiary rolls corresponds to less exposure to the new indexing scheme and smaller estimated benefit changes. Thus, the same underlying factor-the timing of benefit claiming-influences both results. When the offsetting role of SSI benefits is also considered, we estimate smaller overall changes, especially for those at the bottom of the income distribution. When OASDI and SSI are considered together, differences in average benefit changes between disabled and retired workers are removed. This is due to a higher rate of SSI program participation among disabled workers than among retired workers. In addition, including SSI substantially reduces the proportion of disabled workers that have large simulated changes in benefit amounts. The estimated effects of changing the indexing scheme are further muted when total family income is considered. This occurs on a roughly equivalent scale for disabled and retired workers. As a result, changing the indexing scheme would produce little change in the status quo differences in poverty status between disabled and retired workers. Finally, we examine the most economically vulnerable subgroups of OASDI beneficiaries. Within the general group of beneficiaries, we find that the most vulnerable would be less affected than average, primarily as a result of the mitigating effect of SSI benefits. Further, within the population of disabled-worker beneficiaries, we examine economically vulnerable subgroups including those in the lowest primary insurance amount quartile, with less than a high school education, with an early onset of disability, or a primary mental impairment. These groups would also be less affected than average.     

Lifetime earnings patterns, the distribution of future Social Security benefits, and the impact of pension reform

In order to assess the effect of Social Security reform on current and future workers, it is essential to accurately characterize the initial situations of representative workers affected by reform. For the purpose of analyzing typical reforms, the most important characteristic of a worker is the level and pattern of his or her preretirement earnings. Under the current system, pensions are determined largely by the level of the workers' earnings averaged over their work life. However, several reform proposals would create individual retirement accounts for which the pension would depend on the investment accumulation within the account. Thus, the pension would also depend on the timing of the contributions into the account and hence on the exact shape of the worker's lifetime earnings profile. Most analysis of the distributional impact of reform has focused, however, on calculating benefit changes among a handful of hypothetical workers whose relative earnings are constant over their work life. The earnings levels are not necessarily chosen to represent the situations of workers who have typical or truly representative earnings patterns. Consequently, the results of such analysis can be misleading, especially if reform involves introducing a fundamentally new kind of pension formula. This article presents two broad approaches to creating representative earnings profiles for policy evaluation. First, we use standard econometric methods to predict future earnings for a representative sample of workers drawn from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Our statistical estimates are based on a simple representation of typical career earnings paths and a fixed-effect statistical specification. Because our estimation file contains information on each worker's annual earnings from 1951 through 1996 as reported in the Social Security Administration's earnings files, we have a record (though an incomplete one) of the actual earnings that will be used to determine future benefit payments. Our estimates of the earnings function permit us to make highly differentiated predictions of future earnings for each member of our sample. By combining the historical information on individual earnings with our prediction of future earnings up through the normal retirement age, our first approach produces tens of thousands of predicted career earnings paths that can be used in microsimulation policy analysis. Our second approach to creating lifetime earnings profiles is similar in some ways to the traditional method. For example, it is based on the creation of only a handful of "stylized" career earnings patterns. An important difference with the traditional method, however, is that we define the career earnings patterns so that they are truly representative of patterns observed in the workforce. We use simple mathematical formulas to characterize each stylized earnings pattern, and we then produce estimates of the average path of annual earnings for workers whose career earning path falls within each of the stylized patterns we have defined. Finally, we calculate the percentage of workers in successive birth-year cohorts who have earnings profiles that match each of the stylized earnings patterns. Although this method may seem simple, it allows the analyst to create stylized earnings patterns that are widely varied but still representative of earnings patterns observed among sizable groups of U.S. workers. The effects of policy reforms can then be calculated for workers with each of the stylized earnings patterns. Our analysis of U.S. lifetime earnings patterns and of the impact of selected policy reforms produces a number of findings about past trends in earnings, typical earnings patterns in the population, and the potential impact of reform. The analysis focuses on men and women born between 1931 and 1960. Along with earlier analysts, we find that men earn substantially higher lifetime wages than women and typically attain their peak career earnings at a somewhat earlier age. However, the difference in career earnings patterns between men and women has narrowed dramatically over time. Workers with greater educational attainment earn substantially higher wages than those with less education, and they attain their peak career earnings later in life. For example, among men with the least education, peak earnings are often attained around or even before age 40, whereas many men with substantial postsecondary schooling do not reach their peak career earnings until after 50. Our tabulations of the lifetime earnings profiles of the oldest cohorts (born around 1930) and projections of the earnings of the youngest profiles (born around 1960) imply that the inequality of lifetime earnings has increased noticeably over time. Women in the top one-fifth of female earners and men in the top one-fifth of male earners are predicted to receive a growing multiple of the economy-wide average wage during their career. Women born between 1931 and 1935 who were in the top fifth of female earners had lifetime average earnings that were approximately equal to the average economy-wide wage. In contrast, women born after 1951 who were in the top fifth of earners are predicted to earn almost 50 percent more, that is, roughly 150 percent of the economy-wide average wage. Women with a lower rank in the female earnings distribution will also see gains in their lifetime average earnings, but their gains are predicted to be proportionately much smaller than those of women with a high rank in the distribution. Men with high earnings are also predicted to enjoy substantial gains in their relative lifetime earnings, while men with a lower rank in the earnings distribution will probably see a significant erosion in their typical wages relative to the economy-wide average wage. That is mainly the result of a sharp decline in the relative earnings of low-wage men born after 1950. In creating stylized earnings profiles that are representative of those of significant minorities of U.S. workers, we emphasized three critical elements of the earnings path: the average level of earnings over a worker's career, the upward or downward trend in earnings from the worker's 30s through his or her early 60s, and the "sagging" or "hump-shaped" profile of earnings over the worker's career. That classification scheme yields 27 characteristic patterns of lifetime earnings. Surprisingly, the differnce between men and women within each of those categories is quite modest. The main difference between men and women is in the proportions of workers who fall in each category. Only 14 percent of men born between 1931 and 1940 fall in earnings categories with the lowest one-third of lifetime earnings, whereas 53 percent of women born in those years have low-average-earnings profiles. On the other hand, women born in those years are more likely to have a rising trend in lifetime earnings, while men are more likely to have a declining trend. We find that the distribution of lifetime earnings contains relatively more workers with below-average earnings and relatively fewer with very high earnings than assumed in the Social Security Administration's traditional policy analysis. For example, the "low earner" traditionally assumed by the Office of the Chief Actuary is assigned a level of average lifetime earnings that we find to be higher than the average earnings of persons in the bottom one-third of the lifetime earnings distribution. The stylized earnings profiles developed here can be used for policy evaluation, and the results can be compared with those from the more traditional analysis. That comparison produces several notable findings. Because earnings profiles that are actually representative of the population tend to have lower average earnings than assumed in the traditional analysis, workers typically accumulate somewhat less Social Security wealth than implied in the traditional analysis. On the other hand, because the basic benefit formula is tilted in favor of lower-income workers, the internal rate of return on Social Security contributions is somewhat higher than detected in the traditional analysis. Moreover, the primary insurance amount measured as a percentage of the worker's average indexed earnings tends to be higher than implied by the traditional analysis. Finally, the stylized earnings patterns can be used to compare benefit levels enjoyed by workers under the traditional Social Security formula and under an alternative plan based on individual investment accounts. That comparison shows, as expected, that the traditional formula favors low-wage workers and one-earner couples, while an investment account favors single, high-wage workers. Comparing two workers with the same lifetime average earnings, the traditional formula favors workers with rising earnings profiles (that is, with lifetime earnings heavily concentrated at the end of their career), while investment account pensions favor workers with declining earnings profiles (that is, with earnings concentrated early in their career).     

Lifetime distributional effects of Social Security retirement benefits

This article presents three measures of the distribution of actual and projected net benefits (benefits minus payroll taxes) from Social Security's Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) for people born between 1931 and 1960. The results are based on simulations with the Social Security Administration's Model of Income in the Near Term (MINT), which projects retirement income through 2020. The base sample for MINT is the U.S. Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation panels for 1990 to 1993, matched with Social Security administrative records. The study population is grouped into 5-year birth cohorts and then ranked by economic status in three ways. First, the population is divided into five groups on the basis of individual lifetime covered earnings, and their lifetime present values of OASI benefits received and payroll taxes paid are calculated. By this measure, OASI provides much higher benefits to the lowest quintile of earners than to other groups, but it becomes less redistributive toward lower earners in more recent birth cohorts. Second, people are ranked by shared lifetime covered earnings, and the values of shared benefits received and payroll taxes paid are computed. Individuals are assumed to split covered earnings, benefits, and payroll taxes with their spouses in the years they are married. By the shared covered earnings measure, OASI is still much more favorable to persons in the lower income quintiles, although to a lesser degree than when people are ranked by individual covered earnings. OASI becomes more progressive among recent cohorts, even as net lifetime benefits decline for the entire population. Finally, individuals are ranked on the basis of their shared permanent income from age 62, when they become eligible for early retirement benefits, until death. Their annual Social Security benefits are compared with the benefits they would have received if they had saved their payroll taxes in individual accounts and used the proceeds to buy either of two annuities that provide level payments from age 62 until death: a unisex annuity that is based on the average life expectancy of the birth cohort or an age-adjusted annuity that is based on the worker's own life expectancy. On the permanent income measure, OASI is generally more favorable to people in higher income quintiles. Moreover, it is particularly unfavorable to those in the lowest quintile. Because people in the lowest quintile have a shorter life expectancy, they receive OASI benefits for a shorter period. This group would receive greater benefits in retirement if they invested their payroll taxes in the age-adjusted annuity. OASI is more favorable to them than the unisex annuity, however, OASI is becoming more progressive in that the net benefits it provides drop more rapidly among higher income quintiles than lower ones. This article also examines how OASI affects individuals by educational attainment, race, and sex. On both the lifetime covered earnings and the permanent income measures, OASI is more favorable to workers with less education and more favorable to women. The results by race and ethnicity are mixed. When people are ranked by the present value of their shared lifetime covered earnings, OASI appears more favorable to non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics than to non-Hispanic whites. When people are ranked by shared permanent income in retirement, however, OASI produces negative returns for both non-Hispanic blacks and non-Hispanic whites in the most recent birth cohorts, with non-Hispanic blacks faring relatively worse. The changes across cohorts occur partly because of changes in tax rates and benefits, but more importantly because of changing demographics and earnings patterns of the workforce. Of particular importance is the increasing share of beneficiaries who receive worker benefits instead of auxiliary benefits as wives or widows. OASI benefits are based on the lifetime covered earnings of current or former married couples, as well as on earned retirement benefits of individuals. The reduced importance of auxiliary benefits (due to the higher lifetime covered earnings of women) and the increased proportion of divorced retirees make OASI more progressive--even as net benefits decline--for current and future cohorts than for cohorts who retired in the 1990s. Analysis of these findings suggests that simulations of policy changes in Social Security must take into account the decreasing importance of auxiliary benefits across birth cohorts and the complex changes in individuals' marital histories.     

The growth in Social Security benefits among the retirement-age population from increases in the cap on covered earnings

Analysts have proposed raising the maximum level of earnings subject to the Social Security payroll tax (the "tax max") to improve long-term Social Security Trust Fund solvency. This article investigates how raising the tax max leads to the "leakage" of portions of the additional revenue into higher benefit payments. Using Health and Retirement Study data matched to Social Security earnings records, we compare historical payroll tax payments and benefit amounts for Early Boomers (born 1948-1953) with tax and benefit simulations had they been subject to the tax max (adjusted for wage growth) faced by cohorts 12 and 24 years older. We find that 43.2 percent of the additional payroll tax revenue attributable to tax max increases affecting Early Boomers relative to taxes paid by the cohort 12 years older leaked into higher benefits. For Early Boomers relative to those 24 years older, we find 53.5 percent leakage.     

The impact of changing financial work incentives on the earnings of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) beneficiaries

SSDI beneficiaries lose their entire cash benefit if they perform work that is substantial gainful activity (SGA) after using Social Security work incentive programs. The complete loss of benefits might be a work disincentive for beneficiaries. We report results from a pilot project that replaces the complete loss of benefits with a gradual reduction in benefits of $1 for every $2 earned above an earnings disregard level. Beneficiaries who volunteered to participate in the project were randomly assigned to a group receiving the new program or to a control group. The policy led to a 25 percent increase in the percentage of beneficiaries with earnings above the annualized SGA amount, or $11,760 in 2009 dollars. It did not result in a reduction in benefit payments. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Expanding access to health care for Social Security Disability Insurance beneficiaries: early findings from the accelerated benefits demonstration

Most Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries must complete a 5-month waiting period before they become entitled to DI cash benefits and an additional 24-month waiting period before Medicare benefits begin. The Accelerated Benefits (AB) demonstration is a randomized experiment designed to test the effects of providing newly entitled DI beneficiaries who do not have health insurance with a generous health benefits package during the Medicare waiting period. This article presents early findings on the prevalence of health insurance coverage among newly entitled beneficiaries and the characteristics of those without health insurance. It also examines the effects of AB on health care utilization, the extent to which AB reduces unmet medical needs, and the costs of providing the AB health benefits package.     

Purchasing power of U.S. Social Security benefits abroad, 1970-82

This article examines whether the small number of Social Security beneficiaries living abroad enjoy a higher standard of living than they would with the same benefits if they lived in the United States. The article addresses this question using two methods. First, absolute comparisons of U.S. dollar purchasing power abroad are made using "purchasing power parities," a method recently developed to allow international comparisons of real standards of living. Second, the effects of changes in Social Security benefit levels, exchange rates, and rates of inflation on the relative value of benefits abroad are measured. Both methods show considerable instability in purchasing power of Social Security benefits in the 1970's. Although beneficiaries in 1970 generally could live better abroad than in the United States, this advantage eroded considerably during the 1970's, followed by some improvement in 1981-82.     

Benefit adequacy among elderly Social Security retired-worker beneficiaries and the SSI federal benefit rate

Both target effectiveness and administrative simplicity are desirable properties in the design of minimum benefit packages for public retirement programs. The federal benefit rate (FBR) of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program has been proposed by some analysts as a potentially attractive basis of establishing a new minimum benefit for Social Security on both of these grounds. This type of proposal is related to a broader array of minimum benefit proposals that would establish a Social Security benefit floor based on the poverty rate. In contrast to Social Security, the SSI program is means tested, including both an income and asset screen and also a categorical eligibility screen (the requirement to qualify as aged or disabled). The SSI FBR provides an inflation-adjusted, guaranteed income floor for aged and disabled people with low assets. The FBR has been perceived by proponents as a minimal measure of Social Security benefit adequacy because it represents a subpoverty income level for a family of one or two depending on marital status. For this same reason it has been seen as a target-effective tool of designing a minimum Social Security benefit. An FBR-based minimum benefit has also been viewed as administratively simple to implement; the benefit can be calculated from Social Security administrative records using a completely automated electronic process. Therefore-in contrast to the SSI program itself-an FBR-based minimum benefit would incur virtually no ongoing administrative costs, would not require a separate application for a means-tested program, and would avoid the perception of welfare stigma. While these ideas have been discussed in the literature and among policymakers in the United States over the years, and similar proposals have been considered or implemented in several foreign countries, there have been no previous analyses measuring the size of the potentially affected beneficiary population. Nor has there been any systematic assessment of the FBR as a measure of benefit adequacy or the tradeoffs between potential target effectiveness and administrative simplicity. Based on a series of simulations, we assess the FBR as a potential foundation for minimum Social Security benefits and we examine the tradeoffs between administrative simplicity and target effectiveness using microdata from the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Our empirical analysis is limited to Social Security retired-worker beneficiaries aged 65 or older. We start with the assessment of the FBR as a measure of benefit adequacy. We are particularly concerned about two types of error: (1) incorrectly identifying some Social Security beneficiaries as "economically vulnerable," and (2) incorrectly identifying others as "not economically vulnerable." Operationally we measure economic vulnerability by two alternative standards. One of our measures considers beneficiaries with family income below the official poverty threshold as vulnerable. Our second measure is more restrictive; it uses a family income threshold equal to 75 percent of the official poverty threshold. We find that a substantial minority of retired workers have Social Security benefits below the FBR. The results also show that the FBR-based measure of Social Security benefit adequacy is very imprecise in terms of identifying economically vulnerable people. We estimate that the vast majority of beneficiaries with Social Security benefits below the FBR are not economically vulnerable. Conversely, an FBR-level Social Security benefit threshold fails to identify some beneficiaries who are economically vulnerable. Thus an FBR-level minimum benefit would be poorly targeted in terms of both types of errors we are concerned about. An FBR-level minimum benefit would provide minimum Social Security benefits to many people who are clearly not poor. Conversely, an FBR-level minimum benefit would not provide any income relief to some who are poor. The administrative simplicity behind these screening errors also results in additional program cost that may be perceived as substantial. We estimate that an FBR-level minimum benefit would increase aggregate program cost for retired workers aged 65 or older by roughly 2 percent. There are two fundamental reasons for these findings. First, the concept of an FBR-level minimum benefit looks at the individual or married couple in artificial isolation; however, the family is the main consumption unit in our society. The income of an unmarried partner or family members other than a married spouse is ignored. Second, individuals and couples may also have income from sources other than Social Security or SSI, which is also ignored by a simple FBR-based minimum benefit concept. The substantial empirical magnitude of measurement error arising from these conceptual simplifications naturally leads to the assessment of the tradeoff between target effectiveness and administrative simplicity. To facilitate this analysis, we simulate the potential effect of alternative screening methods designed to increase target effectiveness; while reducing program cost, such alternatives also may increase administrative complexity. For example, considering the combined Social Security benefit of a married couple (rather than looking at the husband and wife in isolation) might substantially increase target effectiveness with a relatively small increase in administrative complexity. Adding a family income screen might increase administrative complexity to a greater degree, but also would increase target effectiveness dramatically. The results also suggest that at some point adding new screens-such as a comprehensive asset test-may drastically increase administrative complexity with diminishing returns in terms of increased target effectiveness and reduced program cost. Whether a broad-based minimum benefit concept that is not tied to previous work experience is perceived by policymakers as desirable or not may depend on several factors not addressed in this article. However, to the extent that this type of minimum benefit design is regarded as potentially desirable, the tradeoffs between administrative simplicity and target effectiveness need to be considered.     

Constitutional background to the Social Security Act of 1935

In June 1937, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported unfavorably on Roosevelt's Court-packing plan and the bill was effectively killed. In the same month, Justice Van Devanter retired and gave Roosevelt his first opportunity to make an appointment to the Supreme Court. Over the following 6 years, Roosevelt made seven more appointments to the Court, and in the years that followed the Court continued in the direction boldly advanced in the spring of 1937. A residual effect of the taxing-spending construction of the old-age insurance provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 has been the Court's continued adherence to the view that social security programs consist of separate taxing and spending provisions and are not, constitutionally speaking, social insurance programs. The issue has arisen in both a due process context and an equal protection context. But it is unlikely that the decisions reached in these contexts would have been different had the old-age insurance program been drafted as an earned-benefits program pursuant to the commerce power. Of course, the Court's decisions in the social security cases represented a significant constitutional development in establishing the breadth of Congress' powers to tax and spend for the general welfare. The decisions not only cleared the way for other general welfare programs, but more fundamentally provided the Federal Government with the substantive power and institutional flexibility to respond to the changing needs of the Nation.