Political Earthquake and Aftershocks: The DPP after the 2000 presidential election

The 2000 presidential election marked a major turning point in Taiwan's political development. For the first time since 1949 the government of Taiwan came under the control of a political party other than the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT). The seemingly peaceful transfer of power after the 18 March election leading up to the 20 May inauguration has been widely cited as evidence of Taiwan's democratic consolidation, even though the alternation of ruling power was undoubtedly a major political earthquake in Taiwan history. Since the major political earthquake took place in March 2000, numerous aftershocks have occurred. They include the opposition attempt to recall the newly elected president and vice president; the formation of a 'major opposition alliance'; a dramatic economic downturn; and the 2001 Legislative Yuan elections that resulted in another KMT defeat. Different political parties, especially the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), have been trying to learn how to cope with the new political situation.     

Participation and Competition: innovations in cadre election and selection in China's townships

Since the late 1990s, a large number of electoral reforms have occurred in China's towns and townships across the country. While scattered cases of direct election of township heads happened in the early years, recent cases have acquired very diverse and complicated institutional arrangements. Three ideal types of innovation have emerged that range from competitive selection to direct election. The actual changes to electing or selecting a township leader can be best measured in (1) the degree to which public participation is expanded; and (2) the degree of competition introduced between candidates. In the late 1990s, during the first wave of these innovations, the enterprising cadres in the regime's middle elite, mostly county and city officials, often played a critical ‘crafting’ role, as they responded to local crises in governance or competed for faster promotion. In recent years, amelioration in local governance means crises have become less pressing, while the widespread implementation of reforms means that contained forms of participation and competition are likely to become the new status quo of township institutions.     

论市级以上人大代表补选中的选举机构

关于人大代表的补选活动,我国《选举法》第54条只规定了选举主体而未阐明选举机构,若有数量较大的人大代表资格丧失引发补选活动时,专门的选举机构就必不可少。此时可以参照《选举法》第8条,县级以下的人大代表补选活动由独立的选举委员会主持,市级以上的人大代表补选活动的选举机构为同级人大常委会。但当数量较多的市级以上的人大代表代表资格终止时其同级的人大常委会因成员不足而陷入瘫痪,无法履行其作为选举机构的职责,《选举法》对于这种情形的选举机构的规定尚存缺陷,因而需要结合实践中关于类似问题的应对措施从立法论角度对该法律漏洞进行弥补。     

Patron–Client Politics in Hong Kong: a case study of the 2002 and 2005 Chief Executive elections

The Chief Executive's (CE's) relationship with Beijing is bound to entail a patron-client network, for Beijing has to confirm, endorse and announce the CE's official appointment after a local electoral process where the CE is elected by the 800-man Election Committee, a ‘small circle’ electoral method that is favourable to maintain patron-client relations. In other words, a skilful manipulation of patron-client relations can help to secure electoral success. Still, the candidate has to build up a stable reciprocal relationship with the voters to consolidate their sense of client list recognition to maintain loyalties by means of offering material or non-material benefits the clients need, or even seeking assistance from the patron Beijing. Nevertheless, such exchange of benefits sometimes may not be so successful as to earn the loyalties of all, especially the pro-democracy and voters with different political ideology. Further, the dyadic relations and loyalties of a patron's clients can shift between patrons so that one's patron can also become another's client, like the incumbent CE Donald Tsang who is the client of Beijing but also the patron of all his political appointees, and the former CE Tung Chee-hwa, who was the client of Beijing especially the former President Jiang Zemin, but Tung himself was the patron of many Hong Kong elites coopted to the various institutions and positions. Finally, Beijing's obsession with maintaining effective of indirect control over the HKSAR polity by ordaining the actual choice of a CE and hence the resulting non-contested CE elections of 2002 and 2005 in which open nominations of CE candidates were conducted but the secret balloting for the qualified candidates was not held at all. In short, while voters may become the clients of Beijing, candidates may also seek to become the client list supporter of the central government. Patron-client relation is arguably the hallmark of the insider politics in CE elections.     

Direct Township Elections in China: latest developments and prospects

The first direct election of township government leader was held in Sichuan Province in 1998, following a decade of direct elections at the village level. There have since been experiments with four categories of elections at the township level: direct elections of government leader, deputies to the People's Congress, Party Secretary, and deputies to the Party Congress. Various indirect methods under different terms have also been introduced, which invariably increase the more active participation of ordinary voters. The assessments of these elections vary from total negation, serious doubts to enthusiastic praise. Suggestions for improvement focus on lowering the qualifications of candidates and allowing campaigning by candidates themselves. Following the latest amendment to the Constitution that extends the term of office of the township government from three years to five, four options for further reform are available. Except for one option, direct elections are proposed or at least possible.     

Municipal People's Congress Elections in the PRC: a process of co-option

Congress elections are an important part of political–legal studies in China. The literature has covered the direct election process, voters' attitudes and behaviors, and Party–congress–government relations in Chinese elections. Based on on-site observations, interviews and first-hand documents, this article explores the process of indirect elections at the municipal level. This article examines the interaction among institutions taking part in the municipal congress elections. It also addresses how the social structure changes affect congress elections and deputy compositions. It reveals that an implicit function of the congress election is to co-opt new social groups and interests into the establishment. Such co-option is an adaptive strategy of the Party state in the reform era.     

Women's Political Participation in China: in whose interests elections?

This article takes up the issue of women's political participation in village committees in China. Of interest is the decline in and continuing low level of women's political participation in village governance structures in the reform period, and particularly following the widespread introduction of competitive village elections since 1988. The dominant explanation given for women's numerical under-representation in village committees, and in politics more generally, focuses on women's lack of self-confidence, which inhibits them from standing as candidates, and on the enduring drag of ‘feudal’ attitudes, which construct women as inferior to men, and therefore not capable of leadership. These two factors combined have in turn a material effect, as son-preference advantages boys in access to basic schooling, who thus, particularly in poorer rural areas, end up with higher levels of education, and greater opportunities in waged employment. The common solution adopted by the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF), China's largest women's organisation, lies in a two-pronged attack: first in the ideological realm, targeting men and women's sexist attitudes and concomitantly promoting a discourse of equality, and second, in the material realm by raising women's skills. It is argued here that this dominant text on women's under-representation in village committees masks a more complex conjuncture of variables that shape women's position in local politics. Social practices, economic structures, institutional norms and procedures, and political culture all prey on, revitalise and reproduce gendered notions of the appropriate place of women and men in political life.     

Formal and Informal Politics in Macao Special Administrative Region Elections 2004–2005

Formal politics is defined as political participation under ‘rules and institutions’ while informal politics is a kind of ‘conventions and codes behavior’ in the political sphere, such as cronyism and guanxi networks. Both kinds of politics are interacting and functionally inseparable in a political system. This article explores the interactive dynamics between formal and informal politics in the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR), with the August 2004 Chief Executive election and the September 2005 Legislative elections as illuminating case studies. It highlights the ways and means with which the Beijing and the MSAR authorities shaped the electoral institutions to undermine political opposition. It argues that formal politics possesses more than window-dressing functions to reveal the ‘normal and orthodox form of politics’ while the informal type is the real process for decision making. Formal and informal politics undermined the political input of the mass in Macao and triggered political irregularities involving money politics. It concludes that the dynamics of formal and informal politics did not possess enhancement but corruption in forging a genuinely democratic MSAR polity.     

1996年以来台湾地区领导人选举中的经济投票行为研究

经济投票理论认为,执政者的经济表现决定选民投票行为,当选民认为执政者应为经济表现不佳负责,或选民对未来经济评估悲观时,会投票支持反对党,以惩罚执政党;反之则继续支持执政党.台湾地区虽采行西方选举制度,但选民在自1996年以来的台湾地区领导人选举中的经济投票行为(包括回顾性经济投票和展望性经济投票)都表现出强烈的异质性.这与台湾特殊政治生态和独特的选民结构密切关联.未来,选民的经济投票行为能否回归常态,取决于台湾社会的主要分歧线是两岸关系议题还是经济民生议题.     

Village Election and Governance: do villagers care?

Village elections at the grassroots level have been regularly conducted for more than a decade in the context of the Chinese political system. Both negative and positive views have been expressed and written on village elections. How does one evaluate Chinese village elections? Free and fair elections require conformity to international election principles, rules, and procedures. This study develops a minimum procedural criterion to assess if village elections have followed internationally-accepted rules and procedures of free and fair elections. We also measure the meaningfulness of village elections by examining the effects of elections on village governance and villagers' life. We find that elections have been conducted in a manner consistent with proscribed rules and procedures and are generally free and fair, and there is a considerable convergence of views of villagers and cadres who see that elections are meaningful in producing positive changes in village governance and life. The data also confirm that elected villagers' committees are still in the long shadow of township governments and village Party branches.     

The People's Will

The 2021 Election Committee's sub-sector ordinary elections in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) took place on September 19. These were the first elections held follow-ing the improvements to HKSAR's electoral system on March 11, when a decision to enhance this specific HKSAR system was adopted by an overwhelming majority vote at the Fourth Session of the 13th National People's Congress in Beijing. Since Hong Kong's return to the moth-erland in 1997, the collusion between anti-China forces from Western countries and "Hong Kong independence" advocates has led to repeated outbursts of violence, se-verely undermining local social stability. Moreover, several "independence" advocates entered the local authorities by exploiting loopholes in the region's electoral system. Taking advantage of their positions, they not only supported unrest in Hong Kong but also actively engaged in the planning of "Hong Kong independence," jeopardizing China's territorial sovereignty and security. In this context, the Central Government had to take swift action to improve the HKSAR electoral system and, in doing so, plug the holes.     

Re-interpreting China's Non-intervention Policy towards Myanmar: leverage,interest and intervention

China's non-intervention policy has long been criticized for prolonging the rule of many authoritarian regimes. Myanmar has become one of the classic examples. As China is expected to become a responsible great power, her behavioral patterns have aroused many concerns. This paper aims to re-interpret China's non-intervention policy. While explaining various constraints on China's capability to intervene in the Myanmar government, it shows how China is making efforts to seek a new intervention policy in dealing with countries like Myanmar. It argues that China's insistence on a non-intervention policy does not mean that China does not want to influence other countries such as Myanmar. To assess Chinese leverage and its non-intervention policy toward Myanmar as well as to supplement the current limited academic discussion on Sino–Myanmar relations, in this paper we first examine Chinese leverage in Myanmar through Burmese local politics, such as the power struggle between the central government and local rebel governments. Second, we disaggregate the Chinese interests in Myanmar into different levels (regional, geo-strategic and international) and discuss how these interests affect China's non-intervention policy. Third, we argue that China has indeed tried to intervene in Myanmar politics, but in a softer manner that contrasts with the traditional Western hard interventions, such as economic sanctions and military interference.     

The Rule of Law as Transition to Democracy in China

This paper assesses Pan Wei's proposal for a 'consultative rule of law system' for China, finding it a potentially important step along the path of political reform. China urgently needs political reform to deal with the rapidly mounting problems of corruption, abuse of power, financial scandals, rising crime and inequality, and declining legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. A rule of law, with an independent judiciary and other autonomous institutions of horizontal accountability, is vital if China is to rein in these problems and deliver better, fairer, more transparent and effective governance. However, Pan Wei's proposed system goes only part of the way toward addressing the deficiencies of governance in China, and is therefore best viewed as a transitional framework. To work, horizontal accountability must be supplemented with and reinforced by vertical account ability, through competitive elections, which give local officials an incentive to serve the public good and enable bad officials to be removed by the people. Ultimately, I argue, China can only achieve adequate and enduring political accountability by moving toward democracy. Among the other issues addressed in the paper are the architecture and appointment of a system of horizontal accountability for China; the role of the Communist Party (or its successor hegemon) in a 'rule of law' system; and the timing and phasing of the transition to a rule of law.     

China's Socialization in the International Human Rights Regime: why did China reject the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court?

This article uses a hard law—the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court—to examine the depth of China's socialization in the international human rights regime and the relative weights of sovereignty and human rights norms in determining China's policy choices. It shows that the reasons for China's rejection of the Rome Statute are twofold. On the one hand, Chinese leaders have not fully internalized human rights norms, and they prioritize state sovereignty over human rights when making decisions. On the other hand, the legalized Rome Statute sets up an independent court with mandatory jurisdiction and grants the Prosecutor the ex officio right to investigate a crime. Such treaty provisions may have negative impacts on China's core sovereignty of territorial integration and regime security, thus imposing high sovereignty costs on China. Therefore, China resolutely voted against the Rome Statute, even if such an action made it a small minority outside the international mainstream. These findings indicate that China is still in a weak socialization stage and is not able to take on binding human rights and humanitarian obligations with high sovereignty costs.     

Elections,Democratic Values,and Economic Development in Rural China

This paper assesses several assumptions underlying the promotion of democracy and good governance in rural China. We draw on a 1999 survey of 120 villages in four counties, two in Anhui and two in Heilongjiang provinces (sample of 2,997 households, including villagers, cadres and entrepreneurs). First, we look at how institutionalized ‘democratic procedures’, such as secret ballots, multi-candidate elections, public nominations, and village contracts, are in these villages. Then we analyze villager views on economic development and democracy, finding that villagers want more democracy, even if the economy is doing well. Third, we assess their views on the election process; do they see elections as efficacious, fair, and competitive, or do they feel that the local power elite manipulate outcomes? Fourth, we found that the richest people are less supportive of democracy, with the most democratic being middle-income households. Finally, elections have increased local elite turnover, cadres understand this, and therefore, democracy does lead to good governance.     

Democrats within the Chinese Communist Party since 1989

The focus of this article is the discourse of democracy among a group of senior retired officials and academics within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since 1989. The post-totalitarian regime prevents them from forming a formal faction, but does not stop them from establishing a visible network and effectively arguing for the case of democratization. They want nothing less than Western style democracy as a system involving effective competition between political parties for positions of power through regular and fair elections, in which all members of the population enjoy the freedom of expression and the freedom to form and join political groups or associations. They publish chiefly on the Internet, but also through printing media home and abroad, including some high profile journals under their control or influence in China. By taking advantage of their profound thinking, rich experience and particularly their seniority within the communist hierarchy, democrats within the CCP are making increasing impacts on democratization in China, effectively keeping the debate on China's democratic future alive in the state media and among the CCP leadership. The response of the top CCP leadership to the proposals by their democrat colleagues is not entirely negative, especially on reaching a consensus of accepting democracy and human rights as universal values. The process of the conversion of Chinese communists to liberals is well under way, and sufficient intellectual resources have been accumulated for a democratic transition or a historical breakthrough of democratization in China.     

Environmental management by law in China: The Guangzhou experience∗

Taking enviornmental management in Guangzhou as an example, this article explores the theory and practice of Communist China's idea of “environmental management by law.” Based on the Guangzhou experience, it argues that environmental management by law in China is mainly an administrative system of environmental management which takes law strictly as a tool for efficient and effective environmental protection. This system is operated on the principle of ‘rule by law’, and is the antithesis of the Maoist practice of “rule by person.” Contrary to its Western counterpart, China's environmental management system is built on a state‐centered conception of administrative law instead of a ‘right‐centered’ one which is the core of the ‘rule of law’ tradition.     

China's land disposition system

This paper studies the present land disposition (requisition and acquisition) and land use rights transfer system in China with emphasis on its marketization and its institutional arrangement concerning the central state and the local government. China's current land property right system is first described. It finds that although the communist government gained full control over the Chinese Mainland in 1949, it had never constitutionalized the state ownership of land until December 1982. Since then, the State owns all urban (nonagricultural) land and the rural collectives jointly own agricultural land. Only the user rights of urban land are allowed to be transferred. China's land administration system, its historical evolution, and its institutional configuration are then studied. Institutional difficulties associated with this system are also discussed. This paper proceeds further to study China's land requisition approval system. The role of the local government in land transactions is also discussed. The rest of this paper inquires into the marketization of land transactions in China. Discussion on the trend of China's land market development, suggestions for its improvement and remarks for future studies conclude this paper.     

农村民主选举制度的正负效能分析

民主选举是村民自治的开始,在实践中,不少人认为村民自治就只是搞民主选举,从而过分夸大村委会选举的民主成就,因此,有必要对农村自治中的民主选举制度进行理性评价。事实上,农村民主选举对村民、候选人、村庄以及国家治理既能产生正效能,也会产生负效能。客观认识其在村民自治中的地位和作用,对于推动农村基层民主的真正实现具有重要意义。