Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 and the Primacy of Contract

The Court of Appeal's decision in Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards & Anor is both of interest and significance. By embracing the idea of the parties’ ability to ‘contract out’ of their statutory right to petition the court for relief under section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 (the so‐called ‘unfair prejudice’ remedy), their Lordships have not only contrived to stunt the future development of unfair prejudice as a minority shareholder remedy but, and more importantly for the purposes of this case note, their decision has reasserted and extended the contractual analogy in modern UK company law.     

Prisons,Proportionality and Recent Penal History

A leading aim of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 was to install the principle of proportionality as the primary rationale for sentencing and to bring about a reduction in the use of imprisonment.  In the decade that followed the prison population in England and Wales rose steeply.  This article examines the reasons for the rising use of prison, in order to assess whether proportionality (or ‘just deserts’) was tried and failed.  It argues that in practice the proportionality principle was overwhelmed by other influences, and that deterrence and incapacitation were the main drivers of the increasing use of imprisonment.  The article goes on to argue that proportionality theories have within them the resources to produce penal moderation, notably the ‘drowning out’ argument, the human rights argument, and decrementalism.  The article concludes by rejecting the claim that proportionality theories are likely in practice to result in escalating punishment.     

The Legislative Origins of the MPs' Expenses Scandal

The MPs' expenses scandal of 2009 was one of the most controversial Parliamentary events of modern times. It had a profound impact on public perceptions of MPs and led to the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009. Little academic consideration has, however, been given to the legislative origins of the scandal and the role of ministers and MPs in the creation of the system for MPs' expenses under the Finance Act 1984. Using official documents obtained by Freedom of Information requests, we construct a comprehensive historical analysis of how – without one word of debate in Parliament and only minimal media coverage – ministers and MPs created a special statutory scheme for their own benefit, which they had effective control of and which exempted their expenses claims from the rules applying to other UK taxpayers and the jurisdiction of the Inland Revenue.     

Gender ‘Hostility’, Rape,and the Hate Crime Paradigm

This article examines whether crimes motivated by, or which demonstrate, gender ‘hostility’ should be included within the current framework of hate crime legislation in England and Wales. The article uses the example of rape to explore the parallels (both conceptual and evidential) between gender‐motivated violence and other ‘archetypal’ forms of hate crime. It is asserted that where there is clear evidence of gender hostility during the commission of an offence, a defendant should be pursued in law additionally as a hate crime offender. In particular it is argued that by focusing on the hate‐motivation of many sexual violence offenders, the criminal justice system can begin to move away from its current focus on the ‘sexual’ motivations of offenders and begin to more effectively challenge the gendered prejudices that are frequently causal to such crimes.     

Strict Liability for Police Nonfeasance? The Kinghan Report on the Riot (Damages) Act 1886

The Riot (Damages) Act 1886 imposes a no‐fault obligation on police forces to compensate owners of property damaged in rioting. Following the riots across England in 2011 an independent Home Office review, the Kinghan Report, concluded that the fundamental principle of the Act should be retained, while the machinery should be modernised. The Report conceives of the Act as a useful, if highly unusual, compensation scheme that may ease socio‐economic problems in riot‐prone areas. This article questions that position. Strict liability offers potential advantages in contentious claims against public authorities, providing an incentive for the police to perform their duty to keep the peace while averting the questioning of police decision‐making that claims in negligence would inevitably require. The best alternative to negligence liability might not be ‘no liability’ (the general position now at common law), or liability based on ‘serious fault’ (as the Law Commission proposed in 2008), but liability without fault.     

Marriage at the intersection between tradition and globalization: Turkish marriage migration between Emirdag and Belgium from 1989 to present

In this paper, we will investigate the popularity of marriage migration between Turkish communities in Western Europe and emigration regions in Turkey. Our focus here is specifically on the Belgian case, namely the ‘Emirdag connection’. In Belgium, the majority of immigrants with a Turkish background come from the region of Emirdag, in the province of Afyon. On the basis of quantitative research methodologies, we first consider the magnitude of the phenomenon and the socio-economic situation of those involved. Using the qualitative research techniques of participant observation and in-depth interviews, we analyze the mechanisms in an attempt to explain marriage migration between these regions. Why do so many young people, born and raised in Western Europe, opt for an unknown partner from a region that is largely unknown to them but which proves to be their parents', or even grandparents', region of origin? Why does migration remain such a valuable life project for many young people in these regions of origin, despite the real danger of many negative side effects? The popularity of marriage migration is often explained by its role in making migration possible. However, migration theories alone cannot explain this phenomenon. Here we will argue that the existence of a ‘culture of migration’ that binds the region of origin with the region of destination and in which ‘the family’ as an institution is capable of building a bridge between traditional praxis, as well as the challenges linked to international migration, are crucial for understanding the enduring popularity of marriage migration.     

The Negligence Standard: Political Not Metaphysical

This contribution distinguishes two kinds of responsibility: the basic (or ‘metaphysical’) kind that we all inescapably have as functioning human beings; and the assignable (or ‘political’) kind that connects each of us with some particular tasks, and not with others. Having explored some differences between the two, and in particular the role of law's authority in connection with each, the discussion turns to the negligence standard, especially but not only as it figures in tort law. Recently, several philosophers have attempted to find a role for the negligence standard in the metaphysics of basic responsibility. This contribution resists that development and stands up for the traditional lawyer's view that the negligence standard belongs to the pliable politics of assignable responsibility. Basic responsibility, it is argued, is fundamentally strict.     

Bonnieview v. Woodmont: Court Sorts out Environmental Liability between Homeowners and Developers

Bonnieview Homeowners Ass’n v. Woodmont Builders, LLC,—F. Supp. 2d—, No. Civ. A. 03CV4317(DRD), 2009 WL 2999355 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 2009), was a suit brought by a homeowners’ association and its individual members against the developers of the property where their homes were located and the municipality. In a recent opinion, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey made several important rulings applying federal and state environmental statutes and common law. First, the developers were potentially liable to plaintiffs under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), where their soil grading and stockpiling activities distributed previously contaminated soil around the site, which had been used as a fruit orchard. Second, however, the court prohibited plaintiffs from recovering under CERCLA or New Jersey's Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act) because they had not incurred any environmental cleanup costs compensable under the two statutes. Third, plaintiffs were innocent purchasers not subject to CERCLA liability under a 2002 amendment to the statute. A negligence claim against the municipality failed, however, because the municipality owed no duty of care to plaintiffs. The court also assessed plaintiffs' other federal and state statutory and common law claims.     

The ‘Reasonable Man’, his Nineteenth‐century ‘Siblings’, and their Legacy

The reasonable man is the best known, but not the only, legal construct to be born into the nineteenth‐century common law. This article introduces the man's siblings – including those from the areas of trust law, criminal law, contract law, and intellectual property law (both patents and trademarks). The fact that some of these ‘men’ changed the law is not controversial; this research further highlights that while several of these came to life in that century, only some had a significant role into the twentieth century. Those that did are tied to the foundations of our society through their role in facilitating innovation and consumer protection. The argument is that it was the constructs’ nature and their capacity to accommodate public policy issues that enabled the vitality of the ‘reasonable person ‘ (negligence) and the ‘person skilled in the art’ (patents).     

Protecting Free Speech and Academic Freedom in Universities

Restrictions on speaking events in universities have been created both by recent student‐led efforts at ‘no‐platforming’ and by Part 5 of the Counter‐terrorism and Security Act 2015 which placed aspects of the government's Prevent strategy on a statutory basis. The statutory Prevent duty in universities includes, under the accompanying Guidance, curbing or monitoring events that could have an impact in drawing persons into terrorism. This article places the combined impact of Part 5 and student‐led curbs on campus speech in context by juxtaposing pre‐existing restrictions with the various free speech duties of universities. Focusing on speaking events, it evaluates the resulting state of free speech and academic freedom in universities. It finds potential violations of established free speech norms due to the impact of pre‐emptive strikes against some campus‐linked speech articulating non‐mainstream viewpoints. But it also argues that not all such speech has a strong foundation within such norms.     

Provocation and Pluralism

What is the best way to reflect human diversity in the structure of the provocation defence, and similar excusatory defences in the criminal law? The House of Lords recently concluded that the right way is to allow the jury to personalise and thereby qualify the apparently uniform ‘reasonable person’ standard mentioned in section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957. In this paper we argue that this is not the right way at all. We argue that the reasonable person standard, unqualified, already accommodates the only variations between people that the law should want to accommodate in an excusatory defence. To defend this view we revive the common law's tripartite analysis of the ‘objective’ (or impersonal) issues in the provocation defence: first, was there an action capable of constituting a provocation? second, how provocative was it? and third, how much self‐control should have been exhibited in the face of it? We show that these questions each have a built‐in sensitivity to certain variations between different defendants' situations, but that this does not detract from their objectivity (or impersonality). We argue that no more sensitivity is needed in the name of human diversity, and what is more that no more sensitivity is desirable.     

Beyond the ‘<Emphasis Type="Italic">Tomlinson</Emphasis> Trap’: Analysing the Effectiveness of Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006

One of the intentions underpinning section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 was to provide reassurance to individual volunteers, and voluntary organisations, involved in what the provision called ‘desirable activities’ and including sport. The perception was that such volunteers, motivated by an apprehension about their increased vulnerability to negligence liability, and as driven by a fear of a wider societal compensation culture, were engaging excessively in risk-averse behaviour to the detriment of such socially desirable activities. Academic commentary on section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 has largely regarded the provision as unnecessary and doing little more than restating existing common law practice. This article argues otherwise and, on critically reviewing the emerging jurisprudence, posits the alternative view that section 1, in practice, affords an enhanced level of protection and safeguarding for individuals undertaking functions in connection with a desirable activity. Nonetheless, the occasionally idiosyncratic judicial interpretation given to term ‘desirable activity’, potentially compounded by recent enactment of the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015, remains problematic. Two points of interest will be used to inform this debate. First, an analysis of the then House of Lords’ decision in Tomlinson and its celebrated ‘balancing exercise’ when assessing reasonableness in the context of negligence liability. Second, a fuller analysis of the application of section 1 in the specific context of negligence actions relating to the coaching of sport where it is argued that the, albeit limited, jurisprudence might support the practical utility of a heightened evidential threshold of gross negligence.     

Governance,Proceduralisation and Justice: Some Challenges to the Legal Paradigm

In 1989, Rudolf Wiethöltner alleged that we are witnessing a ‘failure of law’ in terms of its obligation to achieve ‘just law’. This paradox at the very heart of law – in essence, the impossibility of the realisation of legal justice twinned with the law's inability to cease trying to attain this goal – has been accommodated to a degree by the utilisation of a proceduralist paradigm that relies upon the contingency of governance, but this is now coming under renewed scrutiny. This article will put forward three arguments in this respect. The first section will argue that the turn to governance and the resultant procedural paradigm are both consequences of the ‘failure of law'; the second will point to the inherent weaknesses of the procedural paradigm that can be said to stem from this very failure; while the third will discuss some of the challenges issued to those still reliant upon the legal paradigm.     

Dryden v Johnson Matthey: The Boundaries of Actionable Damage

In Dryden v Johnson Matthey, the claimants sought to recover in tort for becoming sensitised to platinum salts by the defendant's negligence. The Supreme Court found, unanimously, that merely becoming sensitised, as opposed to developing an allergic reaction, sufficed as actionable damage. However, the court only provided two ‘indicative factors’ for when damage was ‘actionable’: whether there had been some impairment, and whether the effect of that impairment was ‘more than negligible’. This approach is unclear, in tension with other parts of the judgment, and produces undesirable broader consequences. It misses an opportunity for the Court to provide guidance on developments in tort like preventive damages, claimant‐specific loss, and the broader raison d'être of tort. A narrow and constrained adjustment to the law to permit recovery in negligence of pure economic loss for preventive damage could have achieved the same result without relying on somewhat convoluted mental gymnastics.     

John Vincent’s Reading at Gray’s Inn, 1668/9, on the Merchants’ Assurances Act 1601

In Lent Term 1668/9, John Vincent, a bencher of Gray’s Inn, gave a reading on the Merchants’ Assurances Act 1601 (43 Eliz. I, c.12). The notes of the law reporter, Joseph Keble, record this observance of the centuries-old tradition of readings, which was destined to expire within the next two decades. This paper situates Vincent’s reading within the changing tradition of readings in the seventeenth century. It highlights the role readings continued to play in disseminating sophisticated legal learning, particularly in relation to newer areas of practice such as marine insurance, which were largely uninformed by statute, common law precedent or reference works, and would have been difficult to master through book-study alone. It examines a selection of issues discussed during the reading, focussing on legal outcomes grounded in the ‘customs’, usages, practices and understandings of merchants, and illustrating how these were perceived as exceptional by comparison to the ordinary rules of the common law. The nature and jurisdiction of London’s court of assurances, reconstituted and empowered by the 1601 Act, are also discussed. More generally, this paper demonstrates the value of post-Restoration readings for historians of English law in the late seventeenth century.     

Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint

This article offers a new interpretation – the ‘constitutional constraint’ model – of the duty the Human Rights Act imposes on the courts to give horizontal effect to European Convention rights through the common law. The model requires courts to develop the common law compatibly with the Convention, but only where compatibility can be achieved by incremental development. We argue that models requiring more than incremental development are unsustainable; that deep constitutional norms compel the constraint of incrementalism, which is preserved under the HRA; and that by virtue of section 2 of the HRA, Convention rights function as principles rather than hard‐edged rights in this context. This further undermines the idea that the courts must strictly apply Convention rights and cannot allow them to be overridden by non‐Convention factors. The final section explores the nature of incrementalism in this context and the impact of the model on the doctrine of judicial precedent.     

Norms,Institutions, and Institutional Facts

Norms explained as grounds of practical judgment, using example of queue. Some norms informal, inexact, depend on common understanding (‘conventions’); some articulated in context of two-tier normative order: ‘rules’, explicit or implicit. Logical structure of rules displayed. Informal and formal normative order explained, ‘institutional facts’ depend on acts and events interpreted in the light of normative order. Practical force of rules differentiated; either ‘absolute application’ or ‘strict application’ or ‘discretionary application’, depending on second-tier empowerment. Discretion can be guided by values, principles standards. Pervasiveness of institutions and institutional facts, especially but not only in relation to institutions of state-law, including constitution and state-institutions. Searle's and Ruiter's theories of institution, institutional fact, considered: ‘constitutive rule’ rejected in favour of ‘underlying principle’, structure of ‘institutive, consequential and terminative’ rules explained and defended. Ruiter's conception of ‘institutional’régime' considered and adopted, validity of norms and normative 'régimes' considered and differentiated from truth of statements of institutional fact.     

Male Violence,Marital Unity,and the History of the Interspousal Tort Immunity

The interspousal tort immunity has been understood as a common law rule that was codified in the English Married Women's Property Act, 1882. It was explained as a necessary consequence of the wife's coverture and was justified by the doctrine of marital unity. This conventional account mischaracterizes the complexities underlying the development of the immunity and the reasons for its reformulation in the nineteenth century. This article traces a different trajectory, showing that the interspousal tort immunity was not articulated until Phillips v Barnet in 1876, and examining the way it came into being as a result of the reforms to divorce law and to the property rules of coverture. Although already implicit in the governing principles of the pre-reform law, the nineteenth-century expression of the rule concerning interspousal tort immunity was a product of the contemporary reforms to coverture at least as much as it was a product of coverture itself.     

This Time,it's for Real: The Health and Social Care Act 2012

This article examines the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and associated reforms to the National Health Service in England. It focuses on the Act's policy of making the NHS market more ‘real’, by both encouraging and compelling NHS bodies to act as ‘market players’. The article considers whether the reforms are compatible with the constitutional requirements of accountability for the provision of a public service such as the NHS. It argues that the reforms threaten accountability for three reasons: they make the Secretary of State for Health's relationship with the NHS more complex, they create opaque networks of non‐statutory bodies which may influence NHS decision‐making, and (especially in relation to competition) they ‘juridify’ policy choices as matters of law. Taken together, these arguments suggest that there is force in the claim that the reforms will contribute to ‘creeping’ – and thus unaccountable – privatisation of the NHS.     

Reversing the ‘Tragedy’ of the Commons? Sustainable Management and the Commons Act 2006

The Commons Act 2006 is the first statute since the Commons Registration Act 1965 to address the problems associated with the management of common land in England and Wales. A key focus for the 2006 Act is the introduction of mechanisms for the sustainable management of common land, including self‐regulatory commons councils. This article examines the ‘sustainable’ management of common land in historical and contemporary perspective. It sets the 2006 Act, and the sustainable management of common land, in the wider context of the ongoing debate triggered by Hardin's ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ and subsequent institutional and post‐institutional scholarship on common pool resource management. It uses historical and qualitative research data drawn from three case studies to demonstrate the irrelevance of Hardin's thesis in an English context, and identifies the Commons Registration Act of 1965 as the true ‘tragedy’ of the English and Welsh commons. The case studies also illustrate the challenges posed by the introduction of legal mechanisms to promote the ecologically sustainable management of the modern commons, and inform the critique of the Commons Act 2006 developed in the article.