Antitrust actions and the budgeting process

The author expresses appreciation to Dan Benjamin, Charles Knoeber, C.M. Lindsay, M.T. Maloney, William Shughart II, and John Warner for comments and criticisms. The usual caveat applies.     

Public finance in autocratic process: An empirical note

Our title is borrowed in a modified form from that used by Buchanan 1967. All data, as well as the relevant computer print-outs, is available upon request.     

Political systems and distortions: An empirical study

This paper studies empirically why price distortions are more prevalent in some countries than in others. We find no significant difference between democracies and dictatorships, but frequent regime changes reduce distortions. Political systems (factional-subordinate) that encourage redistributive activities (RDA) tend to have more distortions. Allowing for different effects of RDA in democracies and dictatorships, there is a positive and significant effect of RDA on distortions in dictatorships. In democracies, “distortions-destroying” lobbying seems more important since no significant relation between RDA and distortions can be found.     

Political participation and procedural utility: An empirical study

Abstract.  Democracy can be characterized by policy outcomes as well as governmental processes. In this article, it is argued that people have preferences about both aspects and that they derive utility from the processes involved in decision making over and above the utility gained from outcomes. The authors study political participation possibilities as an important source of procedural utility. To distinguish between outcome and process utility, they take advantage of the fact that nationals can participate in political decision making, while foreigners are excluded and thus cannot enjoy the respective procedural utility. Utility is assumed to be measurable by individually reported subjective well-being. As an additional indicator for procedural utility, reported belief in political influence is analyzed.     

Electoral promises and minority governments: An empirical study

Abstract.  This article studies the relationship between electoral policy proposals and subsequent government actions in the case of minority governments. Content analysis of electoral pledges of Spanish parties is utilised to study the gains that a relatively small party obtains when it helps to sustain the governing party in office without entering a coalition government. According to the authors' results, cooperating in parliament to maintain the minority government in office can be a rational choice for a party because it allows it to obtain significant gains in terms of programme fulfillment.     

Industry characteristics and interest group formation: An empirical study

The role of interest groups in the political process has been the subject of much analysis in both political science and economics. However, few studies have examined directly the factors which influence the variation in interest group formation across industrial sectors and between countries. Using data on 75 industrial sectors in 10 countries, we examine the way in which variations in interest group formation are explained by variations in industrial and political characteristics. In cross-sectional empirical relationships we test for the significance of a variety of industry and political variables. Our results indicate that industry characteristics such as the proportion of total demand purchased by households and the concentration ratio are related to variations in interest group formation. We discuss the implications that our results have for recent theoretical work on the effect of interest groups on economic policy.For helpful comments, we would like to thank Antonio Estache, Bruce Gardner, Dennis Mueller, Mancur Olson, and participants at the meetings of the Public Choice Society and the Southern Economic Association. The International Institute of Management of Berlin, Paul Geroski, Neal Kennedy, Alexis Jacquemin, Kenneth Platto, Joachim Schwalbach, and Hideki Yamawaki helped in providing data. The Computer Science Center of the University of Maryland is acknowledged for provision of computational resources.     

After the congressional veto: Assessing the alternatives

Congressional choice of effective replacements for the recently banned legislative veto will require an accurate understanding of the actual results of the now unconstitutional device. The impact of the veto varied strikingly depending on, among other things, the type and target of the veto and on the principal sites of review in Congress itself. No single mechanism will suffice. Rather a variety of devices are available and under consideration. The underlying question raised by this analysis is which effects of the veto are worth perpetuating in light of past results and stated congressional objectives.     

An explanation of the continuing federal government mandate of single-member congressional districts

A formal rational expectation model is developed to explain why congressional single-member districts (SMD’s) were mandated in 1842 and why that mandate has repeatedly been re-affirmed. The tendency of voters to moderate the dominant party in the federal government combined with the single-party sweep effect of multi-member districts (MMD’s) creates the incentives for the strongest party to support a SMD mandate. This model performs empirically much better than alternative theories. The model’s prediction that the current SMD mandate is permanent is an example of how an institutional change can endure even if it no longer reflects voter preferences.     

Public expenditures in Canadian provinces: An empirical study of politico-economic interactions

It is widely believed that government ideology and electoral constraints are two major factors that influence the level of public expenditures. However, Frey and Schneider argue that the effects of the two phenomena are not simultaneous. Only when a government is popular can it pursue ideological goals, and when popularity is low, energies must be redirected toward gaining support from voters to win the next election. Data draw from the Canadian provincial case are used to test empirically this hypothesis. The findings support the Frey and Schneider explanation.     

Expectations for the 1982 mid-term U.S. congressional elections: An historical perspective

The record of U.S. mid-term elections since the mid-1940s is examined. The author explores the relationship of their results to those in the preceding Presidential year. Differential turnout does not seem to affect the outcome. Presidential popularity matters less than expected. But change in disposable income goes far to explain the scale of the electoral changes recorded. Party loyalty matters less for chances of re-election than mere incumbency. In 1982 reapportionment will help the Republicans but President Reagan's unpopularity will hurt them.     

The two freedoms,economic growth and development: An empirical study

Log-linear methods are applied to categorical data containing economic freedom, political freedom, the level of income, and the rate of economic growth for a panel of about 100 countries from 1975 to 1992. The main results are: given economic freedom, the rate of economic growth is independent of political freedom and the level of income; given the level of income, political freedom is independent of economic freedom and the growth rate. The analysis suggests the fundamental effects of economic freedom in fostering economic growth, and a high level of income as the condition of a high degree of political freedom.     

Punishing environmental crimes: An empirical study from lower courts to the court of appeal

We analyze judicial policy lines concerning the punishment of environmental crime using a unique European dataset of individual criminal cases, including case‐specific information on offenses and offenders. We investigate policy choices made by lower criminal courts, as well as their follow‐up by the relevant court of appeal. The sanctioning policy of the courts has proven to be varied as well as consistent. Judges carefully balance effective and suspended penalties, most often using them cumulatively, but in specific cases opting to use them as substitutes. Overall, both judges in lower and appeal courts balance environmental law and classic criminal law and aim at protecting individuals and their possessions as well as the environment.     

Deliberative participatory budgeting: A case study of Zeguo Town in China

The search for a better practice instrument of civic engagement has led to participatory budgeting and deliberative polling in recent years. Participatory budgeting stresses empowerment and citizens' struggle against the establishment and unequal social structures, whereas deliberative polling works within the system and focuses on improving democratic decision‐making processes by applying credible social science methods. Often, these two processes are presented as being in conflict with each other, which is to the detriment of the search for best practice in deliberative governance. This paper develops a theoretical analysis of deliberative participatory budgeting which is distinguished from unrepresentative and non‐deliberative but self‐selected participatory budgeting; that is, it considers how the quality of participatory budgeting can be improved through deliberative polling. This theoretical analysis is backed by an empirical study of deliberative participatory budgeting in Zeguo Township, Zhejiang Province, China. It explores whether, how, and under what conditions it is possible to combine deliberative polling and participatory budgeting. It details four experiments and assesses the successes, failures, limitations, and problems of the experiments. The case of Zeguo offers scholars, activists, and officials lessons about how to pursue best deliberative practice in both authoritarian states and democratic societies.     

The contractual nature of budgeting: A transaction cost perspective on the design of budgeting institutions

Viewing budgets as contracts, transaction cost theory focuses on the costs of negotiating and enforcing the myriad political agreements by which policymakers allocate the government's resources. This essay provides an overview of transaction cost theory and its implications for the design of budgeting institutions. It contrasts the behavioral premises (bounded rationality and opportunism) of the transaction cost approach with those of more traditional budgetary theories, and examines whether commitment and agency costs have structured budget actors' institutional choices. Investigation of the usage of key budget instruments- entitlements, multi-year appropriations, and tax expenditures - suggests that Congress has been more discriminating in its institutional choices than is commonly supposed. Sensitivity to the importance of transaction costs would increase the effectiveness of budget reforms.     

Temporary legislation,better regulation,and experimentalist governance: An empirical study

This article presents the findings of an extensive multi‐method empirical study that explored the relationship between temporary legislation, better regulation, and experimentalist governance. Temporary (or “sunset”) legislation – statutory provisions enacted for a limited time and set to expire unless their validity is extended – is often hailed as a key tool for promoting experimental and better regulation. Despite the importance of temporary legislation and the burgeoning theoretical scholarship on the subject, there is still a dearth of empirical studies about how temporary legislation is used in practice. The lack of empirical evidence creates a lacuna in at least three areas of theoretical scholarship, concerning temporary legislation, better regulation, and experimentalist governance. This paper is a first step to fill this gap.     

Technology,behavior, and safety: An empirical study of automobile occupant-protection regulation

Technology and human behavior can influence the effectiveness of safety policies. In the field of traffic safety, rational-choice theorists postulate that automobile safety devices induce increased driver risk taking. Such behavioral responses could partly or totally nullify the lifesaving potential of governmental safety rules for new cars, such as the crashworthiness standards adopted by the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This study explores the behavioral-response hypothesis in the context of a car-vintage model of U.S. car occupant death rates. Results from the model imply that U.S. standards have reduced the occupant death rate by roughly 30 percent, a finding consistent with minimal driver response to safety devices. The study provides support for the technological approach to safety policy and suggests that policymakers might consider adopting additional crashworthiness regulations, such as some form of passive-restraint program.Financial support was provided by the Economic Studies Program, Brookings Institution. I thank Robert W. Crandall, Steven Garber, Lawrence Summers, and the editors for comments. All views and residual errors are solely my responsibility.     

The congressional veto: Shifting the balance of administrative control

During the past decade, hundreds of provisions have been enacted by Congress giving that body some form of control over the projects and regulations of federal agencies. Pressures for more far-reaching measures of this sort, including a proposal to vest Congress with a veto of all regulations promulagated by federal agencies, have intensified debate on both the constitutional merits and administrative wisdom of the congressional veto process. These measures are exerting considerable effect, delaying the decisions of the agencies, reshaping the regulatory process, and increasing the direct congressional role in setting administrative agendas and substantive policies. The result is a transfer of administrative power to the more than 200 standing committees and subcommittees of the Congress-and, significantly, to their staffs. This transfer has served to impede the executive chain of command, to diminish the role of independent regulatory agencies as experts in their respective fields, to devalue judicial review of agency action, and to reduce the accountability of the affected agencies.