The Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Regime After the NPT Extension Conference ‐ The Tasks Ahead

Rome’s approach to the Libyan unrest has been guided by two objectives: to protect the commercial relationship that it has built up with Libya over the past decade, and to prevent a mass exodus of migrants toward Italy. Initially, it was believed that these objectives would be endangered by the intervention advocated by Great Britain and France. By early April, principally because Washington’s support for the military mission became clearer, the government’s policy changed. Italy secured commitments from the rebel leaders to honour existing agreements and to scale future relations to the level of support they receive. Although Rome’s concern about immigration proved to be exaggerated, it was also addressed in late April when France agreed to support a proposed reform of Schengen. Once it concluded that the Qadhafi regime was unlikely to survive, Italy cast aside its earlier caution and joined the NATO-led war.     

A western cold war: the crisis in Iceland's relations with Britain,the United States,and NATO, 1971–74

The article explores the crisis in Iceland's relations with the Western Alliance following a left-wing government's decisions, in 1971, to expand Iceland's fishery limits and to demand the withdrawal of US military forces. This sparked a cod war with Britain and a diplomatic stand-off with the United States, with NATO in the middle. It analyzes the motives behind Iceland's behaviour – especially the tension between a pro Western foreign policy course and a domestic anti Western nationalism – the Western response within the context of alliance politics and the democratic peace theory, and the role of international mediation and domestic political realignments in diffusing the crisis.     

Learning to Pull the Strings after Suez: Macmillan’s Management of the Eisenhower Administration during the Intervention in Jordan, 1958

This analysis re-instates the importance of the 1958 British intervention in Jordan within the study of Anglo–American relations and the revisionist literature on Suez. It does so by challenging the idea of British subservience to American foreign policy after the 1956 crisis, and it reveals two key lessons learnt by London: that Britain’s economy, power, and influence were in decline and that Britain could no longer intervene in the Middle East without American support. Having learnt these lessons, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan proved to be a shrewd political actor who used the opportunity of the Jordan intervention to turn the policy of the Dwight Eisenhower Administration to British ends, regaining Britain’s maximum power and prestige for the minimum loss of resources.     

Liberal intervention in the foreign policy thinking of Tony Blair and David Cameron

David Cameron was a critic of Tony Blair's doctrine of the ‘international community’, which was used to justify war in Kosovo and more controversially in Iraq, suggesting caution in projecting military force abroad while in opposition. However, and in spite of making severe cuts to the defence budget, the Cameron-led Coalition government signed Britain up to a military intervention in Libya within a year of coming into office. What does this say about the place liberal interventionism occupies in contemporary British foreign policy? To answer this question, this article studies the nature of what we describe as the ‘bounded liberal’ tradition that has informed British foreign policy thinking since 1945, suggesting that it puts a distinctly UK national twist on conventional conservative thought about international affairs. Its components are: scepticism of grand schemes to remake the world; instinctive Atlanticism; security through collective endeavour; and anti-appeasement. We then compare and contrast the conditions for intervention set out by Tony Blair and David Cameron. We explain the similarities but crucially the vital differences between the two leaders' thinking on intervention, with particular reference to Cameron's perception that Downing Street needed to loosen its control over foreign policymaking after Iraq. Our argument is that policy substance, policy style and party political dilemmas prompted the two leaders to reconnect British foreign policy with its ethical roots, ingraining a bounded liberal posture in British foreign policy after the moral bankruptcy of the John Major years. This return to a pragmatic and ethically informed foreign policy meant that military operations in Kosovo and Libya were undertaken in quite different circumstances, yet came to be justified by similar arguments from the two leaders.     

Between conflict management and role conflict: the EU in the Libyan crisis

This paper assesses the role of the European Union in the Libyan crisis (2011) and critically considers the implications for its evolution as an international security actor. Employing role theory, the paper reviews the historical development of the Union's security actorness and sheds specific light on the balance between self-conception and external expectations in the case of the Libyan crisis. Its central argument is that, despite external expectations and European narratives of a ‘comprehensive power role’, the Libyan crisis showed that the Union still acts in line with its traditional role as a civilian power. The inability to go beyond civilian power stemmed from internal dissonance on a potential hard power role and a corresponding lack of material capabilities. The growing gap between expectations about comprehensive actorness on the one hand and performance on the other is likely to damage the Union's future credibility as an international security actor.     

“We Can't be more Russian than the Russians”: British Policy During the Liman von Sanders Crisis, 1913–1914

This article examines British policy in the Liman von Sanders crisis, which arose between Germany and Russia in late 1913. It takes issue with recent arguments that Britain was too closely bound to the Dual Alliance of France and Russia, that concern for her Indian empire determined her foreign policy, and that the Anglo-German cooperation in 1912 and 1913 was a hollow détente. Britain played an important role in resolving the crisis, by restraining an erratic Russian policy and appealing to Germany to make concessions. Moreover, Britain was the dominant power in the entente and influenced French restraint in this crisis. This served Britain's interests in Turkey, which aimed at the strengthening of that state. Finally, the resolution of the crisis demonstrated a functioning international system, based on alliances and the Concert of Europe, not a system on the verge of collapse into war.     

Evolving norms of protection: China,Libya and the problem of intervention in armed conflict

This article examines the influence of civilian protection norms on China’s response to the 2011 crisis in Libya. It argues that Responsibility to Protect—an emerging norm commonly associated with the Libyan case—did not play a major role in China’s abstention on Resolution 1973 (2011) authorizing international intervention in Libya. For China, Responsibility to Protect is merely a concept and could not serve as the basis for intervention. Instead, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, as a normative foundation for civilian protection endorsed by China, offers a more appropriate lens for understanding China’s vote. Protection of Civilians, however, does not accommodate China’s unprecedented evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya. This operation proceeded from a third logic of Protection of Nationals Abroad, which poses dilemmas for China’s strict adherence to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference and brings to bear domestic interests and notions of protection.     

Anglo–American Relations and the Cold War in 1950

1950 was a crisis year in the Cold War and saw a growing rift between the United Kingdom and the United States over how best to wage it. It was in the Far East that the most dangerous crisis occurred. Britain recognised the People's Republic of China, not only because the Communist regime clearly controlled the mainland, but also because it was felt that it was not irretrievably linked to the Soviet Union. The United States, on the other hand, regarded China as a Soviet satellite and displayed a consistently hostile attitude towards it. The situation worsened with the outbreak of the Korean War in June. Although the United States and Britain agreed that the invasion of South Korea must be repelled, the British were anxious not to broaden the conflict, whilst the Americans used it as a stick to beat the Chinese. The war also prompted accelerated rearmament and the Americans favoured the rearmament of West Germany. Things came to a head in November, with the large-scale Chinese intervention in Korea, followed in early December by a visit to Washington by the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. The British believed that the United States had already concluded that a global war was inevitable, whereas they wished to avoid it if possible. As this article shows, the events of 1950 amply demonstrated the subordinate position of Britain in the “special relationship.”     

The Rhetoric of Appeasement: Hitler's Legitimation and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39

Few grand strategies have been more scrutinized than Britain's decision to appease Nazi Germany. From 1933 to 1938, Britain eschewed confrontation and attempted to settle German demands. However in the five months following the negotiations at Munich, the British abandoned appeasement and embraced a policy of confronting the German state. The roots of both appeasement and confrontation can be found in Germany's legitimation strategies. Until the Munich crisis, Adolf Hitler justified Germany's aims with appeals to collective security, equality, and self-determination—norms central to the European system established by the Treaty of Versailles. After Munich, in contrast, German politicians abandoned these legitimation strategies, arguing instead that expansion was justified as a matter of German might, and not international rights. As Britain came to see German demands as illegitimate, so too did they decide this revisionist state was insatiable, impervious to negotiation, and responsive only to the language of force.     

Yvon Delbos and Anthony Eden: Anglo–French Cooperation, 1936–1938

The period of tenure of Anthony Eden and Yvon Delbos as the foreign ministers of their respective countries coincided with a remarkable improvement and convergence in Anglo–French relations. This was no accident. Both men had similar ideas in relation to the challenges confronting Britain and France in international affairs. Neither wanted really close relations with Soviet Russia and both supported non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War despite their growing concern over German and Italian intervention. Delbos was highly critical of Mussolini's Italy and was firmly opposed to a Franco–Italian rapprochement while Eden, having originally given the Duce the benefit of the doubt, came to distrust him and to oppose even conversations with Italy without prior concessions, such as the withdrawal of Italian volunteers from Spain. Finally, both supported the appeasement of Nazi Germany, including colonial concessions, although Delbos towards the end of his period as foreign minister became more sceptical as to the prospects for success.     

A western cold war: the crisis in Iceland's relations with Britain, the United States, and NATO, 1971-74

The article explores the crisis in Iceland's relations with the Western Alliance following a left-wing government's decisions, in 1971, to expand Iceland's fishery limits and to demand the withdrawal of US military forces. This sparked a cod war with Britain and a diplomatic stand-off with the United States, with NATO in the middle. It analyzes the motives behind Iceland's behaviour - especially the tension between a pro Western foreign policy course and a domestic anti Western nationalism - the Western response within the context of alliance politics and the democratic peace theory, and the role of international mediation and domestic political realignments in diffusing the crisis.     

René Massigli's Mission to London, 1944–1954

René Massigli's considerable contribution to French diplomacy began during the First World War. After being closely involved with many significant developments in French foreign policy during the inter-war years, Massigli then served alongside Charles de Gaulle during the Second World War. Informed by his experience of the 1930s, he adopted a view of western European security that saw him determined to promote greater co-operation between France and Britain to withstand a potential German resurgence and a looming Soviet threat. But following France's efforts after 1950 to promote European integration based on Franco-German co-operation, Massigli re-defined his role of ambassador and openly challenged French initiatives such as the Schuman Plan and, in particular, the European Defence Community, not only because they did not include Britain, but also because they threatened his view of French security. This analysis assesses Massigli's strategic vision and his attempts to overcome the underlying constraints.     

Region,System, and Order: The Mughal Empire in Islamicate Asia

This article introduces early modern Islamicate Asia (～1500–1750) as an international system. Three theoretical insights emerge from an analysis of the international relations of the Mughal Empire, the system's largest polity/economy. First, hierarchies are not necessarily peaceful because the system's structural attributes—polarity, the presence/absence of regions, and the pattern of interunit relations—remain important causal factors. Second, asymmetric material capabilities do not imply unequal relationships because the initiation of state-making policies that others emulate enhances the structural power of the initiator. Finally, systemic stability is reinforced when the interaction of trade, finance, and military power affirm the system's economic and security orders. These findings have implications for the expansion of Europe, for the study of world history, and for the emerging world order.     

Italian foreign policy in the post-cold war period: a neoclassical realist approach

Abstract

Drawing on a neoclassical realist approach, this article analyses the foreign policy conduct of different Italian governments from 1994 to 2008. Pressured by the post-cold war international system, these governments have been compelled to raise Italy's profile within the international system. However, the way in which successive governments have responded has differed markedly. By looking at variables located at the domestic level – elite perceptions of the distribution of power and government instability – it is possible to explain these differences. Neo-classical realism is seen as an advance on Waltzian neo-realism precisely because it allows room for domestic as well as international (or systemic) variables, and because it has a very specific focus on foreign policy as such.     

The European Union in the G20: what role for small states?

The G20 has emerged as the premier forum for international economic policy coordination. For small EU states, the EU's participation in the G20 represents a particular challenge as they may be faced with decisions in which they had no say. This article looks at the possibilities for small state involvement in the G20 process and analyses the extent to which they can influence the EU's participation in the G20. The article suggests two sets of variables to explain the possibilities for influence of small states in the EU's external relations. Looking into four financial and economic policy dossiers, the article explores the conditions of success of small states' strategies. The article does not contradict that the big member states dominate the EU presence in the G20, but it does argue that small states may successfully use the EU as a foreign policy platform to pursue national objectives. Their influence varies strongly and is bound to a number of conditions.     

The discursive construction of intervention: selves,democratic legacies,and Responsibility to Protect in French discourse on Libya

This article analyses French executives' and lawmakers' legitimisations of the intervention in Libya with the aim of understanding the discursive construction of intervention. It investigates the arguments in favour of intervention and the oppositions they were confronted with. To these arguments belong a re-evaluated democratic legacy of France, an identification with the Libyan people, and a debate on Responsibility to Protect and the rule of law in world politics, which have a broader relevance for French actorness abroad. The article applies the Essex School discourse theory and techniques from Interpretive Policy Analysis on executive speeches and parliamentary documents for structuring the debate and for estimating the strength of ideas in their interdiscursive configuration. An ideal-typical explanation of the legitimisation of intervention and of the choice of one policy over another is made. The article argues that going to war in Libya equated to a question of cultural appropriateness.     

Reviving the Russian empire: the Crimean intervention through a neoclassical realist lens

Although many policy-makers and scholars maintain that international norms have altered the motivations underlying state behaviour, this article argues that states continue to pursue national self-interest, but in ways that remain understudied. While traditional realist assumptions explain a great deal of state behaviour, they have not been widely used to account for important alternative tools of state intervention, such as economic and normative strategies. Focusing on the case of Russia's 2014 intervention in Ukraine, this article offers insights into how, and under what circumstances, these tools are used to accomplish traditional state objectives. Guided by the tenets of neoclassical realism, the article argues that in the case of Russia, military force is no longer the sole, or even the primary, means used to accomplish traditional security goals. Such dynamics have significant theoretical and policy implications for contemporary international relations.     

International development and the European Union's external policies: changing contexts,problematic nexuses,contested partnerships

This special section explores and explains how the European Union's (EU's) overall approach to international development has evolved since the beginning of the twenty-first century. At the international level, the rise of a group of emerging economies has not only provided developing countries with greater choices, but has also further enhanced their agency, thus questioning the EU's leadership and even relevance in international development. At the European level, the various (paradigmatic) shifts in each of the three key external policies—trade, security and foreign policy—and the EU's aspiration to project a coherent external action have collided with the EU's commitment to international development. Numerous tensions characterize the various nexuses in EU external relations, which ultimately challenge the EU's international legitimacy and (self-proclaimed) identity as a champion of the interests of the developing world. Nevertheless, the EU has made more progress than is generally acknowledged in making its external policies more coherent with its development policy. Moreover, the EU's relationship with developing countries has gradually become less asymmetrical, though not because of the EU's emphasis on partnership and ownership but more because of the increased agency of developing countries.     

Apologies in International Politics

This article examines the growing conventional wisdom that apologies and other acts of contrition are necessary for international reconciliation. I create and test a theory that connects a country's remembrance with that country's image—threatening or benign—in the eyes of former adversaries. I evaluate the theory in two post-World War II case studies: South Korean relations with Japan and French relations with Germany.

This article offers three major findings. First, it substantiates the claim that denials inhibit reconciliation. Japanese denials and history textbook omissions have elevated distrust and fear among Koreans (as well as Chinese and Australians). Second, although whitewashing and denials are indeed pernicious, the conventional wisdom about the healing power of contrition must be seriously reconsidered. Evidence from the Japanese and other cases suggests that contrition risks triggering a domestic backlash, which alarms former adversaries. Finally, there is good news for the prospects of international reconciliation: countries have reconciled quite successfully without any contrition at all. West Germany actually offered very little contrition at the time of its dramatic reconciliation with France; many other countries have restored close and productive relations without contrition. The best course for reconciliation is to remember the past in ways that are unifying, rather than divisive, and minimize the risk of backlash.     

Palmerston and Anglo–French Relations, 1846–1865

Conventionally, it was Palmerston's political nemesis, Lord Aberdeen (foreign secretary 1841–46), who brokered an entente cordiale with François Guizot and France in the early 1840s, which the belligerent and unequivocally “English” Palmerston then systematically destroyed when he returned to office in 1846. However, not only is this a distortion of the relationship between Britain and France prior to 1846, it also fails to appreciate the nuances of Palmerston's approach to Anglo–French politics. Naval scares and rhetorical constructions of English and British identities certainly drew Palmerston to adopt aggressive positions towards France on occasion, but against this must be set his close personal ties with leading French statesmen, not least Napoleon III himself, and his desire to maintain peaceful harmonious relations with France in order to free Britain's diplomatic hand elsewhere in the world. Although superficially swinging between extremes of amity and enmity, therefore, Anglo–French relations under Palmerston's guidance were in fact far more cordial and close than has sometimes been allowed.