Kennedy and Touré: A Success in Personal Diplomacy

Entering the White House at the crest of the African independence movement, John F. Kennedy and many of his advisors believed that Africa had surpassed Asia as the most permeable battlefield in the East–West Cold War struggle. While the battle lines of the Cold War had already been clearly drawn in Europe and in much of Asia, newly independent Africa was wide open for superpower competition. The central component of Kennedy's approach to dealing with Africa was his use of personal diplomacy with the leaders of that continent. This article is a case study of Kennedy's first successful use of personal diplomacy with an African head of State—Guinea's Sékou Touré.     

Rebel's dilemma: The changing relationship between the IRA,Sinn Féin and paramilitary vigilantism in Northern Ireland

The 40‐month period which has followed the introduction of the IRA's 1994 cease‐fire has witnessed the most intensive vigilante campaign ever carried out by the movement. A commitment to vigilantism has profoundly affected the evolution of both the policy and structure of Sinn Féin and the IRA. However, vigilantism bears costs for the two organizations and several serious attempts have been made by senior figures to end the practice. This article sets out to understand and describe the dynamics of militant republicanism's fluctuating commitment to vigilante violence, and in particular to understand the complex issues vigilantism has raised within Sinn Féin and the IRA in the past three decades. The article concludes that the two organizations are now irretrievably committed to vigilantism, and short of major RUC reform, they will be unable to end what has become a politically‐damaging policy.     

Terrorist Skin,Peace-Party Mask: The Political Communication Strategy of Sinn Féin and the PIRA

The article analyses the political communication strategy adopted by Sinn Féin in order to legitimize the Provisional Irish Republican Army's (PIRA) terrorist campaign during their transition from violence into mainstream politics. Their endeavours to portray a triumphant republican movement in spite of the huge gap between strategic aims and achievements are examined. The political and social rehabilitation of violent Republicanism, and how their leaders have evolved from pariahs to celebrities, is also assessed. The role of the media and political elites, as well as the political discourse of the PIRA and Sinn Féin, is analysed in order to examine how the republican movement has tried to rewrite its past in an attempt to gain political and social legitimacy. Consequently, the myths reproduced by republicans to disguise their failures as historical compromises, reproducing a more benign interpretation of history which distorts the causes and consequences of terrorism, are critically assessed. The article will focus on the struggle for the legitimacy of the terrorist campaign and the propaganda system which, in the words of Garret FitzGerald (Irish Prime Minister between 1981 and 1987), has managed to turn the republican movement into the “peace party” despite murdering thousands of human beings.     

Change and Stability in Eastern Asia: Nationalism,Communism, and British Policy, 1948–1955

British policy in Eastern Asia, 1948–55, aimed to combine the attainment of change leading to stability, to be secured through cooperating with nationalism against the growing threat from communism. After initial errors, ministers and officials revealed realism and flexibility, as shown in policies towards Burma, Malaya, and China. As regards Japan, the United States dominated decisionmaking and British views were rather negative towards the viability of political reform in the longer term and towards economic revival. The collapse of French authority in Indo-China pushed Anthony Eden towards compromise with the communist powers at the Geneva conference in 1954: Britain diverged from the US in supporting a strictly defensive alliance (SEATO), which was linked with an ambivalent approach to the future of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.     

An assessment of democratic vulnerability: regime type,economic development,and coups d’état

Prior research has not established a clear relationship between democracy and insulation from coups d’état, with very few studies illustrating robust findings on the subject. I contend that the lack of attention paid to the conditional influences of democracy on coups has resulted in these mixed findings. I posit that insulation from coups occurs at higher levels of economic development in both autocracies and democracies. However, the vulnerability present at low levels of economic development is significantly greater in democracies. Poor democracies lack the coercive capacity associated with authoritarian states, suffer from relatively weaker patronage networks, and have smaller pots for public goods provision, all making them less capable of maintaining elite loyalty. An assessment of 165 states for the years 1950–2011 offers strong support for the argument. Democracies are indeed an important part of the coup story, but only when simultaneously addressing their level of economic development.     

Prelude to war: Incidence,escalation and intervention in international disputes, 1900–1976

The study provides an overview of a set of data describing the incidence and character of serious international disputes in the twentieth century. The principal findings reported include: Average annual incidence of serious international disputes has risen more than fourfold between 1900 and 1976. The underlying cause of this increase seems to be simply the increased size of the international system. The relative likelihood with which a serious dispute culminates in war is 1 in 9. However, there are definite differences in this relative frequency. Disputes involving major powers escalate to war approximately 1 in 5 times. Disputes involving only minor powers culminate in war with a likelihood of 1 in 20. Intervention in ongoing disputes increases the chance of war. The character of intervention has changed throughout the century with initiators less able to attract support and the targets of threat and force more able to do so.     

Ferocious Times: The IRA,the RIC,and Britain's Failure in 1919–1921

The 1916 Rising was, in military terms, a shambolic failure. Despite the fact that Britain was locked in a gruelling struggle with Germany, the Rising was still utterly crushed within a week. How then, in the aftermath of victory against Germany, did Britain fail to win the subsequent struggle with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) between 1919 and 1921? This article assesses some of the key factors that played out in the conflict, drawing particular attention to the IRA's focus on the Royal Irish Constabulary and the consequences of this, and then later, how distorted perceptions of the proximity of success ultimately undermined British commitment. One of the most remarkable features of the conflict was the widespread belief among many on the British side (and more than a few in the Republican camp) that the IRA was on the verge of total defeat when the truce was declared in 1921. The IRA had suffered heavy casualties and were running low on weapons and ammunition. Yet, somehow the movement prevailed. This article aims to shed light on how and why that happened.     

Bargaining,Fear, and Denial: Explaining Violence Against Civilians in Iraq 2004–2007

From mid-2004 to mid-2007, the Iraq war was distinguished from other comparable insurgencies by its high rates of civilian victimization. This has been attributed to a number of different factors, including the role of Islamic fundamentalist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq as well as the regional ambitions of Iran and Syria. Using an unpublished dataset of violence in Iraq from 2003–2008 from the Iraq Body Count (IBC), this paper argues that the violence against civilians is best understood as a combination of three interacting logics—bargaining, fear, and denial—that are predominantly local in character. First, armed Iraqi actors bargained through violence both across and within sectarian communities, and were driven by mechanisms of outbidding and outflanking to escalate their attacks on civilians. Second, the pervasive fear about the future of the Iraqi state encouraged the “localization” of violence in Iraq, particularly in the emergence of a security dilemma and the proliferation of criminal and tribal actors. Finally, Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq played the spoiler in Iraq, using mass-casualty attacks to generate fear among the population and deny U.S. efforts to build a functioning state. Only by addressing each of these three logics as part of its counter-insurgency strategy can the U.S. put an end to violence against civilians and develop the Iraqi state into a credible competitor for the loyalties of the population.     

Atrocities and armed conflict: state consolidation in Israel, 1948–56

This paper contrasts four cases of atrocity in the early years of the Israeli state and contends that, due to ethnic-cleansing incentives, competitive inducements and outbidding, the stated Israeli ideology of self-restraint had little impact on policy. The article further argues that, during the early periods of democratic state consolidation, democratic states act in very similar ways to authoritarian states and that little restraint is exercised in relation to ‘enemy’ civilians located within the territorial boundaries of the new state. In this respect, arguments that democracies are superior to non-democracies with regard to respect for human rights might be called into question during the initial phases of state consolidation. The paper speci?cally questions how con?ict stalemates impact on the use of violence against noncombatants in order to tip the balance of the war and it argues against the assertion that only paramilitaries would ever use terror against unarmed civilians.