U.S.—Soviet relations: The global village and the free flow of information∗

For the past sixty‐seven years, the Council on Foreign Relations has dedicated itself to enlarging the public dialogue on matters affecting U.S. foreign policy and international affairs. This effort is to be commended. It stands as a testimony to your strong sense of civic responsibility, and it illustrates yet another way in which America's private and public sectors cooperate in matters of national concern.

Forty‐one years ago, Foreign Affairs published the landmark article—"Mr. X"— calling for a bold new approach to the challenges of the post‐war world. At that time, the international structure and order inherited from the nineteenth century had collapsed, and attempts to replace it were directed from two philosophically distinct and antagonistic power centers. This was the era of the Cold War.

America met those challenges with a sense of daring and determination. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO—these stand as testimonials to imaginative leadership and effort. The renewed vitality of Western Europe and Japan—protected by the shield of a strong and effective deterrence—are a measure of its success.

Today, America faces another historic challenge occasioned neither by war nor post‐war dislocations. Rather, it results from changes set in motion by a new and powerful dynamic which in recent years has exploded onto the world scene—the grand spectacle of the Information Revolution.     

Negotiating Verification: International Diplomacy and the Evolution of Nuclear Safeguards, 1945–1972

Nuclear safeguards have been an essential part of the global order since the beginnings of the nuclear age. The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], an international bureaucracy that is supposed to be a non-political, technical institution administers this global nuclear safeguards regime. Even though safeguards have always been controversial, they have turned out to be the most enduring item in the international community’s toolbox to prevent or slow down the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. This analysis shows that nuclear safeguards, whilst they survived the fall of the Iron Curtain, were a genuine invention of the Cold War. At the beginning of the nuclear age, there was an overall understanding that safeguards were not strong enough to prevent the global spread of nuclear weapons. It was only over the course of the late 1950s and 1960s that safeguards moved from the margins to the centre of diplomatic negotiations about global nuclear order. Newly declassified records from the IAEA Archives in Vienna offer insights into the evolution of early nuclear safeguards and suggest that negotiation patterns, proceedings, and settings affected the outcome of this nuclear diplomacy.     

Politicians,Experts and Democracy. Civil–Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Bulgaria

Abstract

Central and Eastern European countries have made significant progress in their efforts to democratize postcommunist civil–military relations. Appointing civilian ministers of defense, improving institutional arrangements and asserting legislative oversight over the armed forces have been key priorities. Problems still abound and levels of reform vary in the region even after NATO's second enlargement since 1989. Challenges remain concerning competent democratic civilian management, and effective defense reform planning and implementation. This article argues that the lack of an integrated Ministry of Defense, the low level of civilian interest in defense matters, the reform-deterrent attitude of political and military elite, and ambiguous institutional lines of authority are factors that still hamper civil–military relations in Bulgaria. I assert that the domestic political environment and international factors together facilitate democratic civilian control over the armed forces.     

Conflict over Israel: The Role of Religion,Race, Party and Ideology in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1997–2002

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the contours of support for the state of Israel in the House of Representatives from 1997 to 2002. In an analysis of votes and cosponsorship decisions, we find that when Congress considers innocuous resolutions of support for Israel, support is consensual and nonpartisan. However, as the violence escalated between Israel and the Palestinians in the 106th and 107th Congresses (1999–2001), the House increasingly considered bills and resolutions that directly engaged the Palestinian issue and forced legislators to take a side in the ongoing conflict. This transformed the politics of support for Israel and increased the level of conflict among legislators. With that, new partisan, ideological, religious, and racial cleavages emerged. Democrats, liberals, and African Americans started to identify with the Palestinians—not Israel—as the oppressed group. At the same time, religious and ideological conservatives and Republicans started to identify with Israel as a just state under attack from lawless individuals considered to be outside the Judeo-Christian tradition. At least with regard to Israel, this suggests that the development of U.S. foreign policy, which is often characterized as an elite-driven pursuit of national interests, is heavily marked by domestic ethno-religious forces.