Explaining the Decline of Macro-corporatist Political Bargaining Structures in Advanced Capitalist Societies

A growing consensus among many observers of Western European politics has developed in recent years that, in certain countries, national level, consensus-based political bargaining arrangements involving representatives of organized capital, trade unions, and the state are giving way to more sectorally-based, conflictual forms of relations. These developments suggest an overall decline in the efficacy of national-level corporatist institutional structures in the liberal democracies of Western Europe. This article contends that neither of the two general theoretical approaches to the study of corporatism - the liberal model of the "neocorporatist state" (which fails to acknowledge the potential for serious system-threatening instability within corporatism) nor the Marxist model of corporatist "political structures" (which incorrectly predicts labor-generated corporatist instability due to inevitable rank-and-file discontent with the policy outputs of corporatist forms) - can account for this current wave of macro-corporatist instability and decline. In response to this theoretical impasse, this article develops a capitalist-centered explanation for the declining significance of corporatist forms. Business interests, it is maintained, may no longer be viewing corporatist arrangements as beneficial due to certain domestic structural economic changes and to transformations in the global capitalist system.     

Corporatism and Social Trust: Bringing Voluntary Organizations ‘Back In’

Abstract

In analyses of the sources of social trust, it has been found that voluntary organizations have no effect upon it. Such analyses have overlooked the role of civil society organizations as intermediary structures between the citizen and the state. This article explores how organizations, linked together in corporatist networks, help generate trust. Two mechanisms for this are pointed out. First, in societies with strong corporatist networks conflicts between employers and employees are perceived as less strong than in societies with weak corporatist networks. Second, as societies with strong corporatist networks also are more egalitarian, conflicts between rich and poor are also perceived as less pronounced than in societies with weak corporatist networks. This analysis provides definite indications that the perception of conflicts between workers and managers, and the perception of conflicts between rich and poor are intermediary variables between corporatism and social trust, and thus supports the hypothesis that voluntary organizations, through corporatist networks of negotiation and coordination, contribute to the growth of social trust.     

How electoral vulnerability affects pension politics: Introducing a concept,measure and empirical application

Are electorally vulnerable politicians really less likely to support controversial legislation, such as pension reforms? While the literature on welfare state retrenchment has increasingly pointed to the role of electoral factors in the dynamics of social policy cutbacks, there are few studies that actually measure the magnitude of electoral pressure and its consequent impact on the politics of reform. To this end, the authors have developed a quantitative measure of the electoral vulnerability of politicians and tested its impact on pension reform outcomes using an original dataset comprising 16 Western European countries from 1980 to 2003. In line with expectations, the results show that the impact of electoral vulnerability on reform depends upon the system of interest intermediation. In corporatist systems, electoral vulnerability indeed impedes reform. But in pluralist systems, increased electoral vulnerability is associated with higher levels of reform. This is because unions in corporatist (but not in pluralist) systems can exploit electoral vulnerability in pre‐legislative bargaining, and thus pressure politicians. Consequently, this study has broader implications for the differential responsiveness of democracies to redistributive issues more generally.     

Ethnoreligious Politics in France: Jews and Muslims

This article focuses on the relationship between the two major ethnoreligious communities – the Jews and the Muslims – and the state in France, as reflected in lobbying, electoral behaviour, and public policies. It shows how the evolution of that relationship, an aspect of the politics of ethnicity, religion and multiculturalism, has been both a cause and a consequence of modifications in approaches to secularism, communitarianism and affirmative action. Finally, it deals with the question to what extent this development corresponds to a pluralist or corporatist model of politics and argues that changes in the relationship between state and society suggest an evolving accommodationist pattern increasingly similar to that of the United States.     

Corporatism, Pluralism, and Democracy: Toward a Deliberative Theory of Bureaucratic Accountability

This essay proposes a deliberative model of bureaucratic accountability and assesses its feasibility. Conventional wisdom suggests that a deliberative theory of bureaucratic accountability has little utility outside corporatist contexts. I reject this view because recent changes in patterns of interest representation have transformed both corporatist and pluralist bureaucracies into more hospitable environments for public deliberation. Contrary to the claims of democratic corporatists, recent pluralist practices of interest representation also seem to be compatible with public deliberation. Hence, movement toward greater openness in administrative decision-making is possible from both liberal pluralist and corporatist starting points. Corporatism clearly has no monopoly on democratic deliberation.     

The regulatory style of environmental governance in China: the case of EIA regulation in Shanghai*

The body of literature that examines how institutional contexts affect environmental governance in advanced industrial countries finds that style of environmental regulation is country‐specific. In the pluralist form of democracy like the United States, environmental policy formulation involves bargaining and compromises among interest groups and regulation enforcement through relatively formal and legalistic means. In the corporatist form of democracy like Sweden and Great Britain, in contrast, environmental policies are more accommodating to divergent societal interests and tend to be less formal in their enforcement. These variations in regulatory style have been attributed to differences in basic constitutional structures, regime types and cultures. How do institutional contexts affect the style of environmental regulation in China, which is both a non‐democratic and developing country? This article examines China's regulatory style by focusing on environmental impact assessment (EIA) regulation in Shanghai. The Shanghai EIA system is analyzed in terms of policy ideology, policy content, regulatory process, public participation and policy consequences. It is shown that China's being a single‐party regime with a ‘rule of persons’ tradition has heavily shaped its environmental governance. Based on Shanghai experience, China's style can be characterized as formal in requirement, agency‐dominated in the regulatory process, legalistic in enforcement, and informal politics as the substance of regulation. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporatism and the Microeconomic Foundations of Swedish Social Democracy: The Swedish Model Revisited*

The aim of this paper is to advance the research into the workings of ‘corporatist’ societies by adding a microeconomic dimension and outlining how such a revised model is applicable to recent Swedish experience. Sweden is often regarded as a corporatist society., that is, one in which policy is the outcome of a ‘social partnership’ between encompassing groups coordinated by government. This corporatist approach, resting on the existence of a macro-economic social contract between peak organizations, is complemented here by an analysis of the micro-level incentives and mechanisms conducive to operating within the corporatist cooperative framework. These characteristics are seen as together constituting what I term the solidaristic market economy, a system of economic relations different in fundamental respects from the two with which we are familiar. While Swedish reality docs not correspond exactly to the economic model set out, the case is made that it is as reasonable to extrapolate from Swedish experience to the solidaristic market economy (and vice versa) as to learn from U.S. experience about the competitive market economy and from the Soviet Union about the command economy. Complemented by these micro-characteristics, corporatist analysis of economic relations under social-democratic regimes is thus seen as explaining the resilience of the ‘Swedish model’. Rather than in constant peril as critics suggest, the encompassing interest organizations and the patterns of relations among them are characterized by continued solidity in keeping with the operating principles of the solidaristic market economy.     

Pluralism,corporatism and perception of corruption

When people know who is influencing the elected politicians and they may ‘put the rascals out’ in case they feel that the incumbents are corrupt, ceteris paribus, their perception of the level of corruption should not be affected by lobbying. If on the other hand people are not sure which or how many actors are influencing public policy and they are not able to hold the government truly accountable as interest group influence is constant with different governments, people will be more likely to perceive the government as corrupted. The former system is a characteristic of corporatism and the latter of pluralism. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that interest groups with resources such as business groups or firms in pluralist systems are more influential than groups with few resources. Thus, people may perceive pluralist policy‐making system as more corrupt than corporatist policy‐making system where fewer visible actors have more or less equal weight in the policy‐making process. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporatism, Pluralism, and Swedish Interest Group Influence in Social Welfare Policymaking

Corporatism and pluralism predict different characteristics of interest groups; their environments are important in understanding the level of influence that these groups have. This article describes variables related to these theoretical approaches and tests them as determinants of two operationalizations of interest group influence, one objective and one reputational. Results of these tests on Swedish interest group information indicate that, although Sweden has usually been considered a model corporatist political system, the situation is more complicated, with some pluralist factors being quite important. The study suggests that interest group influence may be more objectively determinable than is usually believed.     

Adapting Danish Interests to European Integration

When Denmark became a member of the European Community in 1973, political institutions as well as private business had to and did in fact make adaptations to the new and unaccustomed political environment. With the exception of the Common Market Committee of Folkelinget , however, the Danish polity did not change much with regard to the EC until the late 1980s when the Community gained new momentum. Now, traditionally corporatist patterns of decision-making are adapting to a European polity much more complex and pluralist by nature. Political and administrative institutions are developing new ways of influencing EC policies, though their lobbying activities still remain basically ad hoc and reactive. As to private interests, agriculture occupies a unique position with its long tradition of aggressive lobbying, while lobbying by manufacturing companies is still in the making. However, an overall weakening of national corporatist patterns of decision-making in response to the integration process, which one might perhaps have expected, has not taken place. Rather, we observe a strengthening. Thus, our case poses questions as to the relevance of existing corporatist notions for an understanding of the general nature of the policy-making process in the Community and the prospects for interest organizational centralization at the European level.     

Interest‐group politics in France and Ireland: Comparative perspectives on neo‐corporation

An examination of a range of interest‐groups in France and Ireland shows that there are numerous types of involvement in decision‐making processes and that groups display considerable differences in priorities and strategies both as between groups and over time. The nature of governmental response also varies in a similar fashion. The findings are interpreted against neo‐corporatist theory and its variants of sectoral and meso‐corpor‐atism. The conclusion is that neither corporatist nor pluralist models properly fit the situation of the two countries and that an adequate theory will have to take into account both modes of explanation as well as allowing for the volatility and evolutionary potential of interest‐group behaviour.     

Does the American Dairy Industry Fit the Meso-Corporatist Model?

Corporatism having become a less useful label for describing entire political systems, corporatist scholars have emphasized the importance of meso-level corporatism, using dairying as the classic example. Analysis of the American dairy industry does not support the claim that there is 'no corporatism in the United States' but it suggests why meso-corporatist enclaves in a macro-pluralist system are liable to be ephemeral. What sets the American dairy industry apart from its European and Canadian counterparts is that the meso-corporatist institutional arrangements were undermined by the emergence of large regional cooperatives in the 1960s and as a result present dairy policy-making has reverted once more to a pluralist paradigm.     

Think Tanks in Iceland

This article maps the landscape of think tanks in Iceland. It shows that think tanks are very few and insignificant in Icelandic policymaking. In the literature, the growth of think tanks in European countries with corporatist pasts has been linked to a change to a more pluralist system of interest representation. The case of Iceland lends support to this claim. In contrast to Scandinavia, corporatism remains entrenched in Iceland. But although there is a very limited market for local think tanks in Iceland, it is nevertheless recognized by political actors that touting policy advice offered by prestigious (international) think tanks can bring political benefits. This is also demonstrated in the article, showing that the influence of think tanks transcends at times national borders.     

The mass media's dual role: ‘watchdog’ and guardian of their own interests

The mass media are a special case of interest articulation in a democracy because they play two distinct roles. On the one hand, mass media provide information about efforts by various interest groups to influence public policy. On the other hand, being interest groups themselves, the mass media work to protect and advance their own interests. This article examines the compatibility of these two roles in Argentina and Uruguay by placing this in a broader discussion about the role of lobbying in democratic societies. The evidence suggests that despite impediments to the media's ability to fulfill both roles simultaneously, some have performed a credible job. The best explanation for the variance in performance among the media outlets includes a combination of the following factors: the size and density of the media market, patterns of media ownership, the relative strength of the state vis-à-vis the media, levels of public advertising, and the particular practices adopted by individual media companies. Evidence suggests that neither the traditional distinction between corporatist and pluralist societies nor government regulation of lobbying plays a dominant role in determining the media's performance. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporatism and Planning in London in the 1980s

This study confirms the existence of corporatist forms of interest intermediation at the micro level of four local planning authorities in London. In all four boroughs distinctions could be drawn between local business associations and metic, non-local firms. The former displayed most of the institutional characteristics outlined by Schmitter in his original definition of corporatism. In contrast the non-local or metic firms did not exhibit all these institutional characteristics at the level of local government. The conditions under which they bargained with local planning authorities (LPAs) were often influenced by statutory and other requirements handed down from central government. These requirements were themselves often the result of corporatist interest intermediation at the level of the central state. Both local business associations (LBAs) and metic production organizations (MPOs) were required by (LPAs) to implement planning policies. This process has increased in importance during the Thatcher era. Economic decline has made the local planning authorities even more dependent on private organizations for implementation than before. Local LBAs and MPOs were granted privileged access to the planning system. Only the LBAs were granted representational monopolies for their very local areas in this process. MPOs developed representational oligopolies but because they were so few in number they could be in conflict with one another over the rights to develop a particular site. In return for these representational privileges both the LBAs and MPOs were expected to moderate their demands for major departures from the approved local plans. The methods used to intermediate interests to the local planning systems were primarily informal. Although a small number of formal meetings were held each year between external organizations and the LPAs they represented a minority of the contacts between them and representatives of both LBAs and MPOs. Informal bargaining took place in two ways. First, there were issue specific negotiations over particular developments. The second type of contact was long-term, non-issue specific and primarily concerned with network building. Both types of bargaining were relatively secret and involved only the top echelons of the organizations concerned.     

The Finnish Think Tank Landscape – A Mixture of Consensualism and Adversity?

As a common feature of Nordic countries, the Finnish landscape of thinks tanks has been populated by large corporatist interest organisations and government-funded research organisations. In addition to this, since 2005, party-affiliated think tanks form a notable part of the picture. Recently, several small think tanks that are oriented towards specific themes, such as international relations, the environment and feminism, have been founded. This article examines Finnish developments in the field of think tanks with two objectives. First, it gives a general overview of the Finnish think tank landscape. Second, by using interview data and public mission statements of the most prominent think tanks, it explores how these organisations see their role in Finnish society. What is their relationship with media and the political machinery, and how does this relate to their position and activities as either consensual or adversarial actors? It is concluded that redeeming the place of think tanks in the Finnish polity is a continuing challenge, and resorting to adversarial tactics is not a favourable way to do so. This approach has mostly been attempted by neoliberal think tanks that, in the past, have also profited from corporatist structures to enhance their objectives.     

Rethinking Political Science: An Interview with Mark Kesselman

Abstract

While numerous studies show the corporatist style of governance to be on the decline in many western European democracies, Austria, for most analysts, continues to be governed by relatively harmonious practices of institutionalized corporatist concertation. In contrast to the currently popular mainstream assumption that the stability of Austrian corporatism can be traced in large part to Austria's unique and historically well‐established “culture of consensus,” this essay argues that the persistence of corporatism in Austria is attributable largely to the fact that market forces have yet to assume corporatism's functional role of securing labor discipline and wage demand moderation. As such, Austrian capitalists, in contrast to their counterparts in Europe's other postwar corporatist societies, remain reluctant to disassociate themselves entirely from corporatist political structures and to move toward more market‐based forms of industrial relations and economic decisionmaking.     

An institutional dinosaur: Austrian corporatism in the post‐industrial age

While the Austrian party system, based on a competitive electoral logic, is able to absorb the wide‐ranging changes created by modernisation in the last 25 years, the corporatist system, based on a ‘protective’ logic insulates itself from societal change. Corporatist organisations are designed to create societal stability. As societies experience dynamic change, the corporatist institutional structure not only becomes obsolete but also hinders evolutionary institutional adaptation to a changing society. Corporatist institutions are increasingly ‘out of touch’ with popular demands. The sources for this maladaptation reside within the central institutional features of corporatism themselves: organisation of interests in peak associations, compulsory membership to three of the four ‘strategic actors’, and the decision rule of unanimity.