The Creation of Investigating Chambers at the International Criminal Court: An Option Worth Pursuing?

At a time when the position of investigating judge has beenabolished in a number of civil law countries, and is being questionedin those in which it remains, it might seem curious to callfor such a position to be created at the International CriminalCourt (ICC). However, experience at the ad hoc internationalcriminal tribunals (‘ad hoc tribunals’), and especiallyat the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslaviashows that the essentially adversarial procedure used in internationalcriminal proceedings is not wholly suitable for trying complexand highly political international cases. Having investigatingjudges participate in the investigations of such cases coulddecisively enhance the effectiveness, legitimacy and fairnessof international proceedings. This would be particularly appropriatein the ICC's complex legal system, which allows victims to participatein the proceedings and claim reparations. However, this newprocedure must clearly come with a number of safeguards in orderto avoid the failures attendant on the use of the investigatingjudge in domestic systems, which could be fatal to an embryonicand fragile international court.     

Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of Subordinates or Separate Offence of the Superior?

The nature of command responsibility is still open to debatein international criminal law: is a superior to be held criminallyresponsible for the crimes committed by his subordinates ‘asan accomplice’, for having participated in the commissionof the crime by omission, or as a perpetrator of a separateoffence of dereliction of duty? This article surveys the post-WW2case law and the first international instruments on this point,and then analyses the jurisprudence of the International CriminalTribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The judges appearto have recently adopted a new approach to Article 7(3) ICTYSt.in that the superior is held responsible ‘for failureto prevent or punish with regard to the crimes of the subordinate’and no longer ‘for the crimes of his subordinates’.It is a responsibility ‘sui generis’ indeed, wherethe crime of the subordinate plays a central role in the attributionof responsibility to the superior. It is, therefore, necessaryto carefully consider the relationship between the superior'sfailure to act and the subordinate's crime, both with regardto objective and subjective elements. The same question finallyarises in relation to Article 28 of the Rome Statute, the literalinterpretation of which implies that a superior shall be punishedfor the same crime committed by his subordinates. In order toavoid the risk of holding a person guilty of an offence committedby others in violation of the principle of personal and culpablecriminal responsibility, it is crucial to consider separatelythe different cases of command responsibility, which are basedon distinct objective and subjective requirements.     

论成立国际刑事法庭的合法性问题

刑法上的“合法性原则”要求一个法庭必须“依法成立”。法庭只有“依法成立”,才有资格进行审理、并在确定被告有罪时对其进行定罪。刑法上这个原则,当然也适用于国际刑事法庭。自上个世纪90年代以后,国际社会为了惩治严重的国际犯罪行为,已成立了不少国际刑事法庭。尽管这些国际刑事法庭的宗旨和目的相同,但它们的成立方式却各不相同:前南斯拉夫国际刑事法庭和卢旺达国际刑事法庭是联合国安理会通过决议成立;塞拉利昂特别法庭是塞拉利昂政府与联合国通过签订协议而成立。虽然,成立方式可以不一样,但都必须符合“合法性”原则。本文将通过案例分析,来探讨这些国际刑事法庭在实践中是如何论证和裁决关于成立国际刑事法庭的“合法性”原则的法理问题。     

Multilevel Judicial Governance of International Trade Requires a Common Conception of Rule of Law and Justice

Since the establishment of the Permanent Court of InternationalJustice in 1922, governments have consented to, and activelyused, an ever larger number of international and transnationalcourts, quasi-judicial dispute settlement bodies and ad hocarbitral tribunals for the settlement of disputes over the interpretationand application of rules of international law. Such judicialclarification of disputed interpretations of incomplete, intergovernmentalagreements reduces not only the negotiation costs of governmentsby delegating the clarification of contested facts and legalclaims to independent third-party adjudication. Judicial decision-makingat intergovernmental, transnational, national and private levelsalso supplements rule-making and offers citizens judicial remediesfor defending their rights and interests. Modern internationaleconomic law increasingly complements intergovernmental, legislative,and administrative governance by multilevel ‘judicialgovernance’ so as to protect rule of law more effectivelyfor the benefit of citizens (Section I). This contribution criticizesthe one-sidedly power-oriented perceptions of WTO law as ‘internationallaw among states’ (Section II) and the related perceptionsof international judges as dependent agents of states (Section III).Civil society, parliaments and democratic governments shouldencourage national and international judges to cooperate intheir legal task of interpreting citizen-oriented internationaleconomic law ‘in conformity with principles of justiceand international law’, as explicitly prescribed in theVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The legal coherenceof multilevel judicial governance depends on protecting principlesof procedural as well as substantive justice and a common conceptionof ‘rule of law’ not only in intergovernmental relationsamong states, but also vis-à-vis their citizens engagedin, and benefiting from, international trade (Sections IV–VIII).     

Legal Aid,Self-Representation,And The Crisis At The Hague Tribunal

The unfolding of the case of Prosecutor v. Vojislav ŠeŠelj at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has been dramatic and more than a little chaotic. The author argues that it is diagnostic of a broader crisis at the Tribunal. As an experiment in international justice, the ad hoc tribunal model has proved to be expensive and slow, but on several points also procedurally arbitrary, intellectually unconvincing, and vulnerable to improper political considerations. These problems have attained a critical mass in ŠeŠelj’s case, as illustrated here. The accused ŠeŠelj, an ultranationalist politician and former paramilitary leader, has vowed to bring the Tribunal to its knees. He is self- represented at trial. This privilege was twice reaffirmed in 2006 by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, having been twice revoked by a bench of trial judges. In 2007, the new pre-trial judge in the case (now presiding judge), Jean-Claude Antonetti, declared that a self-represented accused who can prove indigence is entitled to legal aid. He ordered the Registrar of the Tribunal to pay ŠeŠelj’s defence expenses from the Tribunal’s legal aid budget if ŠeŠelj could prove his indigence. The author argues that while there is good reason to disburse legal aid funds to an indigent accused who has been granted privileges of self-representation, this entitlement was not convincingly explained by Antonetti. Moreover, ŠeŠelj’s destructive aims were improperly set aside by Antonetti in reaching his decision on the public financing of his defence. The current situation, which represents the combined effort of the Appeals Chamber and Antonetti, allows ŠeŠelj to bully participants in the proceedings, issue thinly veiled threats to prospective witnesses and the public at large, and bend the trial procedure to the requirements of his political populism. The poor handling of this case by the Tribunal as a whole calls into question the ad hoc tribunal model of international criminal justice. In the period 2003–2007, the author was a legal advisor to ICTY trial judges, working for a short time on the Vojislav ŠeŠelj case prior to its transfer to Judge Antonetti.     

Evidentiary Issues in the ICJ's Genocide Judgment

Despite the commitment by the International Court of Justice(ICJ or the Court) in clarifying underlying methods and guidelinesof its approach to fact-finding and evidence, it can be doubtedwhether the judgment delivered in the Bosnia and Herzegovinav. Serbia case genuinely marked a decisive step towards a moretransparent and reliable methodology for evidentiary matters.Behind the formula of ‘fully conclusive evidence’,when dealing with Articles II and III of the Genocide Conventionthe Court adopted for all practical purposes a typical criminallaw ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’ standard of proof.By this choice the Court upheld in substance the argument putforward by Serbia that even if the questions of state responsibilityfor acts of genocide are not excluded by the scope of the Convention,they must nevertheless be judged by the same parameters of individualcriminal responsibility. In reaching its conclusions the Courtrelied heavily on the jurisprudence of the ICTY, both as regardsthe ascertainment of facts and their legal qualification. Itremains to be seen whether in future cases the Court will beable to adopt a similar criminal court posture, and whetherit will be similarly prepared to rely on the findings of otherinternational tribunals such as the International Criminal Court,which is not established by the Security Council.     

Divergent Approaches to Determining Responsibility for Genocide: The Darfur Commission of Inquiry and the ICJ's Judgment in the Genocide Case

Internationally sanctioned assessments of genocide are relativelyuncommon, and since genocide is usually assessed in the contextof an individual's criminal prosecution, assessments of stateresponsibility for genocide are even rarer. Yet two such analyseshave recently been completed: the International Commission ofInquiry on Darfur's Report and the International Court of Justice'sJudgment on genocide in Bosnia. On a key issue, the methodologyfor determining whether a state is responsible for genocide,they diverged. Whereas the Darfur Commission determined whetherthe ‘central government’ of Sudan pursued a statepolicy or plan for genocide in Darfur, the ICJ stressed thata state commits genocide through the acts of its officials,holding that if a state organ or a person or group whose actsare legally attributable to the state, engages in genocide,then the international responsibility of that state is incurred.This article critically examines the different methodologicalapproaches taken by these two bodies in light of internationaljurisprudence. It argues that the Darfur Commission erred infocusing its genocide inquiry on whether high-level officialsin Sudan's government possessed genocidal intent, rather thanon the perpetrators of the underlying criminal acts. In addition,it argues that, whether the Commission's goal was to determinestate responsibility or individual criminal responsibility,its approach was at variance with international law as elucidatedin the UN ad hoc tribunals and as subsequently confirmed bythe ICJ in the Genocide Case. In that regard, the ICJ Judgmentreestablishes two sound methodological principles: the existenceof a state plan or policy, although probative of intent, isnot an implicit element of genocide; and determining state intent(however that may be defined) is not a part of determining stateresponsibility for genocide.     

To Be (Present) or Not To Be (Present): Trials In Absentia before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

One feature of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (‘STL’)differentiating it from other international criminal tribunals(except for the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal) isthat its Statute allows for trials in absentia. The Statutepermits such trials when an accused failed to appear in courtor even to appoint a defence lawyer, but only on the conditionthat, where the indictment could not be served or notified tothe accused, it was duly publicized through the media or communicatedto the state of residence or nationality of the accused. Followingthe case law of the European Court of Human Rights, Article22(3) of the STL Statute allows for retrial, except where anabsent defendant was represented at trial by counsel of hisor her own choosing. The author argues this right to retrialshould not be applied either where (i) the accused expresslywaived in writing his right to be present, but then failed toappoint counsel of his choosing; or (ii) a state's failure tohand the accused over to the STL does not cure the accused'srefusal to voluntarily surrender to the STL. She also arguesthat the right of retrial following trials in absentia oughtto accrue to Lebanese courts, notwithstanding Article 5(1) ofthe Statute, which seems to prohibit Lebanese courts retryingindividuals convicted by the STL. Finally, she takes into accountthe position of states that prohibit trials in absentia, butare requested to surrender a person convicted in absentia bythe STL for the purpose of executing his sentence, suggestingan ad hoc agreement between the state in question and the STLmay be required as a remedy.     

Assisting an Accused to Represent Himself: Appointment of Amici Curiae as the Most Appropriate Option

Given the proportion and complexity of international criminalproceedings, allowing an accused to represent himself beforean international criminal court might render his defence ineffective,even if the accused is a lawyer himself. If international criminalcourts are not willing to have the accused bear the consequencesof his choice of self-representation, the measure of appointingexperienced Defence Counsel as amici curiae to make legal contributionsto add to the Judges’ informed decisions seems to entailfewer undesirable ethical consequences for counsel than beingadded as ‘standby counsel’ or ‘court assignedcounsel’. Through occupying a neutral position and notbeing required to represent the accused, the amici's input maybalance the flow of defence and prosecution arguments and thuscontribute to the fairness of international criminal trials.The measure of appointing standby counsel or court assignedcounsel to an accused who wishes to represent himself appearsless appropriate, especially from a legal professional perspective.     

International criminal justice: reflections on the past and the future

While Nuremberg constitutes a watershed in the evolution of international law with its establishment of the fundamental principle of individual criminal responsibility under international law it has not left much else by way of precedent for the subsequent international criminal tribunals. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 827 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and Resolution 955 (1994) establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, set the groundwork for a new model of hybrid tribunals, with the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2002, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia in 2006, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in 2007. Perhaps one of the greatest legacies of these ad hoc and hybrid courts and tribunals has been paving the way for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court. However, they have also brought about the development of international criminal law through judicial interpretation, elaborating, inter alia, the elements of the crime of genocide as detailed in the 1948 Genocide Convention, the judicial recognition of the concept of joint criminal enterprise and the principle that national arrangements for amnesties in respect of international crimes are no bar to prosecution for such crimes at an international tribunal. In view of the completion strategies of the ad hoc Tribunals, as well as of the SCSL, this article delves into some of their legacies and outlines some of the difficulties and challenges they have faced, while identifying areas of best practice in order for the newly‐operational International Criminal Court to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past or even reinventing new wheels.     

The Crime of Genocide in the ICTR Jurisprudence

The jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal forRwanda (ICTR) has properly focused on the special intent (dolusspecialis) to destroy a group as the distinguishing characteristicof genocide and differentiated it from result-oriented crimes.Although the ICTR has crowned genocide as ‘the crime ofcrimes’, it has simultaneously dethroned it by holdingthat it attracts the same sentence as other humanitarian lawviolations. Nonetheless, ICTR jurisprudence attaches considerableimportance to characterizing the destruction of the Tutsi asgenocide as distinct from crimes against humanity. Because theTutsi cannot be readily distinguished as one of the protectedgroups under the Genocide Convention, Trial Chambers have goneto great lengths to characterize them as an ‘ethnic’group in order to justify the label of genocide.     

Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility

The joint criminal enterprise doctrine appears more and moreas the ‘magic weapon’ in the prosecution of internationalcrimes. Yet, the doctrine not only gives rise to conceptualconfusion and conflicts with some fundamental principles of(international) criminal law but also invades the traditionalambit of command responsibility liability. This becomes obviousif both doctrines are applied simultaneously in cases againstaccused with some kind of superior position. After a short introductionon both doctrines, as interpreted in modern case law, the articlegives some examples of their simultaneous application and triesto develop distinguishing criteria in light of the case lawand a ‘dogmatic’ analysis of both the doctrines.A reference to the theory of ‘Organisationsherrschaft’shows that there is yet another option to impute internationalcrimes to top perpetrators.     

Expert witness in international war crimes tribunals

Abstract

The author has served as an expert witness in eight different cases tried before war crimes tribunals, involving twelve accused. Only three of the twelve accused were convicted. Seven were acquitted and two cases are still pending. The general defense strategy in such cases is to admit the crimes, but to challenge the involvement or responsibility of the accused. Identity then becomes the main issue to be proven by the prosecution. From the verdicts it appears that problems of identification were a major reason for acquittal. A closer look at the cases demonstrates that these problems were entirely due to an astounding naivety of the various prosecutors with respect to identification issues. The identification procedures used by the investigators were violating even the basic principles developed in many years of research in the area of psychology and law. This is even more shocking when it is realized how important these trials are, not only for the accused, but also for the witnesses, the victims, their relatives, their communities, and for international justice.

Since 1987 I have been asked eight times to testify in war crimes trials. The venues were, in chronological order:

• The Special Court in Jerusalem for the trial of suspects accused of crimes in the Second World War – the case against John Demjanjuk.

• The Special Dutch Court for the trial of suspects accused of crimes against humanity in the Second World War – the case against Marinus De Rijke.

• The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); five cases: against Du?ko Tadi? (IT-94-1), Vlatko Kupreskic (IT-95-16), Fatmir Limaj et al. (IT-03-66-T), Ramush Haradinaj et al. (IT-04-84), and Ljubisa Beara (IT-05-88-T).

• The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) – the case against Jérôme–Clement Bicamumpaka (ICTR 99-5-T).

In this paper I will describe some of my experiences, and try to formulate some lessons that I have learned.     

The Requirement of an 'Express Agreement' for Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability: A Critique of Brdanin

The mode of liability known as joint criminal enterprise (JCE)has emerged in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a means of assigning criminalliability to individuals for activities carried out by a collective.As a result, the doctrine must be carefully defined so as notto allow it to extend a defendant's liability beyond the appropriatelimits of individual criminal responsibility. In this regard,a recent ICTY Trial Chamber decision in Branin held that, wherea defendant is not alleged to have participated in the physicalperpetration of the crimes charged but to have contributed insome other way to the commission of the crimes by a group, theprosecution must demonstrate that the defendant entered intoan express agreement with the physical perpetrators to committhe crimes charged. The author argues that this ‘expressagreement requirement’ is both conceptually unsound andpractically unhelpful. Conceptually, it would be inconsistentwith core principles of JCE liability to require an expressagreement between a defendant and the physical perpetratorsof crimes, at least in circumstances in which it is allegedthat there existed a structure of two or more overlapping JCEs.Moreover, because this structure allows the accused and thephysical perpetrators to be operating in two separate JCEs,they need not even share a common criminal purpose. On a practicallevel, arguably in a ‘system-criminality’ contextsuch as the one that developed in the former Yugoslavia duringthe time period in question, the organizers of criminal activityare unlikely to enter into express criminal agreements withthose who physically carry out crimes, because existing organizedhierarchies provide much more efficient mechanisms by whichleaders are able to ensure the realization of their criminalplans.     

Main Achievements of the ICTR

Since trials began in 1997, the International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda (ICTR) has conducted cases involving 50 accused,involving a prime minister and several ministers, prefects,bourgmestres and other leaders, who would otherwise not havebeen brought to justice. Judgments have been rendered in respectof 25 accused, with three acquittals. During the first mandate(1995–1999), the Tribunal delivered ground-breaking judgmentsconcerning genocide, such as Akayesu and Kambanda. In the secondmandate (1999–2003), the judicial output doubled and includedthe Media judgment. Halfway into the third mandate (2003–2007),trials involving 25 accused are ongoing. The ICTR is an efficientjudicial institution which has conducted fair trials, createdimportant jurisprudence, and made a significant contributionto the development of international criminal justice.     

Shedding the blanket of immunity: a commentary on the global principle of ending impunity,realpolitik, and legal precedent

Over the course of the past two decades, there have been attempts by governments and the international political community to limit the scope of immunity granted to heads of states. Nevertheless in recent years we have witnessed former heads of state being brought to justice through ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the permanent International Criminal Court. Yet, head of state immunity remains one of the leading points of contention in international law. The issue is further compounded with the multiplicity of national systems that fall short of their duty to prosecute foreign heads of state if they have committed heinous crimes, those considered jus cogens which constitute peremptory norms. As such, there is a need to examine immunity from prosecution by another state separately from immunity from an international tribunal and/or court. This is especially the case given the problems of initiating ad hoc tribunals and the limited abilities of the ICC, highlighting the need to ensure cooperation of states’ willingness and ability to prosecute. In doing so, I draw from the infamous case of former President of Chile, Augusto Pinochet, and subsequent attempts by national systems to hold accountable foreign heads of state. I conclude by suggesting that the optimism for ending impunity is not only premature, but misguided given the realpolitik surrounding national progression for ending head of state immunity and ensuring their legal obligations to prosecute.     

Constructing Achievement in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): A Corpus-Based Critical Discourse Analysis

The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by the UN Security Council in 1993 to prosecute persons responsible for war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia during the Balkan wars. As the first international war crimes tribunal since the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals set up after WWII, the ICTY has attracted immense interest among legal scholars since its inception, but has failed to garner the same level of attention from researchers in other disciplines, notably linguistics. This represents a significant research gap, as the Tribunal’s public discourse (notably its case law and Annual Reports) can open up interesting avenues of analysis to researchers of law, language, and legal discourse alike. On its official website, the Tribunal claims that it has “irreversibly changed the landscape of international humanitarian law” and lists six specific achievements: “Holding leaders accountable; bringing justice to victims; giving victims a voice; establishing the facts; developing international law and strengthening the rule of the law”. While a number of legal scholars have studied and critiqued the level of ‘achievement’ actually attained by the Tribunal against these metrics and others, of interest to linguists is the ways in which this work might be conveyed discursively. In this paper, we demonstrate how methods from the linguistic field of corpus-based critical discourse analysis can be utilised to explore the discursive construction of such achievements in the language of the ICTY.     

The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise

Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) as a mode of liability in internationalcriminal law is a concept widely upheld by international caselaw. It has, however, been harshly attacked by commentators,particularly with regard to what has come to be known as the‘third category’ of the notion, that of liabilitybased on foreseeability and the voluntary taking of the riskthat a crime outside the common plan or enterprise be perpetrated.This author considers that while most criticisms are off themark, at least two are pertinent: (i) that the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamberin Tadi (1999) was wrong in indiscriminately using terminologytypical of both the civil law and common law tradition, and(ii) that the foreseeability standard, being somewhat looseas a penal law category of culpability and causation, needssome qualification or precision. Generally speaking, the notionof JCE needs some tightening up. For instance, in Kvoka, anICTY Trial Chamber rightly stressed that the contribution ofa participant in a common criminal plan must be ‘substantial’(the Appeals Chamber, however, disagreed to some extent in thesame case). Furthermore, with specific regard to the third categoryof JCE, the author, after setting out the social and legal foundationsof the foreseeability standard and the motivations behind itsacceptance in international criminal law, suggests various waysof qualifying and straightening it out. One of them could liein assigning to the ‘primary offender’ (i.e. theperson who, in addition to committing the concerted crimes,also perpetrates a crime not part of the common plan or purpose)liability for all the crimes involved, while charging the ‘secondaryoffender’ with liability for a lesser crime, wheneverthis is legally possible. The author then suggests, contraryto a 2004 decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Branin, thatthe third category of JCE may not be admissible when the crimeother than that agreed upon requires special intent (this appliesto genocide, persecution as a crime against humanity, and aggression).In such cases, the other participants in JCE could only be chargedwith aiding and abetting the crimes committed by the ‘primaryoffender’ if the requisite conditions for aiding and abettingdo exist. The author then suggests that the view propoundedin 2004 by an ICTY Trial Chamber in Branin is sound, namelythat the general notion of JCE may not be resorted to when thephysical perpetrators of the crimes charged were not part ofthe criminal plan or agreement, but rather committed the crimesunaware that a plan or agreement had been entered into by anothergroup of persons. In conclusion, he contends that this qualifiednotion of JCE, in addition to being provided for in customaryinternational law, does not appear to be inconsistent with abroad interpretation of the provision of the ICC Statute governingindividual criminal responsibility, that is, Article 25, inparticular 25(3)(d).