Reflections on a Half Century of Political Science: Lecture Given by the Winner of the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science, Uppsala, 30 September 1995

Since I am to have the honour this evening of being presented with the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science, it seemed to me that it might be appropriate to say something about the development of political science. Do not fear, however, that I am about to begin my reflections with the study of government in 1622, a task that would greatly exceed my time, my competence and, I imagine, your patience. On a much more modest scale, let me mention a few of the conspicuous changes in political science since I first began teaching and writing in the field about a half century ago. Let me add at once that I do not mean to suggest that my brief account is at all comprehensive or systematic. It is merely a rather subjective survey of a few changes that I find interesting and important.     

Sketches for a Democratic Utopia

I want to sketch the general shape of several new structures that would in my view provide stronger support for democracy than is provided by any existing society. I call these sketches for a democratic Utopia not because I would expect these structures to inaugurate a perfect democracy, whatever that might be, nor because they are beyond human reach. On the contrary the institutions I want to suggest are well within human reach. I call them Utopian only because I am not able to point with confidence to the historical forces that are likely to bring them about.
The structures I have in mind are designed to strengthen freedom and equality among citizens of democratic orders.     

FASHIONS AND FANTASIES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION*

The title of this address results in part from discontent with much of the literature of Public Administration and Public Policy. It is mild discontent, and I do not want unduly to depreciate our writings. But I stop reading many books and articles disappointed, at finding old or obvious ideas restated in new words; at seeing a useful idea refined by scholasticism into complex and empirically untestable propositions; feeling that I am being "got at"; worst of all, with a sense that the work casts only a fitful or elusive light on the important problems it claims to deal with. Schuyler Wallace said years ago when I was starting my academic career that administrative study had been mainly built on the basis of half-truths and fictions,¹ and I believe this is still true. If I had remembered this phrase earlier, I might have called the paper "Half-Truths and Fictions in Public Administration". If it reflects some real discontents, it is also intended to be a bit jokey. Should the jokes fall flat or degenerate into vulgar abuse, blame the author.     

On the measurement of social class and its role in shaping white vote choice in the 2016 U.S. presidential election

In this paper, I assess how social class influenced white vote choice in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. I use 2016 ANES data to create a measure of class that is based on an individual's income, education, occupation, and wealth. I then use a structural equation model to show that an individual's social class both directly and indirectly shaped vote choice. I demonstrate that low class standing was a significant predictor of support for Trump in the general election. I also show that social class exerted an indirect effect. Lower class standing is associated with higher levels of racial resentment and authoritarianism, which were in turn strong predictors vote choice. I conclude that social class was one of the primary determinants of white vote choice.     

Rental Market Discrimination Against Same-Sex Couples: Evidence From a Pairwise-Matched Email Correspondence Test

ABSTRACT

I present the results of a randomized matched-pair email correspondence test of 6,490 unique property owners in 94 U.S. cities to provide a nationally representative estimate of the level of discrimination that same-sex couples experience when inquiring about rental housing. I find that same-sex male couples, especially non-White same-sex male couples, are less likely to receive a response to inquiries about rental units. I also find that same-sex Black male couples are subject to more subtle forms of discrimination than heterosexual Black couples are. I then examine whether state and local antidiscrimination laws covary with rates of housing discrimination against same-sex couples. Although my results are not causal, I find that antidiscrimination laws have an ambiguous relationship with rates of discrimination faced by same-sex couples. State-level housing protections, for example, covary positively with response rates for same-sex Black male couples, whereas local-level laws covary negatively with response rates for these couples.     

Free riders or easy riders?: An examination of the voluntary provision of public radio

This paper tests the widely accepted hypothesis that when a pure public good is voluntarily provided incentives to free ride increase with the number of individuals consuming the good. Specifically, I use unique data on the number of listeners and contributors to public radio to test two hypotheses. First I test whether the proportion of contributors falls as group size increases and second I test whether contributions per contributor falls as group size increases. I find that increases in group size result in significantly more free riding. However, I also find that group size has no effect on contributions per contributor.     

Reflections on Public Choice

My 2002 presidential address to the PublicChoice Society consisted of three parts.The first had to do with the business ofthe Society's 2002 meeting and plans forthe Nashville meeting, and has beenomitted. This essay begins with the secondsection of that talk, in which I identifywhat I call the classic books ofPublic Choice, and then discuss what I viewas common misconceptions about PublicChoice. The next section of this essaysurveys five of the most importantempirical puzzles in Public Choice theory(three of them taken from the work ofAnthony Downs), and my own attempts overthe years to come to grips with thesepuzzles. I should note that, despite mycourtesy appointment in UCI's EconomicsDepartment, in this essay I write primarilyfrom the perspective of a politicalscientist – albeit, one with lots offriends who happen to beeconomists.     

What liberals should tolerate internationally

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on what liberal states should tolerate outside their borders. This requires definitions of `liberalism,´ `toleration,´ and `state.´ In the first section of this paper, I briefly indicate how I use those and other terms necessary to the discussion and introduce the normative principle I take liberals to be committed to. In the second section, I continue clearing the path for the rest of my discussion. In the rest of the paper, I draw conclusions about what liberals should tolerate outside their state that I believe follow from the proffered definitions and principles. I limit myself to interference aimed at providing humanitarian aid, but do so in a way that is meant to provide resources for thinking about other sorts of interventions. In the third section, I consider humanitarian interventions done with the permission of the other state and will point toward a toleration-based view; here we are really talking about non-toleration of suffering. In the fourth section, I consider humanitarian interventions done without the permission of the other state; here we are talking about non-toleration of a state that harms its residents. I consider an objection in section five.     

The Sympathetic Formation of Reason and the Limits of Science

I develop an interpretation of reason using the thought of David Hume and Adam Smith. I contend that reason in Hume and Smith can plausibly be interpreted as a kind of sensation. Reason is a sensation in that it is a sentimental conception of the relationship between two objects that impels certain interpretations. Reason is developed sympathetically in experiential contexts that not only guide but constitute reason’s operation. I comment on Hume’s talk of reason in his Treatise of Human Nature to build my interpretation. I use Smith’s work in The Theory of Moral Sentiments to develop an understanding of the sympathetic formation of reason. I briefly integrate my interpretation with talk of confirmatory bias in psychology and behavioral economics. I conclude by considering implications for scientific conversation.     

The number of rent-seekers and aggregate rent-seeking expenditures: An unpleasant result

I examine a rent-seeking contest in which the winner gets a minimum rent but also gets an additional rent which is an increasing function of his lobbying expenditure. I give real-world examples of such rent-seeking competitions. Contrary to the standard result in the rent-seeking literature, I obtain the perverse result that aggregate rent-seeking expenditures may be inversely related to the number of rent-seekers. However, I note that even if this result holds, the cost of administering rent-seeking competitions may imply that society is better off with fewer contenders than with an infinitely large number of contenders, although the optimal number may not be the smallest number.     

Mill and the Value of Moral Distress

People are sometimes distressed by the bare knowledge that lifestyles are being practised or opinions held which they take to be immoral. Is this distress to be regarded as harm for the purposes of Mill's Harm Principle? I argue, first, that this is an issue that is to be resolved not by analysis of the concept of harm but by reference to the arguments in On Liberty with which the Harm Principle is supported. Secondly, I argue that reference to those arguments makes it clear beyond doubt that, since Mill valued moral confrontation and the shattering of moral complacency as means to social progress, he must have regarded moral distress as a positive good rather than as a harm that society ought to intervene to prevent. Thirdly, I relate this interpretation to Mill's points about temperance, decency and good manners. I argue, finally, that my interpretation is inconsistent with Mill's underlying utilitarianism only if the latter is understood in a crudely hedonistic way.     

Tear Your Mask, and Have it Too: A Reply to Peter Baehr

Peter Baehr highly praises Berger’s contribution to sociology, and yet sharply criticises his claim that unmasking or debunking is he signature method of sociology. Baehr hold such method of enquiry to be dangerously corrosive and in tension with the humanist intentions of Berger. I largely agree with this critique, but I have doubts that a viable alternative could be developed within the framework of the social sciences. Thus, I would suggest that Berger was right in linking unmasking/debunking with the humanist enterprise, despite the negative implications highlighted by Baehr.     

Beyond Welfare: Framing and the Racialization of White Opinion on Social Security

In this article I argue that the framing of Social Security in political discourse has associated it symbolically with race. The linkages are subtle and symbolic, and they serve to associate Social Security with whiteness in a mirror image of the association of welfare with blackness. In turn, these associations have racialized white opinion on the program. After discussing the theoretical mechanism by which issue frames can unconsciously associate policies with citizens' racial predispositions, I review the frames surrounding Social Security. Then, drawing on two decades of nationally representative survey data, I demonstrate the racialization of opinion among whites. Using a variety of measures of racial predispositions, I find that racially conservative whites feel more positively about Social Security than do racial liberals. I conclude by considering the implications of these findings for our understanding of racialized politics and for the connections between race, whiteness, and contemporary American politics.     

Searching for Efficiency in the Public Sector: Interim Evaluation of Performance Budgeting in New Zealand

In this article I examine the efforts to promote performance measurement in the public sector with particular reference to New Zealand. In section two I examine the State Sector Act of 1988 and the Public Finance Act of 1989, which together brought about changes in the New Zealand public sector. In section three I examine the problems of implementing the reform. In section four I discuss the experience of developing statements of performance measurement required under the Financial Administration Act of 1989 and in section five I develop an alternative scheme on the basis that a uniform approach is less likely to be applicable to a range of public sector agencies. The final section contains a brief conclusion.     

Democracy and Capitalism: Collective Action Theory and Structural Analysis

The problem which I address in this paper consists in the connection between democracy and capitalism. I begin by specifying a model of actor theory which indicates a number of methods of achieving co-operation between actors I then review different structural theories of democracy which link up with these methods. Against this background I then seek to clarify—and to some extent evaluate—the arguments which different researchers have adduced in support of the thesis that capitalism is a prerequisite for democracy.     

Micro‐foundations for the Science(s) of Politics

This is a revised version of a talk I gave on 25 August 2009 to the Department of Government at Uppsala University when I received the Johan Skytte Prize. In it, I make a number of assertions about contemporary politics and those who currently practice the discipline of political science that I am convinced are correct, but have not documented with proper references. This will not please hardcore positivists, but either there exist no apposite quantitative sources of proof or the observations seem (to me) to be so qualitatively obvious as not to merit confirmation. Needless to say, I alone am responsible for all errors or omissions and welcome any assistance in discovering them.     

Public affairs,issue management and political strategy: methodological issues that count — a different view

In the preceding article, Doug Schuler makes two challenges to scholars in the areas of public affairs, issues management and corporate political strategies to advance the state of empirical knowledge: (1) to make use of more sophisticated methodology, and (2) to adopt a grand theory to guide our empirical efforts. This paper is a commentary on these challenges. In it, I agree that our field of inquiry requires additional sophistication in methods, measures and statistical tools. However, I disagree that a grand theory would aid us in advancing our field. Instead, I propose that advancement is more likely to occur with the acceptance of a common dependent variable to guide our efforts. I propose that until we agree why we study what we do, we will have difficulty building a coherent stream of knowledge that speaks to the managerial audience. I advocate adopting firm performance as our ultimate dependent variable and defining our area of inquiry as ‘What makes some firms outperform others in the nonmarket environment?’ and ultimately, ‘How does non‐market performance affect overall firm performance?’ Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications     

Political institutions and sovereign borrowing: evidence from nineteenth-century Argentina

I study the relationship between political institutions and sovereign borrowing when constitutional constraints are systematically chosen to obtain better credit conditions. I argue that the impact of institutional constraints on country risk premia depends on the government’s concern with the country’s creditworthiness and its “willingness to repay”; two variables that are hardly observable. To properly evaluate the relationship between political institutions and sovereign borrowing, I focus on the link between institutional constraints and the risk premia of Argentine bonds between 1822 and 1913. Specifically, I analyze whether a “structural break” in the government’s cost of borrowing time-series exists. I use the Perron-Volesang test for structural change with unknown break dates. The statistical analysis indicates that the adoption of institutional constraints led to significant improvements in borrowing terms: the series has a single structural change; and the distinctive break point is associated with the country’s adoption of constitutional checks and balances. Time-series regressions and instrumental variables (IV) estimation reinforce these findings.     

How Do Indifferent Voters Decide? The Political Importance of Implicit Attitudes

A hallmark finding in the study of public opinion is that many citizens approach the political realm with one‐sided attitudes that color their judgments, making attitude change difficult. This finding highlights the importance of citizens with weak prior attitudes, since they might represent a segment of the electorate that is more susceptible to influence. The judgment processes of citizens with weak attitudes, however, are poorly understood. Drawing from dual‐process models in psychology, I test the idea that citizens with weak explicit attitudes rely on implicit attitudes as they render political judgments. I find support for this conjecture in experimental and observational data. There are two main contributions. First, I show that an important and understudied segment of the electorate arrives at political decisions via automatic (but nonetheless predictable) mental processes. Second, I characterize the conditions under which implicit political attitudes matter more and less.     

Climate risks,climate economics,and the foundations of rights-based risk ethics

In this article, I argue that climate ethics must basically be risk ethics. But risk ethics is still an underdeveloped field of normative ethics. For example, rights-based ethical theories, the attractive features of which are outlined in this article, tend to prohibit all risk impositions. Such inability of rights-based theories to deal convincingly with risks could be a reason why the standard approach of climate economics, which as I try to show is based on questionable normative presuppositions, is still as influential as it is. I propose a solution to the problems rights-based moral theories have with risks and outline the basic criteria of permissible and impermissible risk impositions. Finally, I indicate that this will enable us to tackle climate risks in a promising way. The main aim of the article, however, is not to contribute to concrete questions of climate ethics but to the improvement of its normative foundations.