Foreign Policy “On the Cheap”: Latvia’s Foreign Policy Experience from the Economic Crisis

This article assesses whether the reduction of budgetary allocations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia in 2008–2012 led to more modest foreign policy in the sense of both objectives and execution. After assessing four goals of Latvian foreign policy since 2008 – regional cooperation, bilateral development cooperation, facilitation of Latvia’s economic interests abroad, and relations with the Latvian diaspora – the authors conclude that the decrease in funding for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had little impact on Latvia’s ability to achieve foreign policy objectives.     

National Role Conceptions,Domestic Constraints and the New ‘Normalcy’ in German Foreign Policy: the Eurozone Crisis,Libya and Beyond

German foreign policy can fruitfully be analysed through the lens of a modified two-level framework which identifies three interdependent drivers behind government decision making: the expectations of Germany's international partners, domestic constraints and the national role conceptions of decision-makers. In recent years, the configuration of these three drivers has witnessed a two-fold change. First, there has been a nascent shift towards the role conception of Germany as a ‘normal ally’. Second, the domestic context of German foreign policy has become more politicised and contentious. In consequence, Germany's current foreign policy tends to attach relatively less weight to the expectations of its allies, to be more driven by domestic politics – and to be altogether less predictable. The widely criticised approaches of the Merkel government to the Eurozone crisis and to the NATO mission in Libya, in turn, accord to this pattern and stand for the new ‘normalcy’ in German foreign policy.     

Leadership Traits and Ghana’s Foreign Policy: The Case of Jerry Rawlings’ Foreign Economic Policy of the 1980s

This article examines Ghana’s foreign policy-making with reference to internal and external determinants (structural/systemic). Besides these determinants, political actors (primarily, presidents/heads of state) have shaped the country’s foreign policy outcomes, but this field of enquiry (i.e. the individual-level analysis) has not, received much attention in the literature. To enhance the understanding of leadership and personality traits in foreign policy-making, this study draws on the theory of Leadership Trait Analysis to examine Jerry John Rawlings and Ghana’s foreign economic policy in the early 1980s. It argues that the leadership traits of Rawlings to some extent shaped Ghana’s foreign economic policy decisions in the early 1980s.     

The African Union (AU), the Libya Crisis and the notion of ‘African solutions to African problems’

When the crisis in Libya began, it was hoped that the AU would be the one to deal with it under its cherished notion of ‘African solutions to African problems’. However, from the very beginning, the organisation took half-hearted measures in its reaction; its members did not speak with one voice on how to resolve the crisis; and Qaddafi ignored the organisation's call to end the crisis peacefully, eventually resulting in the organisation being over-ridden by the western powers through means of the UN Security Council (UN SC). The Libya crisis demonstrated that beyond rhetoric, the AU does not have the capacity to respond effectively to the crises facing Africa. The crisis rendered the notion of ‘African solutions to African problems’ moot and demonstrated that at the moment the AU lacks the requisite functional tools to actually operationalise the notion.     

Soft or Hard Power? Discourse Patterns in Brazil's Foreign Policy Toward South America

This article analyzes the discourse of Brazil's foreign policy toward South America from 1995 to 2010 by means of quantifying, codifying, and weighting all speeches registered in the homogeneous and periodic official documentation of Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs using a discourse analysis approach. The aim is to investigate discourse patterns in order to qualify Brazil's foreign policy as either hard power or soft power and to identify the orientation and differences in its discourse of foreign policy regarding each country of South America during the presidential terms of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003–2010).     

Foreign policy without the policy? South Africa and activism on sexual orientation at the United Nations

Although South Africa led the UN to adopt its first resolution on sexual orientation in 2011, in recent years, South Africa has made various sharp foreign policy reversals on issues related to sexual orientation and human rights. This article discusses five such policymaking episodes over the period 2010–2016 and considers the wider implications of South Africa's flip-flopping. For one, South Africa's recent behaviour on international sexual orientation issues suggests that the foreign policymaking environment in South Africa is weak, unstructured and porous. Moreover, the sexual orientation issue exposes the limited scope South Africa has to act as a representative of Africa, as a leader in the developing world and as a bridge-building middle power.     

Brazil and South Africa: the ‘odd couple’ of the South Atlantic?

Exploring the complexity of South Africa's and Brazil's ‘like-mindedness’ at the regional, multilateral, and bilateral levels, this article argues that shared middle power roles traceable to the pre-Cold War era and beyond set the scene for a great deal of political complementarity and cooperation at the multilateral level where Brazil and South Africa's shared identities drive an interest in reforming global governance processes. This complementarity does not, however, always spill over to the bilateral level, where trans-societal linkages are still relatively limited compared with state-to-state interactions.     

Turmoil in the Taiwan Strait: Wellington Koo and ROC Foreign Policy 1953–1956

Turmoil in the Taiwan Strait addresses Ambassador Wellington Koo's role in Chinese foreign policy from 1953 to 1956 and his relevance in the larger Cold War context. In particular, it focuses on Koo's involvement in the 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty and the 1955 Dachen Islands Crisis. This paper argues that, although Koo accomplished a fair amount during this time, he would have encountered fewer professional obstacles had he not represented Chiang Kai-Shek, who had become a controversial figure by the mid-1950s. At the same time, one can conclude that Koo creatively used media and meetings with statesmen abroad to shore up support for the Republic of China during this turbulent decade. This article attempts to provide another perspective on Koo, who has traditionally been understudied in the West. Furthermore, this work seeks to add a meaningful contribution to the historiography on cross-strait relations—particularly in the contemporary era.     

No Future for Germany's Past? Collective Memory and German Foreign Policy

Like most aspects of German politics and society after 1945, post-war German foreign policy has traditionally been greatly influenced by the legacy of Germany's National Socialist past and the Second World War. The semi-sovereign and divided nature of the West German state along with the strong argumentative force of collective memory in foreign policy discourse ensured a strong presence of Germany's historical legacy in both institutional and discursive terms resulting in a foreign policy which was characterised by self-limitation, a strong commitment to multilateralism and a civilian foreign policy culture. This article will argue that the interpretation of German collective memory of the Holocaust and the Second World War underwent significant changes under the red–green governments between 1998 and 2005, in particular with regard to the use of force. Although German collective memory continued to be present during this period, it lost its predictability and was used in a variety of crises to justify a range of responses, including military action.     

Economic,trade and development relations between South Africa and the European Union: The end of a strategic partnership? A South African perspective

ABSTRACT

The relationship between democratic South Africa and the European Union (EU) has been in existence for over 20 years, with its roots tracing back to anti-apartheid support measures. In its earlier form, it was anchored in the Reconstruction and Development Programme. Currently, it is guided by the National Development Plan of the National Planning Commission. This relationship has been tested over time, especially as a result of negotiations over the Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU. In the meantime, the euphoria that marked new South Africa's participation in the global system, with trade and development cooperation with the EU as one of the cornerstones, has waned considerably. The cancellation of several bilateral investment treaties with EU member states has further strained the relationship. While there are notable successes in the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership, these may not be reflective of the actual strategic value of the partnership in the context of global shifts and the rising influence of emerging powers with which South Africa is integrating.     

Decoding the Evolutionary Path of Chinese Foreign Policy, 1949–2009: Assessments and Inferences

Chinese foreign policy has made a grand transition during the post-Mao reform era. Chinese foreign policy of the 21st century has become much more open and pragmatic in its relations with the outside world, more extensive in its reach and coverage, highly diversified in its functions and partners, more committed to international norms than before, and much more sophisticated in its dealing with the international community. Yet, the precise balance between the changes and continuities is still quite difficult to gauge. Furthermore, despite crucial visible changes, concerns and worries - even some fears - are discernible with regard to the rise of China. In the last 60 years, Beijing has sought hard to sustain consistencies (shizhong ruyi) in its foreign policy. Perhaps, that is the best clue the world has in inferring the future trajectory of Chinese foreign policy.     

Building bridges? South African foreign policy and trilateral development cooperation

As questions concerning international development climb the international agenda, so countries find themselves drawn into a burgeoning number of negotiations on issues ranging from the future shape and direction of the post-2015 development agenda to ‘aid effectiveness’ and international development cooperation. Moving from the position of a ‘beneficiary’ state in the traditional donor–recipient aid hierarchy, South Africa is looking to define its own niche within the wider development diplomacy context as a development partner. This paper provides an assessment of South Africa's evolving approach towards international development cooperation, with a particular focus on trilateral development cooperation, and what this means for Pretoria's foreign policy in bridging the divide between developed and developing country positions within the international development regime.     

Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper: Deconstruction and Critique

The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper identifies major themes and recommends preferred strategies in Australia’s engagement with the world. These themes and strategies relate to geopolitics, economics and the ‘new international agenda’; there is also a more specific focus on Australia’s Pacific island neighbours and Timor-Leste. There is a strong emphasis on perceived Australian national interests throughout the document. The geopolitical discussion is primarily ‘realist’; economically the document is pro-globalisation; the discussion of the ‘new international agenda’ involves an Australian-oriented pragmatism; there is an assertion of Australian leadership in the South Pacific. With some minor criticism, Labor has accepted the general direction advocated in the White Paper. The document is thus indicative of the likely future direction of Australian foreign policy. Lack of US response indicates declining US engagement with Australia and the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region. China, as the other major power highly significant for Australia, has been low-key in its criticisms.     

Engaging an Elephant in the Room? Locating Africa in Australian Foreign Policy

Africa has traditionally been marginal to the Australian foreign policy agenda, aside from British colonial and Commonwealth ties and later efforts to end minority rule in southern Africa. Yet a resources boom, strong economic growth, increasing democratisation and reformed governance institutions have created new international interests in engaging with Africa and made it difficult for aspiring global players like Australia to ignore the continent's opportunities and challenges. Under Labor (2007–13), Canberra pursued substantial “new engagement” with this “new Africa”, enhancing political and diplomatic relations, supporting major Australian commercial interests and quadrupling the Africa aid budget. Following the election of the Abbott Coalition government in September 2013, the article argues that while commercial opportunities and some specific security and humanitarian concerns will keep the Coalition interested in Africa, the enhanced level of engagement with the continent pursued under Labor is unlikely to be sustained.     

The Trump Administration and Japan: Challenges and Visions for Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy in the New Era

It is possible that Donald Trump’s success in the US presidential election of November 2016 will touch off the greatest transformation in world politics since World War Two. This is because, for the first time, the presidency of the United States—a country that since World War Two has consistently upheld the liberal world order—has been won by a man who asserts that the US national interests will take precedence over international cooperation.

If so, Japan could be one of the most profoundly affected countries. Japan has thus far accepted its status as a junior partner within the US security framework and—without any significant military power of its own—has devoted itself to economic development.

Although it is difficult to predict what Mr. Trump’s policies will be, there is a possibility, based on the statements he has made to date, that he will be calling for Japan to become more self-reliant. Although his comprehension of the Japan-US security arrangements is fraught with misconceptions, there is ample possibility that he will ultimately opt to maintain the current Japan-US security framework. However, given that the average defense expenditure of NATO countries is 2% of their GDPs, and that the average expenditure of OECD countries on official development assistance (ODA) is 0.7% of their GDPs, it is highly questionable whether Mr. Trump will approve of Japan’s level of defense spending (less than 1% of its GDP) or of its level of spending on ODA (approximately 0.2% of its GDP).

It would not be such a bad thing for Japan to become more self-reliant in terms of security. It is almost unnatural for Japan to maintain this relationship as it is, in the form that it has taken since before Japan’s postwar reconstruction. However, in the context of international relations in East Asia, it has long been taken for granted that this is Japan’s basic stance. Changing this will be no easy task—either domestically or in terms of Japan’s relations with neighboring countries.

In these respects, the authors of this paper decided to consider the question of how Japan should develop its foreign and security policy, and to offer some proposals in this regard.     

Taiwan: An Internal Affair! How China’s Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Interact on the Taiwan Issue?

Taiwan may be an internal affair but the domestic public opinion is not invited to participate very much in a debate and a decision-making process that have remained confined to the Chinese Communist Party and the military top leadership and, on purpose, involves a very small number of officials and experts. Conservative and nationalist forces do constrain Beijing’s Taiwan policy. And some leaders are tempted to use the Taiwan issue for unrelated domestic or foreign policy purpose. Nevertheless, what is striking is the potential for flexibility in China’s Taiwan policy. While Chinese local governments and companies’ increasing interests in business-as-usual in the Strait and the unbearable cost of any armed conflict tend to narrow the government’s options, concentration of power and the efficiency of the propaganda machine allow it to rather smoothly manage, in particular vis-à-vis the elites’ conservative opinion group as well as its own public opinion, this flexibility.     

A Leader Without Followers? The Growing Divergence Between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy

Brazilian diplomats and academics alike have long regarded regional leadership as a springboard to global recognition. Yet Brazil's foreign policy has not translated the country's structural and instrumental resources into effective regional leadership. Brazil's potential followers have not aligned with its main goals, such as a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and Directorship‐General of the World Trade Organization; some have even challenged its regional influence. Nevertheless, Brazil has been recognized as an emergent global power. This article analyzes the growing mismatch between the regional and global performance of Brazilian foreign policy and shows how both theoretical expectations and policy planning were “luckily foiled” by unforeseen developments. It argues that because of regional power rivalries and a relative paucity of resources, Brazil is likely to consolidate itself as a middle global power before gaining acceptance as a leader in its region.