The impact of changes in couples' earnings on married women's Social Security benefits

Women's labor force participation and earnings dramatically increased after World War II. Those changes have important implications for women's Social Security benefits. This article uses the Social Security Administration's Modeling Income in the Near Term (version 6) to examine Social Security benefits for current and future beneficiary wives. The projections show that fewer wives in more recent birth cohorts will be eligible for auxiliary benefits as spouses because their earnings are too high. If their husbands die, however, most wives will still be eligible for survivor benefits because, despite the increase in their earnings over time, they still typically have lower earnings than their husbands. Even so, the share of wives who would be ineligible for widow benefits is projected to double between cohorts.     

The role of earnings and financial risk in distributional analyses of Social Security reform measures

The Social Security Trustees project that the Social Security program faces longterm financing difficulties. Several proposals that have been offered to shore‐up the finances of the Social Security program would create individual retirement accounts funded with part of the payroll tax. The authors of many of these proposals claim that future beneficiaries will be better off under their new system than under the current system. This study examines the consequences of differing earnings patterns and year‐to‐year differences in asset returns have for Social Security retired worker benefits in three Social Security reform proposals. Incorporating both actual earnings histories and variation in asset returns shows that none of the three individual account plans can always deliver benefits that are higher than payable current‐law benefits. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Income changes at and after Social Security benefit receipt: evidence from the Retirement History Study

This article details the changes in total income and the composition of its sources that occur upon initial receipt of Social Security benefits, and in the first 4 years thereafter. The study shows that, for many persons, "retirement" is a gradual process rather than an immediate cessation of all paid work. About half the persons entering the rolls continue at least some paid employment after benefit receipt. Even more do so if previous earnings were low or if they have no pension to supplement their benefits. In real terms, the average couple initially loses about one-third of its previous income, while nonmarried women, with less to begin with, lose somewhat less. In the time period studied, inflation was high in historical terms: the Consumer Price Index rose by approximately one-third in the 4-year period following benefit receipt. During that time, the real income of beneficiaries declined by about 10 percent from the levels immediately after benefit receipt. Fewer beneficiaries continued to work 4 years later, so earnings played a smaller role in total income. The real value of private pensions declined by about 20 percent in the 4-year period, but because most persons with such pensions had other, better-protected sources of income, their total income declined by less than 10 percent.     

A benefit of one's own: older women's entitlement to Social Security retirement.

This article explores differences in Social Security eligibility and benefit levels for older men and women using survey data from the Health and Retirement Study combined with administrative records on actual work histories and Social Security rules. We are able to determine the fully insured status of those persons, how close they are to meeting eligibility criteria when they are not fully insured, and their prospects for benefits. Around three-quarters of older women nearing retirement today will be fully insured for Social Security old-age benefits on the basis of their own accounts, but the rest would need substantial extra employment to rise above the eligibility threshold. Further, two-thirds of older married women who are fully insured have sufficient lifetime earnings to translate into an age-65 primary insurance amount worth at least half their husband's, but the other one-third can expect no additional retirement benefit from contributing to Social Security late in life. Finally, most wives will not be able to improve their benefits by working more under current rules. These results have mixed implications regarding the potential impact of women's rising labor force attachment on eventual retirement benefits. Working more years could increase women's chances of becoming eligible for Social Security benefits, but that effect is likely to be small. Furthermore, even when women do become fully insured according to the rules, not many wives will receive a higher benefit at the margin. The reason is that married women still receive higher Social Security benefits as a spouse than they do on the basis of their own work record. In fact, the net benefit from Social Security due to additional work is negative once one takes into account the Social Security contributions the women paid while employed. Benefits paid to widows are even more likely to be based on the spouse's work history rather than on the woman's. Hence, the rising labor market attachment of women in the future may increase their eligibility for benefits but will produce only modest (and often negative) impacts on their old-age Social Security benefits under current rules.     

Income and assets of Social Security beneficiaries by type of benefit

The SIPP data have provided a first look at the relative economic status of various types of Social Security beneficiaries. They have shown that the different types of Social Security beneficiaries face very different economic circumstances. Retired workers and wife beneficiaries have the highest family incomes adjusted for family size. Aged widows and minor children have the lowest family incomes, with high proportions of poor or near poor. And disabled workers are in between, but also have high proportions of poor or near poor. Retired-worker and wife beneficiary households also have considerably more asset holdings than disabled-worker or widow beneficiary households. Beneficiaries with high family incomes are very likely to live with relatives and to rely heavily on the relatives' income. The high-income families tend to have non-means-tested sources of family income other than Social Security amounting to substantial proportions of their total income and to have high asset holdings. Conversely, beneficiaries with low family incomes are very likely to live alone or with nonrelatives, to rely heavily on Social Security and means-tested benefits, and to have low asset holdings. A majority of ever-poor beneficiaries (with the exception of widow beneficiaries) are poor in only some months of a year. This situation is not consistent with the stereotype of beneficiaries living on fixed incomes. But the change in poverty status is often due to a change in the income of other family members rather than of the beneficiary. And in some cases, a change in poverty status occurs with little or no change in income as the cost of living rises.     

The impact of changing financial work incentives on the earnings of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) beneficiaries

SSDI beneficiaries lose their entire cash benefit if they perform work that is substantial gainful activity (SGA) after using Social Security work incentive programs. The complete loss of benefits might be a work disincentive for beneficiaries. We report results from a pilot project that replaces the complete loss of benefits with a gradual reduction in benefits of $1 for every $2 earned above an earnings disregard level. Beneficiaries who volunteered to participate in the project were randomly assigned to a group receiving the new program or to a control group. The policy led to a 25 percent increase in the percentage of beneficiaries with earnings above the annualized SGA amount, or $11,760 in 2009 dollars. It did not result in a reduction in benefit payments. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

The growth in Social Security benefits among the retirement-age population from increases in the cap on covered earnings

Analysts have proposed raising the maximum level of earnings subject to the Social Security payroll tax (the "tax max") to improve long-term Social Security Trust Fund solvency. This article investigates how raising the tax max leads to the "leakage" of portions of the additional revenue into higher benefit payments. Using Health and Retirement Study data matched to Social Security earnings records, we compare historical payroll tax payments and benefit amounts for Early Boomers (born 1948-1953) with tax and benefit simulations had they been subject to the tax max (adjusted for wage growth) faced by cohorts 12 and 24 years older. We find that 43.2 percent of the additional payroll tax revenue attributable to tax max increases affecting Early Boomers relative to taxes paid by the cohort 12 years older leaked into higher benefits. For Early Boomers relative to those 24 years older, we find 53.5 percent leakage.     

Development and evaluation of a survey-based type of benefit classification for the Social Security program

This attempt to classify Social Security beneficiaries by type of benefit using the new Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) has yielded promising results. Evaluations of the classification algorithm based on comparison of the estimated number of beneficiaries in each of the several categories to independent estimates of the number of beneficiaries indicate that in most instances a high percentage of each category has been identified. For the most part, age and monthly benefit amount size distributions seem reasonable. Furthermore, very few persons in the sample who were identified as Social Security beneficiaries could not be assigned to one or another of the benefit groups. The classification procedure also represents a marked improvement over earlier efforts to classify type of beneficiary that relied on data from the March Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS). Most importantly, the benefit classification scheme based on SIPP data appears to provide reasonably reliable distinctions between retired-worker and widow benefits for widowed women and permits the identification of retired-worker benefits for those women dually entitled to retired-worker and spouse benefits. In addition, the distinction between disabled- and retired-worker benefits for recipients aged 62-64 appears to be reasonably reliable, and for women under age 65, the classification procedure distinguishes between disabled-worker benefits on the one hand and widow and widowed mother benefits on the other. Finally, SIPP procedures for identifying minor child beneficiaries yield markedly better estimates than those available from the Current Population Survey. These improvements in the SIPP context are due entirely to the presence of information not collected in the CPS. The enhancement of the SIPP data set in turn resulted directly from an assessment of earlier work carried out by Projector and Bretz in the CPS context and on extensive research into the nature of Social Security reporting errors in the CPS. The superiority of the SIPP data set is linked principally to the presence of three pieces of information: the Medicare BIC, the direct question on reasons for benefit receipt asked of persons under age 65, and the direct measurement of recipiency and amount of benefits for minor children. Other items of some import include self-reported work disability, retirement status (ever retired from a job), previous marital status for currently married women, age first prevented from working due to a health condition, and Supplemental Security Income misreporting items.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Lifetime earnings patterns, the distribution of future Social Security benefits, and the impact of pension reform

In order to assess the effect of Social Security reform on current and future workers, it is essential to accurately characterize the initial situations of representative workers affected by reform. For the purpose of analyzing typical reforms, the most important characteristic of a worker is the level and pattern of his or her preretirement earnings. Under the current system, pensions are determined largely by the level of the workers' earnings averaged over their work life. However, several reform proposals would create individual retirement accounts for which the pension would depend on the investment accumulation within the account. Thus, the pension would also depend on the timing of the contributions into the account and hence on the exact shape of the worker's lifetime earnings profile. Most analysis of the distributional impact of reform has focused, however, on calculating benefit changes among a handful of hypothetical workers whose relative earnings are constant over their work life. The earnings levels are not necessarily chosen to represent the situations of workers who have typical or truly representative earnings patterns. Consequently, the results of such analysis can be misleading, especially if reform involves introducing a fundamentally new kind of pension formula. This article presents two broad approaches to creating representative earnings profiles for policy evaluation. First, we use standard econometric methods to predict future earnings for a representative sample of workers drawn from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Our statistical estimates are based on a simple representation of typical career earnings paths and a fixed-effect statistical specification. Because our estimation file contains information on each worker's annual earnings from 1951 through 1996 as reported in the Social Security Administration's earnings files, we have a record (though an incomplete one) of the actual earnings that will be used to determine future benefit payments. Our estimates of the earnings function permit us to make highly differentiated predictions of future earnings for each member of our sample. By combining the historical information on individual earnings with our prediction of future earnings up through the normal retirement age, our first approach produces tens of thousands of predicted career earnings paths that can be used in microsimulation policy analysis. Our second approach to creating lifetime earnings profiles is similar in some ways to the traditional method. For example, it is based on the creation of only a handful of "stylized" career earnings patterns. An important difference with the traditional method, however, is that we define the career earnings patterns so that they are truly representative of patterns observed in the workforce. We use simple mathematical formulas to characterize each stylized earnings pattern, and we then produce estimates of the average path of annual earnings for workers whose career earning path falls within each of the stylized patterns we have defined. Finally, we calculate the percentage of workers in successive birth-year cohorts who have earnings profiles that match each of the stylized earnings patterns. Although this method may seem simple, it allows the analyst to create stylized earnings patterns that are widely varied but still representative of earnings patterns observed among sizable groups of U.S. workers. The effects of policy reforms can then be calculated for workers with each of the stylized earnings patterns. Our analysis of U.S. lifetime earnings patterns and of the impact of selected policy reforms produces a number of findings about past trends in earnings, typical earnings patterns in the population, and the potential impact of reform. The analysis focuses on men and women born between 1931 and 1960. Along with earlier analysts, we find that men earn substantially higher lifetime wages than women and typically attain their peak career earnings at a somewhat earlier age. However, the difference in career earnings patterns between men and women has narrowed dramatically over time. Workers with greater educational attainment earn substantially higher wages than those with less education, and they attain their peak career earnings later in life. For example, among men with the least education, peak earnings are often attained around or even before age 40, whereas many men with substantial postsecondary schooling do not reach their peak career earnings until after 50. Our tabulations of the lifetime earnings profiles of the oldest cohorts (born around 1930) and projections of the earnings of the youngest profiles (born around 1960) imply that the inequality of lifetime earnings has increased noticeably over time. Women in the top one-fifth of female earners and men in the top one-fifth of male earners are predicted to receive a growing multiple of the economy-wide average wage during their career. Women born between 1931 and 1935 who were in the top fifth of female earners had lifetime average earnings that were approximately equal to the average economy-wide wage. In contrast, women born after 1951 who were in the top fifth of earners are predicted to earn almost 50 percent more, that is, roughly 150 percent of the economy-wide average wage. Women with a lower rank in the female earnings distribution will also see gains in their lifetime average earnings, but their gains are predicted to be proportionately much smaller than those of women with a high rank in the distribution. Men with high earnings are also predicted to enjoy substantial gains in their relative lifetime earnings, while men with a lower rank in the earnings distribution will probably see a significant erosion in their typical wages relative to the economy-wide average wage. That is mainly the result of a sharp decline in the relative earnings of low-wage men born after 1950. In creating stylized earnings profiles that are representative of those of significant minorities of U.S. workers, we emphasized three critical elements of the earnings path: the average level of earnings over a worker's career, the upward or downward trend in earnings from the worker's 30s through his or her early 60s, and the "sagging" or "hump-shaped" profile of earnings over the worker's career. That classification scheme yields 27 characteristic patterns of lifetime earnings. Surprisingly, the differnce between men and women within each of those categories is quite modest. The main difference between men and women is in the proportions of workers who fall in each category. Only 14 percent of men born between 1931 and 1940 fall in earnings categories with the lowest one-third of lifetime earnings, whereas 53 percent of women born in those years have low-average-earnings profiles. On the other hand, women born in those years are more likely to have a rising trend in lifetime earnings, while men are more likely to have a declining trend. We find that the distribution of lifetime earnings contains relatively more workers with below-average earnings and relatively fewer with very high earnings than assumed in the Social Security Administration's traditional policy analysis. For example, the "low earner" traditionally assumed by the Office of the Chief Actuary is assigned a level of average lifetime earnings that we find to be higher than the average earnings of persons in the bottom one-third of the lifetime earnings distribution. The stylized earnings profiles developed here can be used for policy evaluation, and the results can be compared with those from the more traditional analysis. That comparison produces several notable findings. Because earnings profiles that are actually representative of the population tend to have lower average earnings than assumed in the traditional analysis, workers typically accumulate somewhat less Social Security wealth than implied in the traditional analysis. On the other hand, because the basic benefit formula is tilted in favor of lower-income workers, the internal rate of return on Social Security contributions is somewhat higher than detected in the traditional analysis. Moreover, the primary insurance amount measured as a percentage of the worker's average indexed earnings tends to be higher than implied by the traditional analysis. Finally, the stylized earnings patterns can be used to compare benefit levels enjoyed by workers under the traditional Social Security formula and under an alternative plan based on individual investment accounts. That comparison shows, as expected, that the traditional formula favors low-wage workers and one-earner couples, while an investment account favors single, high-wage workers. Comparing two workers with the same lifetime average earnings, the traditional formula favors workers with rising earnings profiles (that is, with lifetime earnings heavily concentrated at the end of their career), while investment account pensions favor workers with declining earnings profiles (that is, with earnings concentrated early in their career).     

Benefit adequacy among elderly Social Security retired-worker beneficiaries and the SSI federal benefit rate

Both target effectiveness and administrative simplicity are desirable properties in the design of minimum benefit packages for public retirement programs. The federal benefit rate (FBR) of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program has been proposed by some analysts as a potentially attractive basis of establishing a new minimum benefit for Social Security on both of these grounds. This type of proposal is related to a broader array of minimum benefit proposals that would establish a Social Security benefit floor based on the poverty rate. In contrast to Social Security, the SSI program is means tested, including both an income and asset screen and also a categorical eligibility screen (the requirement to qualify as aged or disabled). The SSI FBR provides an inflation-adjusted, guaranteed income floor for aged and disabled people with low assets. The FBR has been perceived by proponents as a minimal measure of Social Security benefit adequacy because it represents a subpoverty income level for a family of one or two depending on marital status. For this same reason it has been seen as a target-effective tool of designing a minimum Social Security benefit. An FBR-based minimum benefit has also been viewed as administratively simple to implement; the benefit can be calculated from Social Security administrative records using a completely automated electronic process. Therefore-in contrast to the SSI program itself-an FBR-based minimum benefit would incur virtually no ongoing administrative costs, would not require a separate application for a means-tested program, and would avoid the perception of welfare stigma. While these ideas have been discussed in the literature and among policymakers in the United States over the years, and similar proposals have been considered or implemented in several foreign countries, there have been no previous analyses measuring the size of the potentially affected beneficiary population. Nor has there been any systematic assessment of the FBR as a measure of benefit adequacy or the tradeoffs between potential target effectiveness and administrative simplicity. Based on a series of simulations, we assess the FBR as a potential foundation for minimum Social Security benefits and we examine the tradeoffs between administrative simplicity and target effectiveness using microdata from the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Our empirical analysis is limited to Social Security retired-worker beneficiaries aged 65 or older. We start with the assessment of the FBR as a measure of benefit adequacy. We are particularly concerned about two types of error: (1) incorrectly identifying some Social Security beneficiaries as "economically vulnerable," and (2) incorrectly identifying others as "not economically vulnerable." Operationally we measure economic vulnerability by two alternative standards. One of our measures considers beneficiaries with family income below the official poverty threshold as vulnerable. Our second measure is more restrictive; it uses a family income threshold equal to 75 percent of the official poverty threshold. We find that a substantial minority of retired workers have Social Security benefits below the FBR. The results also show that the FBR-based measure of Social Security benefit adequacy is very imprecise in terms of identifying economically vulnerable people. We estimate that the vast majority of beneficiaries with Social Security benefits below the FBR are not economically vulnerable. Conversely, an FBR-level Social Security benefit threshold fails to identify some beneficiaries who are economically vulnerable. Thus an FBR-level minimum benefit would be poorly targeted in terms of both types of errors we are concerned about. An FBR-level minimum benefit would provide minimum Social Security benefits to many people who are clearly not poor. Conversely, an FBR-level minimum benefit would not provide any income relief to some who are poor. The administrative simplicity behind these screening errors also results in additional program cost that may be perceived as substantial. We estimate that an FBR-level minimum benefit would increase aggregate program cost for retired workers aged 65 or older by roughly 2 percent. There are two fundamental reasons for these findings. First, the concept of an FBR-level minimum benefit looks at the individual or married couple in artificial isolation; however, the family is the main consumption unit in our society. The income of an unmarried partner or family members other than a married spouse is ignored. Second, individuals and couples may also have income from sources other than Social Security or SSI, which is also ignored by a simple FBR-based minimum benefit concept. The substantial empirical magnitude of measurement error arising from these conceptual simplifications naturally leads to the assessment of the tradeoff between target effectiveness and administrative simplicity. To facilitate this analysis, we simulate the potential effect of alternative screening methods designed to increase target effectiveness; while reducing program cost, such alternatives also may increase administrative complexity. For example, considering the combined Social Security benefit of a married couple (rather than looking at the husband and wife in isolation) might substantially increase target effectiveness with a relatively small increase in administrative complexity. Adding a family income screen might increase administrative complexity to a greater degree, but also would increase target effectiveness dramatically. The results also suggest that at some point adding new screens-such as a comprehensive asset test-may drastically increase administrative complexity with diminishing returns in terms of increased target effectiveness and reduced program cost. Whether a broad-based minimum benefit concept that is not tied to previous work experience is perceived by policymakers as desirable or not may depend on several factors not addressed in this article. However, to the extent that this type of minimum benefit design is regarded as potentially desirable, the tradeoffs between administrative simplicity and target effectiveness need to be considered.     

Using data for couples to project the distributional effects of changes in Social Security policy

Under Social Security program rules, the aged receive Social Security benefits either as retired workers, spouses, divorced spouses, or widow(er)s. Retired-worker benefits are paid to workers who have 40 quarters of coverage over their lives. Auxiliary benefits are paid to spouses, divorced spouses, and widow(er)s of retired workers. Spouse benefits are computed using the earnings history of the current spouse for individuals who are married when they apply for benefits. Divorced spouse and widow(er) benefits are computed using the earnings history of the ex-spouse or deceased spouse with the highest PIA. A large number of retired women are entitled to auxiliary benefits. Some women receive only auxiliary benefits, while the majority of women have their retired-worker benefit supplemented by auxiliary benefits. Because the level of Social Security benefits can reflect the relative lifetime earnings of both spouses, as a couple, using individual data to estimate Social Security benefits will tend to underestimate actual benefits, particularly for women. However, detailed data for couples are often difficult to obtain. There is currently no known single data source that includes both marital and earnings history information. As a result, many researchers resort to estimating Social Security benefits using individual data or aggregate data, such as the average earnings of men and women. The Social Security Administration's Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics, with substantial assistance from the Brookings Institution, the Urban Institute, and the RAND Corporation, is developing a model that overcomes this problem by using the marital and earnings histories of both marital partners to estimate Social Security benefits. The Modeling Income in the Near Term (MINT) model projects retirement income (Social Security benefits, pension income, asset income, and earnings of working beneficiaries) from 1997 through 2031 for current and future Social Security beneficiaries using a unique data source--the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)--matched to Social Security Administration records. Using MINT data, this article establishes the importance of using data for couples rather than individuals by examining the impact of changing Social Security benefits to reflect 40 years of lifetime earnings rather than the 35 years required under current law. We compare the effect of this policy change on married women by estimating their benefits with data for couples and with individual data. Results indicate that: Using individual data overestimates the projected reduction in retirement benefits brought about by the policy change and makes the effects on women look more severe than they actually are. Because older birth cohorts are more likely than younger cohorts to receive auxiliary benefits based on their husbands' average lifetime earnings, the bias created by using individual data is projected to be much larger for older cohorts than for younger cohorts. This article emphasizes the importance of using data for couples to estimate Social Security benefits, particularly for women. Although our focus is on married women, using data for couples is just as important for calculating the retirement benefits of divorced and widowed individuals. For individuals who are divorced or widowed at retirement, their Social Security benefits are based on their own earnings history, as well as the earnings histories of each of their previous spouses.     

Social Security and Third World Poverty: The Challenge to Policymakers

Although social security emerged in the industrial countries as a mechanism for alleviating and preventing poverty, it has had a negligible impact on the problem of poverty in the developing countries. Because of the high incidence of poverty in the Third World and the need for effective interventions, conventional social security policies should be critically reexamined. Reviewing previous attempts to formulate social security policies that focus on the poor, this paper challenges policymakers to identify innovative social security programs that address the poverty problem directly.     

Comparative Social Security: The Challenge of Evaluation

There has been dramatic global expansion in the national provision of social security programs throughout the twentieth century. This has provided very fertile ground for the comparative analysis of social security programs and systems over the last forty-five years. Most comparative studies, however, have, been content to describe and compare strategies, programs, institutions and values at the multinational or regional levels. There has been considerable reluctance either to engage in global studies or to embark on comparative-evaluative studies. This paper seeks to fill this gap by providing a framework for an evaluation methodology that permits the global ranking of social security systems and programs.     

Constitutional background to the Social Security Act of 1935

In June 1937, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported unfavorably on Roosevelt's Court-packing plan and the bill was effectively killed. In the same month, Justice Van Devanter retired and gave Roosevelt his first opportunity to make an appointment to the Supreme Court. Over the following 6 years, Roosevelt made seven more appointments to the Court, and in the years that followed the Court continued in the direction boldly advanced in the spring of 1937. A residual effect of the taxing-spending construction of the old-age insurance provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 has been the Court's continued adherence to the view that social security programs consist of separate taxing and spending provisions and are not, constitutionally speaking, social insurance programs. The issue has arisen in both a due process context and an equal protection context. But it is unlikely that the decisions reached in these contexts would have been different had the old-age insurance program been drafted as an earned-benefits program pursuant to the commerce power. Of course, the Court's decisions in the social security cases represented a significant constitutional development in establishing the breadth of Congress' powers to tax and spend for the general welfare. The decisions not only cleared the way for other general welfare programs, but more fundamentally provided the Federal Government with the substantive power and institutional flexibility to respond to the changing needs of the Nation.     

The Social Security Administration's Disability Service Improvement process

Reprinted here in its entirety is Commissioner Jo Anne B. Barnhart's statement of June 15, 2006, to the Subcommittee on Social Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means. In her statement, Commissioner Barnhart outlines the improved disability determination process and how the changes to the process were decided. The key elements are collectively referred to as the Disability Service Improvement (DSI) and represent the most significant changes in the Social Security Administration's 50-year history of determining disability for workers seeking Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. Commissioner Barnhart's statement underscores that while the need for change in the disability determination process was clear, both she and SSA staff listened carefully to all points of view in the decisionmaking process. The end product of this outreach effort and deliberative process is the final rule that was published on March 31, 2006. The new procedures outlined in the final rule will take advantage of the new electronic disability claims system, or eDib, and will shorten times to make disability decisions and will allow benefits to be paid sooner to people who are clearly disabled. Key elements include a new Medical and Vocational Expert System to improve the quality and availability of such expertise at all levels of adjudication, review of state agency determinations by a Federal Reviewing Official to ensure more accurate and consistent decisionmaking earlier in the process, and a newly created Decision Review Board to identify and correct decisional errors and to identify quality issues at all levels. Two improvements underlying the new process at all levels include better documentation of the record and more effective quality feedback loops for continuous improvement. Read Commissioner Barnhart's statement for a further explanation of DSI, how the changes were decided, and her plans for implementation.