Jury nullification

The present study was conducted to determine the effects of nullification information to the jury from two sources, judge's instructions and lawyers' arguments, on juries' verdicts and decision making in three criminal cases. In addition, the research tested the impact of challenges to nullification information on trial outcomes. The results, gathered from 144 six-person juries, indicated that when juries are in receipt of nullification information from the judge or defense attorney they are more likely to acquit a sympathetic defendant and judge a dangerous defendant more harshly than when such information is not present or when challenges are made to nllification arguments. Analysis of the juries' decision-making processes suggested that nullification information may alter the way in which juries perceive and use the trial evidence. In those trials in which a nullification defense was successful, juries used the outcome of the case, as well as the intent of the defendant, to evaluate the worth and weight of the evidence. Pronullification conditions devalued the currency of the evidence and permitted juries to utilize nonevidentiary factors in deciding the cases used in this study.This research was supported by a grant from The University of Toledo Graduate School.     

The Rule of Law and Jury Nullification

Jury nullification occurs when a jury renders a verdict based on what it feels the law ought to demand, as opposed to what the law in fact demands. While it is beyond doubt that criminal juries in common law jurisdictions have the ability to so act without fear of legal censure or redress, it remains a highly contentious issue as to whether such juries ought to be informed of this ability. One of the main objections to informing jurors of their purview to nullify is that, in so acting, the rule of law is subverted. Thus, while jurors might have the ability to so act, they ought to be discouraged from doing so. This ability, in other words, must be hidden from them – a subterfuge justified by reference to the rule of law. In this paper I closely examine the rule of law objection and conclude that the conflicts between jury nullification and the rule of law are greatly exaggerated. In fact, in many respects jury nullification promotes the very same ends and goals as does the rule of law. Hence, I conclude, if there is a reason to withhold from the jury any knowledge of jury nullification, such a reason cannot be grounded on considerations of the rule of law.     

Attitudes,anger, and nullification instructions influence jurors’ verdicts in euthanasia cases

Courts have historically avoided informing jurors about their nullification power (i.e. the power to return a not-guilty verdict when their conscience demands it but the law directs otherwise), fearing that such knowledge would prompt disregard for the law and reliance on attitudes and emotions rather than evidence. We investigated jurors’ inclination to nullify the law in a morally ambiguous case of physician-assisted suicide, testing the impact of euthanasia attitudes on case judgments as well as moderators and mediators of that effect. Mock jurors with pro-euthanasia attitudes were overall less likely to vote guilty than anti-euthanasia jurors, especially when they were given jury instructions informing them of jurors’ power to nullify. Nullification instructions also exacerbated the effect of jurors’ attitudes on anger, disgust, and moral outrage toward the defendant – emotions that mediated the effect of attitudes on verdicts. We also tested the impact of incidentally induced anger on jurors’ reliance on their attitudes rather than the law, given anger’s propensity to increase certainty and heuristic processing. Anger enhanced mock jurors’ reliance on their attitudes under certain conditions. Theoretical and practical implications for understanding juror decision-making are discussed.     

Lesser-included offenses

The positions taken by prosecutors and defense lawyers on proposed jury instructions on lesser-included offenses provide evidence that juries do not follow the law strictly. This paper develops a simple model of expected utility to predict how jurors make their decisions. The model explains a stylized fact that is inconsistent with the idea that juries always follow the law, namely why prosecutors often object to giving the jury the option of a lesser-included offense. We use the model to evaluate the law concerning jury instructions on primary and lesser-included offenses.     

A concept in search of a definition: The effects of reasonable doubt instructions on certainty of guilt standards and jury verdicts

Eighty (6-person) juries heard 1 of the 5 reasonable doubt instructions in a trial that either had strong evidence for guilt or favored acquittal. None of the instructions produced acceptable criteria of self-reported reasonable doubt, although instructions that informed juries to be firmly convinced (FC) elicited the highest standards of proof. The FC instructions yielded verdicts that tended to correspond with the evidence in both versions of the trial. FC juries focused proportionately more on the evidence and less on non-probative issues than juries given other instructions. Juries had lower self-reported standards of proof when the trial evidence was weak for conviction as opposed to when it was strong. The discussion addresses the surprisingly low self-reported standards of proof.     

The representative jury requirement: Jury representativeness and cross sectional participation from the beginning to the end of the jury selection process

The paper specifically addresses the many ways in which the facially neutral procedures actually fail to secure representative jury pools. Although the Sixth Amendment's fair cross‐section requirement forbids systematic discrimination in the creation of the jury venire and panel, it does not guarantee that the criminal jury will in fact reflect an accurate cross‐section of the community. As a result, not only does the Court fail to focus on nonlegally recognized screening mechanisms and factors such as exemptions, excuses, failure to followup jurors, etc., may affect jury representativeness, but also the Court never examined cross‐sectional representation at the entirety of the jury selection processes, except jury panels and final juries.

The first section of this paper presents a brief overview of the constitutional law impacting impartial juries, especially addressing the fair cross‐section doctrine that is the focus of contemporary jury selection procedures. In providing empirical and systematic comparisons of jury participation at each of the distinct jury selection stages encompassing a general population, jury wheels, jury qualified pools, jury eligibles, jury panels, and actual trial jurors, the second section of this paper makes critical analyses of the cumulative effects of screening mechanisms in jury selection. The paper assesses jury compositions by looking at demographic, socio‐economic, and ideological profiles of prospective jurors, illustrating that those jury profiles do not necessarily reflect cross‐sectional representation of the community population at comprehensive stages of the jury selection process. The analytical findings show that unless some deep seated reforms are made to eliminate cumulative effects of selection biases and correct representative imbalances of jury wheels, qualified pools, jury panels, and trial juries, historically underrepresented groups such as racial minorities, the poor, and part‐time employees will continue to be underrepresented on juries, negating the public's shared responsibility for the administration of justice in one of America's most heralded democratic institutions.     

Changing views of jury power

This article highlights the major events and empirical research in the continuing debate over the power and competence of the jury in civil and criminal trials. The concept ofjury nullification, the power of the jury to return a verdict based upon their moral conscience despite the evidence and the law, is used as a convenient filter to discuss the legal and behavioral assumptions about jury power and performance. The legal, historical, and even behavioral contexts reflect a bipolar theme in the level of trust Americans have exhibited towards the jury system. One pole reflects the notion that juries lack predictability and rationality in their verdicts and are moved by emotional concerns. Antipodally, juries have been thought to reflect an historical competence at applying common sense notions of equity and rationality to conflicted and ambiguous cases. This article traces the history of these two views of jury power and competence. A critical review of the empirical research that may inform the debate about the jury's competence in both criminal and civil arenas is provided.     

Effects of Judicial Instructions and Case Characteristics in a Mock Jury Trial of Battered Women Who Kill

This study examined the effects of judicial instructions on the outcome of a mock jury trial that involved a woman who pleaded self-defense after killing her abusive spouse. Jurors were instructed to adopt either an objective or a subjective standard of reasonableness when reaching a verdict. Within objective/subjective instruction conditions, half of the juries viewed a case in which the woman killed her abuser while he was attacking her (confrontational) and the remaining half viewed a case in which she killed him while he was asleep (no confrontation). Juries in the subjective conditions returned significantly more not guilty verdicts than jurors in the objective conditions. At the individual juror level, participants hearing subjective instructions were significantly more likely to rate the defendant as not guilty than jurors given objective instructions when the abuse was nonconfrontational.     

First-ballot votes,predeliberation dispositions,and final verdicts in jury trials

This study examines the proposition that first ballots predict jury verdicts inaactual juries, an oft-cited finding from Kalven and Zeisel, and the explicit assumption by Kalven and Zeisel that first-ballot preferences are equivalent to predeliberation opinions, referred to as the liberation hypothesis. Interview data from respondents who had served on felony juries indicate that first ballots do predict jury verdicts at a high level. However, it is probable that influence occurs in juries prior to the first ballot, making it unlikely that the distribution of votes on the first ballot is equivalent to the individual inclinations of jurors at the time they enter into deliberation, which casts doubt on the liberation hypothesis. Methodological issues in the study of real juries on these topics are discussed.     

Race and the decision making of juries

The relationship between race and jury decision making is a controversial topic that has received increased attention in recent years. While public and media discourse has focused on anecdotal evidence in the form of high‐profile cases, legal researchers have considered a wide range of empirical questions including: To what extent does the race of a defendant affect the verdict tendencies of juries? Is this influence of race comparable for jurors of different races? In what ways does a jury's racial composition affect its verdict and deliberations? The present review examines both experimental and archival investigations of these issues. Though the extant literature is not always consistent and has devoted too little attention to the psychological mechanisms underlying the influence of race, this body of research clearly demonstrates that race has the potential to impact trial outcomes. This is a conclusion with important practical as well as theoretical implications when it comes to ongoing debates regarding jury representativeness, how to optimize jury performance, jury nullification and racial disparities in the administration of capital punishment.     

The basis of citizen's perceptions of the criminal jury

Two studies examined citizens' perceptions of the criminal jury and their evaluations of 6- or 12-person juries operating under unanimous or majority decision rules. Study 1 was a telephone survey of 130 adult citizens in which respondents evaluated alternative jury structures in the abstract. In Study 2, students were asked to evaluate jury structures for a hypothetical trial in which they were either the defendant or the victim in a crime with a mild or serious outcome. In both studies, jury size and decision rule were related to ratings of procedural cost, and the severity of the crime moderated procedural evaluations. In Study 1, juries were preferred to judges and the 12-person unanimous jury was preferred over other jury structures when the crime involved was serious. In Study 2, there were no direct effects due to variations in jury structure, but subjects appeared to trade off procedural cost and thoroughness of deliberation as a function of the seriousness of the crime. Procedural fairness emerged as the strongest independent predictor of desirability for jury procedures, and fairness was related to representativeness and accuracy. The role manipulation did not influence subjects' responses. In both studies, respondents were very supportive of the jury as an institution, despite a perception that erroneous jury verdicts do occur.     

美国死刑量刑程序的历史考察

美国死刑量刑程序经历了一个正当化的历史过程,早期的陪审团废法现象催生了死刑陪审团制度,死刑陪审团制度的建立又引发了死刑案件审判的两分式改革并使死刑量刑程序得以独立,特殊的"凌驾陪审团"规则体现出美国司法界力图保持死刑裁量中职业法官与平民陪审团间的权力制衡。     

Chaos in The Courtroom Reconsidered: Emotional Bias and Juror Nullification

A widespread presumption in the law is that giving jurors nullification instructions would result in "chaos"-jurors guided not by law but by their emotions and personal biases. We propose a model of juror nullification that posits an interaction between the nature of the trial (viz. whether the fairness of the law is at issue), nullification instructions, and emotional biases on juror decision-making. Mock jurors considered a trial online which varied the presence a nullification instructions, whether the trial raised issues of the law's fairness (murder for profit vs. euthanasia), and emotionally biasing information (that affected jurors' liking for the victim). Only when jurors were in receipt of nullification instructions in a nullification-relevant trial were they sensitive to emotionally biasing information. Emotional biases did not affect evidence processing but did affect emotional reactions and verdicts, providing the strongest support to date for the chaos theory.     

The Swedish jury system in press cases: An offspring of the English trial jury?

In the area of press freedom the English influence has for more than 200 years been strongly felt in Sweden. The introduction of a jury system in press cases in 1815 was clearly inspired by the English example. The Swedish variant had, admittedly, some strange features but it was nonetheless, in essence, a jury. Thus it should, historically and systematically, be looked upon as an offspring of the English trial jury.

Since 1815 the Swedish jury has grown more ‘English’ in some respects. Those greater similarities notwithstanding, there are still important differences between the two systems. At least two of the differences are the result of Swedish innovations.

In 1949 the Swedes in the new Freedom of the Press Act included a provision, stating that the court of first instance not only may but must review a verdict of conviction. If also the court convicts and, consequently, fixes the penalty, the defendant can always take the case at least to the appropriate court of appeal. Thus, there is a double‐check or even a triple‐check against an unwarranted conviction. From the defendant's point of view the Swedish jury system can be described as fool‐proof.³⁵

In 1949 the Swedes also introduced a new method of choosing the jury. The jurors are drawn by lot but not, as in England, with the electoral register as the starting point but from a panel chosen by politically elected councils. Furthermore, one third of the jurors must be present or former lay assessors. Through that method of selecting the jurors the Swedes have reasonably counteracted the traditional charges that juries are ignorant or confused or both. On the other hand, the Swedish system may be sensitive to political influence on the administration of justice since the composition, not exactly of this or that jury but of the whole panel, is the indirect result of political elections. However, once more, unwarranted convictions are almost certainly reversed by the courts.

With their method of choosing the jurors the Swedes also avoid a problem which has, in recent years, caused considerable disquiet in Great Britain ‐ jury vetting. The ancient practice of ‘Stand by for the Crown’ is still a reality in English courts. How often the prosecution uses its right to influence the composition of juries by vetting proposed jurors is not known. However, the practice has caused serious concern among lawyers. ‘The fear of “packed” juries is still with us’, to quote an expert in the field, John F. McEldowney.³⁶

The Swedish jury in press cases is certainly not the most important or the best known offspring of the English trial jury ‐ that is, of course, the American jury. However, the Swedish jury has survived for more than 165 years and is still going strong. It is quantitatively of modest significance ‐ there are in ‘normal’ years no more than a dozen cases in the country. However, the jury has an umbrella effect outside the printed media, i.e. what you are allowed to say in a newspaper or in a book you can almost certainly say at a public meeting or on a stage.

In recent decades the Swedish jury has shown a considerable capability of development. It has approached the English model on some points while, at the same time, making innovations on others. It is possible that Sweden during the 1980s may somewhat expand the jury system within the area of free speech, i.e. outside the printed media.     

Perceptions of older adult jurors: the influence of aging stereotypes and jury laws

ABSTRACT

The present study examined younger (18–30 years, N?=?100) and older adults’ (66–89 years, N?=?100) responses to a jury duty questionnaire assessing perceptions of jury duty, their capability to serve, and the capability of older adults to serve. We also explored perceptions of the senior jury opt-out law (a law that allows those over a certain age (e.g. 65 years) to opt-out of jury duty). We assessed why participants believe this law is in place and experimentally examined if informing older adults about this law impacted their jury questionnaire responses. Results demonstrated that older adults were significantly more likely to want to serve compared to younger adults; however, younger adults provided lower capability ratings of older adult jurors compared to older adults. Younger adults’ open-ended explanations for these ratings indicated negative aging stereotypes (i.e. in part, believing that older adult jurors are less capable because of declining health and biased beliefs). Older adults also had a significantly lower rate of agreement with the senior jury opt-out law. Although informing older adults about this law did not impact their perceptions of themselves as potential jurors, it did enforce more negative attitudes towards older adult jurors as a whole.     

Lay Juries, Professional Arbitrators, and the Arbitrator Selection Hypothesis

Do civil juries follow the broad dictates of the law? For example,do those plaintiffs who suffer greater damages receive greaterawards? Are juries consistent? Do juries empty deep pockets?In many states automobile accidents are first tried by a professionalarbitrator and then by a jury if one of the litigants is dissatisfiedwith the outcome. How do the decisions made by professionalarbitrators compare to the decisions made by juries? This articleseeks to answer these questions by first developing a modelof arbitrator selection and then undertaking an empirical studyof 380 automobile accident cases that went through both an arbitrationand a jury trial.     

Predictors of Death Sentencing for Minority,Equal, and Majority Female Juries in Capital Murder Trials

The relatively small body of prior research investigating whether the sex composition of juries impacts sentencing decisions has produced equivocal results. Exploring this topic further, the current study used a large sample of capital cases from North Carolina (n = 675) to examine (a) whether jury sex composition predicted jury capital punishment sentencing decisions; and (b) whether there were different models of sentencing for male-majority, equal male-female, and female-majority juries. When we controlled for a number of legal and extralegal factors, our findings indicated that jury sex composition was independently related to sentencing outcomes. Specifically, equal male-female juries were significantly more likely and female-majority juries were significantly less likely to choose the death penalty versus a sentence of life in prison. In addition, different models (predictors) of sentencing were revealed for each of the jury sex compositions. Implications for future research and policy are discussed.     

A quota jury: affirmative action in jury selection

It is not too naive to believe that the use of affirmative action policies in the jury selection for the Rodney King beating trial of White police officers would have prevented the uprisings that followed their acquittal. The public outrage and riots that followed the verdict demonstrated the need for affirmative inclusion of racial minorities on jury trials to preserve and restore the public’s confidence and legitimacy of verdicts in racially motivated cases. While racially mixed juries offer many benefits, current jury selection procedures fail to provide much protection to members of racial minorities in criminal trials. From the source list to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the current selection procedures provide almost no protection to racial minorities. The issue of preferential treatments of racial minorities in education, employment, and business has divided the nation and even some minority communities themselves. Affirmative action in jury proceedings and trials, however, has yet to receive much deserved attention and critical scrutiny. This article empirically examines public perceptions of possible applications of affirmative action mechanisms in criminal jury proceedings, focusing on the uses of mandatory racial quotas to engineer racially integrated juries in criminal trials. Three different types of racially mixed juries—the jury “de medietate linguae,” the Hennepin jury model, and the social science model—are examined, and the public’s perceptions of affirmative mechanisms ensuring minority participation on juries are analyzed. This article argues that the affirmative mechanism to secure racially mixed juries is essential to both the appearance and substance of fairness in criminal jury proceedings, and both the Hennepin model and the social science model are overwhelmingly supported as the ideal types of affirmative jury structures in creating racially heterogeneous juries.     

Influence of expert testimony regarding eyewitness accuracy on jury decisions

To determine the influence of expert testimony regarding the general unreliability of eyewitnesses, a two-phase study was conducted. In the first phase, 24 community residents served as jurors on four six-person juries. A burglary case was tried in 120 District Court. El Paso, Texas. Two juries heard all the evidence including the expert testimony of a psychologist and the other two heard all of the testimony except that of the psychologist. During the second phase, 24 student jurors constituting four six-person juries viewed a videotape of the trial. Two of these juries saw the entire proceeding from the first phase including the expert testimony and the remaining two saw all but the expert testimony. All juries acquitted the defendant; however, those who heard the expert testimony significantly lowered their judgments of the accuracy and reliability of eyewitness identification as well as its overall importance to the trial. Further, those juries that heard the expert testimony spent a significantly longer time discussing eyewitness identification as well as other relevant evidence. No differences between community residents and college student juries were obtained.The authors wish to thank Judge Brunson Moore, Mr. David Jeans, Mr. Ricky Glenn Smith, Detective James Christianson, D. Steven Cooper, Rachel Hanna, Daniel Torres, and Patricia Tetreault. All of these people participated in the trial and without them this research could not have been conducted. This research was supported by Gift Funds of the Department of Psychology, University of Texas at El Paso.