辩诉交易制度研究——由国内辩诉交易第一案引起的思考

辩诉交易是在美国等西方国家普遍推行的一种非常规的处理刑事案件的程序,但在我国刑法体系中却始终无一席之地。我国相当一部分法院办案效率低,案件久拖不决的问题相当严重,影响了我国司法体制的正常运转。而以“高效率、快结案”为特点的辩诉交易制度却能很好地解决这些问题。在司法实践中我国已经出现了运用辩诉交易处理刑事案件的成功事例,为引进辩诉交易制度开了个好头。     

关于辩诉交易制度的初步探索

辩诉交易是一种具有一定普遍性和实效性的刑事诉讼实践。目前,为提高刑事诉讼的效率与效益,就辩诉交易制度及其在我国的可适用性问题,理论界和实务界展开了激烈的讨论,各方面发表了许多有益的意见。本文意欲从辩诉交易适用的合理性等方面进行分析,并对该制度在我国适用的规范化、制度化,做一个初步的讨论。     

辩诉交易内质的完善

辩诉交易制度虽然无法全盘移植到我国,但是其反应出的核心思想影响着我国的法律建设。纵观我国刑事司法实践,不少制度、刑事政策和尚在试点的制度都折射出辩诉交易制度的合理内核。     

也谈辩诉交易

有关辩诉交易问题的争论在中国学术界已经不算新鲜话题,但是,随着近两年司法实践的进一步增多以及由此带来的一系列问题,辩诉交易又重新成为人们讨论的焦点。那么,中国真的需要引进辩诉交易吗?难道一个简易程序不能解决所有问题吗?笔者在这里将把辩诉交易与各国简易程序作一比较,以期为引进辨诉交易程序的必要性和可行性探求一些理论和实践依据。     

辩诉交易中国化理论辨析

东西方毕竟有着太多不同的历史渊源与文化积淀,所以当任何一项西方的制度将要影响到东方之时,都必将会引起学术界、实务界不可避免的沸反盈天与轩然大波,人们津津乐道,但又众说纷纭。历史又总是这样有     

辩诉交易移植问题初探

辩诉交易制度的产生与发展有其特定的历史及法制背景，从刑事司法价值取向、法制原则、诉讼模式、辩诉交易双方的资本等方面考察，我国现阶段不宜移植辩诉交易制度。     

浅析辩诉交易制度

辩诉交易制度是美国司法制度的重要组成部分。我国刑事诉讼法律中没有辩诉交易,然而司法改革客观要求加大辩诉交易的运用,在改革我国刑事诉讼简易程序的同时,可以分步设立有中国特色的辩诉交易制度。我国的辩诉交易应当规范化及制度化,同时鉴于特定的制度背景,应注意在立法上为其确立一定的限度,以提高刑事诉讼的效率与效益。     

辩诉交易可以中国化

辩诉交易作为英美刑事诉讼中颇具特色又充满争议的一项制度,相对于中国是典型的舶来制度,其自身的缺陷和对正义构成的威胁也遭到了各种质疑和指责。考虑外来制度能否中国化的问题,应结合多项因素从实际国情出发进行分析。本文从辩诉交易与国情的相容以及其为目前国情所需两方面,得出辩诉交易可以中国化这一结论,并提出展望,只要在这项制度的构建过程中,采取相应措施守住正义的防线,辩诉交易必将成功被借鉴。     

辩诉交易制度探析

辩诉交易制度源于美国,是用于提高诉讼效率、节约司法资源、减少积案的一项特殊制度。随着社会的不断发展,我国刑事犯罪率不断上升,而我国司法资源远远不能满足案件的需求,导致大量案件积压,办案效率低下,为了提高司法效率,保障被告人及被害人的权益,实现实然意义上的正义,我国有必要借鉴吸收辩诉交易制度。     

我国的“辩诉交易内质”

如何提高效率、保障公平一直法学界不断探索的课题。在英美法系中,辩诉交易制度应允而生。我国虽然没有完整的辩诉交易制度,但是辩诉交易的精髓却也有所体现。本文试对此精髓进行提炼,结合我国司法实践,提出"辩诉交易内质"的概念,并对其包含的内容进行进一步的分析和阐述。     

确立中国式辩诉交易程序之研讨

随着社会、经济的发展,犯罪率不断上升,刑事案件越来越多。由于各种条件的限制,导致了刑事积案与日俱增。为了及时处理积案和集中力量查处大案,美、德、意等国家的法律规定了辩诉交易程序。我们应从中国国情出发,本着“洋为中用”原则,对国外辩诉交易的发展、辩诉交易与简易程序的关系进行研究,确立中国式辩诉交易程序。     

浅析刑事和解理念对辩诉交易制度的启示——以被害人为视角

辩诉交易制度与刑事和解制度是欧美刑事案件中适用的两类重要的司法制度。两种制度有其相似的地方,也有诸多的不同。其中一点便是刑事诉讼的被害人在两种制度中的地位和作用有着较大的差别。而两者的共同基础———社会契约理论和私法中契约自由的观念,以及辩诉交易制度在实际运作过程中可能出现的问题使得辩诉交易借鉴刑事和解的理念,加强被害人的地位和作用成为可能和必要。     

解读美国辩诉交易制度

辩诉交易虽源于英国 ,但却在美国发扬光大 ,成为美国刑事司法最具特色的制度之一。只有比较全面准确地了解辩诉交易制度的来龙去脉、实施情况、存在的问题以及对辩诉交易的各种评价之后 ,才能根据我国的法制环境进一步研究是否引入 ,如何引入的问题。     

Plea bargaining and deterrence: An institutional approach

Previous economic analyses of plea bargaining have largely ignored its impact on the deterrence of crime. Instead, they have focused on the bargaining between a defendant and a prosecutor once a crime has been committed. This article remedies this deficiency by asking how the practice of plea bargaining influences the determination of criminal punishment and thereby the supply of crime by rational offenders. The key question examined is, how do the ex post objectives of prosecutors affect the ability of legislatures to implement criminal punishments aimed at achieving optimal deterrence? Various prosecutorial objectives are considered in answering this question.     

Toward a Comparative Economics of Plea Bargaining

We attempt to open a path to the comparative analysis of criminal procedure by superimposing the efficiency principle onto an adversarial system characterized by an aversion to false convictions and an inquisitorial system characterized by a desire to justly punish the guilty. We begin with a general model of plea bargaining, embed it in a larger framework that addresses the costs of adjudication, the value of punishing the guilty and the costs of false convictions, and then link the desirability of plea bargaining and compulsory prosecution to the weights given these costs and benefits in the objective function. We examine the judicial endorsement of plea bargaining in the United States and the debate over European analogs to plea bargaining in light of the model, and conclude that plea bargaining will increase social welfare in adversarial systems but not in inquisitorial ones.     

德国辩诉交易的实践与启示

在德国,辩诉交易制度完全是实践中自发的产物。德国辩诉交易实践的形态、产生、争论及相关司法判决和改革草案的分析表明,辩诉交易已经成为德国解决刑事案件的方式之一,这种方式的出现回应了德国刑事诉讼的特点及其面临的困境,同时也缩小了两大诉讼模式的差距,呈现了世界范围内体系差异而解决方式一致的诉讼规律。德国辩诉交易实践表明,在我国建立基于被告人认罪而迅速结案继而获得刑罚减轻的结案方式成为可能。     

To Waive or Not to Waive: The Right to Trial and Plea Bargaining

Criminal defendants in many countries are faced with a dilemma: If they waive their right to trial and plead guilty, they typically receive charge or sentence reductions in exchange for having done so. If they exercise their right to trial and are found guilty, they often receive stiffer sanctions than if they had pled guilty. I characterize the former as ‘waiver rewards’ and the latter as ‘non-waiver penalties.’ After clarifying the two and considering the relation between them, I briefly explicate the grounds for a moral right to trial. I then assess the defensibility of such rewards and penalties. In addition to considering whether waiver rewards and non-waiver penalties serve the aims of legal punishment, I address the three main arguments for permitting them. The first suggests that defendants willing to plead display more remorse for their crimes and thus are deserving of lighter sentences. The second defends waiver rewards and non-waiver penalties in cases where prosecutors are alleged to know that defendants are guilty but face problems establishing their guilt at trial. The third holds that guilty defendants who are willing to plead conserve scarce state resources and should be rewarded for it, whereas those unwilling to plead squander such resources and should be penalized accordingly. I contend that none of these arguments provides persuasive grounds for waiver rewards or non-waiver penalties, even on the assumption that we can distinguish those defendants who should waive their right to trial from those who should not. This conclusion presents a fundamental challenge to contemporary plea bargaining practices.

如何看待被告人有罪答辩——辩诉交易的一点启示

美国辩诉交易制度中的合理因素 ,可以为我国刑事司法实践中正确等待被告人有答辩提供借鉴。应当更新诉讼理念 ,将认罪答辩视为被告人作为诉讼主体对刑事程序运作方式的一种选择 ,建立激励被告人自愿作出有罪答辩的机制 ,对此类案件可简化诉讼程序 ,同时应建立对被告人有罪答辩自愿性明智性的审查机制。     

Measuring and Explaining Charge Bargaining

Charge bargaining is a potentially important form of discretion in criminal sentencing that is obscured in many studies of sentencing outcomes. Our procedure to measure the difference in sentencing outcomes caused by plea bargain emphasizes the amount, in months, that the sentence length is reduced. Using this measure, we compare prosecutorial discretion across counties in two different states. We conclude that charge bargaining plays an empirically important role in determining sentencing outcomes. Furthermore, we find that measuring the distance (in months of prison time) moved during a charge bargain may provide a very different estimate of the discretion than is given by the rate of bargaining, which is the usual measure used. Although the rate of charge bargaining was higher in the voluntary guidelines state, its impact on sentences was greater in the presumptive guidelines jurisdiction, as predicted by Reitz (1998). We further observe a dramatic difference in predictions from shifting the case characteristics underlying the summary measure. This result reveals that distributional differences (either due to the underlying criminal activity or due to the overall level of severity of punishment) can easily obscure the inferences necessary for understanding the operation of the systems. Our finding of differential charge bargaining in these two jurisdictions should provide a caution when comparing the results of studies of disparity in sentencing across jurisdiction types.

和为贵——论行政协调的法制改革

狭义上的行政协调包括行政程序之协调和行政诉讼协调。行政程序之协调指行政机关与人民在相关人民权利义务方面所进行的协商与沟通。行政诉讼的协调目的也是终结行政争议,以协议的方式终止诉讼。对于行政程序之协调,现行的若干制度均不能消除争议。而在行政诉讼协调中,行政诉讼不得调解原则并不存在于台湾和日本。必须在行政协调中建立行政程序及行政诉讼程序的连贯性机制。刑事诉讼中的辩诉交易,以及替代性纠纷解决机制都是对行政诉讼不得调解原则的挑战。