Fundamental Rights

This essay aims at laying the foundations for a general theory offundamental rights. It starts out from a formal and structuraldefinition of the concept of `fundamental right', which is definedas a non-disposable, universal right. The author believes thatthis definition can be used as a starting point for the constructionof a theory of constitutional democracy based on four main theses.1) As fundamental rights are non-disposable and universal, theyare structurally different from patrimonial rights, which aredisposable and individual; 2) fundamental rights constitute thecontent of substantial democracy, i.e. the positive and negativelimits set on the power exercisable by the majority that comprisesformal democracy; 3) citizenship, which is still the precondition forholding many fundamental rights, is a regressive category becauseit is a source of inequality; 4) a distinction must be drawn betweenfundamental rights and the guarantees (duties and sanctions) put in place to protect them. Should a legal order make provision forfundamental rights but fail to accompany them with the necessaryauarantees, the result is a gap that the legislator and the legalinterpreter have a duty to bridge. The theory of constitutionaldemocracy thus elaborated constitutes a profound change in classical(Kelsenian) legal positivism, which is no longer suitable forpresenting the law of contemporary states governed by the rule oflaw, and calls for a more active, critical attitude towards law both by the judge and by legal science.     

Why a Charter of Fundamental Human Rights in the EU?

Abstract. It has been argued that human rights politics is detrimental to social integration. But human rights are not merely abstract principles which, when positivated, secure negative freedom. When they are constitutionalised and turned into fundamental rights they contain a guarantee for equal freedom to all citizens. A charter of fundamental rights is a means to enhance the legal certainty of the citizens, reduce arbitrariness and moral imperialism and to institutionalise the right to justification. However, as the principle of popular sovereignty points to a particular society, and human rights point to an ideal republic, only with a cosmopolitan order can the problem of human rights politics be resolved.     

基本权利限制的合宪性基准

尽管美、德两国违宪审查基准因各自的法律价值取向、权利保护政策和法律传统不同而有所区别,表述方式也存在差异,但各国从形式和实质上的考量因素是基本一致的。这些因素包括确立基本权利限制之合宪性基准的本体论因素,如基本权利的类型、构成;关联论因素,如法治传统、司法政策;以及方法论因素,如基本权利限制的目的、手段和结果等。希望所整合出的基本权利限制之合宪性的基准体系,对我国的立法合宪性审查有所助益。     

Toward a Theory of Prisoners' Rights

This paper explores the issue of prisoners' rights. The conditions of incarcerated people in jails and prisons include psychological and physical deterioration brought on by their condition of confinement. The one sanction that has been debated extensively in the United States is the death penalty. Yet there are numerous losses or deprivations short of death that we might impose on legal offenders. In addition to broader issues such as the nature of rights and the basic moral rights possessed by individuals, issues specific to the rights of serious legal offenders are distinguished and discussed. The latter issues include whether offenders forfeit all or some of their moral rights, whether their retained rights are less stringent, whether the state has any obligation to facilitate exercise of their retained rights, and what specific rights prisoners retain or acquire.     

Raz on Rights: Human Rights,Fundamental Rights,and Balancing

After clarifying the outlines of Raz's interest theory of rights and its relationship to aspects of the principles theory of rights, I consider how his recent observations on human rights manage to fit (or fail to fit) into the interest theory. I then address two questions. First, I elaborate on Raz's definition of morally fundamental rights, arguing that he is right in claiming that there are no such rights. I then show that the interest theory accommodates the notion that rights may take qualitative precedence over conflicting considerations—a question that has become increasingly relevant in light of recent writing on rights.     

法律缺位状态下村民基本权利研究

由于法律的缺位,一些村民的土地权益以及承载于其上的基本权利处于事实上的虚置状态。在土地纠纷诉讼中,村民往往无法获得实质性的司法救济,而这在很大程度上也是由于法律的缺位造成的。从挖掘现行法律规范的潜在价值来看,《物权法》第63条第二款所设定的救济渠道和《农村土地承包法》等法律中所包含的强制性价值条款无法切实担当起保护村民土地权益、进而实现其基本权利的使命。但是,如果能够设置＂法益侵害型＂侵权行为制度,将该种价值条款所包含的＂平等法益＂转介到土地纠纷领域,村民的基本权利是有望得到实现的。当然,法官在转介基本权利的时候,应该对其流量进行动态的控制。     

基本权利限制问题的思考框架

对基本权利限制问题的思考,可以遵循"基本权利的构成--基本权利的限制--基本权利限制的违宪阻却事由"三个思考层次.在第一个层次中确定基本权利的保障范围和基本权利主体,其中需要分析基本权利的内在界限和基本权利的竞合等问题;在第二个层次确定国家对基本权利限制的认定标准;在第三个层次确定该限制行为是否有违宪阻却事由的存在,并依此作出该限制行为合宪或违宪的判断.在这一层次需要分析法律保留、比例原则、基本权利的本质内容等问题.以上三个层次构成了基本权利限制问题的思考框架.     

基本权利具体化之辨伪

基本权利的具体化是一个如何实施基本权利规范的问题,涉及法律的品质、宪法与法律、宪法与公权力的关系。立基于防御品质的早期基本权利具体化是一个法律保留问题,在很大程度上与基本权利限制同义,意在通过立法划定外部界限明确其内容,其后发展了国家保护义务与重大性理论,行政权与司法权亦负有具体化基本权利的义务。具体化的实质一则在于确定以立法者为优先的所有国家机关之于基本权利的义务;二则在于在形成基本权利内容的同时划定不受公权力支配的核心领域;三则在于使基本权利于具体生活关系中获得内容。广义上的基本权利具体化包括三方面的内容,即基本权利的形成、限制与保护,狭义的基本权利具体化要求普通法律在具体的生活领域与生活关系中形成基本权利的内容。     

论基本权利的防御权功能

从基本权利的功能体系出发,可以对基本权利作出规范而细致的法理分析.防御权功能是基本权利所具备的排除国家公权力侵害的功能.防御权功能是各种基本权利所普遍具备的功能,也是基本权利的功能体系中最为核心的部分.针对基本权利的防御权功能,国家承担消极义务,也就不为任何侵害基本权利的行为.不同的国家机关因其行使权力方式的不同,其所承担的消极义务的具体内容也不相同.     

论中国宪法基本权利的发展

基本权利与宪法发展的关系是宪法学研究不能回避的重要问题,基本权利是宪法发展的基点,宪法的发展是对基本权利需求的反映,宪法的发展状况影响着基本权利的发展水平。随着我国公民社会的孕育、法治社会的推进以及人权理念的发展等情势的出现,基本权利与宪法发展具备有利时机。树立人权理念,加强人权的系统性立法和有效性保障是推进我国人权实现和宪法纵深发展的必然选择。     

基本权利的法理学探究

保障公民基本权利是人类社会政治文明的价值目标,但时于如何建构和完善基本权利保障制度仍是困扰我国法治实践的重要课题.在法理学的视野中, "以人为本"是基本权利保障之逻辑起点,而"主权在民"则成为基本权利保障之政治基石.针对当下我国基本权利保障的现实困境,我们应当以程序保障为重心来完善我国基本权利保障体系.     

哈贝马斯的基本权利观——商谈论视角的基本权利体系重构

基本权利体系是现代民主法治国的核心要素之一,也是宪政得以成立的前提。在法哲学史上,对于基本权利的发生学,有两种对立的观点,那就是权利天赋论与权利国赋论,哈贝马斯以主体间性和商谈论为基础建构了其沟通行动理论,并以其作为支点重构了基本权利体系,他的基本权利观可称为权利互赋论,这种理论实现了对经典法哲学权利发生学争论的超越,进而为其重建现代性未竟之事业奠定了法律政治领域的基础。     

宪法基本权利与民事权利之互动原因研究——以人格权为分析进路

宪法基本权利与民事权利之间的双向互动关系是宪法与民法之间关系的缩影,对其互动原因的分析研究,旨在探求影响和决定公法与私法、宪法与民法之互动关系背后的深层原因,从而厘清影响我国当前法治建设进程的相关理论观点。现代以来,随着国家职能的变迁和社会关系的日益复杂,传统的公私法二分式结构渐趋模糊,市民社会与政治国家之间的界限已不再分明,社会福利国家理论的兴起为宪法基本权利与民事权利、宪法与民法、公法与私法之间的互动和交流提供了现实的物质基础和广泛的作用空间。基于理论和实践层面的双重需求,现代国家更多地介入到了私权领域和经济社会生活中而冲破了原有的理论和制度对国家公权所埋设下的层层藩篱,由此导致了公私法在现代社会的各个层面上的互动和交融。     

Fundamental Rights: Between Morals and Politics

Starting from the impossibility of understanding fundamental rights from the standpoint of natural law doctrine or positivism, the author tackles the issue of rights from a realistic point of view, that is to say from the perspective of law and politics on the one hand, and from the perspective of public morality, on the other. Thus the foundation of fundamental rights is the meeting point of conceptions of social morality that are current in the modern world and the political aspect of the conception of pluralist democracy. Moreover, fundamental rights are considered an instrument to enable the social and moral development of human beings.     

知识产权法律与基本权冲突的法理研究

知识产权法制的立法意旨在于鼓励创造与发明,进而促进科学文化的进步.全球日趋一致的知识产权保护标准,并不能使发展中国家得以雨露均沾的共享文明.故此,对发达国家就此议题支持发展中国家利益的立论研究就显得特别重要;此外,就知识产权与基本权之间发生冲突时的法律分析,特别是知识产权法律在法理学中法律效力的辩证关系,及其与宪法基本权冲突时的优位选择理论探索等等,均为本文所深入讨论的命题.     

The Structure of Conflicts of Fundamental Legal Rights

In recent years, the most widespread doctrine about the conflicts between fundamental (usually constitutional) legal rights could be summarized in the following three main theses: (1) The elements in conflict are legal principles, as opposed to legal rules; (2) Those conflicts are not consequences of the existence of inconsistencies or antinomies between the norms involved, but rather depend on the empirical circumstances of the case. In other words, the norms are logically consistent and the conflicts are not determinable a priori or in abstracto, but only in concreto; and (3) The classical criteria for solving conflicts between norms, such as lex superior, lex posterior and lex specialis, are not suitable to solve conflicts among fundamental legal rights. Indeed, they require a specific method known as ‘weighing and balancing’. Although all three theses could be (and indeed have been) regarded as problematic, in this paper I address mainly the second one. I try to show that there is room for a tertium genus between antinomies (deontic inconsistencies) and conflicts caused by strict empirical circumstances that I call ‘contextual antinomies’. There are situations in which the norms involved are not inconsistent but the conflict arises for logical reasons. My thesis is that many conflicts between fundamental legal rights fall in this category. I offer, in an appendix, a proposal of formalization of this kind of conflict and the elements involved in it.     

试论紧急状态下公民基本权利之保障

随着法治的日益健全 ,紧急状态问题越来越引起人们的关注 ,其中关于紧急状态下公民基本权利之保障的问题更是凸现出来。本文从公民基本权利的保障模式、公民基本权利限制的界限、公共利益与私人利益之衡量、宪法特别程序和国家紧急权力的正当性与合法性等角度进行分析 ,并借鉴国外宪法和紧急状态法制中的相关规定 ,提出了完善我国紧急状态下公民基本权利之保障制度的初步设想。     

Supranational Fundamental Rights or Primacy of Sovereignty?

This analysis explores in detail various aspects of the possible legal impact of ‘British’ Protocol No 30 (the so‐called opt‐out from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). On the basis of a legal appraisal, it concludes that the Protocol is not in any way to be understood as a substantial derogation from the standard of protection of fundamental rights in the EU or as an ‘opt‐out’ from the Charter in a substantial sense. Nevertheless, its significance is definitely not to be underestimated. Its adoption as a source of primary law enshrines a legally binding interpretation of the Charter and, in particular, an interpretation of its horizontal provisions. In Article 1(2) and Article 2, the Protocol in fact confirms that the application of the Charter cannot lead to a change in the existing competencies framework. These provisions are of a declaratory nature and apply to all Member States. In Article 1(1), the Protocol is of a constitutive nature since it rules out an extensive interpretation of what can be considered national legal acts adopted in the implementation of EU law only for those States signed up to the Protocol. This specifically means that if, in the future, as part of the application of the Charter, the Court of Justice of the EU (ECJ) has a tendency to subsume a certain area of national legislation under the ‘implementation of Union law’ outside the field of implementing standards, in the spirit of the Ellinki Radiophonia Tileorassi judgment (and subsequently allow their reviewability with respect to their conformity with the Charter), such action would be admissible only for those Member States that have not acceded to the Protocol. However, the Protocol cannot exclude the continued application of the general principles of law instead of the positively constituted fundamental rights in the Charter by the ECJ.