Cooperation and competition in public welfare policies

Present public welfare policies and various proposals for reforming them do not often exploit the advantages of cooperation between otherwise competing altruists. The article examines this principle from a number of perspectives. It shows first how the advantages of the existing cooperative payments structure could be lost in some widely-publicized welfare reform proposals, and it makes a suggestion for retaining these advantages. The article next shows how the same principle could be used to improve existing incentives for private giving. Finally, it uses the same logic to rationalize newly evolving notions of sharing responsibility between governments and the recipients themselves.     

Choosing a media outlet when seeking public approval

This paper considers the media outlet choice of a politician who seeks public approval for a political agenda in a broadcast interview. The available media outlets differ in their “toughness” towards the politician. An interview with a tougher media outlet is more informative, but is also more likely to yield a negative outcome. The choice of the media outlet determines the accuracy of the information that flows to the public and the volume of citizens who consume that information. The analysis shows that (1) politicians who enjoy sufficient popularity are likely to avoid tough media outlets, (2) when seeking approval for controversial agendas, politicians are more likely to appear in tougher outlets.     

Policy feedback and pathways: when change leads to endurance and continuity to change

Policy Sciences - The policy feedback literature was initially concerned with explaining how positive feedback could lead to self-reinforcing policy trajectories. More recently, policy scholars...     

Median voters,political systems and public policies: An empirical test

This paper tests the median voter hypothesis that variations in policies across political systems are caused by variations in median voter preferences. The context of the empirical analysis is the tax policies of three groups of sub-national governments in England in three time periods. The results of a median voter model of tax policy variation are compared to the results of a mean voter model in different party systems and different electoral systems. The evidence provides little support for the median voter hypothesis.     

How powerful are public bureaucrats as voters?

Empirical evidence is collected and discussed regarding the influence of public bureaucrats on government sector outcome in their capacity as consumer-voters. It is necessary to isolate the specific effect of working in the public sector (compared to other occupations) on voting participation and on the probability to support an increase in the public budget. For a balanced evaluation of public bureaucrats' power, other forms of their influencing the government sector outcome need to be taken into account.     

How to argue about the new public management

Hood and Jackson's (1991) distinction between administrative argument and administrative philosophy has been largely overlooked in writings on NPM. This seemingly subtle distinction flows from the more obvious one between “practical argument” and “social scientific explanation.” These terms refer to different scholarly practices. Practical reasoning is a highly-developed form of scholarship in law, public policy, and political theory. Explanation is a highly-developed scholarly activity in political science and related disciplines. The fact that practical argument and explanation are, in principle, complementary scholarly activities in practically-oriented fields such as public management is not a reason to overlook the distinction between them. If scholars writing on NPM made more of this distinction, it might prove easier for their readers to see precisely how social science explanations and practical arguments are interrelated. Discussion of how well claims have been supported would then be facilitated. Also, it would be easier for writers to decide how to engage the NPM literature. Not only would the issues be clearer, but it would also be easier to discuss the merits of alternative approaches to tackling them. If more weight is given to the distinction between practical argumentation and social scientific research by scholars of NPM, an urgent question is: how should the scholarly practice of practical argumentation be characterized?     

Effects of public opinion on abortion policies and use in the American states

A central feature of democratic theory is substantial publiccontrol over the shape of public policies. Recent research onpublic opinion bolsters the connection between public preferencesand policies enacted in the American states. Yet, the next logicalconnection—that of policy and public behavior—isoften omitted in the research. Ideally, preferences should influencepolicy, and policy should influence public behavior. This studyexamines the hypothesis that public opinion influences abortionpolicies, and that public opinion and public policy both influencerates of abortion utilization by state publics. The findingssuggest that public preferences have profound effects on thecontours of abortion policy and access to abortion providers.There are equally significant links to abortion use, even whencontrolling for socioeconomic factors and religious orientationsin the states.     

Institutional change and the delivery of urban public services

Problems associated with providing efficient and equitable distribution of public services are attributable in part to the inabilities of government or other public institutions to be responsive to requirements of their clientele. To permit a better understanding of the nature of such institutional failures, and to suggest avenues of effective reform, this paper views institutional systems of service provision in a control systems framework. In this perspective, the elements of feedback are seen as essential to successful system performance over time and changing conditions. The paper identifies the kinds of error signals a system needs to generate, and the types of corrective mechanisms that it may employ, and then discusses three basic modes of institutional reform—performance evaluation, decentralization, and market competition—for improving the dynamic capability of systems of providing urban public services. Two service areas—sanitation and criminal corrections—are used for illustrating possible applications of the reform strategies.The author wishes to thank his colleagues at the Urban Institute, especially Richard P. Burton, for suggestions and comments on the substance and style of the paper. This paper is based on ideas first presented by the author at the First Annual Convention of the World Future Society, May, 1971. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of The Urban Institute or its sponsors.     

Aspects of change in the Canadian federal public service

This article is divided into two parts. The first part looks at some significant changes that have taken place in Canada's federal public service over the last two or three years. These changes include the introduction of new management techniques, new organizational structures and new approaches to governance. The second part deals with my own organization, Consulting and Audit Canada, including the rationale for our existence, the kind of work we do and the issues we face. Both parts raise issues that are pertinent to the subject of public sector versus private sector, in the context of service delivery. (© 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)     

Putting the puzzle together: Why people join public interest groups

Why people join organizations, especially public interest groups, has been an unsolved puzzle. In this analysis, choice-based probability methods are employed to combine data from the 1980 National Election Study with comparable information about Common Cause members and to estimate models of the participation calculus that put the pieces of the puzzle together. The results demonstrate the primary importance of political interest and policy preferences for the membership choice. Citizens who are politically interested and have preferences that roughly match an organization's reputation find that associational membership has both greater benefits and lower costs for them than it does for others. Variations in the costs of communication — to the degree that they can be measured — are unimportant for the joining decision. An ability to pay is also irrelevant, regardless of educational attainment and despite members' high incomes. Organizational leaders deliberately keep the costs of membership low relative to most citizens' ability to pay; this encourages potential contributors to join in order to learn about the organization.I would like to thank Jeffrey Dubin for going beyond the realm of collegial obligation in providing programming and econometric assistance; Jeffrey Flint, for research assistance; and Kevin Grier, for wise advice. It should be emphasized, however, that all errors are exclusively the author's responsibility.     

Amend the old or address the new: Broad-based legislation when proposing policies is costly

If each legislator wishes to encourage other legislators to address new problems in future periods, then a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium can exist with the following properties: (1) no legislator finds it worthwhile to make a narrow proposal that appeals to a minimum majority; (2) instead, legislators propose policies that appeal to all members, not for fear of retaliation, but rather to encourage other members to work on new problems in succeeding periods; (3) in succeeding periods no legislator amends the existing broad policy. We find an equilibrium with these properties in finite as well as infinite period games.     

Bounded oligarchy: How and when factions constrain leaders in party position-taking

This work investigates the process of position-taking, focussing on the factional bargaining within the party. Exploiting two recently built datasets that estimated the policy positions of Italian parties and factions from 1946 to 2010, we investigate if and to what extent factions bind the party leader in choosing the platform. We find confirmation for the idea that party positions are linked to factional preferences. Overall, the party works as a ‘bounded oligarchy’. Furthermore, the electoral payoff of party unity increases the impact of factional constraints when general elections approach. In line with the cartel party theory, however, autonomous leaders who are directly elected by a wider selectorate can get rid of factional ties choosing more moderate and vote-maximizing platforms.     

论公共政策执行主体的优化问题

现阶段我国公共政策执行暴露出诸多弊端 ,已难以适应市场经济体制发展的需要 ,作为公共政策执行主体的人 ,其政治态度、职业技能、利益需要和行为习惯等都对政策的有效执行产生影响。为此 ,必须重视建立公共政策执行主体的优化机制 ,通过提升人的政治社会化水平来提高政策执行者的综合素质 ,建立公共政策执行主体责任制 ,扩大公共政策执行主体 ,促使公共政策的有效执行。     

An economic model of regime change: Freedom as a public good

This paper analyses regime change via a peaceful revolution. Under these circumstances, peaceful manifestations of unrest reach a point at which the prevailing political system collapses and is replaced by a system which provides more freedom. Such regime change occurred in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria. It is shown that the successful quest for freedom may be explained as a dynamic game. The game has a unique strong equilibrium — that is, a Nash equilibrium robust against mass defections — which arises in consequence of a trigger strategy which is similar to the Tit-For-Tat strategy in a repeated Prisoners' Dilemma.