Costs and benefits of HIV-1 antibody testing of donated blood.

Costs and benefits of the testing protocol for screening donated blood for the HIV-1 virus are evaluated. Estimates are made of the number of HIV-1 infections and cases of AIDS prevented in a year by blood testing, as well as the costs of providing this risk reduction. The risk reduction provided by alternative tests such as the HIV-1 antigen test is also discussed. The value of the risk reduction provided by blood testing is generated utilizing willingness-to-pay value-of-life estimates. The findings indicate that the present testing protocol is cost beneficial and support the FDA decision not to recommend the HIV-1 antigen test for use in donor testing. Policy decisions concerning present and future testing protocols are discussed, and implications for broadening our model to include indirect benefits of donor testing are evaluated.     

Measuring bureaucratic reputation: Scale development and validation

Despite growing interest in bureaucratic reputation as a theoretical construct, the field lacks a standardized measure that can be used in surveys to capture individual‐level variation in the reputation judgments of citizens and other audiences. The aim of this article, therefore, is to develop a standardized, individual‐level measure of bureaucratic reputation based on the conceptual definition provided by Carpenter ( 2010 ). Employing feedback from experts and data from a survey of over 300 U.S. citizens, this article develops and tests a unidimensional scale of bureaucratic reputation, representing the content domains of performance, morality, procedural fairness, technical competence, and general reputation. Results suggest that our proposed bureaucratic reputation scale (BRS) has good internal reliability and that it is positively associated with support for autonomy, budget, and power, which provides evidence of criterion validity. Potential uses of the scale to study bureaucratic reputation are discussed.     

Science ethics as a bureaucratic problem: IRBs,Rules, and Failures of control

“Institutionalized science ethics” refers to the statutory, professional and institution-based ethical standards that guide and constrain scientists' research work. The primary institution responsible for implementing institutionalized science ethics is the Institutional Review Board. We examine the limitations of IRBs and institutionalized science ethics, using bureaucratic theory and, especially, theory related to the development and enactment of rules. We suggest that due to the very character of rules-based systems, improvements in IRB outcomes are unlikely to be achieved through either more or better rules or even by bureaucratic reform. Instead, we suggest that improvements in human subject protection can best be advanced through increased participation. Ours is not a call for more participation by the general public but participation, via “Participant Review Boards” of persons who are eligible, by the protocols of the research in question, to serve as subjects. This provides a level of legitimacy and face validity that cannot be obtained by IRB affiliates, even by “external representatives.” In making these points, we review a recent science ethics controversy, the KKI/Johns Hopkins lead paint study. In spite of being approved by IRBs, the study resulted in a civil lawsuit that reached the Maryland Court of Appeals. The case illustrates the limits of institutionalized science ethics and the bureaucracies created for their enactment. The case also underscores the complex and equivocal nature of the ethical guidelines established under the National Research Act. We are grateful to – for providing helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

Blunt force regulation and bureaucratic control: Understanding China's war on pollution

In the past decade, China has increasingly resorted to top‐down, “blunt force” solutions to environmental problems; officials forcibly shutter or destroy factories to reduce pollution, at immense cost to local growth and employment. Why would a high capacity state like China resort to such a costly method of pollution control? I argue that blunt force enforcement is targeted at overcoming principal–agent problems in the bureaucracy. When institutions are too weak to hold bureaucrats accountable, political leaders increase oversight by drastically reducing the number of steps and resources required to produce a regulatory outcome—resulting in blunt force measures. I illustrate this logic through case studies from China's multiyear war on pollution. Using original data on blunt force measures, I then show how localities with lower bureaucratic compliance face greater blunt force pollution enforcement. These findings reveal that when bureaucratic accountability is weak, states pay a very high cost for cleaner air.     

The politics of bureaucratic competition: The case of natural resource policy

Many concerned with how government functions consider creating competition between bureaucracies an attractive option. Others are skeptical of what impact rival agencies have when they are operating within a political context. Reflecting these discrepant viewpoints, some scholars believe that regulators will compete vigorously for resources and responsibilities; others assert that agency members will act passively as they attempt to protect their autonomy. To assess these contrasting perspectives and determine why competitive agency structures might exist, the following analysis examines one of the classic situations where agencies can serve as functional substitutes: the relationship between the United States Forest Service and the National Park Service. The results demonstrate that agencies put far more weight on autonomy than competition. The principal advantage of functional rivalry for politicians—at least where federal lands are concerned—is to expand the choice set of alternatives available to them.     

Multilevel governance and organizational performance: Investigating the political‐bureaucratic labyrinth

Research on governance has extensively explored the complex interactions of governmental, nongovernmental, and for‐profit entities in the execution of public policy. It has consistently failed, however, to model empirically the joint effects of political and bureaucratic actors in governance systems. To address this issue, a theory of multilevel governance built upon the foundation of representative bureaucracy was developed and tested. Results from an analysis of Texas school districts suggest that Latinos at all levels of the governance system, political and managerial, influence representation at other levels. Findings also indicate that Latinos at each level of governance have positive effects, directly and indirectly, on outcomes for Latino students. The influence of both political and managerial actors at times extends beyond the immediately adjoining level; the effects of such actors cascade through the governance system. The results show that a priority for systematic research should be the identification of approaches and settings for examining the multilevel aspect of governance. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Change in French society: A critical analysis of Crozier's bureaucratic model

The object of this article is to examine critically Michel Crozier's view of the way in which organisational and social change occurs in France. Attention is focused particularly on key concepts such as change, equality and crisis. A clarification of these concepts and the examination of certain logical differences involved in their use leads to the conclusion that the Crozierian account must be rejected. It is suggested finally that an examination of change which would take more account of the particularities of different policy arenas would be more appropriate and more capable of elucidating the true nature of obstacles of change in French society.     

The influence of red tape on bureaucratic behavior: An experimental simulation

Understanding how certain organizational and individual attributes shape responses to red tape is an area that has received little research attention. This study uses an experimental simulation to address these questions. It examines the effect of red tape upon the propensity to provide assistance to clients in a simulated public assistance agency. The findings showed that increasing levels of red tape produce in a corresponding reduction in benefits provided to clients, but that this relationship is strongly moderated by the respondent's perceptions of clients. Clients perceived as more sympathetic consistently received higher levels of benefits than those perceived as less sympathetic. Education and professional training also played a role in influencing award decisions. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Investigating the influence of social costs and benefits of environmental policies through social capital theory

The level of effectiveness of an environmental policy depends to a significant degree on the level of acceptance and cooperation of citizens. The relevant literature indicates that social capital may significantly influence environmentally responsible behaviour connected with the implementation of an environmental policy. In this context, the present article aims to further explore this field by introducing the issue of non-economic social costs and benefits imposed from environmental policies. In particular, it is supported, both theoretically and empirically, that social costs and benefits may influence the decision of individuals to cooperate and comply with an environmental policy and thus may be a significant indicator for environmental behaviour. Furthermore, these social costs and benefits may differ among individuals and are influenced by social capital elements. Consequently, through the article the need of exploring social capital prior to environmental policy implementation is underlined along with the need of creating social capital assessment techniques.     

理性官僚与后官僚时代背景下的中国行政

韦伯提出的理性官僚制模型是适合工业化大生产的,在资本主义完成工业化的过程中起到了重要的作用,对于正处于工业化时期的我国同样有启示作用。对于后官僚时代兴起的批判或推翻理性官僚制的种种新理论与新派别,我们必须根据自身的实际情况,加以详细区别,不能人云亦云。