The Legitimacy of Judicial Responses to Moral Panic: Perceived vs. Normative Legitimacy

In some instances, the criminal justice system is affected by a moral panic; that is, by an exaggerated social reaction to an assumed threat to moral values. When influenced by moral panic, courts demonize defendants and aggravate punishments. Are such responses legitimate? This article argues that by contrast to legitimate condemnation of criminal conduct, demonizing defendants ought never be legitimate. The legitimacy of aggravating punishment requires distinguishing between the sociological concept of legitimacy (“perceived legitimacy”) and the moral concept (“normative legitimacy”). Aggravation of punishment in response to moral panic might be perceived as legitimate since it expresses public perceptions about the severity of the threat to a social value, even when these perceptions are exaggerated; however, punishments that are proportionate to such a perceived, exaggerated, threat to a social value are unjust and unfair, and therefore are normatively illegitimate. When the panic subsides, courts tend to return to lower levels of punishment. The subsidence of the panic enables one to realize that a gap between perceived and normative legitimacy has been created during the panic. Should and can the gap be bridged retroactively in order to gain full legitimacy? One way to bridge the gap is to grant clemency that will reduce the punishment of defendants whose sentences were exaggerated unduly during the panic. The article proposes a more radical mechanism that allows for sentence re-evaluation in cases of moral panic.     

“Kind of Natural,Kind of Wrong”: Young People's Beliefs about the Morality,Legality, and Normalcy of Sexual Aggression in Public Drinking Settings

Unwelcome touching, groping, and kissing are illegal, but widely tolerated in public drinking settings. This contingency in the law's response means that patrons routinely negotiate the moral boundaries of nonconsensual sexual contact. We use 197 interviews with college‐age individuals to examine the discursive strategies young people employ when negotiating those boundaries. We find that most interviewees have experiences with sexual aggression, do not categorize it as aggression, but advocate for stronger legal punishments against offenders. In accounting for this paradox, they draw on contradictory legal and cultural narratives that both normalize and condemn men's sexual aggression. We build on legal consciousness theories and gender theories by highlighting the complex ways that gender stereotypes enshrined in law are implicated in the construction of a social problem. We also contribute to the sociology of culture by explicating the often unconscious link between culture and action revealed in young people's narratives about sexual aggression.     

Criminality and moral dysfunctions: neurological,biochemical, and genetic dimensions

In this article, the author attempts to demonstrate a relationship between neurobiological dysfunctions and/or genetically determined deviant behavior and personality traits as well as moral abnormalities. Data from neuroscience show that a number of neurological dysfunctions are linked to cognitive and emotional disturbances. Cognitive and emotional abnormalities, in turn, are frequently related to moral dysfunctions. Moreover, neurological disorders can produce dramatic psychological and social problems, personality changes, and behavioral problems in patients. Those mental, emotional, and psychosocial problems and related moral dysfunctions are frequently linked to violence and/or criminal behavior. Genetic research found evidence of inheritability of antisocial traits, which interfere with moral development and activities. This information has consequences for any assessment and disposition within the legal system. More research on the interrelationship between neuro(bio)logical, genetic, emotional, and mental aspects of moral dysfunctions is needed for the development of adequate treatment, prevention, and intervention programs.     

When Is a Regime Not a Legal System? Alexy on Moral Correctness and Social Efficacy

Robert Alexy defines law as including a claim to moral correctness and demonstrating social efficacy. This paper argues that law's social efficacy is not merely an observable fact but is undergirded by moral commitments by rulers that it is possible for their subjects to follow the rules, that the rulers and others will also follow the rules, that subjects will be protected from violence if they act in accordance with the rules, and that subjects will be entitled to legal redress if others act violently towards them otherwise than in accordance with the rules. Alexy is correct in his conclusion that a system of norms that is not by and large socially efficacious is not a valid legal system, but wrong insofar as he follows legal positivism in distinguishing this aspect of law's validity from law's claim to moral correctness.     

《吕刑》在中国法律史上的地位与影响

《吕刑》所反映的德刑并举治国思维及刑法制度与原则,直接或间接地影响着后世刑法的构建。在法律思想方面,后世社会的明刑弼教、乱世重典及贤人执法理念与《吕刑》有渊源关系,在法律制度,古老的五刑、五听与赎刑也是后世同类制度的嚆矢。《吕刑》中关于上下比罪、简孚有众、其刑上备等定罪量刑原则又分别成为后世的类推、据众证定罪及重罪吸收轻罪等制度的示范。     

法律实证主义的强立场——兼评拉兹《法律的权威》

在法律与道德的关系上,拉兹认为有效法律的鉴别标准完全排除道德论证,这就是拉兹的渊源论.渊源论表明所有的法律都具有渊源,渊源论的论据来自权威论.权威以理由为基础,是改变行为理由的能力.法律也要主张权威,法律主张合法性权威是它的一个本质特征.权威性理由是排他性理由,排除了道德因素的可能性,权威论支持了渊源论.权威论受到了来自包容性实证主义者和德沃金的批评,他们的争论共同推进了对法律与道德关系问题的研究.     

论社团罚

我国在社会转型的特定背景下 ,产生了与西方社团性质不同的各种社团 ,由此提出了一个重要的法律问题———社团罚。面对社团罚给公民、法人权益造成的损害 ,我国法学理论没有及时对其进行准确的定性 ,法律实践也缺乏迅速有效的制度救济。国内外学界的契约说、社会权利让渡说、社团固有权利说、国家授权说等各种观点 ,均无法正确阐释我国社团罚权力的本质。我国社团罚权力的本质是公私权力的混合 ,社团罚中存在着变相行政处罚、设定和实施民主性不足、法律救济缺失等问题 ,应当从立法、行政、司法等各个方面 ,科学构建对我国社团罚进行法律控制的平衡机制。     

When sanctions convey moral norms

Sanctions not only have the instrumental function of deterring people from undesired behavior but they also have the ability to convey moral norms. As such, they may create a moral motivation not to engage in the sanctioned behavior. This is desirable as this makes the success of a sanctioning system depend less on quality of enforcement. However, sanctions may not always succeed in conveying moral norms. In this paper, three conditions are highlighted that, in the psychology literature, have been empirically proven to influence whether a sanction succeeds to evoke moral norms. First, a sanction should not be regarded as a way to make up for the negative consequences of a transgression a sanction. So, they should be communicated in a retributive way rather than in a compensatory way. Second, as punishments communicate an obligatory rule and rewards communicate a voluntary rule, punishments are a better way to incur moral norms than rewards. Third, severe sanctions more strongly convey a moral norm than mild ones as long as these severe sanctions are not unreasonably severe, are installed by trustworthy authorities and in a fair way. The value of the moral expressive function of sanctions, as well as its drawbacks, are discussed.     

Children at Risk: Legal and Societal Perceptions of the Potential Threat that the Possession of Child Pornography Poses to Society

This article examines legal and social discourses surrounding the phenomenon of child pornography, considering the legal responses to child pornography (particularly when an individual is found to be in possession of such material), and the way in which such material, the child, and the possessor of child pornography are socially constructed.
The article raises the question of whether there has been a moral panic regarding child pornography and the possession of such material, but also considers whether there are real reasons to consider that the possession of child pornography should remain illegal. Research studies which aim to establish the existence of a causal link between possessing child pornography and the act of committing child sexual abuse are examined, as is the argument that criminalizing the possession of child pornography reduces the market for such material. Finally, there is an analysis of the possible impact of social constructions of the child as innocent.     

When legal rights are not a reality: do individuals know their rights and how can we tell?

Public knowledge of rights has been the subject of a number of empirical enquiries over the last decade. In England and Wales, knowledge of rights and its relationship with an individual's capacity to ‘self-help’ and ‘self-represent’ when faced with a civil justice problem has become the subject of renewed attention following changes to legal aid which, from March 2013, will see the availability of legal advice and representation dramatically reduced. Previous studies focusing on public knowledge of rights in this (and other) jurisdictions have illustrated a lack of knowledge amongst the general population and more specifically, a widespread tendency of individuals to assume that the law aligns with their own moral, ethical or social attitudes. However, many of these studies have also suffered from methodological shortcomings. In attempting to address some of these shortcomings this study uses an open-ended format to ask individuals with one or one or more civil or social justice problems to describe their rights/legal position. We find that whilst an open-ended question approach to exploring knowledge of rights yields insight not acquired by other formats, its utility is constrained by difficulty reconciling articulation and actual knowledge of rights. We discuss the implications of these findings as they relate to the development of future research in the field of family and social welfare law, Public Legal Education (PLE) and access to justice post-March 2013.     

Out of Time: The Moral Temporality of Sex, Crime and Taboo

This paper discusses the relationship between law and morality. Morality does not necessarily coincide with the law, but it contributes to it. An act may be legal but nevertheless considered to be immoral in a particular society. For example, the use of pornography may be considered by many to be immoral. Nevertheless, the sale and distribution of non-violent, non-child related, sexually explicit material is legal (or regulated) in many jurisdictions. Many laws are informed by, and even created by, morality. This paper examines the historical influence of morality on the law and on society in general. It aims to develop a theoretical framework for examining legal moralism and the social construction of morality and crime as well as the relationship between sex, desire and taboo. Here, we refer to the moral temporality of sex and taboo, which examines the way in which moral judgments about sex and what is considered taboo change over time, and the kinds of justifications that are employed in support of changing moralities. It unpacks the way in which abstract and highly tenuous concepts such as “desire”, “art” and “entertainment” may be “out of time” with morality, and how morality shapes laws over time, fabricating justifications from within socially constructed communities of practice. This theoretical framework maps the way in which these concepts have become temporally dominated by heteronormative structures such as the family, marriage, reproduction, and longevity. It is argued that the logic of these structures is inexorably tied to the heterosexual life-path, charting individual lives and relationships through explicit phases of childhood, adolescence and adulthood that, in the twenty-first century, delimit the boundaries of taboo surrounding sex more than any other time in history.     

Understanding Acts of Consent: Using Speech Act Theory to Help Resolve Moral Dilemmas and Legal Disputes

Understanding what it means toconsent is of considerable importance sincesignificant moral issues depend on how this actis defined. For instance, determining whetherconsent has occurred is the deciding factor insexual assault cases; its proper occurrence isa necessary condition for federally fundedhuman subject research. Even though mosttheorists recognize the legal and moralimportance of consent, there is still littleagreement concerning how consent should bedefined, or whether different domains involvingconsent demand context-specific definitions.Understanding what it means to consent isfurther complicated by the fact that currentlegal conceptions are not necessarily groundedin argument; they typically depend on appealsto authority and precedent. The purpose ofthis paper is to use speech act theory toprovide a theoretically grounded conception ofconsent; such a conception can aid in the justresolution of legal and moral disputes thathinge on whether an act of consent occurred.     

略论新加坡鞭刑制度的法律基础

新加坡鞭刑继承自殖民地时期刑罚,受穆斯林习惯法影响,符合法的继承规律,没有违反本国宪法规定。目前尚无反酷刑公约或条约能约束新加坡鞭刑,而且其也不与现行反酷刑公约或条约、国际习惯法、法的一般原则相冲突。新加坡鞭刑不是法律意义上的酷刑,宽容死刑的态度使这一指责更显苍白。另外,普通刑罚在新加坡面临着巨大的困境,主刑失效、犯罪形势严峻等因素将新加坡刑罚推向目的刑主义。     

Punishment, Socially Deprived Offenders, and Democratic Community

The idea that victims of social injustice who commit crimes ought not to be subject to punishment has attracted serious attention in recent legal and political philosophy. R. A. Duff has argued, for example, a states that perpetrates social injustice lacks the standing to punish victims of such injustice who commit crimes. A crucial premiss in his argument concerns the fact that when courts in liberal society mete out legitimate criminal punishments, they are conceived as acting in the name of all citizens—on behalf of the whole political community. Resisting this premiss, Peter Chau has suggested that courts ought to be conceived as acting only in the name of “just citizens”: citizens who cannot be plausibly seen as having contributed to distributive injustice. When conceived in this way, Chau argues, courts can no longer plausibly be regarded as lacking standing to punish. This article uses the debate between Duff and Chau to explain why the question of whether to punish socially deprived offenders can only be answered adequately when connected to broader concerns of democratic theory. Specifically, it argues that Chau’s proposal is not available within the context of the kind of political community upon which (Duff rightly believes) a system of liberal criminal law depends for its justification and maintenance: a community in which citizens see the law as embodying shared norms whose specific demands they disagree about. State officials are morally permitted to see themselves as acting on behalf of a subset of the citizenry, I argue, only in circumstances of democratic crisis: circumstances in which a moral community can no longer be plausibly said to exist.     

论婚姻家庭领域道德调整与法律调整的关系──兼谈对婚外恋的道德调整和法律调整

婚姻家庭关系的伦理性是道德调整和法律调整的客观基础。社会道德和法律共同规范着婚姻家庭关系。道德调整和法律调整的手段和领域不同。道德调整和法律调整在婚姻家庭关系中某些领域界限明确,可分别调整;但在另一些领域难以明确界定自己的调整范围,道德和法律可从不同层次加以规范。对婚外恋行为,道德和法律可分层调整,以实现道德调整和法律调整的效力。     

CYNICAL STREETS: NEIGHBORHOOD SOCIAL PROCESSES AND PERCEPTIONS OF CRIMINAL INJUSTICE*

Studies have found that African Americans are more likely to perceive racial biases in the criminal justice system than are those from other racial groups. There is a limited understanding of how neighborhood social processes affect variation in these perceptions. This study formulates a series of hypotheses focused on whether perceived racial biases in the criminal justice system or perceptions of injustice vary as a function of levels of moral and legal cynicism as well as of adverse police–citizen encounters. These hypotheses are tested with multilevel regression models applied to data from a sample of 689 African Americans located in 39 neighborhoods. Findings from the regression models indicate that the positive association between structural disadvantage and perceptions of injustice is accounted for by moral and legal cynicism. Furthermore, adverse police encounters significantly increase perceptions of injustice; controlling for these encounters reduces the strength of the association between cynicism and injustice perceptions. Finally, the findings reveal that cynicism intensifies the association between adverse police encounters and perceptions of criminal injustice. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for research regarding perceived biases in the criminal justice system and neighborhood social processes.     

Fragile Convergence: Understanding Variation in the Enforcement of China's Industrial Pollution Law

Official statistics and independent survey data show that in the last decade China has witnessed a remarkable change in its enforcement of environmental pollution violations, moving toward more formalistic and coercive law enforcement with more enforcement cases as well as higher fines. The data also show that there is considerable regional variation with coastal areas having more and higher punishments than those inland. This article explores these findings, seeking to understand the explanation and meaning of these temporal and regional variation patterns. The study shows how enforcement varies when there is a convergence of governmental, social, and economic institutional forces. The article argues that the basis for such convergence has been fragile, as national pressures have lacked consistency and local community and government support evaporates when dominant sources of income are at stake.     

Moral questions,legal answers,and biotechnological advances

Moral failing is usually construed as a personal flaw, but there is another construction: where morals fail people, where our moral precepts are silent. The author of this article argues that this happens nowadays where technological advances, such as genetic engineering in medicine, raise moral questions but get legal answers. By responding to the legal issues involved, the moral questions are pre-empted. This results in answers drawn from legal categories, often with commercial perspectives, but misses the larger moral dilemma.     

传统中国的法秩序及其构成原理与意义

本文以中外学者关于传统中国社会法与秩序的论说为引子,将法→秩序构成→社会结构→文化原理联系起来观察,发现它们之间存在着同构共质以及由此生发出来的对应与互动的一体关系,而贯通其间的是中国文化的道德原理。道德是传统中国法秩序的正当性所在,传统中国法秩序的构成原理是道德原理。道德原理建立在有机宇宙论之上,这种从宇宙有机出发具有生命感的理论,从根本上回答了有机世界存在的形式与本质,即世界在形式上是道本质上是德,这表明中国人的世界观实际上是道德观。所以,从文化原理上说,道德或许不止是传统中国法秩序保持长期稳定并具有修复机能的奥秘,亦是中华文明绵延不绝生生不息的根源,甚至还有可能是我们复兴中华文化,包括创新中国法文化的思想资源和精神动力。     

论法国公共秩序理论的新发展——兼论我国民事立法与司法的启示

公共秩序从传统的政治、社会以及道德领域走向经济领域,于此,公共秩序具有保护性公共秩序与指导性公共秩序的区分。公共秩序在法律调整以及法律体系的构建与协调方面都具有重要的作用。法国司法实践已经改变了违反公共秩序概念的法律行为绝对无效的做法。我国民事立法需要以公序良俗的概念来取代传统的公共利益概念。在民事司法中,尽量避免适用公共利益对私人的法律行为进行判断,更不能一概地以此来判断法律行为为绝对无效。