Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in a Median Voter Model

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of capital tax coordination in a simple model of fiscal competition where fiscal policy is subject to majority voting and households differ with respect to their labor and capital income. It turns out that a coordinated capital tax increase may raise or reduce welfare, depending on the relative magnitude of i) economic distortions induced by a labor tax and ii) political distortions resulting from the influence of the median voter on fiscal policy decisions. A negative welfare effect is more likely, the smaller the marginal excess burden of the labor tax and the smaller the ratio of the median voter's labor income to average labor income. We also use empirical estimates of the marginal excess burden of taxation to determine the welfare effects of tax coordination; it turns out that a negative welfare effect of coordinated tax increases may emerge in our model for empirically reasonable parameters.     

Tax policies in a globalized world: Is it politics after all?

In a panel dataset of 17 OECD countries over 1970–1997, we provide empirical support for the joint existence of the efficiency and the compensation effects of globalization. Our regression analysis shows that higher economic integration—and the associated external risk—lead to a need for social security policies that require higher taxes. The latter take the form of larger social security contributions that are part of taxes on the immobile factors (labor). The tax burden on the relatively mobile factor (capital) is affected negatively by increased economic integration.     

On the equity effects of taxing imputed rent: Evidence from Australia

Abstract

Taxation of net imputed rent from owner‐occupied housing (and mortgage interest deductibility) has been advocated in Australia on grounds of both efficiency and equity. The current tax system (no taxation or deductibility) favors owner‐occupied housing over business investments, and in the owner‐occupied sector it favors high‐income, low‐debt households over others. Nevertheless, imputed rent taxation has been criticized on the empirical grounds that its direct burden would fall more heavily on low‐income households than high‐income households.

Using micro‐level data from the 1986 Income Distribution Survey, we show that the burden does not fall more heavily on low‐income households when net imputed rent is included in owners’ incomes and when life cycle effects are controlled for. Moreover, for married couples aged 25 to 54, the taxation of imputed rental income would be not only progressive, but more progressive than the taxation of other household income.     

How Tame Will Leviathan Become in Institutional Competition – Competition Among Governments in the Provision of Public Goods

This article critically examines thehypothesis of Brennan and Buchanan that competition amonggovernments in the provision of publicgoods can serve as a substitute forconstitutional constraints on governments.Since Leviathan-type governments withfree choice of tax instruments will be ableto escape competitive pressure by shiftingtaxes to immobile factors, one could thinkof a rule of competition which prohibitstaxes on immobile factors. Indeed, such arule leads to a Nash-equilibriumwhere the tax burden lies on the mobilefactor. However, net income of the citizensmay or may not increase as a result fromsuch a rule, depending on a number ofvariables presented in this article. Acomplete substitution of constitutionalconstraints by the rule of competition may,depending on the same variables, evendecrease net income. Moreover, somepotential for increases in net income maybe forgone, since capital allocation andthe supply of public goods will usually beinefficient in equilibrium. Finally,applying the rule in a real-worldenvironment will be difficult and may evenlead to further serious inefficiencies. Forthese reasons, such a rule will hardly everbe introduced. Hence, competition amonggovernments cannot be viewed as a propersubstitute for constitutional constraints.Whoever is afraid of Leviathan shouldthus not rely on competition amonggovernments (alone).     

Earned income credit utilization by welfare recipients: A case study of Minnesota's earned income credit program

This paper examines utilization of a state earned income credit by AFDC and TANF recipients. Although utilization percentages are increasing, we find that among TANF recipients in 1999, 45.7 percent of all households and 34.8 percent of eligible households did not receive the state earned income credit. Moreover, we find that utilization may depend upon TANF requirements and incentives, information resources, and barriers to work and filing of income tax returns. Finally, we investigate whether low utilization is because of little or no benefit from the state earned income credit and find this may be true for some with barriers or less incentive to work under TANF. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Economic integration and the relationship between profit and wage taxes

This paper analyzes the development of the ratio of corporate taxes to wage taxes using a simple political economy model with workers and capitalists that own internationally mobile and immobile firms. Among other results, our model predicts that countries reduce their corporate tax rate, relative to the wage tax, when preferences for public goods increase, or when the share of capital employed in multinational firms is rising. We further show how an increase in the wage share changes both the relative size of tax bases and the political influence of different income groups. The predicted relationships are tested using panel data for 23 OECD countries for the period 1980 through 2004. The results of the empirical analysis support our main hypotheses.     

Globalization,government spending and taxation in the OECD

Abstract. This article assesses the impact of globalization on welfare state effort in the OECD countries. Globalization is defined in terms of total trade, imports from low wage economies, foreign direct investment, and financial market integration. Welfare effort is analyzed in terms both of public spending (and separately on social service provision and income transfer programs) and taxation (effective rates of capital taxation and the ratio of capital to labor and consumption taxes). Year–to–year increases in total trade and international financial openness in the past three decades have been associated with less government spending. In contrast, integration into global markets has not been associated either with reductions in capital tax rates, or with shifts in the burden of taxation from capital to consumption and labor income. Moreover, countries with greater inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment tend to tax capital more heavily.     

Comment on Steven C. Bourassa and William G. Grigsby's “income tax concessions for owner‐occupied housing”

Abstract

Federal income tax deductions for mortgage interest and property taxes are defensible on grounds of both economic efficiency and the social benefits of homeownership. Homeowners should be treated as landlords renting to themselves; as such, they benefit because they do not pay a tax on the imputed rental income they receive, while rental property owners do. Both receive deductions for mortgage interest and property taxes, and both should.

The mortgage interest deduction generates symmetry between debt and equity financing of a home; if interest were not deductible, those whose income derives largely from property would have an advantage over those whose income comes from labor. Because workers would be disadvantaged, repeal is unlikely to generate the revenues Bourassa and Grigsby expect or modify the distribution of the tax burden in the way they favor. Finally, the deductions promote homeownership, which is socially desirable.     

Progressive Taxation: Applying Hayek's Constraint

That progressive taxation might offset a disproportionate burden of indirect taxes upon low income households sits at the heart of a suggestion from Friedrich Hayek. This concerns the manner in which a degree of progression might be accommodated and constrained to preclude arbitrary tax hikes upon minority income groups. While Hayek's proposal is permissive of socialist aims, it looks for efficiency in resource usage as reflected in the aspiration ‘that each should feel that in the aggregate all the collective goods which are applied to him are worth at least as much as the contribution he is required to make’.     

Interest group demand for taxation

Researchers have typically ignored the determinants of the tax structure of the public sector. Political scientists have concentrated their analyses on the expenditure side of the public ledgers while economists have avoided the issue by assuming that taxes are exogenously determined. In this paper we have shown that a behavioral model of political interest groups can be employed to gain insights into the political selection of taxes. The theory provides a general complement to the well-documented analysis of special interest demand for public expenditures.Our analysis raises several important policy questions. First, is the influence of interest groups on the determination of tax systems desirable from a public policy perspective? For example, special interest groups dominated by high and middle income individuals may prefer regressive tax systems which reduce their own tax burden. Certainly the impact of interest groups on the well-known regressivity of state and local tax systems is an area worthy of additional investigation.     

Taxing work

Abstract. This article examines the development of tax regimes across OECD countries in the latter part of the twentieth century. It gives particular emphasis to taxes on labour income. Taxes on labour income represent a major drain on private households. They have become the mainstay of many of these countries' public sector finances. Taxes on labour income rather than on capital appear to be the preferred instrument of finance for those economic and political interests that advocate and support a strong (and thereby expensive) welfare state. There is little 'free lunch' to be had in these welfare states; if anything, 'socialism in one class' seems to be the rule. Coordinated market economies tend to impose higher tax rates on labour because they have higher levels of wage coordination, their governments are more likely to be oriented to the left and their executives are relatively weak in relation to their legislatures.     

State Income Tax Treatment of the Elderly

The state and local tax treatment of the elderly varies significantly from state to state. In this article, we analyze the differences in effective tax rates for the state personal income tax for elderly versus non-elderly taxpayers. We find that in a majority of states, the average effective tax rate facing the elderly is significantly lower than that of non-elderly taxpayers. The consequences of this tax rate difference may impact long-term state income tax revenues as the elderly population continues to grow.     

Vox Populi? Oregon Tax and Expenditure Limitation Initiatives

This article provides a brief history of tax and expenditure limitation initiatives in Oregon, along with a narrative of contemporary events. Largely as a consequence of the initiative's increased role in the formulation of Oregon's fiscal policy, state and local taxes paid by Oregon households declined from 7.4 percent of income in 1989 to 6.8 percent in 2003; state revenue, which is heavily dependent upon personal income taxes, has become increasingly income elastic; and state and local governments now rely on user fees to an almost unprecedented degree.     

Federal tax reform and the financing of state and local governments

Although the Reagan Administration tax reform proposals would reduce federal income tax liabilities for most taxpayers, federal tax reform would also create strong pressures on state and local governments to cut taxes and public services. These pressures would arise primarily because itemizers would no longer be able to deduct state and local taxes in determining their federal income tax liabilities. In New York City and Boston, it is likely that the Administration's tax reform would induce cuts in spending that range from 2.5 to 7.5 percent. While the elimination of state and local tax deductibility may promote allocative efficiency in the provision of local public goods, the cost would be a decline in the degree of redistribution through the state and local public sector, and a reduction in local public services for the poor.     

Does capital mobility reduce the corporate-labor tax ratio?

Previous empirical studies have shown that there is only a small negative (if any) effect of capital mobility on the corporate tax burden. Using data for up to 20 OECD countries in the period 1979–2000 this paper tries to investigate a less rigid hypothesis: Although capital taxes have not substantially declined in the last twenty years the relative burden of corporate to labor taxes may have fallen due to capital mobility. The results suggest that capital mobility has a weak negative impact on the corporate-labor tax ratio. Other factors however, i.e. the size of the country or the share of investment expenditures are more important in explaining the relative tax burden than capital mobility.     

Volunteer labor sorting across industries

Volunteer labor is generally analyzed as a homogeneous activity, implying that the marginal effects of tax changes and demographic shifts are equal across industries and forms of volunteering. Here the homogeneity assumption is tested by estimating and comparing volunteer labor supply functions in three sectors that rely on volunteer labor—health, education, and religious organizations. Differences in the marginal volunteer labor supply effects are associated with personal demographics, household composition, and tax status. These differences are significant statistically as well as for their policy implications. The effects on volunteering to each sector are predicted for changes in the age, education, and marital status distributions of the population, as well as for changes in income tax rates, itemization status, and income. © 2002 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Taxation and citizen choice: The effect of a county charter on property taxes

As saliency of the tax burden increases, the preference for a lower burden increases, but most counties are restricted by the state from adopting new taxes or changing the existing rates. Some states allow counties to adopt a charter, freeing them from state control. Using a panel of Florida counties from 1980 to 2017, we explore whether citizens act to reduce their property tax once a charter is passed. Citizens act against their preferences not by lowering burden but rather by increasing it in the case of debt service, suggesting citizens are maximizing their optimal tax burden in exchange for services.     

马克思分配正义语境中的税收调节理论及其现实指导意义

按照马克思主义的分配正义理论，按劳分配中的不公平仍然需要政府进行调剂；一定的扣除和分配必须通过政府的权威性以及立法的形式来实施，而税收是唯一通过法的形式来筹集财政收入的渠道；“按劳分配”与“按需分配”的实现都需要发挥税收的调节作用，真正的按劳分配通过税收的调节和相应的社会保障、转移支付等措施必然会导致共同富裕；但税收的征收应体现公平，应采取量能负担的原则，收入多者多缴税，还应考虑家庭人口的多少，相比利润、公债等形式，税收在调节收入分配上具有不可替代的作用；税收调节的最终目标是社会公平，而其中，直接税比间接税对高收入者的调节作用更大等。这对税收政策的制定和新一轮税制改革具有重要的指导意义。税制改革的目标应由以往的效率激励向公平、正义、有序转变。加快推进以调节收入再分配为导向的直接税体系建设，构建以完善的个人所得税为主体，以财产税和社会保障税为两翼，其他税种相互协调配合的税制体系，完善鼓励公益捐赠的税收激励机制。     

Tax Evasion Across Italy: Rational Noncompliance or Inadequate Civic Concern?

The paper suggests anexplanation for the geographical dimensionof tax evasion that focuses on thestructure of territorial government. Taxesadministered by the central government arenot differentiated by regions. Poor areasmay prefer a combination of lower taxes andlower levels of public services at both thecentral and the local level. This isespecially true when income and wealthlevels differ among the areas and thedemand for publicly provided goods iscorrelated to these levels. But the use ofnationally uniform tax schedules imposes awelfare burden on poorer areas. While thetax rates of local taxes can be adjusted tolocal preferences, tax evasion may betacitly accepted as a compensation for thewelfare loss deriving from too highcentrally set tax rates.     

Tax Code Knowledge and Behavioral Responses Among EITC Recipients: Policy Insights from Qualitative Data

We build on the robust quantitative literature on behavioral responses to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) by using in‐depth qualitative interviews with 115 EITC recipients to examine how they understand and respond to its incentive structures regarding earnings, marriage, and childbearing. We find that respondents consider their tax refund as a whole, without differentiating the portion from the EITC; as a result, they cannot predict how their EITC refund would change if they altered their labor supply or marital status. Incentives for childbearing are better understood, but are not specific to the EITC; rather, parents respond to a combination of tax deductions and credits as a whole. Respondents would like to maximize their refunds, but most cannot or would not alter their behavior due to structural constraints they face in the labor and marriage markets. Rather than adjust work hours, defer marriage, or have additional children, respondents exhibit a different type of behavioral response to the incentive structure of the EITC: They alter their tax filing status in order to maximize their refunds. They routinely claim zero exemptions and deductions on their W‐4s, file their tax returns as head of household rather than as married, and divide children among the tax returns of multiple caregivers. Although some of these behaviors qualify as tax noncompliance, they emerge because the intricacies of the tax code conflict with the complexity and fluidity of finances and family life in low‐income households.