Notes on contributors

International comparisons of new radical right‐wing parties usually focus on differences in electoral fortunes, party organisations and leadership. This article uses a different angle by focusing on public policy impact and the role these parties play in the parliamentary and executive arenas. The research is driven by the hypothesis that under the conditions of stable democracy, holding office produces a net result in a ‘taming effect’ on radical right‐wing actors rather than a sharp ‘right turn’. Evidence f rom four countries (Germany, France, Italy and Austria) shows that parliamentary presence alone does not result in policy effects. When the radical right holds executive office, a ‘right turn’ occurs primarily in cultural policies. Overall, real effects of radical right‐wing politics occur largely as a result of the interaction between the radical right and established actors ‐regardless of the radical right's assuming power.     

Notes on contributors

American political science has recently undergone a process of self-criticism principally illustrated by the so-called "Perestroika movement." This article suggests turning to Pierre Bourdieu's sociology of science to clarify some of the mechanisms that contribute to this perceived malaise, beyond the most visible and well-known debate over the supremacy of quantitative methods. In particular, in light of his analysis of the scientific field and his key concept of scientific capital, four major structuring dimensions of American political science are reviewed: academic status, research fields, sociological characteristics and political allegiances. The author then reflects upon the existence of an "establishment" in the discipline.     

Notes on contributors

Abstract

In his article for this issue of Economy and Society, Narayanan (2008 Narayanan, S. 2008. On the stalling of the Malaysian industrialization project. Economy and Society, 37(4): 595–601. [Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) presents a critique of our earlier work on Malaysian industrialization (Henderson &; Phillips 2007). Narayanan's objections are entirely empirical and they take the form of suggesting that had we looked at the ‘right’ data or ‘properly’ interpreted the data we provide, we would have seen that our hypothesis that Malaysia's industrialization project was ‘stalling’ was either wrong, or, if plausible, was unproven. In this response, we show that Narayanan is largely mistaken in his critique. While his contribution contains errors of interpretation, we argue that he is mistaken predominantly because he has misunderstood the methodological basis of our analysis. Specifically, he has failed to grasp our theoretical object and thus has been unable to identify the appropriate empirical terrain for assessing its significance and condition.     

Notes on contributors

Norris Hundley, Jr.: The Great Thirst. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.

William Blomquist: Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in Southern California. San Francisco: Institute of Contemporary Studies, 1992.

Marc Reisner and Sarah Bates: Overtapped Oasis: Reform or Revolution for Western Water. Covelo, CA: Island Press, 1990.     

Notes on contributors

Robyn Eckersley: Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992.

Arne Naess: Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. Translated and revised by David Rothenberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

M. Annette Jaimes, ed.: The State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization, and Resistance. Race and Resistance Series, Boston, South End Press, 1992.

Alexander Wilson: The Culture of Nature: North American Landscape from Disney to the Exxon Valdez. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1992.     

Notes on contributors

This article investigates the political impact of the introduction of state subsidies to political parties. The arguments for and against subsidising political parties are outlined. Different models of party subsidies, and their regulatory frameworks, are discussed. We find little evidence of a cross‐national impact of the introduction of party subsidies. The subsidies cannot explain the decline in party membership. Nor is there evidence to suggest that the subsidies were introduced as a response to membership decline. There is no support for the allegation that party subsidies lead to the petrification of party systems. The subsidies have not meant that other income sources have lost their significance for political parties.