Legislative budget cycles

Recent literature suggests that electoral budget cycles are a phenomenon of new rather than established democracies. What part of the democratization process explains the amelioration of the political budget cycle? We argue the answer lies (in part) in the development of a strong party system. We extend the classic Rogoff-Siebert model to show that political budget cycles are possible in a legislative context with rational voters. We then demonstrate that the development of a strong party system can restrain political budget cycles in a majoritarian electoral system. Finally, we follow prior work in using vote share volatility as a measure of the institutionalization of the party system. Using newly collected vote-share data for 433 elections for 90 democracies from 1980–2007, we calculate a measure of party institutionalization. We then use this data to demonstrate that institutionalized party systems are associated with mitigated political budget cycles, especially in majoritarian electoral systems.     

Wildavsky on budget reform

A large part of the literature on budgeting in the United States is concerned with reform. The goals of proposed reforms are couched in similar language - economy, efficiency, improvement, or just better budgeting ... However, any effective change in budgetary relationships must necessarily alter the outcomes of the budgetary process. Otherwise, why bother? Far from being a neutral matter of better budgeting, proposed reforms inevitably contain important implications for the political system, that is, the who gets what of governmental decisions (Wildavsky, 1961: p. 186). ... budgeting is a subsystem of politics, not vise versa - because of the current tendency to overload budgeting. As much as I respect the importance of budgeting and the talents of budgeteers, to substitute budgeting for governing will not work (Wildavsky, 1992b: p. 439).     

The electoral budget cycle

This article begins with a review of the now substantial literature on the thesis that polticians manipulate governmental outputs so as to favor their chances of reelection. It concludes that while this “electoral cycle” thesis was initially overstated by its proponents, it retains more plausibility than recent critics have allowed. This conclusion is then demonstrated through an analysis of expenditures by the ten provincial governments in Canada between 1951 and 1984.     

A better budget rule

Debt limits, interest coverage ratios, one‐off balanced budget requirements, pay‐as‐you‐go rules, and tax and expenditure limits are among the most important fiscal rules for constraining intertemporal transfers. There is considerable evidence that the least costly and most effective of such rules are those that focus directly on the rate of spending growth, even with their seemingly ad hoc nature and possibilities for circumvention. In this paper, we use optimal control theory and martingale methods to justify a transparent, nonarbitrary rule governing maximum sustainable rate of spending growth, treating the revenue structure of a jurisdiction as a given continuous‐time stochastic process. Our results can be used to determine whether a proposed rate of spending growth is sustainable or not. © 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

A call for budget reform

This article calls for reform of the U.S. Federal budget from two perspectives, preparation and content. The first aspect of reform proposes to amend the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 by eliminating the requirement for an executive budget. It proposes replacing the executive budget submission with a budget prepared by a joint executive-legislative council. While the decision-making process for approval of the budget would remain the same, the council-proposed budget would eliminate several time consuming issues of disagreement such as whose economic estimates are used. The second aspect of reform proposes an examination of the contents of the budget. The current budget focuses on agency appropriations and the debt/surplus figure. Many more issues such as unfunded pension liabilities, true costs of credit, value of government-owned assets and the number of appropriations are largely neglected. This aspect of the budget should be examined by a non-partisan group of experts to make recommendations for an improvement in the informational content of the budget. Improved information could help support sound decisionmaking. The article contends that we can preserve the constitutional separation of powers dealing with the budget while we simply improve the methods used to prepare the document itself, and once the document is prepared it would be structured so it can be examined in a meaningful manner by interested citizens in order to ascertain the financial conditions of the country.     

Political budget cycles and media freedom

This paper examines the effects of elections on the conduct of central governments' fiscal policies. To do so, it uses a unique panel database that includes disaggregated spending and revenue series at the central government level for multiple countries over the 1975–2010 period. Examining political environments under which incumbent governments generate political budget cycles (PBCs), and comparing the relative importance of factors influencing cycles, we identify media freedom as the factor that plays the most critical role. This result provides a micro-foundation for rational opportunistic models for PBCs that rely on asymmetry of information about politicians' competence, and also offers a way to relate different conditioning factors of PBCs, including fiscal transparency and the maturity of democracies. Further, we show that the election-year rise in budget deficits under low media freedom is primarily driven by an increase in the current, not capital, component of public expenditure.     

Political budget cycles and election outcomes

This paper addresses two empirical questions. Is fiscal policy affected by upcoming elections? If so, do election-motivated fiscal policies enhance the probability of re-election of the incumbent? Employing data for 65 democratic countries over 1975–2005 in a semi-pooled panel model, we find that in most countries fiscal policy is hardly affected by elections. The countries for which we find a significant political budget cycle are very diverse. They include ‘young’ democracies but also ‘established’ democracies. In countries with a political budget cycle, election-motivated fiscal policies have a significant positive (but fairly small) effect on the electoral support for the political parties in government.     

Symmetric two-stage contests with budget constraints

The impact of a budget constraint on individual expenditures is examined in two models of two-stage contests with homogenous and risk-neutral players competing to win a single, indivisible, commonly valued rent. The set of players is partitioned into equally sized groups. In the first model, one contestant from each group survives to compete on the second stage against the other survivors. In the second model, one group survives the first stage and its members compete against each other on the second stage. We derive and discuss the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium solution for each model.     

The measurability of budget related rent-seeking

It has been suggested that the extent of rent-seeking expenditures arising from attempts to influence budget allocations should be estimated by the absolute magnitude of the observed changes in allocation. Instead, we argue that it is the extent of theex ante prospective changes that determine the level of rent-seeking, and that in the presence of countervailing activity these may be quite unrelated to the ex post observed values. We further argue that the traditional rent-seeking model of competition for a pre-specified rent is inappropriate in this context.     

Information alliances in contests with budget limits

We study the role of information exchange that may occur in alliances in a contest without noise. Contestants learn their own limits of what they can spend in a contest. They may also form alliances and learn the limits of all players who are within the same alliance. Then they decide independently about their own contest efforts. Alliance formation for the purpose of information exchange is beneficial for members of the same alliance and neutral for all other players. Also, a merger between alliances is beneficial for their members. Further, we identify and discuss the set of stable alliance combinations.     

Separation of powers and political budget cycles

Political budget cycles (PBCs) arise when the electorate is imperfectly informed about the incumbent’s competence and the incumbent has discretion over the budget. Focusing on the second condition, we study how separation of powers affects PBCs in the composition of government spending. We find that the details of the budget process, namely, the bargaining rules, the status quo’s location, and the degree of compliance with the budget law, are critical for the existence and the amplitudes of PBCs. In particular, when the status quo is determined by the previous budget and there is high compliance with the budget law, separation of powers acts as a commitment device which solves the credibility problems that drive PBCs.