Can the AML system be evaluated without better data?

The Anti-Money Laundering regime has been important in harmonizing laws and institutions, and has received global political support. Yet there has been minimal effort at evaluation of how well any AML intervention does in achieving its goals. There are no credible estimates either of the total amount laundered (globally or nationally) nor of most of the specific serious harms that AML aims to avert. Consequently, reduction of these is not a plausible outcome measure. There have been few efforts by country evaluators in the FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports (MERs) to acquire qualitative data or seriously analyze either quantitative or qualitative data. We find that data are relatively unimportant in policy development and implementation. Moreover, the long gaps of about 8 years between evaluations mean that widely used ‘country risk’ models for AML are forced still to rely largely on the 3rd Round evaluations whose use of data was minimal and inconsistent. While the 4th round MERs (2014–2022) have made an effort to be more systematic in the collection and analysis of data, FATF has still not established procedures that provide sufficiently informative evaluations. Our analysis of five recent National Risk Assessments (a major component of the new evaluations) in major countries shows little use of data, though the UK is notably better than the others. In the absence of more consistent and systematic data analysis, claims that countries have less or more effective systems will be open to allegations of ad hoc, impressionistic or politicized judgments. This reduces their perceived legitimacy, though this does not mean that the AML efforts and the evaluation processes themselves have no effects.     

Can minimum prices assure the quality of professional services?

This paper studies the effects of a minimum price fixed by a bureaucratic non-monopolistic professional association on service quality and consumer surplus. It shows that the price set by a Niskanen-type professional association will maximize consumer surplus only if consumers demand the highest possible average quality. If consumers demand services of lesser quality, the association’s price will be too high if measured by consumer surplus. Moreover we show that a deregulated market will always reproduce the favorable result of a uniformly high price in the case of top quality demand, while delivering superior results in the case of a mixed demand for high and low quality services.     

Consumer education: why the market doesn’t work

A growing literature studies the interactions between fully rational profit maximizing firms, on one side, and biased consumers, on the other side. Along these lines, this paper focuses on the consequences of quality misperception on the market equilibrium, by raising the following question: when quality bias affects consumer choice, do firms have incentives to educate their competitor’s customers in order to attract them? To tackle this issue, I incorporate consumer misperception in a Cournot-type duopoly model and consider the consequences on the market outcome. I focus on the two polar cases, when both firms either exploit consumer misperception, or educate completely their rival’s customers. I show that the market exerts conflicting forces on the firms’ incentives, such as a curse of debiasing might occur even in the presence of substitute goods. Consequently, the opportunity of a legal intervention to trigger consumer education is a key issue.     

Can intellectual property rights within climate technology transfer work for the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement?

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - Since the UNFCCC 1992 mandated technology transfer commitments, how to fulfil the commitments and effectively facilitate the...     

Can a 12-step program work in methadone maintenance treatment?

Three consecutive, professionally led (as opposed to self-help) groups following the 12-step program (TSP) were integrated into a methadone maintenance treatment (MMT) program that included 32 heroin-addicted individuals in recovery. This report describes our experience in meeting the challenges that arose and our conclusions regarding the therapeutic potential of this integration. A professional therapeutic staff guided the groups. In-depth interviews of 10 participants and the reflections of the group leaders provided data for learning about the groups' experience. Initially the participants rejected the concepts of Step 1, powerlessness and unmanageability of life. The assimilation of Step 4 (defining character defect) also aroused some resistance. The participants eventually adopted the pragmatic aspects of TSP, including its terminology. The establishment of a common language of recovery helped to create group coherence and a sense of belonging, and helped to meet the needs of those who felt stigmatized by both the nonaddicted and addicted population undergoing nonmethadone recovery. TSP could be adapted to various aspects of daily life, produced a sense of self-efficacy, and stimulated motivation for change. Therapeutic implications are discussed.     

Corruption and economic growth: does the size of the government matter?

Economic Change and Restructuring - Corruption is often a source of contentious debate, covering different areas of knowledge, such as philosophy and sociology. In this paper we assess the effects...     

Can corruption constrain the size of governments?

This paper analyzes the relationship between government size and the level of corruption. We propose a theoretical model where production decisions and corrupt behavior are endogenously determined. We model corruption assuming production in the formal sector is regulated by public officials who can use their public power for private gain. In this context, the underground economy emerges as an outside option that allows entrepreneurs to avoid dealing with bureaucrats. The fact that investments in the informal sector may influence public finances, introduces the possibility of multiple equilibria with different levels of corruption. Consistent with previous theoretical works and recent empirical evidence, we find out that corruption and the shadow economy are complements as they positively correlate across equilibria, which implies that corruption may limit the size of the public sector.     

Victimless venison? Deer poaching and black market meat in the UK

Abstract

The British Deer Society places the number of poached deer in the UK as high as 50,000 each year whereas only 335 incidents were reported to the police in 2009. This article explores deer as invisible victims of green crime and the motivations behind this poaching, drawing on the typologies of wildlife crime offenders developed by Nurse in 2013. In particular, the traditional profit-driven motivation of offenders is explored by attempting to uncover if there is, as suspected, a black market in venison. In order to do this, online questionnaires were sent to wildlife crime officers and gamekeepers asking questions about the scale and scope of deer poaching, who the perpetrators are and what is happening to the meat. From these data, it is hoped that a more detailed picture of deer poaching can be developed to further inform wildlife law and poaching prevention. This article also draws attention to the plight of poached deer and the potential danger to people of a black market in venison.