Applying competitive bidding to health care

This paper reviews the empirical literature on competitive bidding for health services under public programs and, in this context, discusses the major issues that must be confronted in designing bidding systems. These issues include the specification of units of service, the selection of winning bidders, the determination of reimbursement for winning bidders, the treatment of losing bidders, and contract enforcement. The paper then illustrates these issues in practice by outlining one possible competitive bidding system for purchases and rentals of durable medical equipment under the Medicare program.     

The private sector and competition in health care markets

This paper reviews the historical trends in the regulatory and competitive approaches to containment of health care costs, covering efforts in both public and private sectors. The current interest in the potential of private-sector initiatives to stimulate competition in health care insurance and provider markets is highlighted. Since neither the workings of competition in health care nor the role and impact of the private sector in stimulating such competition are well understood, the concluding section discusses important research issues surrounding these topics.     

Regulating through information: disclosure laws and American health care

Efforts to reform the American health care system through direct government action have failed repeatedly. Nonetheless, an alternative strategy has emerged from these experiences: requiring insurance organizations and health care providers to disclose information to the public. In this Article, Professor Sage assesses the justifications for this type of regulation and its prospects. In particular, he identifies and analyzes four distinct rationales for disclosure. He finds that the most commonly articulated goal of mandatory disclosure laws--improving the efficiency of private purchasing decisions by giving purchasers complete information about price and quality--is the most complicated operationally. The other justifications--which he respectively terms the agency, performance, and democratic rationales--hold greater promise, but make different, sometimes conflicting assumptions about the sources and uses of information. These insights have implications not only for health care, but also for other regulated practices and industries.     

Unfinished business: how litigation relates to health care regulation

"Regulation by litigation" is a recently recognized trend in American legal governance that develops differently in each economic sector it affects. In health care, widespread litigation can be viewed as the product of three partial transformations: incomplete industrialization, incomplete consumerism, and incomplete social solidarity. One can argue that the public turns to the courts because other actors who might exercise judgment and authority to resolve problems appear unreliable. Because litigation has several features at odds with sound health policy--including its cost, its hindsight bias, and its adversarial character--it may be necessary to develop new discretionary institutions to address specific questions that regulators cannot or will not answer.     

Explaining health care system change: problem pressure and the emergence of "hybrid" health care systems

In this article, we will further the explanation of the state's changing role in health care systems belonging to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). We build on our analysis of twenty-three OECD countries, which reveals broad trends regarding governments' role in financing, service provision, and regulation. In particular, we identified increasing similarities between the three system types we delineate as National Health Service (NHS), social health insurance, and private health insurance systems. We argue that the specific health care system type is an essential contributor to these changes. We highlight that health care systems tend to feature specific, type-related deficiencies, which cannot be solved by routine mechanisms. As a consequence, non-system-specific elements and innovative policies are implemented, which leads to the emergence of "hybrid" systems and indicates a trend toward convergence, or increasing similarities. We elaborate this hypothesis in two steps. First, we describe system-specific deficits of each health care system type and provide an overview of major adaptive responses to these deficits. The adaptive responses can be considered as non-system-specific interventions that broaden the portfolio of regulatory policies. Second, we examine diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) as a common approach for financing hospitals efficiently, which are nevertheless shaped by type-specific deficiencies and reform requirements. In the United States' private insurance system, DRGs are mainly used as a means of hierarchical cost control, while their implementation in the English NHS system is to increase productivity of hospital services. In the German social health insurance system, DRGs support competition as a means to control self-regulated providers. Thus, DRGs contribute to the hybridization of health care systems because they tend to strengthen coordination mechanisms that were less developed in the existing health care systems.     

Contesting anticompetitive actions taken in the name of the state: state action immunity and health care markets

The so-called state action doctrine is a judicially created formula for resolving conflicts between federal antitrust policy and state policies that seem to authorize conduct that antitrust law would prohibit. Against the background of recent commentaries by the federal antitrust agencies, this article reviews the doctrine and discusses its application in the health care sector, focusing on the ability of states to immunize anticompetitive actions by state licensing and regulatory boards, hospital medical staffs, and public hospitals, as well as anticompetitive mergers and agreements. Although states are free, as sovereign governments, to restrict competition, the state action doctrine requires that "the state itself" make the decision to do so. Partly on the basis of problems in the political environment, the article criticizes courts for using a mere "foreseeability" test to decide whether a state legislature sufficiently authorized competitors to act in contravention of clear federal policy: "Few things are more foreseeable than that a trade or profession empowered to regulate itself will produce anticompetitive regulations."     

Emerging parallels in the American health care and legal-judicial systems.

The structure and principal decision-making processes of the American health care system have, in recent years, evolved to closely resemble those of the legal-judicial system. This transformation reflects important common values that underlie both systems, including the values of life and liberty. This Article analyzes quasi-legal features of the health care system and draws conclusions about how those features might be used to address the problem of health care rationing. It concludes that coverage rules, if properly developed, can provide the sort of objective framework necessary to evaluate claims of health care needs. This Article also demonstrates that by defining legitimate health care needs, society can thereby potentially eliminate or forestall the need to ration necessary care. This can be achieved by using carefully developed coverage rules, rather than the informal rules currently in place, in conjunction with already existing due process methods for interpreting and implementing those rules.     

Consumer-sponsored prepaid group practice: restructuring the health care system

The traditional separation of health care delivery and financing systems is breaking down as various new types of health care facilities are established and as payment continues to be a major concern. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound (GHC) was organized as a prepaid group practice system responsive to consumers. Costs, methods of payment and delivery of care are interrelated and are all influenced by consumer ownership. GHC has been refining its benefit programs since 1945. Strategies for controlling use and costs focus on improved provider management and on flexibility. This article explains how the structure of GHC benefits the consumer.     

The role of tax exemption in a competitive health care market

The Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice 2004 report on competition in health care raises the issue of nonprofit versus for-profit form in several contexts, including their relative financial performance, pricing behavior, and role in caring for the uninsured poor. The report, however, does not discuss in detail the connection between tax exemption and the nonprofit/for-profit debate. Is tax exemption, for example, "buying" charity care for the poor, and would withdrawal of exemption negatively impact health care for the uninsured poor? Or is tax exemption justified on the grounds of other nonprofit behavior outside the financial realm and thus not considered by the report? If nonprofit status does not result in differential financial behavior (as the report concludes) and if competition will end the ability of hospitals to cross subsidize free care for the poor (as the report speculates), is there any reason to retain tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals? This article summarizes the debate on these issues and offers some alternatives to the current structure of tax exemption for nonprofit health care providers.     

Strategies to enhance price and quality competition in health care: lessons learned from tracking local markets

Drawing on observations from tracking changes in local health care markets over the past ten years, this article critiques two Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice recommendations to enhance price and quality competition. First, we take issue with the notion that consumers, acting independently, will drive greater competition in health care markets. Rather we suggest an important role remains for trusted agents who can analyze inherently complex price and quality information and negotiate on consumers' behalf. With aggregated information identifying providers who deliver cost-effective care, consumers would be better positioned to respond to financial incentives about where to seek care and thereby drive more meaningful competition among providers to reduce costs and improve quality. Second, we take issue with the FTC/DOJ recommendation to provide more direct subsidies to prevent distortions in competition. In the current political environment, it is not practical to provide direct subsidies for all of the unfunded care that exists in health care markets today; instead, some interference with competition may be necessary to protect cross subsidies. Barriers can be reduced, though, by revising pricing policies that have resulted in marked disparities in the relative profitability of different services.