美国从伊拉克撤军的思考与启示

2010年8月31日,美国总统奥巴马正式宣布美军结束长达七年在伊拉克的作战行动,表示美国尽到了责任,而＂现在是时候翻开新的一页＂。这表明奥巴马政府正着手清点布什的＂遗产＂,以便扔掉越来越难以承受的政治、经济和军事包袱。虽然美军在伊拉克的军事行动告一段落,但给人们留下了不少值得深思的东西。     

美国和伊拉克:从盟友到死敌

1年前,美英不顾国际社会的反对,出兵伊拉克,推翻了萨达姆政权.当我们从伊拉克战争的是非中走出来,回首往事,我们惊讶地发现,美国和伊拉克这对仇人竟然曾经是亲密的几乎不分你我的盟友,美国曾经不遗余力地支持伊拉克.     

The Fall: Consequences of US Withdrawal From Iraq

There is no big anti‐war movement in the United States against Iraq like there was against Vietnam. But the people have finally spoken against President Bush's Iraq policy by resoundingly returning a Democratic majority to Congress. Henry Kissinger, eminence gris of American diplomacy, ponders whether this means a “return to realism.” The military historian Martin van Creveld looks at what American withdrawal would mean.     

伊拉克战争与美国的霸权战略

美国不经联合国授权,不顾世界多数国家的反对和规模空前的反战浪潮,发动了伊拉克战争,显示出美国“倒萨”的真实意图并不是为了世界的和平与安全,而是为了一己私利。伊拉克战争是美国推行霸权战略的必然结果,因此战争必然会对美国的霸权战略带来深远的影响。     

State economic development strategy: Designing a tool for evaluating policy

In 1987, the new governor of Pennsylvania introduced a plan designed to protect “old” jobs while encouraging public and private investment in targeted “growth” industries. Recognizing that “targeting growth opportunities” was, at best, an uncertain enterprise, the Department of Labor and Industry suggested a program be implemented that would monitor these “key” sectors. To be cost-effective, this evaluation effort would need to be sufficiently timely and sensitive to allow for mid-course corrections. In this paper, we describe an effort to design and implement such a program.     

The United States naval blockade of Iraq: a foreign policy and international law analysis

This is the second of a two part essay by Commander Rosen into the causes of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the modern law of blockade, the political wisdom and the lawfulness of imposing a limited blockade of Iraq. Defects in the current regime of blockade were explored.

In part II, Commander Rosen closely explores the legal justification for the U.S. use of force in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It is frequently overlooked that the U.S. naval blockade (it was called a “naval interdiction”) was a U.S.-only operation from August 12th until August 25, 1990. As a pedagogical exercise, this period is extremely important because the U.S. use of force (by its naval units), in response to a written request by deposed Emir of Kuwait, must be justified under the U.N. Charter to be proper under international law. Once the U.N. Security Council authorized the use of force on August 25, 1990 to enforce the U.N. embargo, then the operation became one in which the U.N., as a corporate body, was acting. Since most low intensity conflicts since 1945, have involved lawful use of force issues outside of Security Council purview, the U.S. unilateral military action (blockade) against Iraqi shipping must be analyzed. It is reasonable to anticipate that future controversies of this sort will occur because of philosophic divisions among the U.N. Security Council permanent members or because there is anaequate time for the U.N. “Security Council to meet and obtain the forces required to insert into a region of conflict. Resurrection of the moribund U.N. Military Staff Committee might be one of the lessons learned from this particular episode.

The United States had the benefit of a U.N. resolution on August 25, 1990 to justify its naval action. Before that date, the legal issue arises whether, in the early stages, national self-defense grounds permitted the use of force against Iraq (blockade) since deprivation of assured access to critical materials (oil) can be considered an act of aggression under some theories of international law. Commander Rosen concludes that the low intensity blockade was probably not authorized, under a theory of national self-defense, because the U.S. had no hard evidence on August 12, 1990 (the day the blockade commenced) that Saddam Hussein would deprive the U.S. of access to Gulf Oil supplies. But, because of the pervasive interdepencies of world economies, world food supplies, and petroleum access, the case was extremely close.

The customary international law of intervention (protection of nationals or humanitarian) and the law of collective self-defense was explored relative to the U.S. imposition of a limited naval blockade. Commander Rosen concludes that intervention theory will not support the limited naval blockade since there was insufficient evidence that U.S. citizens were in imminent danger (as in Grenada) and the blockade operation was too limited and indirect in scope to produce the type of rapid results which have come to be associated with a humanitarian intervention (as in the Congo). But, since Kuwait’s territorial sovereignty had been grossly violated as a result of illegal aggression, Kuwait was privileged under the U.N. Charter to request and receive defense assistance from the United States under Article 51 to recover lost territory. Arguments that the right to act in collective self-defense under Article 51 is limited to the nation which itself is attacked (or a nation closely aligned with the victim) are rejected as contrary to the U.N. norms of promoting community resistance to illegal aggression.

While the Persian Gulf dispute has resulted in open hostilities, international law issues existed whether, in the early stages, the blockade was militarily necessary and whether the blockade could be extended to the Jordanian port of Aqaba, because of conflicting reports as to Jordan’s adherence with the U.N. embargo, were explored. International law would probably not support an extension of the blockade to Aqaba because it would be seen an improper interference with Jordan’s neutrality. Similarly, forbidding the passage of U.N. medical and food convoys into Iraq was seen as a breach of international law provided such shipments were specifically authorized and supervised by the U.N. security council (to ensure that the food was only distributed to civilians).     

CECC:美国对华人权政策的新变量

中美关系经历了30年的风雨,终于进入了一个相对稳定的状态.但是,影响中美关系全面发展的一些结构性问题如人权问题等依然存在.中国作为一个快速崛起的大国,又是共产党领导的社会主义国家,和美国有着截然不同的意识形态,中国始终是美国潜在的战略对手.2000年10月,美国国会相继成立了两个专事中国事务的委员会,就是加强对中国防范的具体表现.     

US bureaucratic politics and the decision to invade Iraq

Why did the second Bush administration decide to invade Iraq in 2003? This article suggests that the question can usefully be addressed by looking at the ways in which regime change in Iraq became part of bureaucratic politics within the US government – under successive administrations – following the unsatisfactory termination of the first Gulf War in 1991. It is contended here that the limitations on bureaucratic politics within the second Bush administration were important in that the path toward a presidential decision for invasion was cleared by the failure of the higher echelons of the national security bureaucracy under Bush to work effectively in exercising core functions of challenge and debate.     

俄罗斯反对美国攻伊的多重考虑

美国一意孤行,坚持发动“倒萨”战争,遭到世界上多数国家的谴责和反对。在这场大规模的反战活动中,俄罗斯的表现十分引人注目,它坚决反对美国动武,强调伊拉克问题应在联合国框架内,通过政治和外交手段加以解决。俄罗斯的主张有两个方面,一是强调伊拉克必须认真执行联合国1441号决议,彻底销毁“大规模杀伤性武器”;二是坚决反对通过外力去推翻萨达姆政权。     

美军在伊为何危局难挨

伊拉克前总统萨达姆被美军抓获后,伊拉克局势并没有遂美国心愿,并未得到多少缓和,而是依然相当严峻.这种局面是多种原因造成的.     

The united states naval blockade of Iraq: A foreign policy and international law analysis

The current Persian Gulf crisis may signal a new period in human history in which the United Nations is viewed as the forum of first resort for the resolution of international harms and disputes. This is particularly striking since the Security Council, because of east-west divisions, has been unable to act in a collective manner to addresses serious international breaches of the peace. This two part essay deals with the events leading up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the step-by-step reaction by the U.S. Government, the imposition of the U.S. Navy blockade of Kuwaiti shipping, and the legal justification for the introduction of forces. The reader is left to decide whether the Rule of Law and Charter ideals of collective security, are the real victors in the current conflict.

Part 1 of the essay examines the detailed economic and political causes for the Iraqi invasion. Even though some commentators have characterized Saddam Hussein's entry into Kuwait as “naked aggression” which was driven by Saddam Hussein's hamartia to become the new Nasser, OPEC production disputes, allegations of excessive Kuwaiti pumping of the Rumalia oil field (straddles both countries), the need for an Iraqi coastline, and large Iraqi debt to Kuwait are seen as “rational” reasons for the invasion. A historical examination of the Iran-Iraq conflict is grafted into part one to assist the reader in appreciating the fact that belligerent conduct is viewed in Iraq as a normative mode of conflict resolution and that in the context of all current and future military and diplomatic interchanges, the proven bellicosity of Iraq should figure prominently in the approaches which are taken.

The U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf must be viewed in the context of the U.S.'s diplomatic and economic interests in the region. The essay concludes that the actions of the United States in the first forty days after the Iraqi invasion were masterful because of the skilled use of the U.N. security council (to build a broad political base) as well as the introduction of limited force (imposition of a naval blockade) to signal to Saddam Hussein that the international community was serious in its resolve. The shooting which is taking place is most unfortunate; but U.S. efforts were properly tailored to keep the world coalition intact and prevent a shooting war. Until approximately 3 weeks into the actual conflict, the level of anti-U.S. rhetoric was noticeably small- a triumph for U.S. foreign policy makers in forming a world-wide consensus and maintaining it and a triumph for international respect for law.

The final portion of Part 1 deals with the history of blockades before and after the 1945 U.N. Charter. Blockade actions have been used since the Middle Ages but the 1856 Pact of Paris and the 1909 Declaration of London are the modern sources for the Law of Blockade. Becuase of the sheer intensity of conflict in the First and Second World Wars, the normative rules contained in the two written sources of law fell into disuse. Even so, most of the substantive provisions from the 19th and early 20th century doctrines are incorporated into contemporary law and policy. Commander Rosen argues strenuously for a modernization of the international conventions to codify the rules of blockade since, given the utter destructiveness of modern warfare, blockades remain a relatively benign use of force in those situations in which use of force is legally justified. But, however laudable the U.N. Charter ideals are to sharply restrict the use of force to exceptionally limited circumstances and make state aggression illegal, situations will arise in which use of force will be necessary to respond to illegal aggression. Resurrection of the old concept of pacific blockade (similar to the naval action taken in connection with the Cuban Missile Crisis) is urged because unanimity in the U.N. is transitory and nations, particularly superpowers, need the legal flexibility to react to illegal aggression with limited uses of force--below the threshold uses of force authorized by the U.N. Charter.     

The ambiguity of US foreign policy towards Africa

Since 9/11, the American policy towards Africa has been strongly influenced by national security interests and in particular by the fight against international terrorism and Islamic radicalisation. Traditionally, the American Africa policy has been the result of bureaucratic policymaking with the Pentagon and the State Department playing prominent roles. The paper argues that in the current century, evangelical Christian lobby groups have gained increasing influence on policymaking on Africa. Because policymaking has been influenced by a number of different actors, the American Africa policy may appear incoherent and ambiguous if judged narrowly on the expectation that it only aims to take care of US national security concerns and economic self-interests. The paper concludes that Africa was important to the United States during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama because of the combination of strong security interests and strong domestic lobby groups that have pressured to place Africa on the US foreign policy agenda.     

冷战后美国对华策略中的日本因素

冷战结束以后,亚太地区的战略格局和中美日相互之间的关系均发生重大变化,日本实力增强,地位提升,其在美国对华策略中的影响力明显强于冷战时期,且影响方式也发生了实质性的变化.     

面临严峻考验的美国中东政策

中东是布什总统第二个任期内的全球战略重点,是美国反恐、防扩散和推进"民主"的主战场.为实施这一战略目标,美国不惜工本,加大力度,投入大量的人力与物力,但事态的发展并不如其所愿,而是遭遇到重重困难,其中东政策面临严峻考验.     

伊拉克:一场美国人输不起的战争

2003年5月1日,美国总统布什以极为夸张的方式乘飞机登上刚刚从海湾地区返回的林肯航空母舰,宣告了伊拉克战争的结束.