The new great game in Central Asia post 2014: The US “New Silk Road” strategy and Sino-Russian rivalry

With the planned US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 looming ever closer, and Central Asia's own future increasingly in doubt, major powers are all competing to enhance their influence in Central Asia. 2014 may mark a regional tipping point, but none can accurately predict how the regional balance might shift after the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. During 2009–2010, the signs of growing Russian dependence on China in terms of economy and energy were palpable, as were the signs of China successfully subordinating Russia to its Central Asian economic agenda. In 2011–2012, it was difficult to see Russia simply acquiescing in its subordination to China without reacting to that situation negatively. Since 2011, to avoid this dependence on China, Russia has vigorously pushed for its regional integration schemes. 2011 marked the launch of the US “New Silk Road” initiative. Great power regional integration schemes, however, undermine both regional and national development.     

Centred discourse,decentred practice: the relational production of Russian and Chinese ‘rising’ power in Central Asia

Abstract

This paper challenges dominant understandings of ‘rising powers’ by developing a decentred, relational account of Russia and China in Central Asia. We ask whether Moscow and Beijing’s regional integrative strategies do not guide, but rather are led by, everyday interactions among Russian and Chinese actors, and local actors in Central Asia. Rising powers, as a derivative of ‘Great Powers’, are frequently portrayed as structurally comparable units that concentrate power in their executives, fetishise territorial sovereignty, recruit client states, contest regional hegemony and explicitly oppose the post-1945 international order. In contrast, we demonstrate that the centred discourse of Eurasian integration promoted by Russian and Chinese leaders is decentred by networks of business and political elites, especially with regard to capital accumulation. Adopting Homi K. Bhabha’s notion of mimicry (subversion, hybridity) and J. C. Scott’s conception of mētis (local knowledge, agency), and using examples of Russian and Chinese investments and infrastructure projects in Central Asia, we argue that in order to understand centring discourse we must look to decentring practices at the periphery; that is, rising power is produced through ongoing interactions between actors at the margins of the state’s hegemonic reach.     

上海合作组织扩员后的地区定位与合作格局

作为新地区主义的一种实践形式,上海合作组织成立后不断发展。上海合作组织坚持以“不干涉内政”原则为核心的主权规范,遵循“国家主义”发展路径。扩员之前,在应对安集延事件、吉尔吉斯斯坦政局动荡等地区安全与政治挑战的过程中,上海合作组织确立了以中亚为地缘安全中心的地区定位。在开展各领域合作的进程中,上海合作组织秉持协商一致的原则,其内部形成了“大国引领、中小国家平等参与”的合作格局。扩员之后,上海合作组织继续遵循“国家主义”发展路径,但其地区定位与内部合作格局出现了新变化。印度和巴基斯坦的加入,使中亚的地缘安全中心地位相对下降,以中亚为重心、南亚为重要延伸成为上海合作组织新的地区定位。印度和巴基斯坦两国的加入,还增加了上海合作组织内部合作格局的复杂性,使“大国引领”的合作格局面临深刻转型,“中小国家平等参与”的合作格局也在发生演变。目前,上海合作组织处于发展转型的十字路口,其发展面临的不确定性需要给予更多关注。     

20年来美国中亚战略的基本路径

苏联解体20年来，美国的中亚战略灵活多样，已经摸索出一套相对稳定、成熟和确定的手段。基本路径和手段包括：密切政治关系、推进地区多极化均衡；加强经济援助和经济合作，推动建立利伯维尔场经济；加强军事安全合作，合作打击极端势力并威慑其他大国；利用软硬手段结合，择机推进民主体制和自由价值观等。从1995年开始，美国采取了大规模政治、经济和军事“攻势”。“9·11”事件后，美国通过在中亚维持军事存在，一度使中亚国际关系发生了有利于美国的变化。     

INTER‐MUNICIPAL COOPERATION AND COSTS: EXPECTATIONS AND EVIDENCE

Austerity and fiscal crisis make the search for cost‐saving reforms in local government more critical. While cost savings from privatization have frequently proven ephemeral, inter‐municipal cooperation has been a relatively understudied reform. We analyse the literature on cost savings under cooperation and find that savings are dependent on (1) the cost structure of public services, particularly those related to scale and density economies and externalities, (2) the structure of local government (size, metropolitan location, powers granted by the nation or regional state), and (3) the governance framework at the local/regional level where cooperation varies from informal to formal. European studies give more emphasis to cost savings, while US studies focus on coordination concerns arising from the higher degree of devolution in the US local government system.     

Economic and Security Regionalism among Patrimonial Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Central Asia

The ‘new regionalism’ has spread to Central Asia; yet there has been little success in implementing most regional initiatives there. Security regionalism has had greater success than economic regionalism, even though economic initiatives would bring great benefits to the economy and population. I propose a connection between patrimonialism and regionalism. Central Asia's patrimonial leaders are driven by survival and personal enrichment, and are beholden to informal vested interests. Since economic regionalism involves liberalisation that adversely affects these actors, the result is ‘virtual’ economic regionalism at best. In the case of security regionalism, some regional organisations progress because they bolster patrimonial regimes, with negative consequences for democracy.     

A middle power’s trade policy under U.S.-China FTA competition: South Korea’s double hedging FTA diplomacy

Existing studies on the roles and foreign policies of middle powers place too much focus on their security policies, while there is a dearth of scholarship on their trade policies. Middle powers have used free trade agreement (FTA) politics not only to obtain economic benefits through trade expansion, but also to achieve broader foreign policy goals. Given the U.S.-China FTA competition in East Asia, as a middle power, South Korea, has developed double hedging FTA diplomacy by supporting both powers’ FTA initiatives in order to avoid potential conflicts and maintain favourable relationships with both powers. Specifically, Korea has tried to maximize its national interest and, furthermore, to maintain regional stability by establishing two bilateral FTAs, the Korea-U.S. FTA and the Korea-China FTA, and by showing interest and participating in larger FTA discussions, such as the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership and the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.     

冷战时期中间地带的国际互动及启示

冷战时期三种不同等级的行为体,在中间地带形成了三个层次的国际互动关系,即超级大国的全球性战略竞争、次级大国(力量中心)参与的局部性竞争与缓和、地区大国参与的地区性竞争与合作。中间地带的三个层次的国际互动呈现出明显的阶段性,其中,超级大国之间的竞争在纵向上贯穿整个冷战时期,在横向上扩展到全球所有地区,而次级大国和地区大国参与的国际互动仅限于一两个阶段和一两个地区,即阶段性和局部性。冷战时期,中间地带在组成和规模上是不断变动的,中间地带与次级大国和地区大国之间会发生相互转化,但次级大国和地区大国在根本上难以撼动冷战两极体制。由于中间地带的变动性、多重性和复杂性,在战略认知上,世界大国应当坚持客观和长远态度,在战略选择上奉行审慎和灵活原则。     

美国全球战略调整：战略重心更多向亚太倾斜

奥巴马政府上任以来对美国全球战略进行了令其前任难以相比的重大调整,将美全球战略的地缘政治、经济、军事重心都由欧洲大西洋向亚洲太平洋更多倾斜,以因应近年来欧亚形势所发生的复杂深刻的重大变化。从目前看,美对欧亚软硬实力对比的相对优势依然存在,且可凭借这种优势,运筹欧亚地缘战略,进行宏观调控,使形势的变化朝着有利于自己的方向发展,以掌控对欧亚的主导权,保持主导地位。但从长远看,随着欧亚各自软硬实力的逐步提高,美现有的相对优势将被逐步削弱,美掌控对欧亚的主导权和保持主导地位将面临更多、更大的挑战。     

Central Asia and regional security

This paper aims to analyze the politico-military cooperation among the Central Asian countries viewed as a key factor in ensuring the regional security. Today, the geopolitical tension in the surrounding regions, the worsening situation in Afghanistan, as well as intraregional socio-economic problems directly affect the security situation in Central Asia. In this regard, the question arises as to how well the Central Asian states are able to meet these challenges. The analysis of the situation in the region in the 1990s and at the beginning of the new century shows that attempts have been made to establish a regional security system based on military cooperation among Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. However, unregulated interstate relations in Central Asia, the lack of political will to cooperate with leaders of neighboring countries and the combination of external and internal threats have contributed to the creation of a regional security system based on the multilateral structures with the involvement of external actors.     

The International Politics of Water Security in Central Asia

The article examines the international politics of water security in Central Asia with a particular focus on the level of regionalism. Are the five Central Asian states evolving into a region capable of solving water management problems on a regional basis? To examine the extent to which water has shaped the structure of Central Asian relations, I use water-related events. The empirical findings suggest that international relations of the Central Asian states are characterised by at least two sets of triads rather than a singular region. The presence of regional fragmentation is likely to exacerbate existing disputes over water and possibly destabilise the region.     

Emerging powers,soft power,and future of regional cooperation in South Asia

This article looks into the future of regional cooperation in South Asia in the light of two emerging powers: China and India focussing on how their rise would change the relationship in the region. The paper argues that China and India both are trying to enhance their spheres of influence forcing the states in the region to align with either of them in a binary framework of unstable equilibrium and uneasy coexistence rather than reinforcing the regional solidarity of SAARC. Such a competition between China and India and the putative interventionary efforts of Western powers and their agencies in the region are bound to bring implications of profound value for not just regional cooperation but for the individual destinies of the various states involved in the days ahead.     

Uzbekistan among the great powers

Under the authoritarian regime of Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan has achieved independence and stability by exploiting its natural resources through a strategy of “staple globalism” and by balancing the great powers against each other. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the new regime first distanced itself from Russia and tried regional alliances, then accepted help from NATO, and most recently turned cautiously to Russia (and China). Throughout, Uzbekistan has managed to receive considerable assistance from international agencies and military aid from several outside powers, albeit relatively little private foreign investment, owing to its poor business climate. The country has also handled potential conflicts with neighbors without significant violence.     

Two Ways of Influence-building: The Eurasian Economic Union and the One Belt,One Road Initiative

Russia and China have been pursuing the Eurasian Economic Union and the One Belt, One Road initiative since the early 2010s, employing two distinct sets of practices in their respective influence-building endeavours. Russia is interested in creating an exclusive sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, in order to bolster its great power status and secure regional primacy. China, in turn, is expanding its economic influence over a vast geographical area disguising economic expansion behind multilateralism. These differences make Sino–Russian competition in Central Asia less plausible.     

Military First Doctrine Is Behind North Korea Adventurism

The recurrent crises emanating from North Korea, and the response to them, is testing US‐China relations and drawing the new boundaries of power in East Asia. The head of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the former South Korean national security advisor address this development.     

The US Will Remain in the Yellow Sea

The recurrent crises emanating from North Korea, and the response to them, is testing US‐China relations and drawing the new boundaries of power in East Asia. The head of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the former South Korean national security advisor address this development.     

China Challenges Unipolar Naval Power in Asia

The recurrent crises emanating from North Korea, and the response to them, is testing US‐China relations and drawing the new boundaries of power in East Asia. The head of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the former South Korean national security advisor address this development.     

多种文明视角下的中东欧社会发展

从古到今,无论在地理位置上还是地缘政治上,处于西欧和东欧之间的中东欧地区都十分重要。由于受不同文明的影响和东西方大国的控制,该地区的民族和国家在很大程度上不能为自己做主,社会发展带有极强的被动性。这是观察正在集体回归西欧的中东欧社会发展的一个重要视角,有助于发现其历史发展逻辑和潜在的动因。文明归宿上的困惑和政治定位上的摇摆是中东欧社会发展的常态,而在其自身认同和同东西方大国对它们的认同上的矛盾会长久存在。     

Transnational Capital,the US State and Latin American Trade Agreements

This paper examines the role of US-based transnational corporations in advancing trade, investment, regulatory and intellectual property rights provisions within NAFTA and DR–CAFTA. I explore the linkages between US firms, the US state and investment patterns in Mexico, Central America and the Dominican Republic in order to develop a framework for understanding the political economy of these regional trade agreements. I locate the timing of each of these agreements within the context of the goals of a transnational interest bloc that includes US-based transnational firms, US state officials and regional business interests and state bureaucracies in Latin America, with each trying to utilise regional agreements as a substitute for failed multilateral initiatives as well as a springboard for advancing a more aggressive set of protections for investors within bilateral investment treaties. In order to determine the extent to which transnational firms based in the USA have influenced these trade agreements, I explore three interrelated aspects of business influence: the extent to which transnational firms with investment interests in Mexico and Central America were involved in organisations that had regular access to key US policy makers; the historical development of a transnational interest bloc that has linked US firms and the US state to transnational capital and state bureaucracies in Mexico, Central America and the Dominican Republic; and the extent to which the same group of transnational firms has been attempting without success to advance a policy agenda in the WTO that incorporates many of the provisions of NAFTA and DR–CAFTA. The failure of this transnational interest bloc to effect substantial changes in WTO policies has led the bloc to rely on regional trade agreements to pursue its interests.     

Financial crises as catalysts for regional cooperation? Chances and obstacles for financial integration in ASEAN+3, MERCOSUR and the eurozone

This article compares and analyses the different answers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations+3 (ASEAN+3), Mercado Común del Dur (MERCOSUR) and the eurozone on financial crises in their respective regions. All three regions were hit by economic turmoil between 1997 and 2012, but whereas ASEAN+3 and the eurozone answered with establishing regional liquidity arrangements (RLAs) in order to fight future crises, financial cooperation did not take off in MERCOSUR. Thus, the paper asks why some regions establish RLAs in cases of crisis and others do not. It argues that the variance of regional financial integration in different world regions is due to different interests of regional powers in their respective regions. The regional powers of ASEAN+3 and the eurozone are institutionally and/or economically highly embedded within their respective regions, but this is not the case for Brazil in MERCOSUR. China and Japan suffered from negative externalities of the Asian crisis, and, consequently, have had an interest to stabilize their neighbours’ economies after the crisis. In contrast, Brazil was able to follow a beggar-thy-neighbour strategy at the turn of the millennium, which externalized some of the costs of Brazil's own economic crisis towards Argentina. As a result, Brazil has had no interest in providing liquidity for its regional neighbours after the crisis. France and Germany are not only economically but also institutionally highly embedded in the eurozone because they share a common currency with their regional neighbours. Thus, the stability of the eurozone is a vital interest for Europe's regional powers, and they devote significant resources to stabilize the economies of the eurozone's periphery.