Russia and the Iraq War: was Putin's policy a failure?

Although Russian President Vladimir Putin has been faced with numerous crises since coming to office in 2000, most importantly the war in Chechnya, the Iraq War was the first major international crisis with which his administration was confronted. As in the case of Kosovo for Yeltsin, and the Gulf War for Gorbachev, the Russian President had to deal with conflicting domestic pressures and apparently still more conflicting Russian national and international interests. Indeed, one result of such a situation was a post-war accusation that Putin actually had no policy or at least no consistent policy with regard to the Iraq crisis [Golan, G., 1992. Gorbachev's difficult time in the Gulf. Political Science Quarterly 107 (2), 213–230]. One may remember similar accusations of Gorbachev's “zigzaging” in the Gulf War and claims that the Yeltsin government failed to forge a Kosovo policy altogether [Levitin, O., 2000. Inside Moscow's Kosovo muddle. Survival 42 (1), 130]. Yet, a certain pattern did appear to repeat itself in the Iraqi crisis, namely, pre-war efforts to prevent a military conflict from breaking out, then gradual escalation of rhetoric if not actual involvement, and finally gradual but relatively rapid retreat to conciliatory posture toward the United States (in all three crises). Moreover, Putin was indeed consistent throughout the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods in his opposition to the Americans' use of force against Iraq and in the need to remain within a United Nations framework. Actually, one might ask (and we shall below) why Putin did not abandon the first part of this policy, in order to maintain the second component, when it became certain that the U.S. was going to attack with or without UN Security Council approval.     

No humanitarian intervention in Asian genocides: how possible and legitimate?

Abstract

This article addresses an important empirical puzzle: why has the United States, without exception, chosen not to intervene in the six humanitarian catastrophes in post-war Asia, namely in Indonesia, East Pakistan/Bangladesh, Cambodia, East Timor, Sri Lanka and Myanmar? We use an eclectic approach that blends arguments about the international normative structure and geostrategic interests to examine what has made the absence of humanitarian intervention in Asia by the US possible and legitimate. Specifically, we focus on the paradox between calls for humanitarian intervention and the historically and geographically contingent social construction of the norms of humanity, national sovereignty and United Nations-backed multilateralism in conjunction with US and Chinese concerns over their regional geostrategic interests. The normative narratives about race, ‘communists’, ‘terrorists’, international order and inclusive multilateral processes, and the geostrategic interests of the US and China, combine to make non-intervention possible and legitimate.     

Memories of ethnic cleansing and the local Iron Curtain in the Czech–German borderlands

The Czech–German borderlands are an archetypal European border region. They evoke not only Cold War histories, but also shelter layers of European memories of the ethnic reshaping of early post-war Europe. By means of life story interviews with German speakers of the border region, this article analyzes the symbolic meaning of and the individual dealing with the local Iron Curtain. It will shed light on the biographical and narrative interconnectedness of experiences of ethnic cleansing in the early post-war period and retrospective perceptions of the Iron Curtain in these borderlands. In particular, it inquires whether and to what extent the local Iron Curtain intensified fractures caused by the region's post-and pre-war attempts to halt the multiethnic composition of the border communities. The article suggests that the local Czech–German Iron Curtain would have never endured as strongly if the border communities' common identity had not already been severely damaged in the course of the region's traumatic history and forced population transfers.     

Iraq: economic sanctions and consequences, 1990–2000

It is a well known fact, of course, that Iraq has been under a UN Security Council system of comprehensive embargo for the past 10 years. The consequences of the embargo have been catastrophic for the people and the economy of Iraq. Yet our understanding of the humanitarian emergency in Iraq will be enhanced if we examine the impact not only of the embargo but of other factors as well. This paper identifies four such factors: (1) the decision by the Iraqi government to initiate the 1980-88 war against Iran; (2) the militarisation of the Iraqi economy; (3) Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing 1991 Gulf war; and (4) the sanctions regime which has been in place since August 1990. The paper argues that, while all the non-sanctions factors played their different roles, it is, in the last analysis, the force of the intensity and the open-endedness of the sanctions regime which bears the major share of the responsibility for the current conditions in Iraq.     

Bush's America and the New Exceptionalism: anti-Americanism,the Holocaust and the transatlantic rift

This article examines how the USA's growing ‘Holocaust consciousness’ has impacted on conservative interpretations of the transatlantic rift. Presenting the Holocaust as an antipode to US national identity has helped signal a moral divergence between the USA and Europe. The instrumentalisation of the Holocaust and anti-Semitism has allowed US conservatives to reframe norms of self-defence, victimisation, and liberation in justifying the invasion and occupation of Iraq. In the wake of Iraq claiming anti-Semitism as a ‘European disease’, and anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism as ‘twin brothers’, helps delegitimate European criticism of the war on terror. A new form of exceptionalism portrays the USA not only as the liberator of death camps and the protector of the Jewish people but, after 11 September, as a victim itself.     

What difference does difference make? Reflections on neo- conservatism as a liberal cosmopolitan project

This article examines cosmopolitanism with specific reference to the 'realist turn' in United States foreign policy since 2001. In examining the evasions of cosmopolitanism, the article suggests that neo-conservatism in the US is not necessarily completely incompatible with some interpretations of liberal internationalism and cosmopolitanism, which in turn are linked to the idea of a benevolent US hegemony. Indeed, the Bush-Blair alliance should be seen in this light. Even on its own terms however, this is a project that is bound to fail, as it ignores the inequalities and hierarchies of the international order, which have intensified in the neo-liberal era, and the historical and sociological reasons for 'state failure'. If cosmopolitanism is to have a future, then it must evade the quick fix solutions proposed by advocates of 'liberal military intervention'. If it fails to do so, then it will remain complicit with an 'imperialist', US-led neo-liberal international order.     

Saddam Hussein: Political Psychological Profiling Results Relevant to His Possession,Use, and Possible Transfer of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to Terrorist Groups

This article applies psychological profiling data from the speeches and interviews of Saddam Hussein during the 1990 Gulf Crisis to many of the recent questions about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) policies and intentions that were pivotal to the decision to wage war in Iraq. Content analysis of Hussein's verbal comments prior to the invasion of Kuwait and after the introduction of coalition forces into Saudi Arabia were used to assess his psychological state, political attitudes, and decision-making processes under stress. The findings were then applied to the recent issues of Iraqi WMD possession, use, and possible transfer to terrorist groups. The results of this political psychological assessment of Hussein indicated that prior to his removal by coalition forces it was extremely unlikely that he had significantly reduced what he perceived to be Iraq's WMD capabilities. Analysis of Hussein's political psychology, sensitivity to threats, propensity for violent reactions, and tendency to miscalculate indicated that he had a very low threshold for WMD use and may not have waited to be attacked before using these weapons. The results also indicated that the same characteristics that made Hussein an extremely likely candidate for WMD use made it unlikely that he would transfer WMD assets to a terrorist group not under his direct control. Although examination of Hussein's decision making under stress indicated that the invasion would increase the likelihood of Iraqi WMD use, it was not seen as increasing the odds of Iraqi transfer of WMD to terrorist groups. However, the results also indicated the potential for Hussein to suffer from a significant series of cognitive biases with direct impact on his decision making regarding WMD, as well as his ability to use these weapons. Support was also noted for his potential to experience gaps in reality testing and immobilizing anxiety should the military struggle turn desperate for Iraq and for him personally. The implications for the characterization of leaders likely to use WMD were also examined.­     

Short story

A case study of the Mozambican conflict is used to illustrate the need to integrate a gender perspective which is historically grounded and which encompasses social relationships between women and men rather than the existing 'impact of conflict on women' approach. This is demonstrated first by examining ways in which postcolonial states have continued constructions of gender which assign women to the private/domestic sphere and then by establishing how security in Southern Africa has been mediated by gendered constraints, whether in peace or war. The specific character of the Mozambican conflict is summarised, as are its outcomes in terms of gender relations which have intensified women's vulnerability. This is then related to an examination of the nature of some of the major humanitarian responses to the Mozambican emergency, where there was a wide divergence between stated policies on gender and practice. It is argued that this 'gender gap' is being perpetuated in some aspects of the reconstruction phase, despite women's enormous contribution to the task of rebuilding Mozambican society.     

Humanitarianism in intra-state conflict: aid inequality and local governance in government- and opposition-controlled areas in the Syrian war

This article argues that humanitarian aid in intra-state conflict plays a crucial but largely unrecognised role in shaping the preconditions for negotiations for peace and post-conflict reconstruction. Drawing on a spatial theory approach, it identifies the role of humanitarian aid as not being temporary and independent, but as forming an integral part of the daily lives of local communities and of continuously evolving structures of governance during conflict. As a result, significant imbalances in the distribution of aid between different geographical areas, as highlighted in the current Syrian war, threaten not only the immediate survival of civilians, but also their future.     

Reconstruction as modernisation: the ‘post-conflict’ project in Afghanistan

This paper examines the post-war reconstruction programme in Afghanistan, arguing that it contains the seeds of radical social change. The paper analyses the tensions of the present reconstruction project in light of the past experience of similar programmes launched by Afghan rulers and their foreign supporters. The central argument is that the conflation of post-war reconstruction with a broader agenda for development and modernisation has brought out a wide range of tensions associated with social change. Simultaneously the prominent foreign role in the undertaking has increasingly had negative effects. As a result, the entire project shows signs of severe contradictions that are adding to the problems caused by the growing insurgency.     

Designing a secure Iraq: a US policy prescription

The third Western attempt at regime construction in Iraq is now underway. Western plans to rebuild the Iraqi state will fail again if they ignore the real roots of Iraqi insecurity: its geopolitical weakness. The preoccupation with designing a new constitution ignores the historical evidence of the 1930s and 1950s that it is bound to fail. Surrounded by far larger powers such as Turkey and Iran, Iraq desperately needs long‐term commitments of arms and allies. While de‐garrisoning is a vital part of the regional peace puzzle, an insecure Iraq destabilises politics in Baghdad and fuels arms competitions. Thus the USA and UK must intercede on Iraq's behalf and help to resolve the long‐standing disputes over the unfair division of the Shatt al‐Arab with Iran, and access to sea arrangements with Kuwait. If Iraq is permitted to drift away a decade after reconstruction, its regime will again fall.     

A Season for Disarmament

Is President Barack Obama's proposal for zero nuclear weapons realistic? Will it make the world more secure, or more prone to wars since they are no longer unthinkable? To evaluate this bold strategic initiative, we have invited comments from two former US secretaries of state, a former director of the CIA and the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency who led the hunt for Saddam's non‐existent weapons of mass destruction on the eve of the Iraq war.     

Obama Plan May Spur Proliferation

Is President Barack Obama's proposal for zero nuclear weapons realistic? Will it make the world more secure, or more prone to wars since they are no longer unthinkable? To evaluate this bold strategic initiative, we have invited comments from two former US secretaries of state, a former director of the CIA and the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency who led the hunt for Saddam's non‐existent weapons of mass destruction on the eve of the Iraq war.     

Better to Remain Ambiguous on Nukes

Is President Barack Obama's proposal for zero nuclear weapons realistic? Will it make the world more secure, or more prone to wars since they are no longer unthinkable? To evaluate this bold strategic initiative, we have invited comments from two former US secretaries of state, a former director of the CIA and the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency who led the hunt for Saddam's non‐existent weapons of mass destruction on the eve of the Iraq war.     

Obama,Reagan and Zero Nukes

Is President Barack Obama's proposal for zero nuclear weapons realistic? Will it make the world more secure, or more prone to wars since they are no longer unthinkable? To evaluate this bold strategic initiative, we have invited comments from two former US secretaries of state, a former director of the CIA and the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency who led the hunt for Saddam's non‐existent weapons of mass destruction on the eve of the Iraq war.     

Environmental migration and conflict dynamics: Focus on developing regions

As Iraq is plunging into civil war, politics and violence in the Middle East are increasingly perceived to be highly interconnected and entwined. This article offers an attempt to understand the nature and scope of this regional interconnectedness involving three of the region's states—Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Its approach takes advantage of the work by scholars of other regions than the Middle East, more precisely those analysing the ‘new wars’ and ‘Regional Conflict Formations (rcfs) of primarily Central and West Africa and the Balkans. The article suggests that, provided some methodological problems are addressed or at least acknowledged, the rcf model offers a useful approach to studying and addressing this region's multiple conflicts. Its assessment of the rcf model's utility in reference to the Middle Eas—broken down along the suggested levels of military networks, political networks, economic/financial networks and social networks—suggests that its emphasis on material – physical linkages neglects important symbolic – political resources that easily cross borders and are equally determining in fuelling and framing conflicts. This lacuna is echoed in US policy making toward the Middle East. The article concludes that, in order to avoid myopia in both analysis and policy making, such more discursive processes ought to be integrated into and made complementary with the rcf conceptualisation of conflict-related cross-border traffic. This will also allow for better analysis of the complexity of identity politics and it underscores the fallacy of assumed Western exogeneity to this region's conflicts.     

The unassailable principle: why luther gulick searched for a science of administration

Luther Gulick's two contributions to the Papers on the Science of Administration are often regarded as a statement of the “orthodoxy” in the field of public administration in the pre-war period. This paper challenges this view. It argues that the two basic claims in Gulick's work--the notion that public administration could be considered as a science, and that field could be studied without regard to politics--were widely contested throughout the 1920's and 1930's. Gulick adhered to these claims in part because they were useful in protecting a young and weakly-institutionalized field against powerful critics. By the late 1930's, academics in public administration may have confronted a dilemma: the position staked out by Gulick and others, while essential to the development of the field, was regarded by many within the field as being intellectually untenable.     

A PROLEGOMENON TO THE STUDY OF THE ROLE OF RHETORIC IN THE GARBAGE-CAN POLICY PROCESS: THE CASE OF HONG KONG'S POSITIVE NON-INTERVENTIONISM

This article analyzes the Hong Kong government's policy making process from the garbage-can perspective. Despite the official claim that the principle of positive non-interventionism has been consistently adhered to, Hong Kong policy makers have been strategically employing positive non-interventionism as rhetoric in legitimizing what they choose to do or not to do in an ad-hoc manner. As a result, be it under colonial rule or Chinese sovereignty, Hong Kong has been governed like an “organized anarchy.” Indeed, playing with the rhetoric of positive non-interventionism has become the identity of Hong Kong policy makers. This argument is illustrated with a review of Hong Kong's industrial policy making from the pre-war period to the present.     

Russia in the European Home? Convergence,Cosmopolitanism and Cosmism in Late Soviet Europeanisation

The aim is to present a conceptual and historical reconstruction of Gorbachev's notion of a ‘European home’, its underlying philosophy of history as well as its relation to Russian cosmism. The concept is contextualised within the convergence debate of the post-war period, in which a rapprochement between communism and capitalism was posited. The essay concludes with reflections on what the conceptualisation can tell us about the fall of communism and what impact the concept has had on today's search for a common European identity. An argument is advanced that the notion contained paradoxes that contributed to the dislocation of post-Soviet Russia from Europe.     

The 1950s—the triumph of the Soviet economy

The frequent assertions in both Russian and Western economic literature and the broader press that the command economy is not viable are based on data showing the inefficient use of material and labour resources in the pre-war period and the continuous decline in the rate of economic growth and the efficiency of resource use in the 1960s–1980s. Yet it is a long way from observing these facts to confirming the failure of the command economy. Before the political system of the USSR began to collapse in 1990–91 there had been no prolonged absolute fall in GDP nor, in the post-war period, in the standard of living of the population, nor had technical progress come to a halt as it did, for example, in the 1990s after the rejection of the command economy. Compared with the latter period it is justifiable to talk of the indisputable advantages of the command over the market economy in Russian conditions, if of course we do not consider (for which there are some grounds) the enormous difficulties of the Russian economy in the 1990s to be consequences of a protracted transformation crisis. I would like to draw attention to the fact that these advantages are evident even in comparison with the degenerate mid-1980s version of the command economy, which was very different from the classical model.