State disintegration and power politics in post-Suharto Indonesia

This article illustrates how discourses on ‘state fragility’ have been instrumentalised by the Indonesian military in order to consolidate its political and economic power after the fall of Suharto. In the wake of Indonesia’s transition to democracy violent conflicts escalated in East Timor, Aceh, Papua, the Moluccas and Sulawesi. Most notably East Timor’s successful secession spawned fears over the potential ‘balkanisation’ of Indonesia. In this context the Indonesian military, which had been shunned for its involvement in Suharto’s New Order, managed to re-establish itself as the ‘guardian of the nation’. Based on fieldwork in Indonesia, the article describes how post-9/11 discourses over a potential break-up of Indonesia were used by the Indonesian military to reconsolidate its power in the post-Suharto era. The research findings illustrate that, against the looming threat of state disintegration, attempts to revoke the military’s prerogatives have either failed or have been aborted during the planning stages.     

Reclaiming and rebuilding the history of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Aceh is known as not only a rich but also a rebellious region. It experienced one of the longest wars against the Dutch colonial government. The seeds of conflict with the Indonesian government were sown early on during the independence period in the 1940s and 1950s. During the Suharto period (1966-98) Aceh developed from being a poor province to being the fastest growing provincial economy in Indonesia. However, the Acehnese believe that they did not gain much from this economic growth. This fuelled anti-Jakarta feeling among the Acehnese and also increased the popularity of the Free Aceh Movement ( Gerakan Aceh Merdeka ) in Aceh. The military solution that the Suharto government imposed in the late 1980s worsened the human rights conditions in Aceh. As both the Habibie and Abudurrahman Wahid governments have failed to end the conflict, many Acehnese have been calling for a referendum to decide the future of the province: whether to remain part of Indonesia or to be an independent state.     

Historical Blocs and Democratic Impasse in the Philippines: 20 years after ‘people power’

One noteworthy feature of the political crisis in Indonesia, which followed the Asian financial crisis of 1997 was the speed with which the collapse of the Suharto government was subsumed by a wider crisis of the Indonesian nation-state. One aspect of this crisis is the strengthening of secessionist movements in several regions of Indonesia, calling into question the country's national boundaries, themselves a legacy of the Dutch colonial era. This article examines the tensions in the nation-building efforts of the Indonesian state by focusing on the three territories where secessionist movements have been strongest: East Timor, which has already successfully broken away from Indonesia, and Irian Jaya and Aceh, where long-standing secessionist movements experienced significant growth in the aftermath of the resignation of President Suharto on 21 May 1998. Our analysis emphasises that these secessionist movements arose in direct response to the ways in which the Indonesian state, especially during the Suharto period, went about the tasks of nation-building. In particular, each movement was to a large degree fuelled by brutal and indiscriminate state violence. At the same time, each has been greatly affected by global trends of decolonisation, the Cold War and its aftermath. The distinct timing and manner of each territory's incorporation into the Indonesian nation-state has had a profound influence on the character of, and appeals made by, each movement, as well as on their prospects for gaining support from the wider international system.     

Comparative political corruption: Issues of operationalization and measurement

As with other areas of comparative political inquiry, analyses of political corruption must carefully negotiate around numerous methodological issues. In this article, we focus primarily on problems of operationalization and measurement of corruption. We evaluate the major examples of cross-country measures of corruption that have recently emerged and review research that has incorporated the new measures. We end with a discussion of an alternative method for the cross-national measurement and analysis of corruption, one that might also facilitate the goal of establishing universal principles and causal claims about political corruption. Thomas D. Lancaster is associate professor of political science at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. His research and teaching interests include comparative politics, with a specialization in western and southern European politics, and the logic of comparative political inquiry. Gabriella R. Montinola is assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Davis. Her current research focuses on economic development, interest representation, and the causes and consequences of political corruption. She is the author or co-author of articles in various journals, includingWorld Politics, Journal of Democracy, andBritish Journal of Political Science. The authors would like to thank Richard Doner, Robert Jackman, and the editor and referees ofSCID for their helpful comments.     

Political corruption,economy, and citizens' evaluation of democracy in South Korea

South Korean politics has been haunted by numerous corruption scandals as well as the prosecution of politicians and their cronies for their corruption. Yet despite the prevalence and salience of political corruption, many citizens of South Korea tend to overlook the problem by continuing to support corrupt politicians and administrations. This study defines under what circumstances political corruption shapes citizens' judgment of government and the political system as a whole in South Korea. The results indicate that national economic conditions as a perceptual screen mediate the effect of political corruption on the evaluation of democratic governance.     

Corruption in India: Control measures and consequences

Much has been written on corruption in the Third World. Studying the phenomenon of transactional corruption, however, is fraught with many shortcomings. The insidious corruption of subverting the regimes or abusing the constitution for political or partisan gain is paid little attention. This article analyses corruption in India within its social, cultural, and political contexts. The workings of the various anti‐corruption measures are also examined. The concept of regime corruption is studied. The article concludes that curbing corruption largely depends upon the social attitudes. In particular, the political parties should not only take the blame for the current situation, they should also play an active role in correcting the pernicious practice of corruption.     

Political corruption,economic performance,and electoral outcomes: a cross-national analysis

The current study examines how the incumbent government's economic performance plays a role in mediating the impact of political corruption on electoral outcomes in 115 developing countries with relatively higher levels of corruption than Western consolidated democracies. Borrowing theoretical insights from the information-processing theory of voting, this study finds that political corruption becomes a formative electoral factor when the regime fails to sustain a sufficient level of economic growth. Otherwise, political corruption is not a significant factor that shapes electoral outcomes, irrespective of the level of perceived corruption, because the economy occupies voters' minds as the most important issue, making it a more accessible issue than political corruption.     

Corruption and the Mexican political system: Continuity and change

Thanks to the nature of its political system, Mexico has had a long history of political corruption. Yet recent changes in the patterns of corruption and broader political changes have seemingly altered the equation. Anger over rampant corruption under President Carlos Salinas contributed to the stunning electoral defeat of the PRI in July 1997, while the outcome, the PRI's loss of majority control of the Chamber of Deputies, will add to the structural pressures that have mounted in recent years against institutionalised corruption. This article explores these trends. It sets out the historical and theoretical foundations of corruption in Mexico, examines changes in the incidence and patterns of corruption, and discusses the impact of recent political changes on this aspect of the system. Though cautiously optimistic regarding the impact of Mexico's political breakthrough on efforts to deal with the problem of corruption, the essay concludes on a cautious note, highlighting the difficulties other Latin American countries have encountered in strengthening the rule of law and reining in corruption.     

Problems of corruption and distrust in political and administrative institutions in Slovenia

Corruption is perceived in all societies as a social pathology that causes great material and moral damage and is a threat to the society's continual development. Especially in countries with a freshly consolidated democracy, as Slovenia, the phenomena of corruption must be treated with all due attention. This article emphasises that corruption in Slovenia is publicly perceived as one of the most important and even increasing problems in society. We are also analysing one of the crucial side effects of the corruption, resulting itself in ever deeper public distrust to most significant political and administrative institutions.     

President Gloria Macapagal‐Arroyo's anti‐corruption strategy in the Philippines an evaluation

Fighting corruption has been one of the priority issues for President Gloria Macapagal‐Arroyo for the past five years. Faster‐paced and result‐oriented implementation of anti‐corruption projects did bring some tangible results. There are new laws and executive and administrative orders related to anti‐corruption which have been passed. New strategies during her second term such as strengthening anti‐corruption agencies, more social value formation at the national level, and the use of e‐procurement in the government system, show encouraging signs for success. However, despite the effort and achievement, the public perception of corruption and sincerity of the government performance in fighting corruption remains unchanged or has even worsened. Is it due to lack of political will? Does this mean that the government is losing the war on corruption? The answers are complex, but two important reasons are the slow progress to improve the country's economy and the ineffectiveness of the government which has resulted in a negative public perception. The government needs to gain more public confidence so that the anti‐corruption reforms will strengthen good governance and make it accountable.     

Will REDD+ Safeguards Mitigate Corruption? Qualitative Evidence from Southeast Asia

High levels of faith and finance are being invested in REDD+ as a promising global climate change mitigation policy. Since its inception in 2007, corruption has been viewed as a potential impediment to the achievement of REDD+ goals, partly motivating ‘safeguards’ rolled out as part of national REDD+ readiness activities. We compare corruption mitigation measures adopted as part of REDD+ safeguards, drawing on qualitative case evidence from three Southeast Asian countries that have recently piloted the scheme: Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. We find that while REDD+ safeguards adopt a conventional principal-agent approach to tackling corruption in the schemes, our case evidence confirms our theoretical expectation that REDD+ corruption risks are perceived to arise not only from principal-agent type problems: they are also linked to embedded pro-corruption social norms. This implies that REDD+ safeguards are likely to be at best partially effective against corruption, and at worst will not mitigate corruption at all.     

The North‐South dialogue revisited: Some personal reflections

This article focuses on the experiences of South Korea and the Philippines and examines the relationship of corruption to political and economic development. It argues that corruption is a manifestation of specific sets of state-society relations, political systems, development trajectories and types of external linkages. Corruption in these contexts should not be seen as pathological phenomena but as deeply integrated into the particular path of political and economic development. The article further identifies the context and scope for reform.     

The post-cold war predicament: A conclusion

The 1997 Asian economic crisis discredited the international discussion about ‘Asian values’ in Pacific Asia, replacing it with a globalised ‘good governance’ discourse. The financial breakdown undermined claims by Asian autocrats that government should be based on authoritarian ‘Asian values’, not ‘Western democracy’. Yet, seven years later, authoritarian regimes in the region are flourishing while the new democracies flounder. Why have dictatorships, not democracies, prospered politically since the Asian financial crisis? Pacific Asia began as an ‘imagined community’ of developmental dictatorships, making authoritarian development the ‘original position’ against which democratic governance is judged. While the demise of ‘Asian values’ contributed to the fall of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, it did less harm to authoritarian regimes in more economically developed Malaysia and Singapore. The US‐led anti‐terror coalition provided several authoritarian rulers in Pacific Asia with welcome support from the West, while allowing them to weaken internal opposition. The new democracies, by contrast, faced international pressures to combat terrorism, often arousing local protest. Finally, middle class‐based reformist movements have risked destabilising the region's new democracies in the name of good governance.     

Political Corruption and Institutional Stability

This article is the first to statistically examine the reciprocal relationship between formal political institutions and political corruption. We argue that political corruption is an informal institution that allows nondemocratic leaders to build political support, act as a substitute for liberalizing concessions in the formal institutions of the state, and thereby extends the longevity of non-democratic regimes. Yet, whereas high corruption level will prevail in nondemocratic regimes, we expect the electoral constituency in democratic regimes to have the formal power to curb political corruption. We demonstrate that these expectations hold by estimating a dynamic multinomial regression model on data for 133 countries for the 1985–2008 period. Our model shows that high-corruption autocracies and hybrid regimes are more stable than their low-corruption counterparts, but that low-corruption democracies are more stable than high-corruption ones. For autocratic and hybrid regimes, the stability is due both to corruption making the formal institutions more resistant to democratization and that the formal institutions prevent reductions in corruption. Consistent democracies, on the other hand, are able to reduce corruption and become more stable as a result.     

The Fight Against Government Corruption in Romania: Irreversible Results or Sisyphean Challenge?

The fight against political, especially government, corruption has dominated Romanian political discourse for many years. However, the vast majority of the political elite have continuously opposed the prosecution and conviction of defendants of corruption crimes. After a long constitutional conflict that seriously inhibited the fight against government corruption between 2006 and 2009, law enforcement agencies finally began to experience some success. Nevertheless, the extent of government corruption has remained consistently high. This article analyses the struggles that have occurred between 2004 and 2013 in the fight against government corruption in Romania and particularly examines the interplay between formal and informal factors in this field.     

The Contingencies of Societal Accountability: Examining the Link Between Civil Society and Good Government

Corruption interferes with and distorts the processes of political decision making and implementation, often to the disadvantage of the already disadvantaged. Yet our understanding of the factors that might propel a political system from lower to higher levels of probity remains speculative. This article examines the role of one category of actors often touted as an important countervailing force to political power: civil society. Existing case study research provides evidence that civil society can play a decisive role in holding public officials accountable, but that the success of such societal accountability is contingent upon a number of favorable contextual and institutional conditions. The analyses presented here use panel country data to examine whether the strength of civil society affects corruption. The results corroborate the findings of existing case studies; a vibrant civil society mitigates corruption but only provided that conditions such as political competition, press freedom, and government transparency exist in the country.     

Big Government,Big Corruption? Examining the Relationship between Government Size and Public Corruption in the Philippines

Unlike corruption, government size has not been studied in the Philippines despite numerous literature suggesting relationship between the two. This study fills that gap by looking at state spending and how it relates to the enduring political issue of public corruption. Findings suggest that, contrary to expectations, bigger disbursements actually improve public’s perception of bureaucratic corruption, similar to the effect of better institutions and rule of law.     

The Effects of Corruption on Satisfaction with Local and National Governments. Does Corruption ‘Grease the Wheels’?

Abstract

A causal association was found between higher levels of corruption and lower levels of satisfaction with local and national governments. However, interaction term analysis provides suggestive evidence that: first, as public service satisfaction increases, the effects of corruption change from negative values to positive values for both local and national governments; second, as political situations improve, the negative effects of corruption diminish for both local and national governments; and, third, as the economic situation improves, the negative effects of corruption diminish for local, but not for national governments.     

The Dictator's New Clothes: The Relationship Between E-Participation and Quality of Government in Non-Democratic Regimes

It is often assumed that the development of e-participation and e-government initiatives aimed at stimulating citizen participation in the political process and fostering more efficient governmental services harbors a great potential for improved control of corruption and government performance. Thus, it is often argued that e-participation is an efficient instrument for increasing transparency and quality of government in non-democratic and developing countries. However, this article argues that these assumptions should be questioned on theoretical, empirical, and methodological grounds. The results of the empirical time-series cross-section analyses show that positive development in terms of e-participation in non-democratic countries does not lead to corresponding positive effects in terms of control of corruption and quality of government. Rather, in many cases the Internet offers political elites new opportunities in their quest for remaining in power.