The Caribbean Court of Justice: a learning experience for the International Criminal Court?

This article starts by examining the role of Small States in the development of the International Criminal Court (ICC). It then surveys the functioning and administration of the ICC before proceeding to draw on key lessons for this Court, including on the election of judges and financing, from the Caribbean Court of Justice.     

The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: How Compulsory Is It?

The "compulsory jurisdiction" of the International Court ofJustice is not truly compulsory. The Court's jurisdiction isbased on the consent of the parties. States have the optionto accept or not to accept the Court's jurisdiction and cando so under terms and conditions they determine themselves.However, once a State has granted its consent, and when a disputethat falls within the scope of that consent is submitted tothe Court, the State must subject itself to the Court's jurisdiction.It is that legal obligation that is at the root of the term"compulsory".     

Hybrid Texts and Uniform Law? The Multilingual Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union

The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) is shaped by the language in which it is drafted—i.e. French. However, because French is rarely the mother tongue of those drafting that case law, the texts produced are often stilted and awkward. In addition, those drafting such case law are constrained in their use of language and style of writing (owing to pressures of technology and in order to reinforce the rule of law). These factors have led to the development of a ‘Court French’ which necessarily shapes the case law produced and has implications for its development, particularly insofar as it inevitably leads to a type of precedent in that case law. That case law also undergoes many permutations of translation into and out of up to 23 different languages. The resultant texts that make up the case law are hybrid in nature—consisting of a blend of cultural and linguistic patterns, constrained by a rigid formulistic drafting style and put through many permutations of translation. The present paper investigates the production of the Court’s multilingual case law and considers whether the hybrid nature of that case law can actually aid the presentation (and thus the development) of a ‘uniform’ EU case law.     

How Does the European Court of Justice Reason? A Review Essay on the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice

This review essay analyses two significant recent contributions to the debate over the reasoning of the Court of Justice (CJ). These contributions highlight the impossibility of a wholly scientific and deductive approach to attributing ‘correct’ outcomes to the Court's case‐law. At the same time, their analysis adds significant findings for the debate over the Court's possible ‘activist’ or political role. Following from these contributions, this essay makes two arguments: firstly, that the inability of the Court to anchor its reasoning solely in a deductive form of legal reasoning should encourage the CJ to engage in a more advanced ‘constitutional dialogue’ with the EU's political institutions; and secondly, that truly understanding the Court's reasoning involves a closer analysis of the institutional and personal dynamics influencing Court decisions. Understanding European judicial reasoning may require a closer look at the social and political—as well as doctrinal—context within which European judges act.     

Gender and Justice in the Progressive Era: An Investigation of Saint Louis Juvenile Court Cases, 1909–1912

There is increased interest in the history of the juvenile court and its role in the social control of youth. In this context, feminist scholars have emphasized the long‐standing legacy of the court's attempt to control girls' violations of gender images, particularly sexual behavior and status offenses. This perspective argues that girls are penalized more harshly than boys, despite being charged with less serious offenses. The present study tests hypotheses about the relationships between gender and charge, prehearing detention, and disposition using St. Louis juvenile court records for the years 1909–1912. Qualitative content analysis is used to probe more deeply the connection between gender and sexually based charges in the early history of the St. Louis juvenile court. Findings indicate that girls were subject to harsher forms of social control than boys, despite less serious charges, and that sexual behavior was described and treated much differently in girls' records than in boys'. Connections to contemporary practices are delineated.     

Oiling the Machinery: The Lord Chancellor's Office and the County Court Bench, 1927–44

This article makes extensive use of recently opened documents in the PRO to explore the appointment and management of the county court judiciary between the wars, with particular emphasis on the role of the permanent officials in the Lord Chancellor's Office. It concludes that during this period the selection process, having already been largely de-politicised, became bureaucratised, ensuring the officials a dominant role. As a result the county bench became more homogeneous. The officials are also shown to have engaged in more systematic and ambitious attempts to manipulate vacancies so as to fit judges to districts both in terms of aptitude and other attributes.     

Watering Down the Court of Justice? The Dynamics between Network Implementation and Article 258 TFEU Litigation

With the establishment of an administrative network to manage implementation of the Water Framework Directive (WFD), a more consensual approach to judicial enforcement seemed like a natural next step. This anticipation was partially derived from the experimentalist nature of the WFD, requiring concerted action in the specification and application of its open‐ended and broad provisions. This article assesses how important changes in WFD implementation practices shape the role played by the Court of Justice with respect to Article 258 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The examination of the WFD litigation reveals interesting tensions. Network‐based implementation practices keep Member States accountable for the progress of implementation and make a subsequent legal action swifter. At the same time, implementation practices remove from courts those issues that may be better solved by network participants. The results show how the function and exercise of judicial enforcement is influenced by the ways in which legislation is implemented.     

The First Member State Rebellion? The European Court of Justice and the Negotiations of the ‘Luxembourg Protocol’ of 1971

This article delves into the history of the negotiations of the ‘Luxembourg protocol’ of 1971, which conferred jurisdiction upon the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for the interpretation of the 1968 Brussels convention. The protocol provided a preliminary ruling procedure that had undergone restrictive modifications in comparison with the European Economic Community (EEC) treaty's original (Article 177). Some have, therefore, interpreted the outcome of the negotiations as a sign that the mechanism was being criticised in national administrations. This article will, for the first time, bring to the surface archival evidence to explain why the protocol contained an altered version of Article 177 EEC. Furthermore, it will reveal that the governments' experts' intention to limit the procedure in the protocol caused serious concern inside the ECJ, of which some members consequently repeatedly urged national decision‐makers to opt for formulas identical with Article 177 EEC.     

Judicial Interpretation or Judicial Activism? The Legacy of Rationalism in the Studies of the European Court of Justice

During the last two decades, law as a factor in European integration has attracted great scientific interest. Numerous studies and theoretical analyses have been published that have undertaken the task of examining and explaining the role of law in the progress of integration. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in particular, as Europe's judiciary body, draws much attention in this context. However, the inflexible, mechanistic and universalistic notion of rationality that these works employ leads to serious misinterpretations and unjustified criticism regarding the role the ECJ takes in the course of integration. Within the frameworks of contemporary approaches, the Court is perceived as just one more political player among other actors and institutions, able to shape the EU in the pursuit of its own rational interests. By outlining the theoretical concept of context rationality, this article shows that the logics of law and judicial lawmaking are based on a non‐trivial and non‐political rationality and cannot be understood appropriately without paying attention to the context of European law.     

Beyond the Law?: The Justice of Deconstruction

This paper offers a close reading of Derridas essay Force of Law that emphasises the twin strengths of a deconstructive approach to questions of law and justice -- textual analysis and political context. Derridas interest is in limit or test cases, and so he engages with the fraying edges of the law, its borders, the frontiers that are most heavily policed because they are most fragile, for example capital punishment, genocide, general strikes and terrorism. Derrida undertakes an exploration of violence through a reinterpretation of Walter Benjamins Critique of Violence. At the heart of Derridas difficult argument is a demand for justice that goes beyond the cataloguing of specific injustices, and beyond the terms of Benjamins critique. The utopian impulse that underpins Force of Law is carried over into Specters of Marx, Derridas recent explicit grappling with the legacy of Marxism. The links between these two texts by Derrida implies a sustained politics of radical commitment on the part of deconstruction, a commitment to future forms of legality and egalitarianism, a theory of justice posited upon prescience rather than precedent.     

Criminal Law, the Victim and Community: The Shades of ‘We’ and the Conceptual Involvement of Community in Contemporary Criminal Law Theory

The article addresses the argument, put forward by Lernestedt, that the proprietor of the ‘criminal-law conflict’ is the community (or the community and the offender) and discusses his proposed theoretical model of criminal law trial. I raise questions regarding the legitimacy of such a model, focusing on four counts. Firstly, I assert that his assumptions about the state the individual and the old/new versions of criminal law theory are society-dependent. Secondly, I address some problems with the concept of community and particularly with the proposed conception of community, which seems to mostly exclude the offender. Thirdly, I question the need for (or added value of) such a proposed conceptual involvement of the community as an actor in the criminal law process and theory. Lastly, some potential problems with the idea of the victim as a mere “representative of us” are mentioned, including the possibly undesirable demands and limitations on the victim’s agency and issues of respect for the victim’s individuality.     

Member States of the Commonwealth – Their Relationship with the International Court of Justice

The removal of judicial independence from the motherland for several Commonwealth countries was fraught with difficulties. The determination of where final national appeals would lie has had a most colourful history in the Commonwealth. An extension of judicial dependence may arguably be expressed in the manner in which a state address disputes of international law and its choice of the appropriate tribunal for redress. It is argued in this article that independence did not seem to indicate that some Member States were willing to relinquish their desire to move too far away from the family of the British Commonwealth. Consequently, in accepting the Option Clause of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), a number of Commonwealth Member States entered a reservation which, inter alia, excludes disputes with the government of any country that is a Member of the British Commonwealth. Although today only eight Commonwealth Member States (including Britain) maintain this exclusionary clause, to the extent that these eight may find themselves bound by this clause presents some difficulty when there are disputes among these Member States. The author highlights these difficulties by examining the case of Mauritius and the Chagos Archipelago. Ultimately, the present day Commonwealth seeks dispute settlement through peaceful means, with an absolute respect for the rule of international law governing relations within and among its Member States.     

The European Court of Justice – The Need for Change in a Changing World

The article, from a speech delivered at the 11th Liverpool Law ReviewAnnual Lecture at The Law School, Liverpool John Moore's University, November 2001, before invited guests and students, considers the role and position of the European Courts in achieving the objectives of the treaties and institutions of the European Union. It examines the current position of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the Court of First Instance of the European Communities and the implications of the structural changes introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty. The article reflects upon how the future accession to the Union of new Member States may affect that situation. It also considers how changes proposed in the Treaty of Nice, when ratified, will enable the European Courts to meet future demands placed upon them. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Irish Court of Appeal in Chancery, 1857–77

The Irish Court of Appeal in Chancery was established in 1856 and began work in 1857. From then until the end of 1877 when the Courts of Common Law and Equity were replaced by the new Supreme Court established under the Judicature (Ir) Act of that year the Court sat to hear appeals against decrees made by the Lord Chancellor, Master of the Rolls or Vice-Chancellor in the Court of Chancery, against decisions of the Incumbered Estates Court or its successor the Landed Estates Court, and against decisions of the Courts of Probate, Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Admiralty, and Matrimonial Causes and Matters. The ourt was the counterpart of the Court of Appeal in Chancery established a few years earlier in England, but the chain of events by which the Irish Court came into existence, along with the membership of the Court and its consequences, make the history of the Irish Court unique. The purpose of this article is to explore those issues.     

Au nom de qui? The European Court of Justice between Member States,Civil Society and Union Citizens

Abstract: How does the quest for legitimacy of the European Union relate to the view the European Court of Justice(ECJ) accords to Union citizens, civil society and to private actors? It is submitted that the ECJ is currently developing a jurisprudence under which citizens, as well as their organisations and corporate private actors, are gradually, and in almost complete disregard of the public/private distinction, being included in the matrix of rights and—a crucial point—obligations of the treaties. The ECJ incorporates civil society actors and citizens, beyond notions of representative (citizenship) and participatory (civil society) democracy, into the body of law and thereby reworks its own and the Union's identity. Two core aspects are explored: the first is the reconfiguration of Union citizenship as a norm which triggers the application of the substantive norms of the EC Treaty. The second aspect of this evolution is the creation of ‘private governance’ schemes, i.e. processes in which, as a rule, private action is regarded as action that has to meet the standards of the Treaty. The analysis shows that the court is disentangling itself from the State‐oriented Treaty situation and drawing legitimacy directly from citizens themselves so that judgments should be pronounced ‘In the Name of the Citizens of the European Union’.

1 European Court of Justice 20 September 2001, Case C‐184/99, Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I‐6193, para. 31.

     

Who is steering the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice? The influence of Member State submissions on copyright law

The juridification of the European policy process is increasingly fragile, and little understood. This study develops a novel methodology to investigate the influence of Member States on the rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The focus is on the domain of copyright law which has seen a dramatic escalation of preliminary references to the Court, indicating a normative void. Examining 170 documents relating to 42 cases registered between 1998 and 2015, we measure empirically the impact of submissions by Member States and the European Commission on the interpretation of copyright concepts. We show that France is the most influential country by some distance, both in terms of the number of interventions (an ‘investment’ in policy) and in terms of persuasive power (arguments adopted by the Court). The evidence also suggests that the departure of the UK from EU litigation will disturb the delicate balance of CJEU jurisprudence.     

Patent Cases in the Court of Chancery, 1714–58

The purpose of this article is two-fold. First, it discusses recent improvements in the cataloguing of Chancery bills and pleadings entered between 1714 and 1758, held in the C 11 series at the National Archives. This has made it much easier to locate cases by subject, and a methodology for doing this is described. Secondly, the article outlines the results of work carried out in C 11 on cases relating to patents for invention. Although there has been significant research into how other forms of intellectual property right were adjudicated in the Court of Chancery, notably copyright, patent law for this period remains obscure. The article shows that Chancery (along with the common law courts) retained the principal jurisdiction in patent law, rather than the Privy Council as was once thought.