Complicating Complicity: Aiding and Abetting Causing Death by Dangerous Driving in R v Martin

The law of complicity, particularly relating to joint enterprise liability, appears to becoming more and more complicated. Cases on secondary liability for murder in the Court of Appeal demonstrate that this area of law is difficult to interpret and to apply. Even more complex is the question of how to apply these cases to offences other than murder. This case note attempts to address the Court of Appeal's questions in the case of R v Martin as to how the jury ought to be directed in a case of aiding and abetting causing death by dangerous driving.     

Economic impact of Wicks v State Rail Authority (NSW) (2010) 84 ALJR 497

In Wicks v State Rail Authority (NSW) (2010) 84 ALJR 497 the High Court of Australia held that, among other things, plaintiffs (who establish that they suffer a recognised psychiatric illness as a result of the breach of duty of care owed to them by the defendant under s 32 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)) are entitled to recover damages for pure mental harm under s 30 if their psychiatric injury arose "wholly or partly from" a "series of shocking experiences" in the form of "a sudden and disturbing impression on the mind and feelings" in connection with witnessing at the scene "another person ('the victim') being killed, injured or put in peril by the act or omission of the defendant". The High Court construed the phrase "being ... injured or put in peril" to include plaintiffs who suffer pure mental harm by witnessing at the scene another person being injured through the process of suffering pure mental harm in the form of psychiatric injury occasioned by the defendant's negligent act or omission. The Wicks decision raises the question whether the expanded liability of defendants for pure mental harm is economically sustainable.     

Desperately seeking donors: the 'saviour sibling' decision in Quintavalle v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (UK)

The recent House of Lords decision in Quintavalle v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority has raised difficult and complex issues regarding the extent to which embryo selection and reproductive technology can be used as a means of rectifying genetic disorders and treating critically ill children. This comment outlines the facts of Quintavalle and explores how the House of Lords approached the legal, ethical and policy issues that arose out of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority's (UK) decision to allow reproductive and embryo technology to be used to produce a 'saviour sibling' whose tissue could be used to save the life of a critically ill child. Particular attention will be given to the implications of the decision in Quintavalle for Australian family and medical law and policy. As part of this focus, the comment explores the current Australian legislative and policy framework regarding the use of genetic and reproductive technology as a mechanism through which to assist critically ill siblings. It is argued that the present Australian framework would appear to impose significant limits on the medical uses of genetic technology and, in this context, would seem to reflect many of the principles that were articulated by the House of Lords in Quintavalle.     

Don't Mention the War! R. v Bottrill,ex parte Kuchenmeister (1946) Revisited

R. v Bottrill, ex parte Kuchenmeister (1946) established that a ministerial certificate is determinative of whether a state of war exists between the United Kingdom and another state. But of the ‘Aryan’ German, Kuchenmeister, long a resident in Britain and with a British family, virtually nothing is known. The present paper seeks to uncover the complex story of Kuchenmeister's business activities in the British armaments industry before the war, MI5’s determination to have him interned on the not wholly convincing footing of his loyalty to Germany during the war, and Kuchenmeister's prolonged legal battles with the Home Office. A distinction between the law in books and the law in action may be sharply drawn from the affair.     

R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union: Three Competing Syllogisms

The Miller case concerned the constitutional requirements for the UK to give notice of its intention to withdraw from the EU pursuant to Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. The parties made submissions in terms of two competing syllogisms. The Government argued that ministers, exercising Crown prerogative, had the power to give notice without statutory authorisation. The Applicants argued that the process required authorisation by Act of Parliament because the UK's withdrawal would deprive people of rights arising under EU law. However, a majority of the Supreme Court decided in favour of the Applicants based on a third and significantly different syllogism, based on the proposition that the European Communities Act had established EU law‐making and law‐interpreting institutions as new ‘sources of law’. This note assesses the three competing syllogisms and examines the constitutional significance of the majority's proposition that these new EU sources of law were integrated into UK domestic law without disrupting the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.