The spoils of peace in Iraqi Kurdistan

This paper examines transition patterns in post-Gulf war Iraqi Kurdistan as a function of external aid, and the impact of these developments on relations between the Kurdistan region and Baghdad. It argues that, despite ethnic traditions and structural legacies, the asymmetrical and changing nature of aid has created new incentives for conflict and co-operation. Since 1991 aid has strengthened the Kurdistan region's power in relation to the state and increased leverage on the central government to accommodate Kurdish demands for autonomy. Yet it has also created an increasingly complex political – economic order and new interdependencies between the regions. The shift from relief aid to reconstruction within a neoliberal framework has helped open the Iraqi and Kurdish political economies by encouraging trade between the Kurdistan region, regional states and foreign governments. The creation of a federal Iraqi state has also led to financial and political linkages between the Kurdistan region and Baghdad and to new requirements for negotiation.     

Commodity prices and appropriate technology‐some lessons from tin mining

The paper considers the rationale of the slogan ‘trade not aid’. In the absence of aid tying, foreign exchange from pure aid must always be more valuable than an equivalent amount of foreign exchange from exports. Thus, two alternative interpretations of the slogan are considered. First, a comparison of trade with the aid component of an equal amount of foreign assistance; second, a comparison of trade with an equal amount of foreign assistance itself, which, it is argued, is the most relevant comparison to make. It is shown that on realistic estimates of the excess cost of import substitution, the grant element of loans, and the excess cost of aid tying, it is unlikely that trade is more valuable than aid.     

European Union anti-piracy initiatives in the Horn of Africa: linking land-based counter-piracy with maritime security and regional development

Piracy off the coast of Somalia has resulted in a steady decline in trade through the Arabian Sea and higher costs of doing business for multiple world regions. The EU has responded to the threat with a large-scale anti-piracy operation in the Horn of Africa, which constitutes the first free-standing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) military operation that is not entirely dependent on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) planning and assets. The operation is designed to interdict Somali piracy operations across the Gulf of Aden and to keep some of the world’s busiest sea lanes open for reasons of world trade. This article argues that the EU preoccupation with military solutions to the piracy problem, based on interventions through the Somali federal government with an emphasis on security, is insufficient because it fails to address the underlying causes of piracy and misunderstands the Somali socio-cultural-security nexus and the need for practical longer term land-based approaches to development. The reduction of Somali piracy activities can be linked to this increased military response capacity as well as to increased security precautions undertaken by shipping companies, but none of these strategies has succeeded in dismantling piracy networks. They therefore offer only a temporary and costly stopgap measure.     

Hybrid Actors,Tactical Variety: Rethinking Asymmetric and Hybrid War

Wars like those in Iraq and Afghanistan should be understood as hybrid wars, wars in which elements of ethnic or tribal conflict, ideologically based insurgency, factional squabbling, and organized crime are inextricably intertwined, with the same actors playing multiple and partially conflicting roles. Hybrid war is inherently transnational, featuring transnational crime networks, “migrant warriors,” transnational diaspora links, legitimate international trade, and foreign intervention. It takes place in hybridized states reliant on local warlords and other actors whose power prevents effective state-building. In this context, while counterinsurgency doctrine prescribes appropriate military strategy and tactics, the core problem is more political than military. Since a hybridized client state is not likely to be politically reformable even if a foreign ally achieves military success, outside allies like the United States should generally refrain from boots-on-the-ground intervention, pursuing instead a diplomatic solution, even though such a deal is likely to be unpalatable.     

The Obstacles to Foreign Aid Harmonization: Lessons from Decentralization Support in Indonesia

Relying on a new institutional economics analysis of transaction costs, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness emphasizes donor harmonization as an intermediate objective for increasing the effectiveness of foreign assistance in bringing about development outcomes. Surveys on adherence to the Paris Declaration commitments so far suggest that foreign aid donors are lagging behind targets. This paper explores the political and bureaucratic obstacles faced by bilateral and multilateral aid organizations trying to harmonize aid at the country level. Looking at foreign support for the decentralization and local governance sector in Indonesia??where a ??bold experiment?? in harmonization failed to bring about improved donor coordination??I find evidence that the lack of harmonization can be linked to some of the characteristic pathologies of foreign aid: the dominance of the strategic interests of some donors and the structure of bureaucratic incentives within aid agencies. These traditional problems work through a pathway that is underexplored in the literature: by enabling a lack of coordination among agencies within the recipient government, donors create barriers to harmonization of their own programming. However, I conclude by noting that government coordination failure may not be as much of a problem as donors make it out to be. Decisions about governance and decentralization are necessarily contentious and political. In the case where donors succeed in bringing about government coordination in the interest of their own harmonization, they risk exercising harmful leverage that leads to premature resolution of domestic policy disputes, thereby undermining the Paris Declaration principle of country ownership.     

From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: how the Ethiopian intervention and the ‘War on Terror’ exacerbated the conflict in Somalia

Abstract

External intervention has frustrated and continues to frustrate peace and stability in the Horn of Africa and Somalia, adding various adverse layers to an already complicated and complex conflict. The level of forceful military engagement intended for regional domination has profoundly affected negatively the efforts of peacebuilding and statebuilding in Somalia. This article examines how the earlier Ethiopian policies towards Somalia has reshaped the (post)-Cold War politics of the Horn. In doing so, it traces the roots of the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia vis-à-vis new non-state armed groups to chart the changing political dynamics of the conflict in Somalia. By using historical approach, the article argues that Ethiopia’s agenda is central to understanding why the ‘War on Terror’ has strengthened and subsequently midwifed armed militant movements (e.g. new insurgency groups) in Somalia, starting from Al-Itihaad to today’s Al-Shabaab. In focusing upon various regional actors and groups, the article moves from the emphasis of internal systems to external power structures, considering the wider historical and political factors in the region that must be closely examined if the regional and local conflicts are to be deeply understood. While it is a context-specific study, the article aims to contribute fresh perspectives and insights to ongoing discussions on the consequences of the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia.     

Petty and grand corruption and the conflict dynamics in Northern Uganda

This study explores the relationship between corruption and conflict in northern Uganda, using the perspectives of local business owners as an inroad. The purpose is to highlight how various types of corruption can be related to conflict dynamics in different ways, depending on the context. The article argues that in post-war northern Uganda grand corruption can be seen as related to the conflict dynamics, while petty corruption is generally not seen that way. At the centre of the conflict in northern Uganda lies a deep mutual mistrust between the population in the north and the central government. Therefore corruption in the public sector that occurs at the central level, in particular with regard to funds aimed at the north, tends to be associated with the conflict, whereas the various types of petty corruption encountered by local businesspersons in Gulu, the largest town in northern Uganda, are seen by these actors as normal or as ‘the way things are’.     

Exploring the Paradoxical Consequences of State Collapse: the cases of Somalia 1991–2006 and Lebanon 1975–82

Relative social and economic well-being in the aftermath of a state's collapse is usually explained on the basis of a single case, Somalia, and with reference to the impact of endogenous factors such as the repressive and predatory nature of the state which collapsed and the ability of civil society actors and institutions to fulfil those functions that are normally performed by a state. This article challenges this theoretical view. As can be seen from a study of Lebanon, relative well-being after state collapse is more common than it appears to be at first glance. Moreover, given the limited role that the Lebanese state played in the economic and political spheres before the breakdown of state authority in 1975, the repressive and predatory nature of the collapsed state cannot be the explanatory variable in this case. Exogenous factors, such as remittances from abroad, international loans bestowed upon residual state institutions and ‘political money’ from foreign powers, are the decisive factors generating such paradoxical developments. Study of Somalia and Lebanon also shows the limitations of the conceptualisations of state collapse prevalent in the literature.     

Budgetary chaos and evasion: the case of somalia

In 1990 and 1991, several Sub-Saharan African nations (Liberia, Somalia, and Ethiopia) experienced violent disintegration of existing governments. Other nations (Mozambique, South Africa, Kenya, and Zaire) continued to show signs of being on the brink of violent upheaval, while Zambia experienced a major democratic shift in its government. The forces of change in Africa seem to be mirroring political change that has and continues to take place in eastern Europe and in the territories of the former Soviet Union. This paper is a case study of national budgetary and financial management during a period of national disintegration. The information comes from observations formed during the final days of the political regime of one of these Sub-Saharan African nations - the Republic of Somalia.

The twenty-one year political regime of Mohamed Siad Barre in Somalia came to an end in January 1991 when rebel forces captured the capital city of Mogadishu, forcing Barre and his remaining followers to flee the capital. In the weeks and months leading up to the end of the regime, the normal functioning of the government had effectively ceased, collapsing under the weight of corrupt practices and substantial inefficiencies resulting from the government policies.

This paper describes some of these practices as they related to the national budgetary and financial management processes. In particular, the existence of chaos and evasion in national budgeting was evident with the existence of repetitive budgeting, lump sum budgeting, escapist budgeting, underfunding, externally driven policy, and information gaps. The analysis conducted suggests the importance of sound budget practices for the stability of a government. The conclusions derived focus on the issue of the role of political instability, attempts to modernize, and general systems organization as they relate to Somalia.     

Building terror while fighting enemies: how the Global War on Terror deepened the crisis in Somalia

Somalia has become a front in the US Global War on Terror (GWoT) because of the potential connection between terrorism and state fragility. While originally oriented towards ‘building states while fighting terror’, Enduring Freedom in Somalia obtained quite the opposite result of deepening the existing conflict. Why and how did the GWoT result in the controversial outcome of ‘building terror while fighting enemies’? This article argues that the GWoT sponsored in Somalia an isolationist strategy that encouraged the political polarisation and military radicalisation of the insurgency. To explore this argument, the article first analyses the structure of the intervention by focusing on the interests and strategies of the interveners. Then it evaluates the conditions under which the modality of intervention (through the use of diplomatic, economic and coercive measures) violated the conditions essential to resolving conflict.     

Cold War redux in US–Russia relations? The effects of US media framing and public opinion of the 2008 Russia–Georgia war

This paper examines the Cold War rhetoric in US–Russia relations by looking at the 2008 Russia–Georgia war as a major breaking point. We investigate the links between media, public opinion and foreign policy. In our content analysis of the coverage in two major US newspapers, we find that the framing of the conflict was anti-Russia, especially in the initial stages of the conflict. In addition, our survey results demonstrate that an increase in the media exposure of US respondents increased the likelihood of blaming Russia exclusively in the conflict. This case study helps us understand how media can be powerful in constructing a certain narrative of an international conflict, which can then affect public perceptions of other countries. We believe that the negative framing of Russia in the US media has had important implications for the already-tenuous relations between the US and Russia by reviving and perpetuating the Cold War mentality for the public as well as for foreign policymakers.     

Turkey in Somalia: challenging North/Western interventionism?

Turkey’s humanitarian and development intervention in Somalia is unusually illuminating as a case study to investigate the relations between emerging and conventional interveners in conflict zones since, in this case, Turkey’s intervention carries adequate impetus to resist assimilation with conventional North/Western counterparts. Our starting point is the observation that Turkish and conventional humanitarian and development interveners have struggled to coordinate or cooperate in Somalia. This article investigates what this uncooperative and uncoordinated organisational behaviour means, and we root our investigation in 21 face-to-face interviews with officials working inside the Turkish and conventional intervention in Mogadishu and Nairobi to inquire about how they understand and theorise this discordant behaviour. We use a parsimonious analytical framework of trustworthiness that questions the ‘ability’ and ‘integrity’ of counterpart organisations to explore the intentions behind organisational behaviours. Our analysis of interview narratives evidences challenges to conventional methods of intervention by Turkish organisations and the protection of the same by North/Western organisations. Our concluding discussion interprets these findings in relation to consequences for the status quo hierarchy of global governance and its promotion of liberal intervention norms, and for the utilisation of securitised and remote-control intervention methodologies in conflict zones such as Somalia.     

The Effectiveness of Aid under Post-Conflict Conditions: A Sector-Specific Analysis

It is widely believed that foreign aid may help conflict-affected countries to recover after the termination of conflicts. However, the available empirical evidence supporting this view largely neglects the heterogeneous nature of aid. Drawing on the conflict database of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, we address the hypothesis that the effectiveness of post-conflict aid differs between specific sectors. Our focus is on social and economic infrastructure which is most likely to suffer during conflict episodes so that the need for aid is particularly pressing in this area. We find fairly robust evidence that post-conflict aid is effective in improving social infrastructure. In contrast, aid appears to be ineffective in improving economic infrastructure.     

On Aid,Growth and Good Policies

This study provides a critical analysis of the growth regressions in Burnside and Dollar [2000]. First, we analyse the relationship between aid and government expenditure in a modified neo-classical growth model. One of the main results of the analysis is that while good policies spur growths they may at the same time reduce the effectiveness of foreign aid. Second, we show that the econometric results in Burnside and Dollar emphasising the crucial role of interaction between aid and good policies in the growth process are fragile, as they are extremely data dependent. Finally, we demonstrate that the Burnside and Dollar data lend support to the idea that the association between aid and growth can be approximated by decreasing returns to aid. This finding conforms well to regression results in other recent studies.     

Democracy over power? The democratic decision-making process in the case of the attempted privatization of Estonia's power production

The suspense-filled attempted partial privatization of the Narva Power Plants in the neo-liberal darling Estonia involved a rich cast, from trade unions and local scientists, via Estonian courts and ombudsmen to international consulting firms, major global banks and the US government. More important, a detailed single case study on the democratic decision-making process in this privatization case makes it possible to go beyond common generalizations regarding the consequences of neo-liberalism for democratic processes. It shows that purported proponents of economic neo-liberalism such as the US government sometimes use their arguments to advance the narrow business interests of politically well-connected firms. Established private firms can behave in a more rent-seeking manner than publicly owned, ex-communist companies. Liberal economic principles of open competition and a level playing-field are at times used by actors in the democratic process to question top-down, opaque economic decisions.     

With the best of intentions: Lessons from UNOSOM I and II

The introduction of United Nations peacekeeping troops into Somalia was supposed to be the first of many such operations in the new world order. What went wrong in Somalia and what implications are there for the future of U.N. peacekeeping? This article explores these questions and identifies a list of lessons designed to assist the United Nations in fulfilling the potential suggested by the Somali operations, while avoiding some of the pitfalls. These lessons include the need for early warning and early action, coordinating with NGOs and local actors, strengthening command and control, not sending a traditional peacekeeping force to do an enforcement job, humanitarian assistance‐ during conflict requiring enforcement action, peacekeeping not always translating into conflict resolution, and peacekeeping being inherently problematic in civil conflict.     

War-torn countries,natural resources,emerging-power investors and the UN development system

The unsustainable aid dependency of war-torn countries – most of which are rich in natural resources – makes it imperative to start gradually replacing aid with foreign direct investment (fdi) and exports. This article identifies ways in which stakeholders – governments, the international community, including the UN development system, foreign investors, and local communities – could work together in a ‘win-win’ situation. Most crucial is avoiding conflict-insensitive policies that fuel discord by putting governments and foreign companies, often from emerging markets, in direct confrontation with local communities. The control of natural resources is often a root cause of conflict, and the latter’s exploitation can become a major challenge as wars end. The peculiarities of war-torn countries are discussed along with the specific impediments to attracting fdi into the exploitation of natural resources. An effective and fair legal framework is necessary to ensure that investors do not operate as ‘enclaves’, creating new conflicts.     

What Drives Japanese INGOs to Operate in Latin American Countries?

International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) provide essential aid and public services to less-developed countries. Although most literature focuses on Western INGOs, Asian INGOs have also become globally active. Little is known about what motivates INGOs to provide services in other regions, such as Latin America. In this study, we seek to identify the criteria Japanese INGOs use to select Latin American recipient countries. We propose that Japanese INGO operational location decisions are a function of Japanese foreign policy agenda, Japan-recipient country business relations, and recipient country’s need and liberalization. Using data from Japanese INGOs working in Latin America and 24 Latin American countries on contextual, macroeconomic, and demographic indicators, we find that the significant factors driving INGO decisions to operate in Latin American countries are need and the presence of Japanese businesses in the recipient country. Results have practical implications for foreign aid targeting and economic development.     

Business,Brokers and Borders: The Structure of West African Trade Networks

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to show how a formal approach to networks can make a significant contribution to the study of cross-border trade in West Africa. Building on the formal tools and theories developed by social network analysis, we examine the network organisation of 136 large traders in two border regions between Niger, Nigeria and Benin. In a business environment where transaction costs are extremely high, we find that decentralised networks are well adapted to the various uncertainties induced by long-distance trade. We also find that long-distance trade relies both on the trust and cooperation shared among local traders, and on the distant ties developed with foreign partners from a different origin, religion or culture. Studying the spatial structure of trade networks, we find that in those markets where trade is recent and where most of the traders are not native of the region, national borders are likely to exert a greater influence than in those regions where trade has pre-colonial roots. Combining formal network analysis and ethnographic studies, we argue, can make a significant contribution to the current revival of interest in cross-border trade in the policy field.