Reinterpreting India's Rise through the Middle Power Prism

Abstract

India's spectacular rise in recent years has been the source of hyperbolic theorising and speculation on its major power status. Middle power theory offers a set of dynamic analytical parameters which allow for re-evaluating India's global influence and identifying both strengths and weaknesses of its power projection and resources. Placing emphasis on themes of Third World leadership, good international citizenship, multilateral activism, bridge-building diplomacy, and coalition-building with like-minded states, the middle power concept can encapsulate key aspects of India's contemporary agency and account for structural dynamics which constitute a reformist world-view through the reconfiguration of the Indian state within the existing world order. Overall, middlepowermanship delineates fundamental continuities in India's foreign policy tradition, epitomises India's existing position in the neoliberal world order, while providing a good indication of the directions India will take on the global stage in the short and medium-term.     

Is India a Responsible Great Power?

Abstract

To what extent does rising responsibility accompany rising power in international relations? This article focuses on India to address the question: is a responsible great power in the making? Following a brief theoretical discussion on the notion of responsibility and its relationship to rising power, the article offers an empirical overview of India's achievements thus far, and also the international and domestic challenges that it faces today. It argues that despite the attempts by observers to thrust greatness upon India, the country is yet to achieve greatness. The article further illustrates that India's record of assuming global responsibility has been lacklustre at best. A central argument of the article is that India's reluctance to share the burden of providing global public goods is inseparably bound with the nature of its rise to power.     

The Rise of India: Overcoming Caste Society and Permit-License-Quota Raj,Implementing Some Economic Freedom

Two or three centuries ago most of mankind was still very poor. When the West outgrew mass poverty, India was a British colony and suffered from stagnation. When East Asian economies exploited the advantages of backwardness and benefited from export-led growth, India remained inward-looking and poor. The ‘Hindu rate of growth’ preserved mass poverty. Since the reforms of the early 1990s India has exploited the advantages of backwardness and some global markets. In this article, the roots of India's failure to grow rapidly before the end of the twentieth century are analyzed. Stagnation is blamed on restrictions of economic freedom, whereas growth is explained by the expansion of economic freedom. Before the mid-twentieth century, the caste system and the legacy of sultanism curtailed economic freedom and contributed to economic stagnation. Thereafter, democratic socialism distorted incentives and generated ‘permit-license-quota raj’ or a rent-seeking society. When some obstacles to growth were dismantled, vigorous growth followed. Although expanding economic freedom remains limited. India's growth potential is not yet fully exploited. Indian infrastructure and human capital formation remain inadequate, regulations intrusive, and the budget in deficit. The rule of law looks better on paper than from the ground. Compared to China Indian public policy still has a lot of room for improvements. ‘Maoists’ or Naxalites threaten political stability and economic freedom. Geopolitics may explain India's late, slow and incomplete reforms. The rise of Asia, in particular of China and India, generates geopolitical challenges of its own. Conceivably, the global expansion of economic freedom permits not only the rise of Asia, but the peaceful management of the coming power transition between Asia and the West.     

China's Relations with India's Neighbours: From Threat Avoidance to Alternative Development Opportunity

Abstract

China, once seen as a threat by the states of South Asia, is now viewed correctly as an alternative development opportunity. The unprecedented success of the Chinese development model places it as an obvious alternative to that offered by India—or indeed by the Western model of development—but what implications does this have for the middle and small powers that surround India, and indeed for India and the Western developed world? The fundamental rationale for China's relations with South Asia has changed radically, but the Sino-centric nature of Chinese foreign policy remains. Uniquely, for India's neighbours, but also for the global political economy as a whole, Chinese economic power raises political issues of human security, economic interdependence, and the relationship between physical infrastructure and the benefits of global public goods. The Chinese necessity to tranship through South Asia is identified as a complex new reality for the great power.     

India's South Asia policy in the twenty-first century: new approach,old strategy

Maintaining regional supremacy and stability and denying extra-regional actors a military foothold in South Asia have long been key objectives of India's regional policy. In pursuance of these objectives, India displayed a willingness to undertake coercive action against its smaller South Asian neighbours. Evidence of this is seen in the military intervention in Sri Lanka (1987–1990) and a virtual economic blockade of Nepal (1989–1990). However, during the past decade, India appeared to draw away from such overt interventionist policies and even accepted outside actors like Norway and the United Nations being involved in the peace process in Sri Lanka (2002–2006) and Nepal (2006–2011), respectively. Notwithstanding India's apparent shift in behaviour, these actions do not represent a fundamental change in the country's traditional policy towards the region.     

Chronic poverty and entitlement theory

This paper examines chronic poverty in the developing country context within the entitlement theory approach. The dialogue on entitlement theory originally introduced by Sen is extended here to explore poverty and its persistence, or chronic poverty. A conceptual framework is presented, in which poverty and its persistence are explained within the context of the individual's economic and non-economic situation and development incentives. These attributes are influenced by the individual's entitlements. It is shown that poor endowments and resource base are important causes of persistent poverty. Policies aimed at reducing poverty therefore must address problems associated with improving the entitlements of individuals and households. The definition of ‘entitlements’ in the paper is not restricted to material possessions—the economic entitlements of the individual or the household—but is extended to incorporate the individual's skills, education and productive ability—the non-economic entitlements. The discussion is rooted in the increasing awareness of multidimensional poverty. The paper focuses on rural poverty in certain parts of India, where most of India's chronic poverty is situated. Over a million people can be classified as chronically poor in terms of duration, severity and deprivation. This is despite the government's commitment to the eradication of poverty since the early 1950s, with a total expenditure of nearly $7 billion in the past 50 years.     

The Evolution of ‘Homegrown Conditionality’ in India: IMF Relations

This article explores the historical relationship between the Government of India (GOI) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a successful model for the ways in which a developing country can learn to work with and through multilateral organisations to promote economic and political development while sustaining democratic institutions and relative international political autonomy. In the mid-1960s, India's relations with the USA, IMF, and World Bank were strained after an attempt by these institutions to exert ‘leverage’ over Indian economic policies was exposed to parliamentary debate and the scrutiny of a free press. By the late 1970s, the GOI charted a new course in its interaction with the IMF. In 1981, India was awarded the largest IMF loan to a developing country up to that time. This article will evaluate India's economic reform strategy in the early 1980s and explain the development of the concept of ‘homegrown conditionality’ within the GOI.     

Strategic Culture,Representations of Nuclear (In)Securities,and the Government of India: A Critical Constructivist Perspective

In this article, I use Alastair Johnston's concept of strategic culture re-visited through a critical constructivist perspective to analyze the representations of India's strategic culture and nuclear policy choices. In doing so, I explore how the representational practices of (and the mutually-constitutive relation between) India's nationalist identity/Self and its strategic environment, facilitated via its political leaders’ ideological lenses, have produced shifting representations of India's strategic environment to justify the nation's nuclear policy choices. In exploring this representational linkage between India's strategic environment and its nuclear (in)securities, I am cognizant that anarchy is a challenge facing India's task of nation-making and thus realism serves as a partially valid explanation for understanding the logic proliferation. Yet, my study demonstrates how culturally guided interpretations of what constitutes the Indian Self have divergently re-interpreted India's strategic environment and (in)securities to define the nation's nuclear policy choices.     

Review

Abstract

What structured the fundamental nature of Indian security for the first 50 years of the country's independence? This article draws out four normative parameters that have been tempered and normalised during this period through India's international interaction along with her internal political developments. Using notions of ‘security identity’, the article unpacks these normative parameters in order to investigate holistically the interaction between both domestic and foreign influences in India's international relations. As such, the article finds a relative consistency to how security has been conceived of in India—displaying sustained threats to its territorial integrity, a continued democratic tradition, ongoing fears of communal violence plus an engrained desire for a greater global role. In turn, it has been the interface between internal and external factors that has structured, and continues to structure, Indian security.     

Curbing Corruption in India: An Impossible Dream?

This article analyses the serious problem of corruption in India by examining its causes and the various anti-corruption measures employed by the government from the formation in 1941 of the first anti-corruption agency, the Delhi Special Police Establishment, which was expanded to form the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in April 1963. India's ineffective anti-corruption strategy can be attributed to the lack of political will of its leaders and its unfavourable policy context, which has hindered the enforcement of the anti-corruption laws. The lack of political will in fighting corruption is manifested in the lowest per capita expenditure and least favourable staff-population ratio of the CBI when compared to those of its counterparts in Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Thailand. To enhance the CBI's effectiveness, it should be removed from the jurisdiction of the police and be established as an independent agency dedicated solely to curbing corruption. The Constitution of India should also be amended to empower the CBI to investigate corruption cases at the state level without obtaining the consent of the chief minister of the state. In view of the lack of political will, this article concludes that curbing corruption in India remains an impossible dream in the foreseeable future.     

Be Wary of Asian Triumphalism

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

China and the Rest Are Only Joining the American‐Built Order

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

Is Japan Closer to the West Than Turkey?

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

Here Comes the Second World

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

When Western Interests Trump Values

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

The Coming Battle of the Atlantic: Euro vs. the Dollar

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

Facing a Post‐American World

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

The ISI Reaches East: Anatomy of a Conspiracy

Operations in India by Pakistan's intelligence agency, Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), have primarily been confined to Kashmir, where it actively aids and abets militant organizations. A larger game plan of the ISI has come to light in India's north eastern region with Assam - with its sizeable Muslim population - becoming the primary target of the agency. It is seeking to create trouble in the state by way of direct aid to the separatist organizations there. Although it is not altogether certain whether Pakistan has any territorial designs in that part of India (the state of Assam geostrategically borders Bangladesh, which broke away from Pakistan in 1971) it is evidently becoming clearer that the ISI wishes to set many a "prairie fire" in the area in order to tie down Indian troops from their primary role in Kashmir and elsewhere.     

The Politics of Telecommunications Regulation: State–Industry Alliance Favouring Foreign Investment in India

This paper explores the political economy of three significant policy decisions of the Congress–United Progressive Alliance government between November 2005 and February 2006. These decisions improved the regulatory incentives for the smaller and efficient firms in the Indian GSM industry, which were heavily dependent on foreign investment for their expansion. India's telecommunications sector became more attractive to foreign investors as a result of these regulatory changes. This was a notable departure from the past when government policy had favoured large domestic investors using CDMA technology who were not dependent on foreign capital. A globalisation friendly policy change occurred after a Centre-Left United Progressive Alliance coalition came to power. The paper argues that these decisions, which promoted both competition and foreign investment, occurred due to the increased sensitivity of the Department of Telecommunications towards the needs of the relatively smaller GSM service providers, driven by considerations of efficiency. They were not driven by a crisis of private investment, foreign pressure, or stealth. The shift occurred in normal times when the Department of Telecommunications under a persistent ministerial stewardship took on a regulator, which was less interested in engineering this shift. This globalisation-friendly strategy depended to a large extent on the particular industrial sub-sector that the ruling party or coalition supported for spreading telecommunications in India.     

The Rise of the Rest Warms the Planet

tokyo —America's post‐World War II commitment to universal rules of openness has spread economic gains far and wide, enabling new prosperity on a global scale. It is this American‐forged stable world order that has led to what Fareed Zakaria refers to as “the third great powershift” in the last 500 years: the “rise of the rest,” which follows on the rise of the West and the rise of the United States as the dominant Western power. It is indeed a remarkable legacy of American hegemony that China, India and others are rising, or arising anew, without the pillage, plunder and war associated with the emergent great power experiences of the past.