Locke, Sincerity and the Rationality of Persecution

According to the most influential contemporary reading of John Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), his main argument against religious persecution is unsuccessful. That argument holds that coercion is ineffective as a means of instilling religious beliefs in its victims. I propose a different reading of the Letter . Locke's main consideration against persecution is not the unsuccessful belief-based argument just outlined, but what I call the sincerity argument . He believes that religious coercion is irrational because it is ineffective as a means of inculcating the right intentions in people. Once this alternative argument is placed at its centre, the Letter is seen to be a more fertile source of political argument than is suggested by alternative readings. In particular, the sincerity argument gives us a powerful reason for rejecting state moral paternalism, the doctrine that the state may use coercion to make people morally virtuous. If moral virtue depends upon people having the right intentions, and if coercion is ineffective as a means of instilling the right intentions in people, then state moral paternalism is ineffective and hence irrational.     

Cohen on Locke, Land and Labour

G. A. Cohen has argued that Locke's remarks on the value-creatingcapacity oflabour contain a premise which is both implausible and incoherently defended by Locke. I contest Cohen's attribution oferror to Locke. and offer an alternative interpretation of his remarks, integrating them within his more widely discussed labour-mixture argument. However, I agree with Cohen, although for distinct reasons, that Locke's remarks do not constitute a plausible anti-egalitarian argument.     

Locke, Darwin, and the American Science of Modern Virtue

American “progress” has typically been reconstructed in terms of the Lockean understanding of who we are. That “progress” is only ambiguously progress. It highlights the truth about our personal freedom, but at the expense of the truth about who we are as free and relational beings. So our Lockeanism receives and deserves Darwinian criticism—criticism from the point of view of the social animals evolutionary theory says we are. This article is a scientific prelude to our openness to a theory that incorporates what’s true about Locke, what’s true about Darwin, and more.     

Hegel,Habermas and the Spirit of Critical Theory

Abstract

This paper explores the complex relation between Hegel and Habermas. Centring the discussion around the key themes of philosophy, modernity and political philosophy, it argues for a gradual re-approachment of Habermas towards Hegel. In the final section on critical theory, it takes up the question of the spirit of this theory to offer a more trenchant critique of Habermas' theoretical short coming from this perspective.     

Locke and the Politics and Theology of Toleration

Locke's theory of toleration has been understood to rest on the claim that persecution was insufficient to instil either (i) true or (ii) sincere belief in people. Although Locke did indeed make both these claims, neither was fundamental to his theory. Locke was principally concerned to deny that persecution was necessary to instil true or sincere belief; its insufficiency to those ends he, and his contemporaries, took for granted. His denial of the necessity of persecution presupposed that human beings were, in principle, naturally adequate to the discovery of God's wants for them. The same presupposition, which derives from natural theology, underwrote the views in politics and revealed theology that complete his theory and supplied its moral content. Contemporary theories of toleration purposing to proceed on Lockean assumptions are morally and philosophically impoverished by their failure to see the requirements laid on an adequate theory of toleration by genuinely Lockean terms.     

Hegel against Fukuyama: Associations, Markets and Recognition

Fukuyama's influential book The End of History and the Last Man presents an Hegelian picture of history as the story of the struggle for recognition. Modern liberal society is the end of history since it resolves that struggle. However, unlike Hegel, Fukuyama assumes recognition is pursued for its own sake. The assumption lends plausibility to a market model of recognition which sits uneasily with his own defence of associational spheres of existence. Hegel, in contrast, inherits an Aristotelian position according to which recognition is parasitic on other goods. This account of recognition informs Hegel's defence of an associational account of civil society and his rejection of market exchange as satisfactory site for recognition. Hegel's response to market modes of recognition is contrasted with that of Adam Smith.     

Weber, Wilson, and Hegel: Theories of Modern Bureaucracy

Convergence between Woodrow Wilson's and Max Weber's thought, as well as their differences with regard to the politics–administration dichotomy, can be ascribed to the Hegelian tradition of public administrative theory. On the one hand, Wilson was strongly influenced by Georg W. F. Hegel. On the other hand, there is an empirical connection between Hegel and Weber. Both shared a consciousness of the German bureaucratic tradition based on Hegel's Philosophy of Right . These insights have important methodological and theoretical implications for the contemporary comparative study of public administration.     

Toleration,Skepticism, and Blasphemy: John Locke,Jonas Proast,and Charlie Hebdo

As the recent Charlie Hebdo, Copenhagen café, and Garland, Texas, shootings show, religion has recently reemerged as a source of violence within liberal democracies, particularly in those instances where cases of alleged blasphemy are involved. Although toleration arose, within the liberal tradition, as a means of dealing with such conflict, some individuals, possessed of devout religious belief, when confronted with beliefs or practices profoundly at odds with their faith, cannot conceive of toleration as a possibility. In such situations, the demand that these individuals tolerate that to which their faith is at odds is likely to run up against a more personal and, for its adherents, eternal agenda. This article considers a way in which those with devout religious beliefs might tolerate that which is profoundly at odds with their faith, thereby providing a means to avoid violent outcomes such as those in the “extreme cases” above.     

Locke on the Moral Basis of International Relations

This article aims to focus analysis of Locke's theory of international relations away from the familiar discourse of sovereignty and natural law and toward a different discourse involving self-government and international society. It argues that Locke's conception of international society balanced interrelated, overlapping, and even competing claims about sovereignty and natural law in a normative framework in which the right of self-government replaced the principle of sovereignty as the moral basis of international relations. Thus, for Locke the norms deduced from the law of nature govern the international state of nature even as independent societies remain the primary executors of the law of nature in international society. The article concludes by considering how Locke's reflections on international relations may contribute to our understanding of contemporary debates about sovereignty, the use of force, and the ethics of intervention.     

Recognitive Freedom: Hegel and the Problem of Recognition

Abstract

This paper examines the theme of recognition in Hegel's account of self-consciousness, suggesting that there are unresolved difficulties with the relationship between the normative sense of mutual recognition and phenomenological cases of unequal recognition. Recent readings of Hegel deal with this problem by positing an implicit distinction between an ‘ontological’ sense of recognition as a precondition for autonomous subjectivity, and a ‘normative’ sense of recognition as embodied in rational social and political institutions. Drawing on recent work by Robert Pippin and Axel Honneth, I argue that Hegel's conception of rational freedom provides the key to grasping the relationship between the ontological and normative senses of recognition. Recognitive freedom provides a way of appropriating Hegel's theory of recognition for contemporary social philosophy.     

Express Consent and Full Membership in Locke

It seems mysterious why Locke requird express consent as a condition of full membership of civil society. It is suggested this requirement be interpreted as a political programme. In a draft of a pamphlet of 1690 Locke criticizes the oath of allegiance required after the Glorious Revolution for not demanding the recognition of William and Mary de jure. So Perhaps he does not want to exclude the greater part of the natives from citizenship; he wants to establish William's throne on a full and universal recognition of his legitimacy.