An introduction to judicial fact-finding

This article seeks to provide an introduction as to how judges determine facts. It draws on material across a range of jurisdictions as to how judges themselves have described what they do and what they ought to do. It explores what factors judges take into account when deciding whether the evidence of a witness is credible. It examines the difference between recollection and reconstruction of events by witnesses and considers how judges draw inferences from primary facts. The importance of documentary evidence, expert evidence, judicial notice and the giving of reasons in the fact-finding process are also explored.     

论法官现代化:专业化、职业化和同质化——兼谈中国法官队伍的现代化问题

法官队伍的现代化是实现法治的基本条件之一。现代法治国家的法官队伍以专业化、职业化和同质化为基本特征。我国法官队伍因受观念和体制的制约而与法治发展的要求相去甚远。未来我们应积极汲取国外有益经验 ,从贯彻司法独立入手 ,改革现有的法官培养管理体制 ,以便加速法官队伍的现代化 ,推动中国的法治进程     

Risks of Criminal Victimization in Contemporary Urban China: An Application of Lifestyle/Routine Activities Theory

The philosophical underpinnings of youth courts rest on the notion that youths are less culpable and more reformable than adults. Some scholars argue that, ideally, when sentencing youth crime, judges should engage youthful offenders in moral communication to elicit change. But do they? What more generally do judges say to the youths? This paper analyzes the frequency and content of judicial censure and moral communication in the sentencing of youth sex offenders. Drawing on the sentencing remarks for 55 sexual violence cases, we examine the ways in which judges interact with youths and censure the offenses, and what, if any, normative guidance they give concerning gender, sexuality, and violence. We found that in most but not all cases, the judges censured the offending as both a moral and legal wrong. However, they spent more time discussing a youth’s future than past behavior, as they sought to elicit change. The judges did not degrade or exclude the offenders; rather, they addressed them in a spirit of reintegration, as worthy individuals with future potential. Although the judges set norms of appropriate sexual behavior to the youths when the offense victims were children, they did not always do so when victims were female peers. In this Youth Court, “real rape” was sexual offending by a youth against a child under 12 years of age. By contrast, in about one‐fifth of cases, all of which occurred against a female peer, the offending was censured only as a legal wrong (a “pseudo censure”) and less likely subject to judicial norm setting.     

Sentencing Transparency in the Information Age

How unrestricted or restricted should judges be when deciding a sentence? To what extent should sentences be predetermined, or to what extent should judges be left with the right to decide a sentence in each individual case? Some legal systems, most notably in the United States, have chosen sentencing guidelines to control judicial discretion. However, another approach has been to use computer technology in the form of so‐called sentencing information systems (SIS). This article examines these developments and what possible influence they have had and could have in the Scandinavian, particularly in the Norwegian, context. Penal institutions today are adjusting to the demands of the information society. Does and could the fact that we are living in an increasingly technologically mediated world influence judicial decision‐making? The article argues that the use of technology is not simply a question of technological change, but is first and foremost a social and political phenomenon, related to the relations of trust in a society.     

SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND THE SENTENCING BEHAVIOR OF JUDGES*

This paper explores the extent to which the social background of judges affects their sentencing behavior. An analysis of data on felons convicted in Georgia suggests that background has little direct bearing on sentencing outcomes. Instead, it conditions the weight judges attach to legally relevant and social background factors. Expectations about the role of the judge's age, religion, prior prosecutorial experience, and local background received mixed support. Older judges were selectively more punitive than their younger colleagues, but they did not direct this punitiveness toward disadvantaged offenders. Nor was there evidence that male judges were paternalistic toward female offenders. Baptist and Fundamentalist judges also sentenced more punitively, but they were not more likely than other judges to discriminate against black or disadvantaged offenders. Rather, they appeared to hold white and older offenders to a higher standard of behavior. Former prosecutors were selectively punitive and applied the law more uniformly than nonprosecutors. Local judges appeared to be more responsive to public demands for incarceration and sentenced more particularistically. These results illustrate the importance of considering judicial background in conjunction with case attributes, and they underscore the need for research that increases our understanding of judicial background as a conditioner of differential treatment during sentencing.     

论释明的具体化:兼评《买卖合同解释》第27条

释明在两大法系主要国家的存在形式有别,但其功能与价值有共通之处,即追求实质正义与程序正当的统一,实现"该胜者胜诉,该败者败诉";保障当事人的程序主体性,避免"突袭性裁判";促进纠纷在一审程序中"一揽子"解决,提高裁判结果的可接受性从而提升诉讼效率。释明要求法官是中立的裁判者,但不是旁观者,其理念与规范在我国民事诉讼立法、司法解释及规范性文件中已有初步体现,尚待进一步科学化与体系化。当前亟需明确释明的具体对象与界限,健全释明的激励与约束机制。释明的方式是审判的艺术,对法官的素养有较高的要求。     

The Deserving Worker: Decisions about Workplace Accommodation by Judges and Laypeople

Employment civil rights laws require employers to make reasonable accommodations for certain workers so that they can perform their jobs. The “reasonableness” of an accommodation request should be based largely on the cost of the accommodation relative to the company's resources, but how do people really evaluate such requests? This study examines determinations of the reasonableness of workplace accommodation requests made by trial judges and ordinary people. Using a 2 × 3 × 3 between‐subjects factorial design, we test the effect of worker identity (nursing‐mother worker, transgender worker, and Muslim worker) and cost on determinations of reasonableness. We find that (1) the identity category of the requesting worker impacts determinations of reasonableness by both judges and laypeople, (2) the cost of the accommodation impacts determinations of reasonableness, (3) judges are more likely to think that accommodation requests are reasonable than are laypeople, (4) there is a complicated relationship between accommodation cost and employee identity, and (5) the cost of the requested accommodation mitigates the effect of identity significantly for judges but less so for ordinary citizens. While judges are less influenced by the identity category of the employee‐requestor than are their lay‐counterparts, social status plays a role in determining what constitutes “reasonable accommodation.”     

The presence of counsel at forensic psychiatric examinations

In virtually all situations involving forensic psychiatric assessments, the patient is represented by counsel. But does this fact entitle the lawyer to be present at the clinical evaluation? In a series of New York cases spanning a generation, judges have allowed presence of counsel at the psychiatric examination. The most common reason given for such a conclusion is to assure better cross-examination of the expert witness. Psychiatric evaluations mandated by law necessitate several guidelines different from those of the usual doctor/patient relationship. While we may have to accept the presence of attorneys in our consulting rooms, they should be observers only. To allow active intervention would distort the clinical process.     

Reporting sensational trials: Free press,a responsible press,and cameras in the courts

It is common today to criticize the media for the way in which they report sensational trials. Lawyers often join in this criticism, claiming that the portrayals harm their public image. This article examines such complaints and demonstrates that including cameras in the courts need not lengthen a criminal trial, nor substantially affect the judicial process. Using the O.J. Simpson criminal case as a backdrop, the article shows how delays in that case were caused not by cameras, but by the judge's inconsistent rulings that signaled to the defense lawyers that they were under a different and more lenient standard than the prosecutors. Surveys of American judges show that those who have experienced cameras in their own courtroom have come to the conclusion that such media coverage does not impede justice, aids the public in understanding the judicial process and has little effect on American's perceptions of lawyers. Those judges who have the urge to play to the cameras should ban them, but if they do not, the blame lies with them and not the media, which simply report what is happening.     

What judges know about eyewitness testimony: A comparison of Norwegian and US judges

Abstract

We surveyed 157 Norwegian judges about their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony, and compared their answers to a prior survey of 160 US judges. Although the Norwegian judges were somewhat more knowledgeable than the US judges, both groups had limited knowledge of eyewitness testimony. The Norwegian judges, like the US judges, frequently differed from eyewitness experts in their responses to such important issues as whether eyewitness confidence is related to identification accuracy at trial and what is the best method for conducting identification procedures. As was true for the US judges, more knowledgeable Norwegian judges had many of the beliefs that may be necessary for reducing and mitigating the effects of eyewitness error. The results suggest that increasing judges’ knowledge of eyewitness testimony may be an important component of the solution to eyewitness error.     

Can feminist judges make a difference?

Many of the expectations and aspirations about the ‘difference’ that women judges would make have proved unrealistic, given the inevitable diversity and often conservatism of women appointed as judges. On the other hand, we might reasonably expect feminist judges to ‘make a difference’. This essay focuses on feminist judges, and seeks to identify what it is that we might reasonably expect of them. This in turn requires consideration of who counts as a feminist judge, what might be included in a feminist approach to judging, and what institutional norms inherent within the judicial role might constrain the adoption of a feminist approach. The essay concludes that feminist judges both can and ought to make a difference across a wide range of judicial activities.     

法官的审判理念与实践

法官在审判活动中既需要把握体现在法律规则和司法制度中的理念,又需要通过自己的理念进行事实判断和法律解释。法官之所以有智慧,并不是因为他有理性,可以掌握一些法律的原理并根据这些原理处置他们的纠纷案件,而是因为法官能依据情景的可能性并能根据这种案件的实际状况来采取措施。一名称职的职业法官不应再限于法律知识学习,他要的是用智慧去追求法律整体的逻辑一贯性和条文之间的关联性,注重对规范合理性涵义的推敲与综合操作,留心于确认法条背后的共同原则和指导原理。     

释明的理论逻辑

释明有时会使案件结果发生逆转,所以必须有逻辑可循。释明不得背离保护权利、维护实质正义的释明主旨和其他正当目的,不能超出当事人主张的事实和已呈现的事实。此为释明的目的边界和事实边界。时效制度与释明制度之主旨相悖,所以不能就时效释明。在事实边界内,法官应进行一切合目的的释明,包括对当事人未主张的权利和重要事实的释明,原告的请求额不足时也应释明。法官就事实无法形成心证时应告知当事人追加证据。遵循逻辑的释明不会使法官丧失中立性。辩论主义并非绝对不可突破,也不能以尊重处分权为名漠视权利之丧失。     

司法认知:证明责任的新视角

证明责任解决的是当事人对哪些事实应当举证证明,否则承担败诉风险.司法认知解决的是哪些事实不需要当事人举证证明,免除当事人的证明责任,而由法官直接确认.在证据法学中,人们往往热衷于从证明对象的角度来把握哪些事实应该由当事人承担证明责任,而鲜有从司法认知的角度来把握证明责任的承担.如果从司法认知的角度来把握证明责任,那么司法认知影响证明责任的分配.但是司法认知只影响主观证明责任的分配,而与客观证明责任没有实质的关联.     

Problems surrounding release of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity.

The problem of release from institutionalization of those not guilty by reason of insanity is a most troublesome one. Psychiatric criteria for release are to be balanced by what judges see as the needs and protection of society. In 1972, New Jersey in the Maik decision adopted an extremely stringent rule which, if strictly followed, would condemn most NGIs to life imprisonment. Judge Weintraub's demand for assurance that the underlying or latent condition was no longer present put psychiatric examiners in an untenable position. The psychiatrists of the state took the unusual step of preparing a critique of the Supreme Court decision and distributing it to the legal profession through a law periodical. In the interim, the inequities of the Maik rule were recognized and an evolutionary set of standards laid down in the Carter case which provides some flexibility and set standards for conditional release. This clarification will undoubtedly be of great assistance to both courts and psychiatrists in dealing with a complex issue which can never have simple guidelines.     

Understanding the Judicial Role in Addressing Gender Bias: A View from the Eighth Circuit Federal Court System

The role of trial judges in the litigation process is frequently debated. Are judges to be dispassionate adjudicators, disengaged referees in a sport in which attorneys compete? Or are they charged with a more active role in promoting the substance, form, and process of justice? In the present paper, we explore the judicial role in addressing gender bias in federal litigation, using data gathered for the Eighth Circuit Gender Fairness Task Force. The federal judges of this circuit were surveyed about their experiences, observations, and opinions of gender-biased conduct. Results indicated that although judges viewed judicial intervention as an appropriate response to gender bias, they had little personal experience with intervention in such a situation. Fur thermore, when specific hypothetical scenarios were presented, they generally agreed that the described conduct was inappropriate but offered little consensus regarding the best course of action for an attorney or judge confronted with such behavior. The Eighth Circuit data thus provide the basis for expanded understanding of the conduct at issue, the options for action in response, and the persistent discrepancy in viewpoints on gender bias and the judicial role.     

When is the Truth not the Truth? Truth Telling and Libel by Implication

Implied libel cases involve defamatory news stories composed entirely of factual, truthful material. Because they lack the false statements typically required for a successful libel suit, these cases present unique challenges regarding determination of falsity. This article examines how appellate judges articulate and apply conceptions of truth in libel- by-implication cases. It concludes that there exists no common understanding of truth and that judges and courts that favor the correspondence theory of truth tend to favor the media, while those that adopt the coherence theory of truth do not. This disagreement over the fundamental understanding of what constitutes truth leads to confusion and lack of clarity for journalists and judges. The article concludes that the actual malice standard apply in all implied libel cases.     

A comparison of Chinese judges' and US judges' knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony

Abstract

We surveyed 170 Chinese judges about their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony, and compared their answers to a prior survey of 160 US judges. Although the Chinese judges were less knowledgeable than the US judges, both groups had limited knowledge of eyewitness testimony, including for such important issues as whether lay people can distinguish between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses. Unlike the US judges, greater knowledge of eyewitness factors for the Chinese judges was not related to beliefs that may be necessary to reduce eyewitness error. Compared to the US judges, the Chinese judges were much less likely to believe that they needed additional eyewitness training and that they knew more about eyewitness testimony than lay persons. We also discuss the impact of culture, legal systems, investigative procedures, and judges' function on the Chinese judges' responses, and the legal reforms that China may need to implement to reduce eyewitness error.     

Representation and Waldron's Objection to Judicial Review

Jeremy Waldron objects to judicial review of legislation onthe ground that it effectively accords the views of a few judges‘superior voting weight’ to those of ordinary citizens.This objection overlooks that representative government doesthe same. This article explores the concept of political representationand argues that delegates may be institutionally bound to heedthe convictions of their constituents, but they are not theirproxies. Rather, they are best viewed as their trustees. Theyought to decide according to what they think is in their constituents’interest. In this sense, a strong element of independent judgmentis involved in their institutional role. So, if we have no problemwith assigning their views superior voting weight, it shouldnot be thought particularly objectionable to give judges thesame power. What is more, once we acknowledge the independencethey enjoy, the question arises whether and by what institutionalmeans we ought to constrain and check their power. The judiciaryis well suited effectively to carry out this supervisory function,because it is immune from political pressure by the legislaturethat would reduce it to its instrument. Hence, in some casesthe institution of judicial review is morally justified.     

HOW JUDGES THINK ABOUT RACIAL DISPARITIES: SITUATIONAL DECISION‐MAKING IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM*

Researchers have theorized how judges’ decision‐making may result in the disproportionate presence of Blacks and Latinos in the criminal justice system. Yet, we have little evidence about how judges make sense of these disparities and what, if anything, they do to address them. By drawing on 59 interviews with state judges in a Northeastern state, we describe, and trace the implications of, judges’ understandings of racial disparities at arraignment, plea hearings, jury selection, and sentencing. Most judges in our sample attribute disparities, in part, to differential treatment by themselves and/or other criminal justice officials, whereas some judges attribute disparities only to the disparate impact of poverty and differences in offending rates. To address disparities, judges report employing two categories of strategies: noninterventionist and interventionist. Noninterventionist strategies concern only a judge's own differential treatment, whereas interventionist strategies concern other actors’ possible differential treatment, as well as the disparate impact of poverty and facially neutral laws. We reveal how the use of noninterventionist strategies by most judges unintentionally reproduces disparities. Through our examination of judges’ understandings of racial disparities throughout the court process, we enhance understandings of American racial inequality and theorize a situational approach to decision‐making in organizational contexts.