Western Media Exposure and Chinese Immigrants’ Political Perceptions

Using evidence from an original survey experiment among 3,032 Chinese student immigrants in the United States, I examine how exposure to Western media changes their evaluations of the Chinese government’s performance and their trust in official discourse. My findings suggest that reading Western reports on China shifts immigrants’ perceptions of government performance in different directions, depending on how similar reports are censored in Chinese media. On issues that are strictly censored, immigrants exposed to Western reports became more critical of their home government’s performance and decreased their trust in official discourse. Conversely, on issues that are relatively open to independent reporting, immigrants did not become more critical of government performance, and their trust in official discourse maintained after being exposed to Western information.     

Editors’ Introduction: negotiating stormy waters

Neo-Orientalism is a means of articulating a subordinating discourse regarding populations and societies associated with Islam. This article argues that the labelling of Chechens and Chechen society as ‘desperate’ is another way of upholding the neo-Orientalist frame. About 2876 articles on the Chechen conflict culled from the Lexis-Nexis database were coded for the language of ‘desperation’. A majority of these articles linked desperation to either ‘radical’ Islam or gender dynamics/women's participation in the conflict. Thus, this article argues that the Russian–Chechen conflict is framed by the media to uphold a neo-Orientalist gaze, in which the language of desperation plays a key role, in order to delegitimise any cause the Chechens may have for fighting.     

What Drives Political Participation? Motivations and Mobilization in a Digital Age

This article provides insights into the driving forces that underpin new forms of political participation. Digital technologies offer opportunities for engaging in a wide range of civically oriented activities, each of which can contribute to deeper democratic engagement. Conventional acts of political participation are argued to be driven primarily by intrinsic motivations relating to self-efficacy and empowerment, with participants feeling they can have influence over decision makers. Little research explores whether similar motivations drive participation in less conventional acts, as well as whether mobilization attempts via social media by peers or political organizations mediate those motivations. Drawing on data from a survey among a representative sample of the U.K. electorate, we find the offline and online spheres of agency remain fairly distinct. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations both matter but extrinsic motivations have the strongest explanatory power independent of the sphere of activity. The mediating effect of mobilization tactics has a minimal effect on extrinsic motivations, online or offline, but online intrinsic motivations lose their explanatory power. As intrinsic factors offer little explanatory power, some forms of online political participation may lack meaning to the individual. Rather, these non-conventional acts result from reward seeking and are more likely to be encouraged by nongovernmental campaigning organizations, suggesting social media users are most likely to perform simple acts in support of non-contentious causes.     

Expanding the Conversation: Multiplier Effects From a Deliberative Field Experiment

Do formal deliberative events influence larger patterns of political discussion and public opinion? Critics argue that only a tiny number of people can participate in any given gathering and that deliberation may not remedy—and may in fact exacerbate—inequalities. We assess these criticisms with an experimental design merging a formal deliberative session with data on participants’ social networks. We conducted a field experiment in which randomly selected constituents attended an online deliberative session with their U.S. Senator. We find that attending the deliberative session dramatically increased interpersonal political discussion on topics relating to the event. Importantly, after an extensive series of moderation checks, we find that no participant/nodal characteristics, or dyadic/network characteristics, conditioned these effects; this provides reassurance that observed, positive spillovers are not limited to certain portions of the citizenry. The results of our study suggest that even relatively small-scale deliberative encounters can have a broader effect in the mass public, and that these events are equal-opportunity multipliers.     

Does economic inequality breed political inequality?

Does economic inequality generate political inequality? While there is a large literature on the effect of inequality on regime change and support for democracy, there is little research on its effect on political equality across socioeconomic positions. Yet democracy and political equality, although related, are distinct concepts. While political power tends to be more evenly distributed in democracies than in autocracies, there is substantial variation in both regime types. This study argues that economic inequality should decrease political equality through multiple mechanisms: (1) it increases the resources of the rich relative to the poor; (2) it widens the gap in policy preferences across income groups; (3) it reduces participation; and (4) it depresses support for democracy. Using three measures of inequality and data on more than 140 countries between 1961 and 2008, it was found that economic inequality tends to increase political inequality, even when one controls for the level of democracy. Results hold when the sample is restricted by regime type. Finally, evidence in favour of the mechanisms is provided.