The rise and fall of “Novorossiya”: examining support for a separatist geopolitical imaginary in southeast Ukraine

In the spring of 2014, some anti-Maidan protestors in southeast Ukraine, in alliance with activists from Russia, agitated for the creation of a large separatist entity on Ukrainian territory. These efforts sought to revive a historic region called Novorossiya (“New Russia”) on the northern shores of the Black Sea that was created by Russian imperial colonizers. In public remarks, Vladimir Putin cited Novorossiya as a historic and contemporary home of a two-part interest group, ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking Ukrainians, supposedly under threat in Ukraine. Anti-Maidan agitation in Ukraine gave way to outright secession in April 2014, as armed rebel groups established the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhans’k People’s Republic on parts of the eponymous Ukrainian oblasts. Rebel leaders aspired to create a renewed Novorossiya that incorporated all of eastern and southern Ukraine from Kharkiv to Odesa oblasts. To examine the level of support for this secessionist imaginary in the targeted oblasts, our large scientific poll in December 2014 revealed the Novorossiya project had minority support, between 20 and 25% of the population. About half of the sample believed that the concept of Novorossiya was a “historical myth” and that its resuscitation and promotion was the result of “Russian political technologies.” Analysis of the responses by socio-demographic categories indicated that for ethnic Russians, residents of the oblasts of Kharkiv and Odesa, for older and poorer residents, and especially for those who retain a nostalgic positive opinion about the Soviet Union, the motivations and aims of the Novorossiya project had significant support.     

Notes and news

Russia and Asia have an ambiguous relationship. More than half of Russia is geographically in Asia and much of its history, too. Peter the Great switched Russia's main focus to Europe. But by the middle of the 19^th century the “Slavophiles” were contesting that “Westernising” view as the Russian Empire expanded. After World War II, the USSR played an important ideological role in Asia, until the failure of the invasion of Afghanistan. The ensuing collapse of the USSR resulted in a smaller, much more “European” Russia, which the West was nonetheless not eager to embrace. Today, the dynamic economies of Asia offer opportunities, not least as a market for Russia's energy exports. But the legacy of Peter the Great lives on.     

War and identity: the case of the Donbas in Ukraine

Abstract

The study of identities struggles to capture the moments and dynamics of identity change. A crisis moment provides a rare insight into such processes. This paper traces the political identities of the inhabitants of a region at war – the Donbas – on the basis of original survey data that cover the four parts of the population that once made up this region: the population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas, the population of the self-declared “Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic,” the internally displaced, and those who fled to the Russian Federation. The survey data map the parallel processes of a self-reported polarization of identities and the preservation or strengthening of civic identities. Language categories matter for current self-identification, but they are not cast in narrow ethnolinguistic terms, and feeling “more Ukrainian” and Ukrainian citizenship include mono- and bilingual conceptions of native language (i.e. Ukrainian and Russian).     

Alexei Navalny and challenges in reconciling “nationalism” and “liberalism”

This article examines the challenges and complexities in the efforts by political activist Alexei Navalny to reconcile “nationalist” and “liberal” modes of thinking in the current Russian environment. After deciphering three major axes of Navalny's narratives on the national question, the author then discusses the social and political context within which the national-democratic (Natsdem) movement was forged. Natsdems, who are simultaneously pro-European and democratic but also xenophobic, and who target an audience among the urban middle classes, reflect a fundamental shift in Russian society. The last part of the article discusses the paradoxes of Navalny's trajectory, in which a failed theoretical articulation between “nationalism,” “democracy,” and “liberalism” nonetheless has translated into a political success.     

After the Ukrainian crisis: Is there a place for Russia?

Revolutionary protests in Ukraine in winter 2014 resulted in the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and an anti-terrorist operation launched by Kiev in eastern Ukraine. What was a totally internal manifestation of displeasure with governmental policy transformed into an international security crisis. While Kiev considers it a Russian–Ukrainian conflict, Moscow perceives it as a Russian–West confrontation, claiming that the crisis was provoked by NATO’s desire to enlarge into the region where Russia’s vital interests lie. The article analyses the sources of the current Ukrainian–Russian conflict and looks into Russia’s place in post-crisis Ukraine. As history has shown, even those states which used to fight each other for centuries managed not only to find peace but to establish constructive relationships. Still, with the shift from material to ideological confrontation, there are fewer and fewer options for compromise.     

The views of the Chinese statesman on the par Eastern problem (1921)

The phrase “The Great Game” was first used in the context of Russia and Central Asia by the ill-fated Captain Conolly in 1840. For Conolly, the game metaphor signified a contest in which the Russians were Britain's potential opponents, while the Central Asians were her immediate ones. Indeed Conolly, like Thorburn, a later writer, seems even to have envisaged Russia as Britain's partner in the work of civilizing Asia. Boulger, tried to use the phrase to signify Anglo-Russian confrontation but interestingly the phrase was little used in the literature on Central Asia until Kipling's “Kim” endowed it with a popularity and the implication of great power rivalry which it had not previously enjoyed. In fact widespread use only came after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, though “The Great Game” is now in ever more frequent use to signify American/Russian rivalry. Kipling's use has triumphed over Conolly's.     

Perviy Kanal's Trotsky and the “Atlanticisation” of Leon Trotsky's Legacy*

Trotsky, an eight-part miniseries made in 2017 for the centenary of the Russian Revolution, has recently been made available on Netflix for global audiences. This article analyses Trotsky through the theoretical lens of neo-Eurasianism, especially as developed by the political theorist Aleksandr Dugin. Dugin's philosophy posits a civilisational divide between the “Atlantic” values of secularism, open markets, cosmopolitanism and sexual profligacy represented by the Anglo-Atlantic cultural sphere, and the “Eurasian” values of authoritarianism, cultural conservatism and religious nationalism present in a revived Russia. I argue that Trotsky's interpretation of Leon Trotsky's legacy reflects the popularisation of Dugin's neo-Eurasianist political philosophy in Russia. The article covers some of the key historical events depicted in Trotsky, discussing their accuracy with reference to existing academic biographies of Leon Trotsky. I then discuss the series’ apparent fixation on the Jewish heritage of Trotsky (who was born Lev Bronstein), which has been the focus of much of the media coverage of the series, before addressing the fraught place that Trotsky occupies in Russian historical memory. I then move on to a discussion of the political philosophy of neo-Eurasianism and its relevance and application to the political climate of modern Russia. Finally, I consider what Dugin has said about Trotsky himself. Despite (or perhaps because of) its distortions of history, the series serves as a fascinating reflection of the values and political climate of modern Russia.     

Sergey Glazyev and the revival of Soviet economics

A veteran Western observer and authority on Russia's political economy examines the recent debate on economic growth in Russia. Focusing on Sergey Glazyev, a prominent statist and nationalist favored by President Vladimir Putin, who reemerged at the top of the public debate, the author discusses the essence of his ideas (state capitalism, Eurasian integration, and expansionary fiscal and monetary policy). He proceeds to analyze the critical response of liberals, citing inter alia objections to loose fiscal and monetary policies. Russia's liberal economists favor broader international integration, whereas Putin is clearly in favor of state capitalism and Eurasian integration. This study ends with an up-to-date politico-economic assessment titled “Where is Putin going?”     

Destined for deadlock? Russia,Ukraine, and the unfulfilled Minsk agreements

ABSTRACT

Bringing peace, security, and stability to the war-torn region of Donbas has proven to be a challenging – some would say near-impossible – task. The “Minsk II” agreement, signed in February 2015, was supposed to put an end to the armed hostilities, resolve the underlying political issues, and gradually restore Ukrainian government control of the country’s eastern border. None of this has happened. Despite continuous Western support and pressure, progress in the implementation of the peace plan signed in Minsk has been slow, also after the much-anticipated Paris summit of the “Normandy Four” (Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France) in December 2019. This article discusses the underlying causes of the current stalemate, emphasizing factors such as the inherently complex nature of the conflict, the process through which “Minsk II” came into being, the vague and ambiguous language of this and other agreements, practical challenges related to the timing and sequencing of agreed-upon measures, and Russia’s persistent non-acknowledgement of its role in the conflict.     

Russia,the death penalty,and Europe: the ambiguities of influence

Studies of capital punishment worldwide investigate how international influence affects the death penalty. We analyze European influence on the death penalty in Russia over the imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet periods, using two parameters: the changing mechanisms of influence in each period and the death penalty's significance in the broader spectrum of punitive violence. On the first parameter, in the tsarist period, European influence on Russian policy was “productive” – exercised through prestige, moral suasion, and “diffusion.” In the Soviet period, European influence was blocked. In the post-Soviet period, European influence is coercive, as the Council of Europe has unsuccessfully sought to compel Russia to abolish its death penalty. On the second parameter, the death penalty in Russia has always been only one of many forms of state-sanctioned punitive killing. In consequence, the Council's involvement in Russia's death penalty has produced an incoherent policy outcome and has entangled the Council in Russia's authoritarian politics. Russia thus exemplifies the hazards of external involvement in death penalty abolition.     

Russia and Japan at a new stage of relations

Today, bilateral relations between Russia and Japan are at an important historical stage, says Alexander Nikolaevich Panov, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Japan. There is a “window of opportunity” to establish a new Russian‐Japanese relationship in the twenty‐first century. The only issue that now awaits resolution is the legal settlement of territorial delimitation. This outstanding issue provides the basis for Russia's proposal to incorporate an agreement concerning territorial demarcation into the treaty on peace, friendship, and cooperation. It is in the interests of both nations to preserve, strengthen, and broaden their bilateral relations and to revitalize and enhance their cooperation in all areas     

Nationalism and modernism in the East Turkestan Republic, 1933–34

This study explains the intellectual history and ideology of the Turkic insurgency and the East Turkestan Republic in Kashgar in 1933–34. Texts in periodicals from the period suggest that the insurgency was defined by its intellectual elites more as a nationalist enterprise than as a religious one. The insurgency's ideologists established important national attributes of the East Turkestani nation, particularly its national name, homeland, symbology, and history, and they also articulated East Turkestani national interests, particularly political independence, representative government, and modernization. Regardless of the arguably low degree of social penetration of the ideas of the elites among common society and the small extent to which policy was actually implemented, the intertwining of East Turkestani national identity and interests with political self-government and modernization was an ideological concept that had a profound impact on all subsequent administrations in Xinjiang.     

The Russian Dimension of Baltic Maritime Governance

This paper seeks to reconstruct the development of Baltic maritime governance by filling in the gap in the systematic study of Russian maritime policy. In a review of historical, administrative, economic, and political facets of Russian maritime policy, the paper identifies the logic of “greatpowerness” underpinned by the category of “national interest” as its main driver. In this overall logic, cooperation with the EU in maritime affairs is a part of larger Russia’s EU politics. Thus, Baltic maritime governance depends on the ability of the EU and Russia to maintain constructive relations beyond the scope of the maritime domain.     

Russia’s use of semi-state security forces: the case of the Wagner Group

This article provides a definitive, in-depth case-study, using primarily Russian sources, of Russia’s use of the informal “Wagner Group” private military company (PMC) and its antecedents (from 2012 to 2018) in Nigeria, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Syria, Sudan, and the Central African Republic. It explores why Russia has used this group without legalizing its existence or role. While Wagner is sometimes used in the same ways that other rational states use PMCs, corrupt informal networks tied to the Russian regime have also used it in ways that are not typical of other strong states and that potentially undermine Russian security interests. Understanding the Wagner Group is interesting for comparative academic studies of PMCs, because Wagner doesn’t fit well any existing PMC category or template in the literature. It is also crucial for US and allied policy analysts attempting to attribute “Russian” actions in foreign theaters.     

Official Russian identity discourse in light of the annexation of Crimea: national or imperial?

Close examination and analysis of the Kremlin’s framing of Russia’s annexation of Crimea reveals that domestically it was presented in unprecedented national irredentist terminology, aiming at reunifying the Russian nation in one state. The Russian nation was largely described in ethno-lingual or ethno-cultural terms, while the Russian state was all but explicitly declared as a nation–state of ethnic Russians. The official identity discourse was marked by the recasting and unprecedentedly strong reassertion of boundaries between the Russian and Ukrainian nations, legitimizing Russian claims to Crimea. However, the changing references to the crisis in Eastern Ukraine illustrate how the Kremlin’s identity rhetoric is still mainly guided by considerations of political necessity, rather than dictated by some national or ideological vision. Significantly, the focus of the Russian official identity discourse shifted from the state to the nation. This marks a decisive departure from Putin’s earlier largely statist rhetoric in the 2000s, and a new stage of maturation and official acclamation of national ethnicization trends launched during his third presidential term. After years of sitting on the fence, the Kremlin reinvented itself as an active and initiating player in the nationalism field.     

The Great Game and the evolving nature of political talk shows on Russian television

ABSTRACT

Much has been written about the specific way in which the Russian government under President Vladimir V. Putin uses television to propagate pro-government views on domestic and international politics by influencing what is aired. This paper examines the first season of The Great Game (Bol’shaya Igra in Russian), a television talk show that appears on Russia’s national television network Channel One, as an example of the government’s effort to shape public opinion. A content analysis suggests The Great Game differs from the typical Russian talk show genre in that it delivers political messages without much entertainment, providing cerebral discussions of issues that nonetheless back up all nine of the core “neoconservative” concepts underlying recent Russian political strategy. This suggests that the Russian government and television executives innovate to determine how best to use television to win over skeptical citizens to the Kremlin’s point of view.     

Rome and its Histories: a View from Australia

In this paper I trace the many debates about the past, and its relationship with the present and the future, that have eddied around Rome over the last two centuries. I spend quite a bit of time illustrating the Catholic line on the “eternal city” and on its contestation from, first, Italian nationalist and then more imperialist and Fascist expositions of “sites of memory” there. After “liberation” in 1944, there were new approaches to elucidating the city's meaning, headed by the “myth of Anti‐Fascism” and extending to a left terrorist reading by the Red Brigades. In recent years, “post‐fascism” has grown in importance in Italy's capital, especially as embodied by the mayor since 2008, Gianni Alemanno. These ideological and politically inspired reckonings of history have squared uneasily with the more popular comprehension of the place of the past, all the more given that Rome has been in rapid growth, first from within Italy and nowadays from across the globe. Specific urban groups, notably the city's Jews, have also read history in their own manner. In sum, Rome has not been a venue for a simple, two sided, “culture war”, as cliché assures us is our fate in Australia. Rather, as is also true here, Rome has proved a site of constant and multi‐fronted arguments about the meaning of history, as should be true of any serious democracy.     

Russia and the United States: Still cold in Northeast Asia?

The US has been reluctant to acknowledge Russia's relevance to the Asia‐Pacific, the author says, because “too little time has passed since the interests of these two former adversaries collided in the region.” Russia has the longest Pacific coastline and borders with China, Japan, Korea and Mongolia. Despite the end of the Cold War, however, Russia is still not an integrated participant in Northeast Asian economic cooperation. Vladimir Ivanov is a Visiting Fellow at the Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia in Niigata. He argues that Russia has made a clear choice between “guns and growth,” and that the country should be allowed to come in from the cold and join this region's development.