The Politics and economics of revenue growth: A cross–national analysis

Despite considerable interest in comparative fiscal policy in general, and the high salience of tax policy and tax reform in the industrialized democracies, there are relatively few cross–national studies of the economic and political correlates of revenues over time. We undertake a cross–national time series study of revenue growth in fourteen OECD countries between 1958 and 1990.We test a number of political and economic hypotheses about revenue change, including political business cycle, 'fiscal illusion', elasticity, and ideological theories. For the 1958—1990 period, we find that all countries, regardless of revenue structure, experience higher real revenue growth as a result of inflation, but that revenue growth is more responsive to unemployment in countries that rely more on direct taxes compared to countries with less direct–tax reliance. We find that this effect is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We also find that revenue tends to increase in the years following elections, consistent with the idea that governments try to minimize the political fallout from tax increases by separating them as much as possible from election campaign periods; this effect, too, is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We find no support for 'fiscal illusion' and ideological theories of revenue growth.     

Katrinanomics: The politics and economics of disaster relief

Hurricane Katrina revealed massive governmental failure at the local, state and federal levels. This commentary brings the modern theory of property rights and public choice reasoning to bear in explaining why officials failed to strengthen New Orleans's levee system despite forewarning of its weaknesses, failed to pre-deploy adequate emergency supplies as the storm approached landfall and failed to respond promptly afterwards. Its main lesson is that no one should have expected government to be any more effective when confronted with natural disaster than it is in more mundane circumstances.     

The war on poverty: between economics and politics

A wealth of solutions to poverty have been proposed, with little understanding of the forces required to turn a sound idea into an implementable program. A system approach is suggested to overcome this deficiency. This implies analyzing the effects of antipoverty measures on other elements of a society and a polity and the feedback effects of changes in these other elements on the new programs which are being introduced. Such an approach is seen overcoming the limitations of fragmented views of the issue—such as the purely economic one—as well as the lack of systematic analysis of a progam's costs, benefits, sources of funds, and nonfinancial resources. Consequently, a challenge is also offered to those who formulate programs without taking into account dominant values (e.g., questions of consensus) and other political considerations (e.g., which groups would benefit or suffer from the program). This is seen as leading to undemocratic action or, most frequently, to inaction due to resistance. The article concludes with a brief review of the recent Nixon-Moynihan proposal in terms of the societal-system approach here advocated, and adds a cautionary note on the limits of planning.In revising this article, I benefited from comments by Daniel Bell, Carolyn O. Atkinson, and Sarajane Heidt.     

The interaction between economics and politics: modelling cycles

Abstract. In this article simulation results are used to analyze the capacity of a general politico-economic model, developed by one of the authors, to generate cycles of various lengths. The model describes behaviour of individuals and organizations in the economic as well as the political sphere. The interaction between both spheres gives rise to short term (business) cycles as well as long term (Kondratieff) cycles. The analyses concentrate on the effect variations in the political sector (regarding, e.g., party identification on non-economic grounds, the sensitivity of voters, and the discount parameter for past economic results) have on the cycles found.     

The state in industrial relations: A cross-national analysis of developments and socioeconomic effects

Abstract This is a comparative study of the three main roles of the state in industrial relations: the state as employer in the public sector, state intervention in private–sector–wage bargaining, and the procedural role of defining a legal framework for industrial relations. Based on data from 20 OECD countries, the article's analytical focus is twofold. For each of these roles, the paper examines whether there is a convergence towards neoliberal regulation in response to the shift from demand–side to supply–side policies, and whether neoliberalism is superior to alternative regulation forms in terms of performance. No evidence of such dominance of neoliberalism can be found. The upshot is that developments of state regulation are as much path–dependent as its socioeconomic effects are contingent on a country's context.     

Political parties, electoral systems and democracy: A cross-national analysis

Abstract.  The number of political parties and the type of electoral system may impact the level of democratic functioning within a government. Models are used to explore whether the number of political parties increases a country's democracy score on the POLITY IV measure of democracy, and whether countries with proportional representation electoral systems have higher democracy scores than those without. Multiple regression analysis reveals that countries with proportional electoral systems have higher democracy scores. Countries involved in the Third Wave of democracy may find the choice of an electoral system among the most important issues in structuring a democratic government.     

Varieties of Limited Access Orders: The nexus between politics and economics in hybrid regimes

This article advances our understanding of differences in hybrid stability by going beyond existing regime typologies that separate the study of political institutions from the study of economic institutions. It combines the work of Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast (NWW) on varieties of social orders with the literature on political and economic regime typologies and dynamics to understand hybrid regimes as Limited Access Orders (LAOs) that differ in the way dominant elites limit access to political and economic resources. Based on a measurement of political and economic access applied to seven post‐Soviet states, the article identifies four types of LAOs. Challenging NWW's claim, it shows that hybrid regimes can combine different degrees of political and economic access to sustain stability. Our typology allows to form theoretical expectations about the kinds of political and/or economic changes that will move different types of LAOs toward more openness or closure.     

Passions and interests revisited: the psychological foundations of economics and politics

Homo Politicus, Homo Oeconomicus. Can these two abstract human types meaningfully be distinguished? Is there a characteristic set of motivations that drive human beings in so far as they are political actors and a different set that drive their economic lives? What are the psychological foundations of economics and politics? The answers to these questions have significant implications both for the study and the practice of economics and politics. If homo politicus is essentially identical to homo oeconomicus, it is safe to generalize from the study of economic behavior to political phenomena. If not, such a procedure will distort our understanding of politics. Similarly, if we design political institutions and public policies assuming that people will behave as they do when they confront economic choices, we may find our intentions thwarted if we have neglected the distinctive motivations characteristic of political action.     

Reversal of fortune: the politics and economics of the superconducting supercollider

Congress approved the superconducting supercollider (SSC), but later cut all funding after construction for the project had begun. We claim that this reversal was due, in part, to a problem of time inconsistency. Representatives from states in contention to receive the project had an incentive to support it early in the process. Once Texas was chosen as the SSC site, the other contender states had a greatly diminished incentive to continue to support it. Our empirical results show that the probability of switching from ‘for’ to ‘against’ the project is significantly higher for representatives from the former contender states.     

Robert D. Tollison and the economics of politics

This paper tracks economists’ rising, yet elusive and unstable interest in collective decision mechanism after World War II. We replace their examination of voting procedures and social welfare functions in the 1940s and 1950s in the context of their growing involvement with policy-making. Confronted with natural scientists’ and McCathythes’ accusations of ideological bias, positive studies emphasizing that collective decisions mechanisms were unstable and inefficient, and normative impossibilities, economists largely relied on the idea the policy ends they worked with reflected a “social consensus.” As the latter crumbled in the 1960s, growing disagreement erupted on how to identify and aggregate those individual values which economists believed should guide applied work, in particular in cost-benefit analysis. The 1970s and 1980s brought new approaches to collective decision: Arrow’s impossibility was solved by expanding the informational basis, it was showed that true preferences could be revealed by making decision costly, and experimentalists and market designers enabled these mechanisms to be tested in the lab before being sold to those public bodies looking for decision procedures that emulated markets. In this new regime, the focus paradoxically shifted to coordination, revelation and efficiency, and those economists studying collective decision processes were marginalized.     

The politics and economics of pork barrel spending: The case of federal financing of water resources development

This paper empirically investigates the economic and political factors that have influenced annual Corps of Engineers water resource spending. Despite the common view that “pork barrel” spending is economically unjustified and purely politically motivated, economic factors have been important in determining water resource spending. From 1865–1920, economic development and industrialization increase spending, and from 1921–1988, spending appears to be counter-cyclical. There is also evidence that majority parties control spending levels in the post-Civil war period, while in recent times, legislators act under a norm of “constrained universalism” and are influenced by the costs to their constituents of increased spending.     

Education and economic growth in the United States: cross-national applications for an intra-national path analysis

Do the leading predictors of economic growth found in the cross-national research have a capacity to predict economic growth at the state level in the United States (US)? Are the effects of education spending on economic growth underestimated because research fails to examine the indirect effects of spending on economic growth? This article presents the findings from a study investigating the relationship between education and economic growth in US states while controlling for the effects of the leading predictors of economic growth from the cross-national research. It also utilizes a path model to examine direct and indirect relationships between education spending and economic growth measured as per capita income growth. The results indicate that spending on higher education and highway expenditures demonstrate a positive association with growth in per capita income, while K12 (kindergarten through 12th grade) spending and K12 pupil–teacher ratios demonstrate a negative association with income growth from 1988 to 2005. Moreover, K12 spending and population growth indirectly affect income growth through their relationship with K12 pupil–teacher ratios, and spending on higher education indirectly affects income growth through college attainment rates. Overall, all but one variable from the cross-national research demonstrates a significant direct or indirect relationship with income growth during at least one time-period investigated. Treating K12 pupil–teacher ratios and college attainment as mediating variables also enhances our understanding of the dynamics that explain growth in per capita income at the sub-national level in the US. However, some unexpected findings emerge when the data are analyzed on the basis of two eight-year sub-periods.     

Local government grants and income tax revenue: Redistributive politics in Norway 1900–1990

An important aspect of the welfare state is public provision of private goods, primarily education and health care. In Norway the provision of these services has been organized through the local public sector. The development of the welfare state has to a large extent been the development of welfare communes. The important revenue sources of the local and county governments, grants and income tax revenue, have been controlled nationally, and the paper addresses the determinants of these revenues during 1900–1990. The approach combines a demand model of local public services emphasizing price and income-elasticities with a political economy model of central government ideology and strength. The decision making is understood as bargaining between the government and interest groups, and the political structure consequently is of importance for the policy outcome. The analysis shows how politics matter, and the results indicate that a minority coalition government implies 30% more grant and income tax revenue to local and county governments than one party majority in the long run.     

The politics and economics of auction design in the market for sulfur dioxide pollution

The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 aim to create a market in emissions of sulfur dioxide from power plants by distributing a fixed number of tradable pollution permits called “allowances,” and by providing for the auction of a small fraction of the total number of allowances. This article describes potential inefficiencies in this market and how an auction could enhance the market. It shows that the method by which allowances are “bundled together” for auction is an important efficiency-related element of auction design. The article also examines the politics of auction design and how equity goals strongly shaped the design ultimately adopted by Congress. Finally, some implications are suggested for the role of policy analysis in the legislative process.     

Electoral turnout and income redistribution by the state: A cross-national analysis of the developed democracies

Abstract.  This article explores the sources of variation in state redistribution across 13 developed democracies over the period 1979–2000, drawing upon data from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, the Luxembourg Income Study and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The discussion begins with the median voter hypothesis, which predicts that the extent of state redistribution in a country will be positively related to the degree of pre-government inequality. In seeking to extend the median voter approach, the article takes into account two additional variables: the level of electoral turnout and the degree to which turnout is skewed by income. The analysis confirms that pre-government inequality is indeed positively related to state redistribution. However, the predictive power of the median voter approach is significantly improved when account is taken of the level of electoral turnout and the extent to which the turnout rate reflects an income skew – variables that are themselves related. The link between turnout and redistribution is especially strong for social transfers as opposed to taxes, and for the lower and middle, as opposed to the upper, part of the income spectrum.     

An examination of the causal relationship between government spending and revenue: A cointegration analysis

This paper tests the validity of the proposition that there is a causal relationship between government expenditure and government revenue for Greece over the period 1957–1993. The empirical analysis employs tests of cointegration as pre-tests for Granger tests of causality. The empirical evidence suggests that there is a long-run relationship between government spending and government revenue and expenditures cause revenues.     

Institutions and the convergence hypothesis: The cross-national evidence

DeLong and others have shown that cross-country convergence in per capita incomes is limited to samples of currently-industrialized nations, or universal-literacy nations. In particular, income dispersion has failed to decline in groups of ex ante rich nations. This study finds strong convergence in per capita incomes among nations with institutions (namely secure property rights) conducive to saving, investing, and producing. Incomes are shown to converge even within ex ante rich samples when measures of institutional quality are held constant.