Governance as a strategy in state-of-nature games

Public choice scholars routinely claim that coercion can be used to solve the social dilemma. However, while social contract theorists have frequently described state-of-nature societies using game theory, they have not used game theory to show how coercive action within such societies can improve outcomes. Here I operationalize the concepts of coercion and governance within a Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) framework; governance is operationalized as coercion to compliance, and to adopt a coercive strategy is to impose a strategy choice upon another player. I show that, under certain conditions, adding governance strategies to a noncoercive one-shot PD game can improve outcomes.     

Revealed public preference and social utility

Methods of demand theory are applied to the problem of the existence of a social welfare function under specific public choice algorithms. Integrability conditions, necessary for the derivation of social demand functions from utility maximization, are used. The social choice function, which chooses the mean of all voters demand for public goods to be the public provision, is analysed in detail. Necessary conditions for the existence of a social utility function, and by implication, a transative social ordering, are derived for this case. These conditions imply restrictions on individual preferences.     

The role of behavioral economics and behavioral decision making in Americans' retirement savings decisions

Traditional economic theory posits that people make decisions by maximizing a utility function in which all of the relevant constraints and preferences are included and weighed appropriately. Behavioral economists and decision-making researchers, however, are interested in how people make decisions in the face of incomplete information, limited cognitive resources, and decision biases. Empirical findings in the areas of behavioral economics and judgment and decision making (JDM) demonstrate departures from the notion that man is economically rational, illustrating instead that people often act in ways that are economically suboptimal. This article outlines findings from the JDM and behavioral-economics literatures that highlight the many behavioral impediments to saving that individuals may encounter on their way to financial security. I discuss how behavioral and psychological issues, such as self-control, emotions, and choice architecture can help policymakers understand what factors, aside from purely economic ones, may affect individuals' savings behavior.     

测量国债规模的模型阐释——基于国债功能的变迁

采用经济学规范研究方法,沿袭了模型阐释国债规模测量的主流研究路径--当前价值的借款约束模型和国债自然规模模型,从宏观和微观、供给与需求的角度,剖析了决定一国国债规模的关键要素.关注了不同模型下的均衡结果,获得了国债功能变迁下测量国债规模的组合模型.研究表明,在制度变迁等外部因素影响下,国债功能有显著的变化.国债功能的变迁是国债规模波动的主要原因之一.理论上,现今的国债规模测量存在短期均衡和长期均衡交替呈现的基本特征.而在动态分析框架下,国债规模的测量受到宏观和微观因素的共同影响.研究对理论模型结果进行了操作性解释,为实证研究搭建了必要的实施框架.研究认为,进一步地探寻测量国债规模组合模型的微观基础,是将来研究的主要方向.     

More Money,Fewer Problems? Cross-Level Effects of Economic Deprivation on Political Representation

While equal political representation of all citizens is a fundamental democratic goal, it is hampered empirically in a multitude of ways. This study examines how the societal level of economic inequality affects the representation of relatively poor citizens by parties and governments. Using CSES survey data for citizens’ policy preferences and expert placements of political parties, empirical evidence is found that in economically more unequal societies, the party system represents the preferences of relatively poor citizens worse than in more equal societies. This moderating effect of economic equality is also found for policy congruence between citizens and governments, albeit slightly less clear-cut.     

乡镇经济增长模式之转变：以T镇为个案

国内外很多学者对中国乡镇经济高速增长的原因进行了深入研究,但是对于如何能够实现从粗放型经济增长模式转变为集约型经济增长模式则关注不够,而正好是这一转折点推动了乡镇企业质的提高.为了探讨乡镇经济增长模式转变的道路,通过个案研究的方法来寻找证据.通过对T镇的考察,运用理性选择的理论解释了乡镇领导人是如何促进乡镇经济增长模式转变的,这也是文章的创新之处.即乡镇领导人一方面通过集体企业改制甩掉了那些长期亏损的企业,淘汰了粗放型的发展模式,虽然说付出了巨大的代价,但是实现了乡镇经济整体的受损最小化;另一方面,乡镇领导人通过工业园建设提升了乡镇经济的规模和效益,通过招商引资吸引了乡镇经济增长所需的技术和资金,集约型经济增长的生长实现了经济发展的获益最大化.通过这两种路径,乡镇领导人的理性选择影响了经济增长模式的转变.通过对T镇的个案研究,希望能够同前人的研究展开对话,同时亦希望推广此项研究的外部效度.     

Innovations, externalities and the problem of economic progress

In modern industrial societies innovativeness is seen as a source of economic growth and welfare increases. Following this assessment economic research presently focusses almost exclusively on the question of how to elicit innovations. Yet innovative economic activities have always also meant losses, sometimes even hardship, to some members of society, and incalculable risks. The present paper tries to develop a more balanced picture by acknowledging these less pleasant implications. Whether, and under what conditions, the permissive regime which modern societies have adopted towards innovations can be justified is discussed within the framework of a contractarian approach.     

Political theory in historical context. Reflections on Democratic Justice and the Social Contract by Albert Weale

In Democratic Justice and the Social Contract, Weale defends a contractarian theory of social justice following what he calls the ‘empirical method’, which consists in grounding ethics and politics on the observation of concrete examples of social contracts, rather than abstract speculations. In this paper, I will make three critical remarks. First, the empirical method is open to the same objections usually raised against more abstract approaches to social contract theory: by an appropriate choice of the starting point, one can justify any ethical or political position. Second, Weale’s focus on the societies that were successful in managing common pool resources appears arbitrary: other social organizations (e.g. hunters and gatherers societies) would be a more obvious choice. Finally, in following the empirical method, philosophers must be willing to import into ethics and politics the same problems of interpretation one encounters in theoretical social sciences. As an example, I will show that Weale’s position on the welfare state depends on the interpretation he gives of some practices observed in the societies he chooses as models. Different interpretations of the same practices would induce Weale to revise his positions.     

Social process in grizzly bear management: lessons for collaborative governance and natural resource policy

In this study, we analyze a case of governance in natural resource management. Building on the limited body of literature on termination and using methods of problem orientation and social process mapping, we examine a stakeholder engagement process designed to address conflicts in grizzly bear management in Banff National Park, Alberta. Terminated in 2009 after several years of collaboration, this stakeholder engagement process explicitly used the policy sciences framework to cultivate dialogue, improve participants?? decision-making skills, and make consensus-based recommendations for grizzly bear management. Our analysis demonstrates the utility of undertaking social process mapping and problem orientation in order to understand a natural resource policy problem. We include recommendations to foster a social process that allows for clarification and advancement of the common interest in stakeholder groups, insights into how social process can contribute to policy termination, and reflections on the practical, collaborative use of the policy sciences to solve problems of governance. This analysis complements other articles on this case that examine stakeholder perspectives, initial outcomes, and decision process, collectively providing a thorough policy analysis.     

Parliamentary procedure: principal forms and political effects

A standard conclusion of theorists who model bargaining as a non-cooperative game is that the party designated to make the first move—the formateur party—will determine the bargaining outcome. Most empirical studies of parliamentary coalition formation have paid surprisingly little attention to the formation process. In this paper we model government formation as a two-stage unordered discrete choice problem that better reflects this process. The first step involves the selection of a formateur party, and the second involves the choice of partners by the predicted formateur. We evaluate several hypotheses for the two stages, using a data set of all cabinets formed in the Western European countries from 1970 to 2006. In our analyses of formateur selection, we find that party size is clearly the dominant feature. In the second stage, we show that when predicting government composition it is fruitful to add information drawn from a first stage analysis.     

Computing Nash Equilibria in Probabilistic, Multiparty Spatial Models with Nonpolicy Components

Although there exist extensive results concerning equilibriain spatial models of two-party elections with probabilisticvoting, we know far less about equilibria in multiparty elections—i.e.,under what conditions will equilibria exist, and what are thecharacteristics of equilibrium configurations? We derive conditionsthat guarantee the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium anddevelop an algorithm to compute that equilibrium inmultipartyelections with probabilistic voting, in which voters chooseaccording to the behaviorists' fully specified multivariatevote model. Previously, such computations could only be approximatedby laborious search methods. The algorithm, which assumes aconditional logit choice function, can be applied to spatialcompetition for a variety of party objectives including vote-maximizationand margin-maximization, and can also encompass alternativevoter policy metrics such as quadratic and linear loss functions.We show that our conditions for an equilibrium are plausiblegiven the empirically-estimated parameters that behavioristsreport for voting behavior in historical elections. We alsoshow that parties' equilibrium positions depend not only onthe distribution of voters' policy preferences but also on theirnonpolicy-related attributes such as partisanship and sociodemographicvariables. Empirical applications to data from a recent Frenchelection illustrate the use of the algorithm and suggest thata unique Nash equilibrium existed in that election.     

Measuring the Growth of the Nonprofit Sector: A Longitudinal Analysis

Scholars have examined the effects of various environmental factors on the nonprofit sector to elucidate the role of nonprofits in modern society. However, researchers report a paucity of information on nonprofit growth using longitudinal data, especially outside the United States. This article analyzes 40 years of political, economic, and sociodemographic data in South Korea to test theories of nonprofit growth and to determine whether the concepts and theories developed for Western societies can be successfully applied in South Korea. The results show that demand‐ and supply‐side economic theories account for variations in nonprofit growth, but the existing socioeconomic explanations fail to recognize the political influences on nonprofit development. Nonprofit organizations have emerged from social and economic necessity but have also been nurtured within a political framework.     

Voter preferences,simple electoral games,and equilibria in two-candidate contests

The fundamental assumption of spatial models of party competition is that voters possess cardinal utility functions defined on all combinations of issue positions which candidates may adopt. Furthermore, spatial theorists usually assume that utility functions have a shape common to all voters and that voters' most preferred positions are distributed in some regular manner. Employing these and attendant assumptions, the spatial theorist seeks to ascertain what deductions can be made about candidate strategies, i.e., the positions which vote or plurality-maximizing candidates should adopt in an election. It has been found that, in many situations, convergence to an opponent's positions and/or adoption of the median/mean of the most preferred positions of all voters is an important candidate strategy. In this context, two main problems have arisen: (1) difficulties of empirical or statistical analysis; (2) the abovementioned candidate strategy is generally not applicable to elections in so-called ‘plural’ societies. One path out of this latter problem has been formulated by Rabushka and Shepsle (1972). This article explores another potential solution by addressing the following question: If voters arenot characterized by cardinal utility functions, but some other type, what are the consequences for candidate strategies? The alternate assumption employed is that voters are characterized bylexicographic utility functions. The consequences for candidate strategies of this assumption are then determined for two plurality-maximizing candidates in some one- and two-dimensional, three-, five-, and seven-voter electoral games.     

Economic Growth and Social Capital

Recent interdisciplinary theoretical work has suggested that social capital, or the interpersonal trust of citizens, plays an important role in explaining both the efficiency of political institutions, and in the economic performance of contemporary societies. This paper examines the relationship between social capital and economic growth in a sample of thirty-four countries over the period 1970 to 1992, within the framework of a modified neo-classical model of economic growth. The findings suggest that social capital has an impact on growth which is at least as strong as that of human capital or education, which has been the focus of much of the recent work on endogenous growth theory. It appears to have about the same impact on growth as catch-up or the ability of poorer nations to adopt technological innovations pioneered by their richer counterparts.     

Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation

In this article I argue that theorizing about justice at the level of ideal theory is inherently flawed and thus has impoverished liberal egalitarianism. Ideal theorists (falsely) assume that a political philosopher can easily determine (or has privileged access to) what constitutes the 'best foreseeable conditions'. Furthermore, by assuming full compliance, ideal theorists violate the constraints of a realistic utopia. More specifically I argue that liberal egalitarians who function at the level of ideal theory adopt a cost-blind approach to rights and a narrow view of possible human misfortune. The former issue leads liberal egalitarians to give priority to a serially ordered principle of equal basic liberties or to treat rights as 'trumps'; and the latter to a stringent prioritarian principle (Rawls' difference principle) or luck egalitarianism. Taken together, the cost-blind approach to rights, coupled with the narrow view of human misfortune, mean the liberal egalitarian theories of justice cannot address the issue of trade-offs that inevitably arises in real non-ideal societies that face the fact of scarcity. This makes liberal egalitarianism an ineffective theory of social justice.     

Ideology and candidate evaluation

How does the expressed political ideology of voters influence their evaluation of presidential candidates? The classic answer to this question is provided by the spatial theory of electoral choice in which utility for a candidate is a function of the proximity between the voter and candidate positions on the liberal-conservative continuum. We have argued elsewhere that spatial theory, while intellectually appealing, is inadequate as an empirical model of mass behavior. We have developed a directional theory of issue voting that we believe provides a more realistic accounting of how specific policy issues influence utility for a candidate. Directional theory is based on the view that for most voters issues are understood as a dichotomous choice between two alternative positions. While ideology is widely understood as a continuum of positions, the directional model can be applied to the relationship between ideology and candidate evaluation. In this paper we compare the two theories using National Election Study data from 1972 to 1988. The results tend to favor the directional model over the traditional proximity model. We conclude by briefly tracing out the implications of this finding.     

Economic hardship and social capital in Europe: A comparative analysis of 27 democracies

This article evaluates whether economic hardship affects social capital in Europe. Comparing 27 European countries, it evaluates the impact of personal experiences of economic hardship on engagement in voluntary associations as a cornerstone of civic and democratic life. Empirical analyses of the Eurobarometer data indicate that individual economic hardship has indeed a negative effect on associational volunteering in Europe. However, the result is qualified in two respects. First, it is found that the effect of individual economic hardship is contingent upon education. Second, this effect mostly refers to volunteering for associations providing solidarity goods (Putnam groups). These results have broader implications for understanding how economic hardship shapes the social capital within democratic societies.     

From path dependence to policy mixes for Nordic electric mobility: Lessons for accelerating future transport transitions

We examine the problem of how to accelerate policies related to electric vehicles (EVs) in the Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. These four Nordic countries represent an interesting collection of cases by virtue of having common decarbonization targets extending to the transport sector, interlinked electric energy systems and a joint electricity market largely based on low-carbon energy while they are open societies bent on innovation, making them well adaptable to a transition toward electric mobility. Our analytical framework drawing from transition research, lock-in and path dependency and institutionalism enables us to discern technological, institutional and behavioral mechanisms which can have both constraining and enabling effects vis-à-vis this transition by means of shaping national socio-technical systems and regimes. On this basis, we also discuss how to develop policies accelerating the transition. We find that the incumbent industries can shape policy choice through the lock-in into institutional inter-dependencies. The accumulation of social and material features, and vested interests of actors, for its part can maintain regime level inertia, impeding the transition. Yet, technological lock-in can also enable EVs, by means of learning effects from technologically interrelated wind energy projects and available infrastructure in buildings that support the EV charging needs. Overall, the complexity of path-dependent mechanisms embedded in the dominant regimes, together with the diversity of emerging policy mixes, demands attention both on the technologies and broader socio-technical systems in order to properly assess the prospects of transition toward electric mobility.

     

Beyond the Social Market: Rethinking Capitalism and Public Policy

Despite its worthy motives, social market philosophy provides neither a useful analytical framework for understanding modern capitalism, nor the policy tools to address our present economic and social predicament. The concept of ‘market failure’, with its underlying assumption of market equilibrium, does not capture the systemically adverse outcomes of collective market forces. A more sophisticated understanding of capitalist economies, and the societies in which they exist, would recognise that the market economy is a dynamic but not self‐regulating system. It is embedded in, and impacts on, four other economies – of the natural environment, of family and care, of voluntary association, and of the public sector – which operate under different motivations and allocative principles. The role of government is central, to balance the values created by different kinds of institutions and to constrain the dynamic impacts of market forces. A number of policy conclusions are offered arising from this framework.     

论公共权力、公共管理与有效政府的范式界定

当前世界各国都迫切需要解决这样一个问题在社会经济的发展进程中,政府该发挥一种什么样的作用,以及如何使这一作用得到有效发挥?本文从公共权力的视角入手,通过对公共权力基本内涵的分析,界定了"有效政府"的范式,为我国行政改革提供了有益的借鉴.