What I Like About You: Legislator Personality and Legislator Approval

Political Behavior - Recent work in the study of legislative politics has uncovered associations between the Big Five personality traits and myriad phenomena in the United States Congress. This...     

Constraining Executive Action: The Role of Legislator Professionalization in Latin America

What explains the failure of legislatures with strong constitutionally endowed powers to exert themselves over the executive in practice? We examine the role of legislator professionalization in strengthening the legislature's ability to constrain executive action, conceptualizing legislator professionalization as prior legislative experience and prior professional work experience. We argue that more professionalized legislators, through the skill and knowledge they bring to the policymaking process from prior experience, will be better equipped to challenge executive authority. In a sample of four Latin American countries from 1990 through 2010, we find that legislatures are more likely to curb executive decree issuance when individual legislators are strongly professionalized, controlling for constitutional powers and several other partisan and political factors. Our findings suggest that legislatures composed of more professionalized legislators can constrain executive action, especially in the context of a unified political opposition in the legislature.     

Estimating Ideal Points in the British House of Commons Using Early Day Motions

This article develops a new method for estimating the ideological preferences of members of the British House of Commons. Existing methods produce implausible results due to high levels of party cohesion and strategic voting on the part of opposition parties. To circumvent these problems, this article estimates MP preferences using Early Day Motions (EDMs) as an alternative to roll‐call votes. The Bayesian ideal point model for the decision to sign an EDM takes into account both policy preferences and signing costs. The estimates obtained have greater face validity than previous attempts to measure preferences in the House of Commons, recovering the expected order of parties and of members within parties. The estimates successfully predict voting behavior in the House of Commons. As with other Bayesian ideal point methods, this approach produces natural uncertainty estimates and allows for easy calculation of quantities of interest such as member ranks.     

Legislator Success in Committee: Gatekeeping Authority and the Loss of Majority Control

In multiparty legislatures, the largest party or coalition may fall short of controlling a majority of plenary seats. However, plurality‐led congresses generally endow the largest parties with extensive agenda‐setting prerogatives, even when plenary majorities are lacking. In this article, we present a model and compelling evidence describing changes in the strategic behavior of committee chairs when majority control is lost. Using a dataset that includes all the bills proposed to the Argentine House in the last 25 years, we estimate success in committee in majority‐ and plurality‐led congresses. We provide extensive evidence that the loss of majority control reduces the importance of the median voter of the plurality party while improving the success of the median committee voter.     

Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation

In this article I argue that theorizing about justice at the level of ideal theory is inherently flawed and thus has impoverished liberal egalitarianism. Ideal theorists (falsely) assume that a political philosopher can easily determine (or has privileged access to) what constitutes the 'best foreseeable conditions'. Furthermore, by assuming full compliance, ideal theorists violate the constraints of a realistic utopia. More specifically I argue that liberal egalitarians who function at the level of ideal theory adopt a cost-blind approach to rights and a narrow view of possible human misfortune. The former issue leads liberal egalitarians to give priority to a serially ordered principle of equal basic liberties or to treat rights as 'trumps'; and the latter to a stringent prioritarian principle (Rawls' difference principle) or luck egalitarianism. Taken together, the cost-blind approach to rights, coupled with the narrow view of human misfortune, mean the liberal egalitarian theories of justice cannot address the issue of trade-offs that inevitably arises in real non-ideal societies that face the fact of scarcity. This makes liberal egalitarianism an ineffective theory of social justice.     

Gender Matters in Politics

Although often ignored by practitioners and academics alike, gender matters in both politics as a practice and politics as a subject of study. This article systematically demonstrates how both the practice and study of politics are gendered in ways that lead to an over‐representation of men. It also argues that both are intertwined in significant ways that need to be unravelled, but also that important changes have taken place in both over the last 30 years. The article goes on to highlight some of the challenges that remain and ends by outlining some of the key themes that should be an important part of an on‐going agenda to improve politics as a practice and as a discipline.     

Has Legislative Television Changed Legislator Behavior?: C-SPAN2 and the Frequency of Senate Filibustering

Using data from 1959–1998, this studyexamines the impact of legislativetelevision (C-SPAN2) on the number offilibusters in the United States Senate. As previous work has suggested, theinstitutional rules of the federallegislative branch of government in theU.S. often allow for politicalgrandstanding and posturing, and theseactivities are enhanced with the presenceof television cameras on the legislativefloor. Like those previous studies, thepresent work builds a theoretical modelwherein political services are consideredsearch/experience goods, and serviceproviders (federal legislators) areexpected utility maximizers who areconcerned with promoting their policypreferences and their re-electionprospects. Poisson model estimates suggestthat the presence of legislative televisionhas worked to increase the filibuster countin the Senate. As a result, such posturingand positioning on the issues by incumbents(in front of television cameras) is costlyfor challengers to replicate and likelycontributes to lower turnover rates in thelegislative branch.     

When Gender Matters: Macro-dynamics and Micro-mechanisms

Does candidate sex matter to general election outcomes? And if so, under what conditions does sex exert an effect? Research conducted over the past 40 years has asserted an absence of a sex effect, consistently finding that women fare as well as men when they run. Nevertheless, this scholarship neglects sex-based differences in candidate valence, or non-policy characteristics such as competence and integrity that voters intrinsically value in their elected officials. If women candidates hold greater valence than men, and if women’s electoral success stems from this valence advantage, then women candidates would be penalized if they lacked the upper hand on valence. Recent research at the macro-level reports a 3 % vote disadvantage for women candidates when valence is held constant (Fulton, Political Res Q 65(2):303–314, 2012), but is based on only one general election year. The present study replicates Fulton’s (Political Res Q 65(2):303–314, 2012) research using new data from a more recent general election and finds a consistent 3 % vote deficit for women candidates. In addition, this paper extends these findings theoretically and empirically to the micro-level: examining who responds to variations in candidate sex and valence. Male independent voters, who often swing general elections, are equally supportive of women candidates when they have a valence advantage. Absent a relative abundance of valence, male independents are significantly less likely to endorse female candidates. If correct, the gender affinity effect is asymmetrical: male independent voters are more likely to support men candidates, and less likely to support women, but female independents fail to similarly discriminate.     

Legislator Turnout and the Calculus of Voting: The Determinants of Abstention in the U.S. Congress

The belief that turnout and abstention depend on theinteraction of the benefits and costs of voting is oneof the longest held in public choice. The interplaybetween benefits and costs has typically been studiedwithin the context of voter turnout in elections, butthese results are confounded by the fact thatparticipation in such elections is a low-cost, low-benefit activity. Analysis of voting in legislatures,where the potential returns and costs to participantsare greater, is more promising. This paper examines participation on roll calls in theU.S. House of Representatives during the recent 104thCongress (1995–1996). We analyze all contested rollcalls during this two-year period, using a negativebinomial count model that accounts for legislatorheterogeneity, to determine what factors associatedwith such votes induce turnout. Our results suggestthat, while turnout is predictable, its primaryexplanation does not lie with our standard calculationof expected benefits. We find that the ideologicalpolarization of the roll call alternatives is not avery important factor for turnout and, even morestrikingly and contrary to what past analysis hasimplied, the likelihood of any given legislator beingpivotal is completely irrelevant. Rather, what is mostimportant is that a non-trivial number of members ofCongress decide not to vote when contextual factorsforce them to choose between electioneering andlegislating. Consequently, while our results are notsufficient to induce a full-fledged ``paradox ofcongressional voting'' analogous to that of massvoting, they do indicate that participation inCongress depends most heavily on factors beyond adesire to affect the outcome.     

Knowledge Matters: Policy Cross-pressures and Black Partisanship

Black Americans are a core Democratic constituency, despite holding views on social issues that put them in conflict with the party. Conventional wisdom attributes this partisan commitment to the salience of race and concerns about racial inequality. This paper considers whether the Democratic bias derives in part from low levels of political knowledge. Using data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Study, this paper examines how political knowledge moderates the relationship between social issue cross-pressures and partisan attitudes among Black Americans. I demonstrate that the extent to which Democratic allegiance persists despite policy disagreements depends on whether blacks are sufficiently knowledgeable to act on their policy views, and not simply on the importance that blacks assign to their racial commitments. It is only among politically knowledgeable Black Americans that social issue cross-pressures are at all politically consequential; for them, Democratic partisanship is resilient but not immune to policy disagreements. For blacks with low levels of political knowledge, partisan support is unaffected by policy disagreements. This pattern is most pronounced among religiously active Black Evangelicals, for whom social issues are highly salient.     

When Trust Matters: The Case of Gun Control

Political Behavior - Declining trust in government is often cited as the cause of declining support for policies that require ideological sacrifices. Yet pivotal to the effect of trust is the...     

Money Matters: The Financing of the Conservative Party

The article examines the financing of the Conservative Party in the aftermath of the 2001 general election. An examination of the party's income and expenditure shows that pre-2001 patterns remain - the Conservatives are the poorer of the two main parties but continue to be the principal recipient of corporate and in-kind donations. However, the article also demonstrates that income rose sharply in the aftermath of the change of leadership in 2003, suggesting that this change may have stimulated donations. Also, as for other parties, questions of probity continue to arise following larger donations but, like Labour, the Conservatives oppose any caps on political giving.     

The Negotiated Economy: Ideal and History*

In the negotiated economy an essential part of the allocation of resources is by definition conducted through institutionalized negotiations between independent decisionmaking centres in state, organizations and corporations. Institutionalized creation of consensus via campaign institutions and forced compromise via negotiating procedures and decisions are central characteristics of the negotiated economy. The article includes evidence to the fact that the present Danish economy is a negotiated economy. During a long historical process, a multi-centred and pluralist political structure has been formed and simultaneously the discursive and institutional basis for co-ordination of decisions made in autonomous organizations has been created. It is shown how today's wages policy, labour market policy, public expenditures policy and industrial policy are characterized by negotiation-based economic processes. It is argued that this historical development has far-reaching theoretical consequences. The institutional conditions presupposed in traditional economic theory for the ideal of optimal allocation of resources is enshrined in the constitutional interpretation of the distinction between the authority of the sovereign state and civil society. As a result of the evolvement of the negotiated economy these institutional conditions no longer exist. This development has made a myth of the ideal of optimal allocation of resources and challenges the interpretation of rationality in traditional economic theory.