Climate agreements and India: aligning options and opportunities on a new track

The Climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009 witnessed the emerging power of Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (BASIC). Although still focussed on domestic development goals, BASIC countries have made important steps toward a greater engagement in the global climate agenda. For India, the shift was marked by a voluntary, but conditional, target of reducing emission intensity, away from the past normative position based on “equal per capita,” emissions entitlements. The new track aims at finding cost-effective mitigation strategies that align national development goals and climate actions. This paper examines the mitigation potential of a domestic sustainable development policy using a suite of integrated assessment models. The long-term goal is to keep temperature increase below 2°C. This article shows that it is possible to match domestic development goals and climate mitigation. Win–win options exist and side benefits—in terms of energy security and local pollution—are important. However, development policies are not sufficient to achieve the desired emissions reductions. We find that it is necessary to introduce a constraint on the carbon budget. The price of carbon that emerges is however much lower than in a conventional mitigation scenario. Finally, this paper proposes to shift the negotiations away from the current climate-centric focus toward “development,” in order to reduce conflicts and deliver greater global and national benefits.     

In what format and under what timeframe would China take on climate commitments? A roadmap to 2050

Balancing China’s energy needs to fuel its rapid economic growth with the resulting potential impacts of climate change presents an enormous climate policy dilemma, not simply for China but for the entire world. This is the major reason why the role of China is an issue of perennial concerns at international climate change negotiations. In response to these concerns and to put China in a positive position, this paper maps out a realistic roadmap for China’s specific climate commitments toward 2050. Taking many factors into consideration, the paper argues that China needs to take on absolute emissions caps around 2030. However, it is hard to imagine how China could apply the brakes so sharply as to switch from rapid emissions growth to immediate emissions cuts, without passing through several intermediate phases. To that end, the paper envisions that China needs the following three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations before taking on absolute emissions caps that will lead to the global convergence of per capita emissions by 2050: First, further credible energy conservation commitments starting in 2013 and aimed at cutting China’s carbon intensity by 46–50% by 2020; second, voluntary “no lose” emission targets starting in 2018; and third, binding carbon intensity targets as its international commitment starting in 2023. Overall, this proposal is a balanced reflection of respecting China’s rights to grow and recognizing China’s growing responsibility for increasing greenhouse gas emissions as China is on its way to becoming the world’s largest economy.     

Countries start to explain how their climate contributions are fair: more rigour needed

In the lead-up to the Paris Agreement, every country was invited to submit an intended nationally determined contribution (INDC), and indicate how it is fair. We analyse how countries have explained the equity of mitigation and adaptation in 163 INDCs, providing a bottom-up analysis of equity to complement a literature that has focused on top-down allocations. While no single indicator of equity was used by all INDCs, a menu of quantified indicators or tiered approaches could provide bounded flexibility across different national circumstances. The most common equity indicator used in mitigation INDCs is the country’s ‘small share’ of global emissions, followed by per capita emissions. The emissions of individual ‘small share’ INDCs add up to 24% of annual global emissions when using a consistent data set. Per capita emissions are used across a range of countries with low (0.5) to high (25 t CO₂–eq per capita) values for that indicator. Adaptation is included in 89% of INDCs, of which more than half quantify impacts in some manner, and two-thirds use vulnerability as an equity argument. Broadly, we find that most claims to equity are either unsubstantiated or drawn from analysis by in-country experts. Only two INDCs refer to independent evidence, and none consider the consequences of their approach when applied to all countries. Given that the aggregate effect of INDCs will not be sufficient to keep global temperature increase well below 2 °C, and even less to keep temperature below a 1.5 °C rise, the INDCs have distributional implications. More rigorous information is needed to assess relative fair shares, which could be provided officially in future nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Absent improved information, it is likely that researchers and civil society will continue to assess informally what could be considered fair. A hybrid approach to equity—combining bottom-up assessment and top-down allocation—would be consistent with the hybrid architecture of the Paris Agreement, which comprises bottom-up elements such as NDCs and top-down elements such as global goals. Improved information on equity in NDCs will be an important input to the global stocktake ‘in the light of equity’.     

The Stock Market to the Rescue? Carbon Disclosure and the Future of Securities-Related Climate Change Litigation

This article considers the role that securities litigation can play in forcing public companies to disclose climate change risks to their investors and potential shareholders. Such disclosure can prove to be a strong incentive for companies to manage their greenhouse gas emissions and climate change exposure better. Securities regulators in North America have, for the most part, resisted efforts effectively to enforce obligations by companies to disclose climate change risks. This led to a recent action by the Office of the Attorney-General in New York, which exemplifies the role that litigation can play in this area. Investors themselves may soon bring their own actions against companies over their carbon disclosure, the basis for which is already provided in securities legislation.     

Genesis of the CDM: the original policymaking goals of the 1997 Brazilian proposal and their evolution in the Kyoto protocol negotiations into the CDM

A body of literature is emerging applying critical consideration to the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism’s (‘CDM’) achievement of policy goals regarding sustainable development, geographical distribution of projects and related matters. This article places this literature in the context of the policymaking goals of the CDM’s Brazilian architects. The CDM arose from the Brazilian Proposal’s Clean Development Fund, and was negotiated between Brazil and the United States in the weeks preceding the Kyoto Conference of Parties. The CDM’s Brazilian architects continued to pursue their underlying policy goals by taking a leadership position in the Marrakesh Accords negotiations. During this period Brazil’s primary policy objectives comprised achieving meaningful mitigation of GHG emissions to avoid dangerous interference with the climate system, derailing a perceived US/IPCC initiative to allocate emissions cap obligations in the Kyoto Protocol on the basis of current emissions, and taking a leadership position both among the G-77 and China and in the multilateral climate negotiations as a whole. The CDM arose in this context from the G-77 and China’s desire to coerce the North’s compliance with the North’s emissions cap obligations through an alternative means of compliance. As a result, there was no focus on broad conceptions of sustainable development, or on broad distribution of CDM projects throughout the South. Instead, the CDM’s Brazilian architects envisioned that CDM-related sustainable development would arise exclusively from the presence of the CDM projects. Similarly, the Brazilian Proposal advocated allocation of the Clean Development Fund on a basis proportionate to each non-Annex I countries projected 1990–2010 greenhouse gas emissions. These views persisted through the evolution of the Clean Development Fund into the CDM and through Marrakesh Accords negotiations. This article argues that the CDM has largely met the policy goals of its Brazilian architects and that the pursuit of different, additional, refined or more nuanced policy goals necessitates corresponding refinements to the CDM, or any successor mechanism, specifically targeting those different, additional, refined or more nuanced policy objectives, lending support to the emerging literature proposing changes to the CDM to pursue corresponding policy objectives.     

Acceptance and Support of the Australian Carbon Policy

In July 2012, the Australian government instituted the Clean Energy Legislative Package. This policy, commonly known as the carbon policy or carbon tax, holds industries responsible for emissions they release through a carbon price. Because this will have an indirect effect on consumer costs, the policy also includes a compensation package for households indirectly impacted. This study, building upon past work in distributive justice, examines the determinants of the policy’s acceptance and support. We proposed perceived fairness and effectiveness of the policy, and endorsement of free-market ideology, would directly predict policy acceptance. We tested this through an on-line survey of Australian citizens and found that policy acceptance was predicted by perceived fairness and effectiveness. More Australians found the policy acceptable (43 %) than unacceptable (36 %), and many found it neither acceptable nor unacceptable (21 %). In contrast, when asked about support, more Australians tended not to support the policy (53 %) than support it (47 %). Support was predicted by main effects for perceived fairness, effectiveness, free-market ideology, and the interaction between free-market ideology and effectiveness. We conclude by considering some of the implications of our results for the implementation of policies addressing climate change mitigation and adaptation, for theories of social justice and attitudinal ambivalence, and for the continuing integration of research between economics and psychology. Furthermore, we argue for the distinction between policy support and acceptance and discourage the interchangeable use of these terms.     

Legislating Against Climate Change: A UK Perspective on a Sisyphean Challenge

The UK's Climate Change Act offers a framework for civil society to achieve 'low carbon' realignment through to 2050. The Act is reviewed for its coherence as a mechanism for directing future policy. The legislation establishes a carbon budgetary process, mandates greenhouse gas reduction targets and strategies, and imposes a novel range of duties supported by processes for ensuring transparency concerning progress. Following an overview of climate change risks and likely economic consequences, the analysis identifies selected regulatory strategies. It explores the main statutory features, with an emphasis upon the implications of imposing mandatory duties on decision makers. An evaluation of the key policy choice of emissions trading is informed by perspectives of environmental justice, in particular as to questions of equitable burden-sharing in relation to impacts of climate change and related policies. A concluding section summarises reasonable expectations and ongoing challenges.     

Geoengineering governance-by-default: an earth system governance perspective

Geoengineering—the deliberate interference in the climate system to affect global warming—could have significant global environmental and social implications. How to shape formal geoengineering governance mechanisms is an issue of debate. This paper describes and analyses the geoengineering governance landscape that has developed in the absence of explicit geoengineering regulation. An Earth System Governance perspective provides insight into the formation of norms resulting from an overlap in international treaties and from the actions of engaged non-state agents. Specifically, the paper explores the instruments and actors having effect in existing formal and informal geoengineering governance mechanisms. It finds that geoengineering is subject to a form of ‘governance-by-default’. This is due to a situation in which state actors have not resolved the tension between two legal norms: that of ‘precaution’ and that of ‘harm minimisation’. This governance-by-default is characterised by uneven regulation from existing multilateral agreements established for other purposes, an absence of regulation specifically focused on geoengineering, guidance from an international ambition to hold global average warming below 2 °C and to achieve net-zero emissions in the second half of the century, and strong normative engagement by the research community. Governance-by-default is likely to be a stopgap development until more enduring and focused governance emerges.     

‘Multicolored’ green criminology and climate change’s achromatopsia

While green criminology may be an effective name or label for the sub-field or perspective within criminology that considers a wide range of environmental issues, it is, in reality, a ‘multicolored green’ – a criminology that engages a spectrum of issues, that reflects the interests of some racial groups more than others, that reveals and analyzes environmental harms which disproportionately impact some racial groups more than others, and that can be approached from a number of vantage points or that can be viewed with variously tinted lenses. This article begins with an overview of climate change, including a discussion of its anticipated impacts and indicators of its already-being-felt effects. It then offers some general comments on the disproportionate impact of environmental threats and harms before turning to a discussion of the present and anticipated distributional impacts of climate change. Here, this article argues that climate change is, in effect, achromatopsic – it is color-blind, in that it affects us all regardless of skin color – but that those impacts will be distributed unevenly/unequally and that various groups are and will continue to be in different positions to adapt to climate change. This article concludes by suggesting that while the environmental harms caused by climate change are real – and the risks and threats they pose tangible and serious – climate change presents an exciting challenge for our creative potential as humans. In the process of reducing our consumption of fossil fuels and stabilizing (or, better yet, reducing) our greenhouse gas emissions, we might better assist those geopolitical regions most at risk (i.e. poor, developing countries) to become more resilient – an approach that is necessary for both the physical health of the planet and the prospects for social justice.     

The Organized Irresponsibility Principle and Risk Arbitrage

In an age of accelerating wealth at the very top and accelerating risks at the bottom, there is a clear disjunction between the flow of social benefits and social damages produced by different actors and their share of these respective benefits and damages. Yet, the specific processes that generate the dualization of tracks of accumulation of rewards or accumulation of risks and precarity are still up for debate. In tackling this dual process in a way that is attuned to the critical contribution of contemporary forms of the law to this uneven accumulation of wealth and of risks, this paper focuses on organized irresponsibility—where individuals can cumulatively contribute to risks, but avoid individual culpability—and how relations of organized irresponsibility provide extensive opportunities for risk arbitrage. Risk arbitrage is correspondingly a process where actors, whether it be individuals or larger organizations, can produce social risk, appropriate benefit from these risks, and disproportionately avoid the consequences of the risks so as to benefit from the overall “cycle of reward and risk”—even if society as a whole is worse off. The paper identifies organized irresponsibility as fundamentally undergirded by mismatches between existing configurations of law and the existing complexity of the processes of the production of social goods and risks. This paper proceeds to show how gaps in the law enable the organized irresponsibility principle—that given a level of risk production, the greater the number of actors involved and the greater complexity between causes and the risk’s impacts, the less overall culpability that tends to be assigned. It then shows how the organized irresponsibility principle enables relationships of risk arbitrage that intensify contemporary risk and inequality.     

Exploring national and regional orchestration of non-state action for a < 1.5 °C world

The importance of actions by non-state and sub-national actors (e.g., companies and cities) is increasingly recognized, because current governmental commitments are insufficient to limit the increase of global temperatures to 1.5 °C. Orchestration, the alignment between ‘orchestrator’ (e.g., international organizations and governments) and ‘intermediaries’ (e.g., city networks and partnerships), could harness additional contributions by building catalytic linkages and by enabling a growing number of actions. Although most orchestration efforts have been made in the context of international climate negotiations, regional and national orchestration could be useful by contributing to the implementation of national commitments, and by inspiring greater ambition. We investigate whether and how regional and national orchestrators respond to shortfalls in international orchestration. Using insights from a comparative study, we provide an early indication of the catalytic potential of orchestration in Latin America, Europe, India, Argentina, and Sweden. We find considerable impacts of global level orchestration on the emergence of these initiatives, however orchestrators do not simply copy other efforts; they emphasize different catalytic linkages, including the engagement of underrepresented actors; implementation; and, the provision of ideational and material support. Catalytic linkages in a complex landscape with multiple orchestrators could sometimes be improved through coordination. Given the enormous scale of transformation needed, a focus on scale may seem natural. However, for socially just outcomes, orchestrators need to resist a sole focus on scale, and also aim at experimental and small-scale actions, which may not lead to immediate large-scale impacts but which may prove crucial in longer-term transformations.     

Exploring the agency of Africa in climate change negotiations: the case of REDD+

Emerging climate change regimes, such as the mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+), are increasingly aiming to engage developing countries such as those in Africa, in sustainable development through carbon markets. The contribution of African countries to global climate negotiations determines how compatible the negotiated rules could be with the existing socioeconomic and policy circumstances of African countries. The aim of this paper is to explore the agency of Africa (African States) in the global climate change negotiations and discuss possible implications for implementing these rules using REDD+ as a case study. Drawing on document analysis and semi-structured expert interviews, our findings suggest that although African countries are extensively involved in the implementation of REDD+ interventions, the continent has a weak agency on the design of the global REDD+ architecture. This weak agency results from a number of factors including the inability of African countries to send large and diverse delegations to the negotiations as well lack of capacity to generate and transmit research evidence to the global platform. African countries also perceive themselves as victims of climate change who should be eligible for support rather than sources of technological solutions. Again, Africa’s position is fragmented across negotiation coalitions which weakens the continent's collective influence on the REDD+ agenda. This paper discusses a number of implementation deficits which could result from this weak agency. These include concerns about implementation capacity and a potential lack of coherence between REDD+ rules and existing policies in African countries. These findings call for a rethink of pathways to enhancing Africa’s strategies in engaging in multilateral climate change negotiations, especially if climate change regimes specifically targeted at developing countries are to be effective.     

Climate Change and Global Citizenship

The international climate change regime has failed. Even the most optimistic assessment of action to limit greenhouse pollution in the coming few decades will not prevent calamitous changes in Earth's climate. Arguments for international—that is, interstate—justice that have permeated international negotiations on climate change have been insufficient in fostering robust action by states. Indeed, by diverting all responsibility to states, focusing on international justice has not addressed consumption and pollution by hundreds of millions of affluent people around the world, including many millions living within developing states that have no treaty obligations to limit nationwide pollution. Increasingly, however, it is these individuals that matter: more and more of them who are not now subject to any climate‐related legal obligations are able to afford lifestyles that lead to greenhouse gas emissions and more climate change. This is especially true given the very rapid increase in the numbers of affluent people in the developing world. Bearing this in mind, this article goes beyond the still important questions of international climate justice to explore cosmopolitan or global climate justice. Global justice demands that affluent individuals in both affluent and poor states do much more to limit their pollution of the atmosphere. By being good global citizens, capable persons can help states start the world on a path to reducing the severity of climate change.     

The EU 40 % greenhouse gas emission reduction target by 2030 in perspective

We assess the fairness and ambition level of the EU’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) of reducing domestic greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40 % relative to 1990. For this, we calculate which reduction targets for other major emitting economies are comparable to the EU target, given widely diverging effort-sharing approaches. We introduce a novel approach in which the EU target is taken as starting point for allocating emission reductions to other regions. Under this approach, the global emission level is an outcome of the analysis, contrary to standard effort-sharing approaches in which the global climate goal is specified. We find that the INDC of the EU, if other regions take on comparable targets based on a differentiated convergence per-capita approach, could be sufficient for a global 2 °C pathway. However, if emissions are allocated according to a historical responsibility approach, the global emission level in 2030 is much higher than the level of 2 °C pathways. Furthermore, we conclude that India, Mexico, and Brazil have more ambitious INDCs than the EU according to both a differentiated convergence per-capita approach and a historical responsibility approach.     

Sustainability labelling as a tool for reporting the sustainable development impacts of climate actions relevant to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

The architecture of global carbon markets has changed significantly since the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals were both agreed in 2015. Voluntary, international cooperative approaches established in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement allow Parties to work together to achieve the targets set out in their respective Nationally Determined Contributions to limit global warming to an increase below 1.5–2 °C. In Article 6.4, a sustainable mitigation mechanism is established for which rules, modalities and procedures will be developed internationally considering the experience and lessons learned from existing mechanisms, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and its Sustainable Development (SD) Tool. Historically the issue of making integrated assessments of sustainable development and mitigation actions has been politically and methodologically controversial for many reasons: developing countries fear that an international definition of SD will interfere with their sovereignty and therefore their ability to define their own development pathways; players in the carbon market fear that markets can only handle one objective, namely mitigation outcomes; and sustainable development is regarded as too complex and costly to be measured and quantified. In an effort to address these concerns, the article proposes a new methodology for the sustainability labelling of climate mitigation actions relevant to Article 6 approaches. The article draws on an application of the CDM SD tool to analyse 2098 Component Programme Activities that had entered the CDM Pipeline by January 2017. The article demonstrates that assessment of the sustainable development benefits of climate actions can be graded and labelled based on the analysis of qualitative data, which is less costly than applying a quantitative approach.

     

Fostering a triple response mechanism to combat global climate change: Emission abatement,carbon capture and water improvement

The Kyoto Protocol has established emission abatement and carbon sink increase to cope with climate change. However, in recent years, developed countries tend to focus more on the former. The simplifying of GHG causes has posed challenges for the understanding of climate change issues and for the development of consequent counter-measures, leading to present controversy and dilemma over mechanisms to combat global climate change. It is held that a desirable global cooperative stance should be “harmonious but differentiated,” i.e., the division of responsibilities and co-operation among the countries should be conducted after the diversities of different countries are recognized in terms of climate change, interests and functions. To meet this end, it is necessary to have UNFCCC play a leading role, under which emission abatement, carbon sink and water cycle improvement are concurrently reinforced. Under this triple mechanism, industrialized countries ought to continue to take the lead in emission abatement, while developing countries, especially those with great potentialities to strengthen carbon sink and water conservancy, ought to conduct ecological preservation and to develop hydraulic capacity so as to strengthen the natural carbon cycle and water cycle to combat climatic impacts.     

Seasonal Variation of Black Carbon Emissions in Urban Delhi,India

Abstract

This article reports on timing the adverse effects of black carbon released into the atmosphere from biomass combustion, vehicular emissions and local combustion sources. Black carbon contributes to global warming through its light absorption capacity, has a direct and indirect impact on climate and public health, and will result in ongoing environmental damages and claims. The authors studied measurements of black carbon taken in Delhi, India during 2016 and 2017, and reports on seasonal factors that contribute to higher emissions.     

Allocation of aid for adaptation to climate change: Do vulnerable countries receive more support?

Wealthy countries spend increasing amounts of aid to support adaptation to climate change in developing countries and have committed under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to prioritize adaptation aid to those “particularly vulnerable” to climate change. While research has started to track this aid, it has not yet examined its allocation across all donor and recipient countries. We thus do not know to what extent vulnerable countries indeed receive more support for adaptation. We address this research gap and ask: how does this commitment to prioritizing particularly vulnerable countries translate into actual adaptation aid allocation? To what extent do vulnerable countries receive more adaptation aid? We address these questions though a quantitative analysis of data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development on bilateral adaptation aid from 2011 through 2014. In contrast to other studies, we find that vulnerability—or more precisely, vulnerability indicators—matter for adaptation aid allocation. Countries that are more exposed to climate change risks, such as extreme weather events or sea level rise, receive more adaptation aid, both on a per capita basis and as a percentage of all adaptation aid. These results indicate that collectively (even if not at the level of each individual donor) donors align their bilateral adaptation aid allocation with global promises.     

The 2 °C target: a European norm enters the international stage—following the process to adoption in China

“The 2 °C target—a European norm enters the international stage” is an empirical, qualitative study, using the case of China to illustrate the role played by the EU as a leader and forerunner pushing for a 2 °C target using diffusion mechanisms of persuasion and socialization. In order to better understand and evaluate how international and European climate norms enter the global and domestic discourse, the article details the nascent theoretical debate and critically assesses the role of the scientific community as translating medium. In the field of climate change China has been an increasingly important member of the UNFCCC process and a key target of European engagement policies. Process tracing shows that British scientific and political personalities took central roles introducing the discourse about the 2 °C target in China. The article aims to set an example of possible trajectories a norm can follow and will require further testing in the future.     

The War on Climate Change: Ushering in Sustainable Development to VDCs through a Technical Capacity-building Facility

The clean development mechanism (CDM) is a large part of the international legal framework that regulates and mitigates anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation to climate change. While rapidly developing countries have found success in attracting and implementing CDM projects, the structure of CDM is not robust enough to bring sustainable development to vulnerable developing countries (VDCs). Developers and VDCs need a facility that eschews the market-based approach and meets VDCs where they currently are; if not, CDM will continue to perpetuate the absence of institutional capacity building—such capacity building that is needed to develop projects to full scale. This article proposes implementing a bifurcation system within the CDM that would separate rapidly developing countries from VDCs with the end goal of creating a technical capacity-building facility to provide direct aid and technology transfer to usher greater VDC involvement in the CDM.