Remarks on the Visuddhimagga,and on its treatment of the Memory of Former Dwelling(s) (pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa)

Journal of Indian Philosophy -     

Two Investigations on the Madhyamakakārikās and the Vigrahavyāvartanī

Purpose of the article is to provide support for the contention that two fundamental treatises representing the teaching of Madhyamaka, viz. the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās and the Vigrahavyāvartanī, were designed to establish and justify a metaphysical tenet claiming that no particulars of any kind can exist on some level of final analysis and that this was the only primary concern of those works. Whereas the former text is in the first place dedicated to providing proofs of the central metaphysical thesis the major objective of the second treatise lies in a defense of the claim against possible objections. A correlate of this view regarding the content of those two works is on the one hand that the philosophy of the founder of the Madhyamaka-school essentially consists in a metaphysical teaching implying a radical rejection of a stance propagated in earlier Buddhist schools according to which objects of ordinary experience could be reduced to or explained by the existence of other sorts of particulars that can be theoretically postulated. On the other hand the exegesis advocated in the article implies that theorems pertaining to the nature of language or the relationship between language and non-linguistic reality are not at all a predominant issue in the pertinent texts and presumably were not a major matter of concern of early Madhyamaka in general. Accordingly matters pertaining to questions of semantics attain relevance at best in the form of objective consequences which the metaphysical doctrine might entail. The paper focuses on the second chapter of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās as well as the segment of the Vigrahavyāvartanī which deals with the first major problem, represented by the verses 1–4 and 21–29. The reason is that a detailed and thoroughgoing investigation of these two textual passages is suited to disprove a contention voiced by Western scholars who suppose that the teaching of the founder of Madhyamaka embodies a particular claim pertaining to the relationship between language and non-linguistic reality.     

Some Remarks on the Genesis of Central Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda Concepts

The present paper is a kind of selective summary of my book The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda (2014). [1.–2.] It deals with questions of origin and early development of three basic concepts of this school, viz., the ‘idealist’ thesis that the whole world is mind only (cittamātra) or manifestation only (vijñaptimātra), the assumption of a subliminal layer of the mind (ālayavijñāna), and the analysis of phenomena in terms of the “Three Natures” (svabhāvatraya). [3.] It has been asserted (H. Buescher) that these three basic concepts are logically inseparable and therefore must have been introduced conjointly. [4.] Still, from Vasubandhu onward treatises have been written in which only one of the three concepts is advocated or demonstrated to be indispensable, without any reference to the other two being made. Likewise, in most of the earlier Yogācāra treatises, the three concepts occur in different sections or contexts, or are even entirely absent, as vijñaptimātra in the Yogācārabhūmi (except for the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra quotation) and ālayavijñāna in the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra and Madhyāntavibhāga. [5.] It is therefore probable that the three concepts were introduced separately and for different reasons. [5.1.] As regards the concept of the “Three Natures”, I very hypothetically suggest that it was stimulated by the Tattvārthapa?ala of the Bodhisatvabhūmi. [5.2.1.] In the case of ālayavijñāna, I still think that my hypothesis that the concept (term + idea) originated from a problem emerging in connection with the “attainment of cessation” (nirodhasamāpatti) holds good and has not been conclusively refuted, but I admit that Prof. Yamabe?s hypothesis is a serious alternative. [5.2.2.] An important point is that in the Yogācārabhūmi we come across two fundamentally different concepts of ālayavijñāna, the starting point for the change being, probably, the fifth chapter of the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra. [5.3.] As for ‘idealism’, we may have to distinguish two strands, which, however, tend to merge. [5.3.1.] The earlier one uses the concept cittamātra and emerges as early as in the Pratyutpanna-buddha-sa?mukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra in connection with an interpretation of visions of the Buddha Amitāyus. [5.3.2.] The later strand introduces the concept vijñaptimātra and seems to have originated in the eighth chapter of the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra in connection with a reflection on the images perceived in insight meditation. [5.3.3.] In texts like the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra, concepts from other Mahāyānasūtra strands (like abhūtaparikalpa) become prominent in this connection, and it is only in the Mahāyānasa?graha that the use of vijñaptimātra is finally established.     

Classical Sāṁkhya on the Authorship of the Vedas

The question as to whether the Vedas have an author is the topic of vivid polemics in Indian philosophy. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the classical Sāṁkhya view on the authorship of the Vedas. The research is based chiefly on the commentaries to the Sāṁkhyakārikā definition of authoritative verbal testimony given by the classical Sāṁkhya writers, for these fragments provide the main evidence (both direct and indirect) for the reconstruction of this view. The textual analysis presented in this paper leads to the following conclusion. According to most classical Sāṁkhya commentaries, the Vedas have no author. Two commentators state directly that the Vedas have no author, and four commentators allude to the authorlessness of the Vedas. Only one commentator seems to hold the opposite view, stating that all the authoritative utterances are based on perception or inference of imperceptible objects by authoritative persons, from which it follows that the Vedas too have an author or authors.     

Some Reflections on the Term <Emphasis Type="Italic">Sautrāntika</Emphasis> in Vinaya Context: <Emphasis Type="Italic">vinayadharaḥ sautrāntikaḥ</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra</Emphasis>

The word sautrāntika is known to designate one of the philosophical schools in later documents, but its earlier phase remains uncertain. The discovery of this term in the Mahāparinirvā?a-mahāsūtra thus brings forward new evidence essential for solving the problem of sautrāntika. In this paper, I will attempt to establish the interpretation of the context, in which the phrase vinayadhara? sautrāntika? appears.     

Commentators on the Cārvākasūtra: A Critical Survey

In spite of the fact that the mūla-text of the Cārvākasūtra is lost, we have some 30 fragments of the commentaries written by no fewer than four commentators, namely, Kambalāśvatara, Purandara, Aviddhakarṇa, and Udbhaṭa. The existence of other commentators too has been suggested, of whom only one name is mentioned: Bhāvivikta. Unfortunately no extract from his work is quoted anywhere. The position of the Cārvākas was nearer the Buddhists (who admitted both perception and inference) than any other philosophical system. But in order to brand the Cārvākas as pramāṇaikavādins they were made to appear as one with Bhartṛhari. Even though the commentators of the Cārvākasūtra had some differences among themselves concerning the interpretation of some aphorisms, they seem to have been unanimous in regard to the number of pramāṇas to be admitted. It was perception and inference based on perception. Only in this sense they were pramāṇaikavādins. Unlike other systems of philosophy, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata did not accord equal value to perception and inference. Inference, they said, must be grounded on perception first, so it was of secondary kind (gauṇa). From the available evidence it is clear that the commentators were unanimous in one point, namely, primacy of perception which includes admittance of such laukika inference as is preceded and hence can be tested by repeated observations. In this respect both Aviddkarṇa and Udbhaṭa were in agreement with Purandara. Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa or Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa was known as a commentator who differed from the traditional Cārvākas and broke new grounds in explaining some of the aphorisms. His commentary is creative in its own way but at the same time unreliable in reconstructing the original Cārvāka position. Udbhaṭa seems to have digressed from the original, monist materialist position by taking a dualist position concerning the body-consciousness relation. Moreover, he seems to verge on the idealist side in his explication of an aphorism. In this sense he was a reformist or revisionist. Aviddhakarṇa, like Udbhaṭa, attempted to interpret the Cārvāka aphorisms from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika point of view, perhaps without being converted to the Cārvāka. Since it is not possible at the present state of our knowledge to determine whether they were Cārvākas converted to Nyāya or Naiyāyikas converted to Lokāyata, the suggestion that they simply adopted the Cārvāka position while writing their commentaries without being converted to the Cārvāka, may be taken as a third alternative. In spite of the meagre material available, it is evident that (1) not unlike the other systems, there is a lack of uniformity in the commentary tradition of the Cārvākasūtra, (2) not all commentators were committed monistic materialists; at least one, namely, Udbhaṭa, was a dualist, and (3) in course of time Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terminology, such as gamya, gamaka, etc., quite foreign to the traditional Cārvāka, has been introduced into the Cārvāka system.     

(Close) the Door,the King (is Going): The Development of Elliptical Resolution in Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā

This paper examines three commentaries on the ?abdapariccheda in Kumārila Bha??a’s ?lokavārttika, along with the the seventeenth century Bhā??a Mīmā?sā work, the Mānameyodaya. The focus is the Mīmā?sā principle that only sentences communicate qualified meanings and Kumārila’s discussion of a potential counter-example to this claim–single words which appear to communicate such content. I argue that there is some conflict among commentators over precisely what Kumārila describes with the phrase sāmarthyād anumeyetvād, although he is most likely describing ellipsis completion through arthāpatti. The paper attempts both a cogent exegesis and philosophical evaluation of the Bhā??a Mīmā?sā view of ellipsis completion, arguing that there remain internal tensions in the account of ellipsis preferred by the Bhā??a, tensions which are not entirely resolved even by the late date of the Mānameyodaya.     

On the Alleged Indebtedness of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā Towards the Vedānta Kaumudī: Some Considerations on an Almost Forgotten Vivaraṇa Text (Studies in Vedānta Kaumudī I)

Dharmarāja Adhvarin’s (middle XVII cent.) Vedānta Paribhā?ā (VP) is a well-known introduction to Advaita Vedānta, targeted to beginners who are already trained in Navya Nyāya. According to Dasgupta (1942), the VP is so heavily indebted to Rāmādvaya’s Vedānta Kaumudī (VK), which was composed in the middle of the 14th century and is today almost forgotten, that the VP’s “claim to originality vanishes”. The VK was, however, only edited in 1955 and then again in 1973. In the light of this improved textual basis, what is our judgement about Dasgupta’s hypercritical statement? Did actually the VP ever claim to be original? Was this originality somehow superimposed on the VP later? Is the VP really so much indebted to the VK? This paper aims at comparatively analysing the textual background of these questions. I will start from the analysis of one Advaita’s epistemological tenet, namely the valid knowledge (pramā), in the VK and then compare it to the corresponding parts in the VP.     

Does Early Yogācāra Have a Theory of Meaning? Sthiramati’s Arguments on Metaphor in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Triṃśikā-bhāṣya</Emphasis>

Can the early Yogācāra be said to present a systematic theory of meaning? The paper argues that Sthiramati’s bhā?ya on Vasubandhu’s Tri??ikā (Treatise in Thirty Verses), in which he argues that all language-use is metaphorical, indeed amounts to such a theory, both because of the text’s engagement with the wider Indian philosophical conversation about reference and meaning and by virtue of the questions it addresses and its motivations. Through a translation and analysis of key sections of Sthiramati’s commentary I present the main features of this theory of meaning and discuss the ways in which it is distinct from Vasubandhu’s ideas. I demonstrate how this theory of meaning enabled Sthiramati to present a unique understanding of discourse that distinguishes between varying levels of truth within the conventional realm. This understanding sat well with the Yogācāra soteriological and theoretical needs, and most importantly, enabled him to establish the meaningfulness of the school’s own metaphysical discourse. Securing this meaningfulness was especially important to Sthiramati in meeting the challenge posed by the radical conventionalism of the Madhyamaka, and his response as I interpret it suggests that one of the main disputes between the early Yogācāra with the Mādhyamika, at least as reflected in the Tri??ikā-bhā?ya, in fact turns on linguistic rather than ontological issues.     

Natural Liberation in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Sāṃkhyakārikā</Emphasis> and Its Commentaries

The subject of this article is the concept of natural liberation in classical Sā?khya. On the basis of the Sā?khyakārikā by ī?varak???a and its traditional commentaries, I will attempt to demonstrate that liberation from suffering in Sā?khya is not the result of rational inquiry—the prevailing view among contemporary scholars. The Sā?khya does not necessarily prescribe yogic practice as argued by other scholars. Instead, I will defend a position expressed by K.C. Bhattacharyya and Frank R. Podgorski, according to which liberation in classical Sā?khya is a natural and spontaneous process of suffering transforming into its own cure. I will argue that although traditional authorities may disagree over the form the liberating process takes on the phenomenal level (as yogic practice, instruction from a teacher, etc.), there is a general agreement that the natural forces are the primary drives and agents of liberation.     

Philosophy in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mahābhārata</Emphasis> and the History of Indian Philosophy

The study of philosophical terms and doctrines in the Mahābhārata touches not only on important aspects of the contents, composition and the historical contexts of the epic, but also on the historiography of Indian philosophy. General ideas about the textual history of the epic and the distinction between “didactic” and “narrative” parts have influenced the study of epic philosophy no less than academic discussions about what is philosophy in India and how it developed. This results in different evaluations of the place of philosophical texts in the epic and their relationship to the history of Indian philosophy. While some scholars have suggested that there is a “philosophy of the epic” its composers wished to propagate, others have argued that “philosophy” is included in the epic either in a “proto” form or in a variety of doctrines (often presented is “mixed” or “unsystematic” ways) they deemed relevant. The article discusses these views and some of the heuristic assumptions on which they are based. It proposes to widen the scope of analysis by paying more attention to the interplay of narrative and didactic passages, the various ways in which philosophy is presented in the epic, and its connection to a larger spectrum of the reception of philosophy in textual genres and by audiences outside the expert circles of the philosophical schools.     

Some Further Comments on the First Section of the Vigrahavyāvartanī

The publication deals with topics concerning the interpretation of the Vigrahavyāvartanī in as much as they are relevant for the understanding of (early) Madhyamaka-philosophy in general. A major part of the article is dedicated to a critical assessment of a number of views which have been propagated recently in a paper by Sharma (In: Nagoya studies in Indian culture and Buddhism, Saṃbhāṣā, 2011). A primary goal of the present investigation consists in substantiating the claim that early Madhyamaka represents a metaphysical teaching which stands in sharp contrast not only to stances of common sense but also to tenets propagated in Buddhist dogmatics.