Enforcing compliance with international environmental agreements using a deposit-refund system

Whether nations are able to cooperatively manage shared resources through international environmental agreements (IEAs) depends on whether compliance with voluntary commitments can be enforced. Given that nations are sovereign enforcing compliance with IEAs cannot rely on the presence of a strong sanctioning body. Nonetheless, enforcement provisions must be effective in the sense that they will deter non-compliance and credible in the sense that they will actually be imposed. In this paper, we address the problem of enforcing compliance with IEAs by examining one promising mechanism—a deposit-refund system—that exhibits the necessary features for effective enforcement. We analyze a simple model to demonstrate the desirable properties of the mechanism and then consider the effects of imperfect monitoring, uncertainty, partial participation and reputation on the effectiveness of a deposit-refund system.     

International environmental agreements between developing countries only: learning from the Brazil–Uruguay case over the suspicion of acid rain

This article is about the process of negotiation and implementation of a bilateral environmental agreement between two developing countries. It analyzes the case of the Act of Jaguarão between Brazil and Uruguay on assessing the risk of transboundary air pollution by the President Medici (UTPM) coal-powered thermo-electrical facility in the Candiota region of southern Brazil. The article adds to the scarce literature on international environmental conflict resolution and negotiations between developing countries, especially in Latin America. First, it explains that even with the asymmetry of power between Brazil and Uruguay, negotiation was possible due to a series of factors, such as the interest of Brazilian environmental agencies in improving the monitoring of emissions from UTPM and the international scrutiny of Brazil prior to the upcoming Rio-92 Earth Summit. Both states obtained mutual gains from the agreement by developing ‘joint fact finding’ research and monitoring. Second, different from most of the mainstream literature, the research reveals that weaknesses in institutional agreements, such as a lack of sanctions or deadlines, were not an implementation impediment. In fact, the very weaknesses of the agreement actually enabled authorities in both countries to cooperate in the development of an acid rain monitoring program in the Candiota region, and as a result, to improve air monitoring capacities in both countries. Third, this research shows that the implementation process (1991–2003) produced different results and impacts: it helped to develop technical capacities of environmental agencies in both countries, increased the political power of Brazilian environmental agencies to control UTPM, and pushed for behavioral changes to enable UTPM to respond to the demands of both governments.     

Free trade agreements for the environment? Regional economic integration and environmental cooperation in East Asia

Traditionally, it has been argued that increased economic competition through free trade agreements would bring about environmental degradation. This study, however, argues that recent international free trade agreements have tended to enhance environmental cooperation among participating countries. This study has examined the process by which East Asian countries have developed mechanisms for the extant level of regional environmental cooperation, particularly highlighting the reasons for commonalities and differences in regional environmental cooperation between ASEAN and the dominant economies in the region. It finds that three factors particularly matter for developing regional environmental cooperative mechanisms: networks of intergovernmental organizations, the strong willingness of political leaders which is often embodied in national strategies for regionalism and the establishment, and the institutionalized linkage—particularly through FTAs—between trade and the environment. Tracing the process of policy evolution within three groups of countries sheds light on the political conditions under which the four entities involved (the ASEAN, Japan, China, and the Republic of Korea) have produced and strengthened cooperative environmental mechanisms among them along with free trade agreements. Focusing especially on the environmental policy changes in Japan, China, and the ROK associated with the creation of its FTAs with ASEAN, the study concludes that each of free trade agreements has incrementally developed environmental cooperation, especially when integrated into a vision for regional integration.     

Bounded rationality and social interaction in negotiating a climate agreement

An agreement on climate change mitigation hinges on large-scale international cooperation. Rational agents are supposed to consider the cost and benefits of cooperation, which then determine their negotiation positions. Behavioral economics provides experimental evidence that decision-making in negotiation-like situations is influenced by systematic cognitive biases and social interaction. In this paper, we examine the impact of bounded rationality and social preferences on bargaining in international climate negotiations and illustrate how particular deviations from full rationality affect the incentives to cooperate. Of special interest are fairness preferences for burden-sharing rules and behavioral responses to different framings of climate change and policy, as well as implications of these for communication about climate change. The analysis will further address different levels of representation, including individual citizens, politicians, experts, and (professional) negotiators. The consequences of the most prominent nonstandard preferences and biases for negotiating a climate treaty are assessed, and specific strategies to foster cooperation are suggested.     

Environmental regime effectiveness and the North American Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement

Scholars and practitioners around the globe are grappling with how to improve the effectiveness of complex, transboundary, and multilevel environmental regimes. International environmental agreements (IEAs) have been around for decades yet achievements and outcomes have not met expectations. While international relations scholars have primarily focused on the effectiveness of agreements between states, public policy scholars have been interested in outcomes at a variety of scales including international, national, sub-national, and local across various environmental policy domains and at the instrument and program levels. This article presents findings from a case study of environmental regime effectiveness that uses a modified version of the Oslo-Postdam solution to assess the effectiveness of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, a long-standing, bilateral international environmental agreement between Canada and the USA. The findings indicate that there is a need to more broadly define international environmental agreements in complex transboundary systems to include both formal and informal regime features and multilevel governance efforts and to focus on specific policy goals and ecological outcomes associated with IEAs. This case also illustrates the potential to modify the Oslo-Postdam approach by combining expert assessment and data collection methods with traditional policy analysis and program evaluation methods in assessments of environmental regime effectiveness.     

The effectiveness of international environmental agreements

Many argue that international environmental agreements (IEAs) can alter states’ cost-benefit analyses by providing crucial information about the costs of environmental degradation. Thereby, IEAs may help to effectively curb environmental pollution. However, previous attempts to empirically measure institutional effectiveness found it difficult to provide credible estimates because they have missed to produce convincing counterfactuals. This study empirically estimates the effectiveness of one prominent example of an international environmental institution, the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution agreement (LRTAP). It sets forth a transparent identification strategy in light of latest advancements in the causal inference literature and presents evidence for the non-effectiveness of the LRTAP in changing member states’ behavior in terms of anthropogenic emissions of two substances (NO _x and SO₂). By deriving and illustrating the use of difference-in- differences (DID) design in the context of IEAs, this study provides a general methodological tool kit to drawing causal inferences about the effectiveness of international environmental institutions.     

Attainability of International Environmental Agreements as a Social Situation

This paper applies the theory of social situations to study whether international environmental agreements (IEAs), mainly those on greenhouse gas emission reductions, can be attained. A game theoretic model is generally a black box for decision makers, where the mechanisms, which lead to solution(s) of the game, are not explicitly pointed out. This paper opens this black box by making the (institutional) move rules explicit. The usual pessimistic outcome with an ineffective and small size of stable coalitions among world regions is countered. Our model challenges conventional wisdom in the sense that large coalitions are possible outcomes of the cartel game, namely by incorporating: (1) farsightedness, and (2) coalitional moves with commitment as an alternative to myopic and individual moves which characterise the cartel game. We show that even if the international negotiations on climate change mitigation are modelled as an n-person prisoner's dilemma, one cannot rule out cooperation among world regions as a solution of the game. Indeed, in most analysed situations the grand coalition is among the solutions of the game. This shows that predictions based on cartel stability may be too pessimistic if it comes to analysing incentives to cooperate in implementing international environmental policy. Moreover, in an empirically calibrated model, we find three out of six instances where Russia (with or without the US) has an incentive to sign the Kyoto protocol.     

Structural conditions for novelty: the introduction of new environmental clauses to the trade regime complex

When do parties introduce novel clauses to a system of contracts or treaties? While important research has investigated how clauses diffuse once introduced, few empirical studies address their initial introduction. Drawing on network theory, this paper argues that novel clauses are introduced when agreements are concluded in certain structures of earlier agreements and the clauses they include. This paper demonstrates this argument using the example of 282 different environmental clauses introduced into the trade regime complex through 630 trade agreements concluded between 1945 and 2016. We find that trade agreements are more likely to introduce novelties when they involve parties with a diversity of experience with prior environmental clauses and introduce more novelties when more parties are less constrained by prior trade agreements between them. Contrary to prevailing wisdom, power asymmetry between the negotiating parties is not statistically significant.

     

A historical institutionalist view on merging LULUCF and REDD+ in a post-2020 climate agreement

In the context of the UNFCCC negotiation process on a global climate agreement, policy makers are looking for approaches on how to significantly raise the mitigation ambition of all relevant sectors, including the land use sector. Aside of the formal negotiations some Parties to the UNFCCC have started an informal dialogue and discuss how to merge the fragmented accounting rules for mitigation relevant land use activities, in particular those concerning forest-sector emissions. Stressing that ‘history matters’, we use a historical institutionalist perspective to assess the institutional pathways of the different accounting rules for developed and developing countries, their mutual relationship, and in how far they are supportive or counterproductive for this endeavour. Our empirical analysis shows that Parties tend to use any modification phase in the negotiation process to water down already achieved agreements, and that negotiating modalities after targets have been agreed is not conducive either. In the efforts of specifying the Paris agreement, merging existing rules into a common accounting framework is likely to further compromise the exisiting weak rules and modalities, and potentially what negotiators consider as ‘environmental integrity’. With this, a formal negotiation of common rules for the accounting of the land use sector may yield an outcome below what has been achieved since the negotiations on a post-2020 agreement started in 2005. We conclude that politically acceptable approaches for the land use sector that also contribute to the overall objective of raising ambition should avoid reopening already agreed decisions on rules and modalities.     

Do deep and comprehensive regional trade agreements help in reducing air pollution?

Environmental concerns are increasingly being incorporated into regional trade agreements (RTAs) to promote environmental quality and ultimately ensure compatibility between trade and environmental policies. This occurs in a context where air pollution and its effects on human health are of major concern. This paper investigates whether the proliferation and depth of environmental provisions (EPs) in RTAs are associated with lower concentration levels of particulate matter. We present an index of EPs in RTAs that measures the breadth and depth of the provisions and use it to estimate the effect of ratifying RTAs with different levels of EPs on changes in PM_2.5 concentration levels in a panel of OECD countries over the 1999–2011 period. Using an instrumental variables strategy, we find that countries that have ratified RTAs with EPs show lower levels of PM_2.5 concentrations when we control for scale, composition and technique effects and for national environmental regulations. Moreover, the PM_2.5 concentration levels in the pairs of countries that belong to an RTA with EPs tend to converge for the country sample. The results also hold for a longer period of time (1990–2011) and a broader sample of 173 countries as well as for other pollutants, namely CO₂ and NO₂.     

Above the Boundaries: Ozone Depletion,Equity, and Climate Change*

This introduction examines the global legislative process as it applies to environmental agreements. It argues that this process should be seen as consisting of at least two phases. Phase one seeks to create a broad legislative framework designed to facilitate debate emanating from three different perspectives: science, equity, and economics. Phase one also seeks to attract as many countries as possible to the negotiating process. Phase two then tries to reconcile at least some of the conflicts inherent in these three different starting points.     

国际知识产权贸易谈判的新方略

世界贸易组织成立后,发达国家并未满足于<与贸易有关的知识产权协定>所确立的知识产权保护标准,而是迅速形成了新的谈判方略,即把谈判重心由阻力较大的世界贸易组织转移至更易达成协定的区域场合,通过缔结分散的区域贸易协定竞争性地提高知识产权保护标准.此种谈判方略的推进使得发展中国家日益丧失根据具体国情制定和实施适当知识产权政策的自主空间.有鉴于此,包括中国在内的发展中国家应通过建立知识产权发展同盟、发展产业磋商与咨询体系、参与国际组织和智库活动、制定内部谈判指南等途径,改进谈判策略、强化谈判力量、提高谈判技术,引导形成更加民主和平衡的知识产权国际保护机制.     

可持续发展的国际法保障

可持续发展是国内法与国际法的既定目标。作为法律价值的一部分 ,可持续发展追求代内与代际的公平。尽管现在已经存在一些实现可持续发展的国际法律机制 ,但意图更加有效地实现可持续发展所应有的法律规则、执行与监督以及争端解决制度 ,关键在于立足于现有的组织机构进行发展与强化 ,而不应试图建构一个新的世界环境组织。在国家之间充分合作、严格遵守有关国际法律机制的基础上 ,全球可持续发展是可能实现的。     

‘US, China and the Economics of Climate Negotiations’

Despite the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the US decision not to comply with its Kyoto commitments seems to drastically undermine the effectiveness of the Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. Therefore, it is important to explore whether there are economic incentives that might help the US to modify its current decision and move to a more environmentally effective climate policy. For example, can an increased participation of developing countries induce the US to effectively participate in the effort to reduce GHG emissions? Is a single emission trading market the appropriate policy framework to increase the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol? This paper addresses the above questions by analysing whether the participation of China in the cooperative effort to control GHG emissions can provide adequate incentives for the US to re-join the Kyoto process and eventually ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This paper analyses three different climate regimes in which China could be involved and assesses the economic incentives for the major world countries and regions to participate in these three regimes. The main conclusion is that the participation of the US in a climate regime is not likely, at least in the short run. The US is more likely to adopt unilateral policies than to join the present Kyoto coalition (even when it includes China). However, a two bloc regime would become the most preferred option if both China and the US, for some political or environmental reasons, decide to cooperate on GHG emission control. If the US decides to cooperate, the climate regime that provides the highest economic incentives to the cooperating countries is the one in which China and the US cooperate bilaterally, with the Annex B_?US countries remaining within the Kyoto framework.     

司法过程中的对抗与合作——一种新的刑事诉讼模式理论

以无罪推定、程序正义为标志的传统刑事诉讼理论,建立在国家与被告人具有相互对立的诉讼立场的基础之上。在被告人自愿认罪的情况下,这种对抗性司法不具有存在的基础,国家与被告人具有进行诉讼合作的可能。在此前提下,国家追诉机构与被告人经过协商、妥协而进行的诉讼合作,具有"协商性公力合作"的特征;被害人与被告人经过协商达成和解协议,则属于一种"私力合作模式"。相对于对抗性司法模式而言,合作性司法已经初步形成了一种相对独立的理论框架,那就是实用主义的利益观、建立在诉讼合作基础上的司法正义观,以及独立于实体正义和程序正义的第三种法律价值观。     

Blocking change: facing the drag of status quo fisheries institutions

Under what conditions can international environmental institutions survive changing power alignments? This article argues that relatively declining powers and private domestic actors play an important role in preserving the status quo because they are eager to retain advantages that existing institutions afford them. This effort to block change affects fisheries negotiations, in particular, by allowing powerful actors to avoid new rules once an institution is in place. I hypothesize, first, that relatively declining fishing powers attempt to retain past institutional successes, while emerging fishing powers seek to alter the status quo. Second, negotiating positions reflect not only a country’s position in the world, but also the access provided to domestic stakeholders who wish to gain, or fear losses, from new agreements. Therefore, I hypothesize that powerful beneficiaries in domestic politics push relatively declining powers to support the status quo when those private actors benefit from highly legalized past agreements and participate in foreign policy decisions. I test these hypotheses by exploring US and EU approaches to fisheries treaty negotiations through archival research and interviews with fisheries negotiators. The evidence supports hypotheses that status quo powers seek to protect earlier deals more intensely when they negotiate with rising fishing powers, and when private parties are most influential. As hypothesized, both governments are particularly protective of the most complex earlier agreements under these conditions.     

Negotiating Effective International Environmental Agreements: Is an Objective Approach to Differential Treatment Possible?

The negotiation of international environmental agreements is rendered less effective and more costly than necessary on account of the incentives for rent seeking. This article argues that the problem of rent seeking in this context is complicated by the legitimate demand for the differential treatment of relevant heterogeneity, when insufficient information is available to distinguish between demands based on legitimate differences and rent-seeking. In order to reduce the overall costliness of the totality of international resource agreements, the general rule should be that differential treatment should be provided only in exceptional circumstances. A corollary to this rule is that differences that do not affect future negotiating costs may be considered in current negotiations. This points to differences that are exogenous to the bargaining process, such as a country's physical location. It is argued that development status of a country is another such factor, since the incentives to pursue development are unlikely to be affected by its recognition in current negotiations. Furthermore, the failure to recognise development status as a legitimate basis for differentiated treatment implicitly rewards the early identification and exploitation of unmanaged resources. Restriction of differential treatment to a small number of such differences enables the focusing of negotiations, and the structuring of discussions. A case study of the Montreal Protocol illustrates how the differential impacts of a uniform standard may be estimated, once the range of impacts is delimited.     

合作与牵制:气候变化的国际法律机制及其应对

全球气候变化问题是当前的热点话题,各国在参与实施《联合国气候变化框架公约》及《东京议定书》中都在积极寻求制高点。因此在全球气候变化的控制和实施方面,国际社会体现出合作与牵制两种表现,牵制是在谈判中的牵制,谈判是相互牵制的谈判,这两种表现中,合作是目的,牵制是手段。发展中国家要在2012年之前做好充分准备具有一定的挑战性,需要处理好合作与牵制的关系,我国面临的问题具有一定的独特性,处理好控制全球气候变化方面的合作与牵制的关系,积极应对全球气候变化问题。     

Governing international freshwater resources: an analysis of treaty design

International rivers create complex relationships between their riparian states, which can contribute to economic, political, and social losses. Treaties provide a means for states to coordinate their actions in managing international river disputes to minimize these losses. However, there is little knowledge about treaty content and the factors influencing treaty design. We test whether a relationship exists between the challenges of negotiating, complying, and distributing the gains in bilateral, multilateral, and basin-wide negotiation contexts and the depth of cooperation along with the degree of institutionalization. While the great challenges confronting multilateral or basin-wide negotiations can produce treaties that focus on joint gains and shallow cooperation to secure the signature of riparians, we find that they can also provide opportunities for deeper, more behavior-altering, cooperation. To manage the difficulties of maintaining multilateral cooperation, we find a higher degree of institutionalization. We also find that bilateral negotiations provide states with opportunities for deeper cooperation, but a lower degree of institutionalization.