The effectiveness of international environmental agreements

Many argue that international environmental agreements (IEAs) can alter states’ cost-benefit analyses by providing crucial information about the costs of environmental degradation. Thereby, IEAs may help to effectively curb environmental pollution. However, previous attempts to empirically measure institutional effectiveness found it difficult to provide credible estimates because they have missed to produce convincing counterfactuals. This study empirically estimates the effectiveness of one prominent example of an international environmental institution, the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution agreement (LRTAP). It sets forth a transparent identification strategy in light of latest advancements in the causal inference literature and presents evidence for the non-effectiveness of the LRTAP in changing member states’ behavior in terms of anthropogenic emissions of two substances (NO _x and SO₂). By deriving and illustrating the use of difference-in- differences (DID) design in the context of IEAs, this study provides a general methodological tool kit to drawing causal inferences about the effectiveness of international environmental institutions.     

Enforcing compliance with international environmental agreements using a deposit-refund system

Whether nations are able to cooperatively manage shared resources through international environmental agreements (IEAs) depends on whether compliance with voluntary commitments can be enforced. Given that nations are sovereign enforcing compliance with IEAs cannot rely on the presence of a strong sanctioning body. Nonetheless, enforcement provisions must be effective in the sense that they will deter non-compliance and credible in the sense that they will actually be imposed. In this paper, we address the problem of enforcing compliance with IEAs by examining one promising mechanism—a deposit-refund system—that exhibits the necessary features for effective enforcement. We analyze a simple model to demonstrate the desirable properties of the mechanism and then consider the effects of imperfect monitoring, uncertainty, partial participation and reputation on the effectiveness of a deposit-refund system.     

International environmental agreements between developing countries only: learning from the Brazil–Uruguay case over the suspicion of acid rain

This article is about the process of negotiation and implementation of a bilateral environmental agreement between two developing countries. It analyzes the case of the Act of Jaguarão between Brazil and Uruguay on assessing the risk of transboundary air pollution by the President Medici (UTPM) coal-powered thermo-electrical facility in the Candiota region of southern Brazil. The article adds to the scarce literature on international environmental conflict resolution and negotiations between developing countries, especially in Latin America. First, it explains that even with the asymmetry of power between Brazil and Uruguay, negotiation was possible due to a series of factors, such as the interest of Brazilian environmental agencies in improving the monitoring of emissions from UTPM and the international scrutiny of Brazil prior to the upcoming Rio-92 Earth Summit. Both states obtained mutual gains from the agreement by developing ‘joint fact finding’ research and monitoring. Second, different from most of the mainstream literature, the research reveals that weaknesses in institutional agreements, such as a lack of sanctions or deadlines, were not an implementation impediment. In fact, the very weaknesses of the agreement actually enabled authorities in both countries to cooperate in the development of an acid rain monitoring program in the Candiota region, and as a result, to improve air monitoring capacities in both countries. Third, this research shows that the implementation process (1991–2003) produced different results and impacts: it helped to develop technical capacities of environmental agencies in both countries, increased the political power of Brazilian environmental agencies to control UTPM, and pushed for behavioral changes to enable UTPM to respond to the demands of both governments.     

Military spending,liberal institutions and state compliance with international environmental agreements

The current paper examines the dynamics of state security behavior and international environmental protection. In particular, the study provides a liberal institutional approach in identifying a “guns and butter” relationship between military spending and state participation with international environmental agreements. This cross-national study employs both bivariate and multivariate regression models to analyze the relationship between military expenditures and state participation with international environmental agreements, particularly examining the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. The empirics of the study suggest that states with higher military expenditures as a percent of GDP are less likely to comply with international environmental agreements. Theoretical and empirical implications are presented in the conclusion section.     

Technology investment, bargaining, and international environmental agreements

If countries are to engage in international environmental cooperation, they must bargain over the distribution of gains. When future bargaining over pollution abatement is expected, how should a country decide on public technology investments to reduce the domestic cost of pollution abatement? I find that while countries tend to underinvest because they fail to internalize the global benefits of new technology, the magnitude of the problem depends on a country’s bargaining power. Powerful countries underinvest less frequently, because they expect to reap most of the global benefits from new technology in the international negotiations. I also investigate the effectiveness of a simple reciprocal technology agreement. I find that it can help solve the underinvestment problem, and this beneficial effect is particularly pronounced in the case of powerful countries. These findings imply that changing the bargaining protocol on climate change to the benefit of powerful countries may help secure the necessary technology investments.     

Risk-sharing agreements to cover environmental damage: theory and practice

Mordernization has witnessed increasingly new industrial sectors which have the potential to create environmental disasters. The insolvency of risk creators in case of such disasters may lead to insufficient compensation as well as to a dilution of preventive incentives. Insurance is a traditional instrument to address these problems, but is subject to limitations such as the lack of information by the insurers on the risk and limited insurance capacity. The risk-sharing agreement is an alternative which is widely used in high-risk sectors but it received relative little attention in academic literature. This paper analyses the potential of risk-sharing agreements in minimizing total social costs of environmental harmful activities, in comparison with insurance. The comparison shows the advantage of risk-sharing agreements in terms of less demanding information requirements, allowing for mutual monitoring and the potential to reduce administrative costs. However, the analysis also shows that a few conditions need to be met for such advantages to be materialized. This paper then discusses a typology of various risk-sharing agreements and illustrates the different categories with examples from the maritime and nuclear sectors. Based on these experiences, this paper explores the possibilities to expand risk-sharing agreements to other policy areas where environmental risks may emerge.     

Effects of funding mechanisms on participation in multilateral environmental agreements

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - The “rational design approach” to studying international agreements holds that policy-makers evaluate costs and...     

The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey

This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process impacts different stages of agreement formation and stability. We distinguish the rules defined during pre-negotiations that govern negotiations, ratification and implementation. Strategic delegation and lobbying are directly relevant during the negotiation and ratification phases. Implementation, the choice of policy instruments at the national level, will also be impacted by lobbying and indirectly influence negotiations. We find that the basic theoretical framework for the analysis of international environmental agreements is largely unrelated to empirical approaches. Furthermore, we observe that models of the political process of agreement formation, like for example sequential game models, are yet to be developed.     

Lessons learnt from two decades of international environmental agreements: law

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - As Patricia Birnie cautiously and prophetically put it in the inaugural issue of this journal (INEA 1, January 2001, p. 74),...     

Signaling in international environmental agreements: the case of early and delayed action

This paper presents a stylized international environmental agreements game with two regions differing in their preference for environmental quality. If side payments are allowed, cooperation can increase the payoffs accruing to both regions. However, cooperation can be impeded by asymmetric information about the regions’ types and only become feasible once a region has credibly revealed its type. We show how in a two-stage game early (delayed) action can act as a credible signal to reveal private information on high (low) benefits. Yet, the cooperative solution with asymmetric information is Pareto-dominated by the outcome with perfect information.     

Environmental policy integration among multilateral environmental agreements: the case of biodiversity

The system of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) comprises hundreds of conventions and protocols designed to protect the environment. Institutional interaction within the MEA system raises issues of environmental policy integration (EPI), i.e. balancing different environmental objectives and considerations. Mainstream proposals for enhancing EPI in environmental governance build upon the assumption that environmental institutions are fragmented. However, recent research reveals that the MEA system has been defragmenting over the years such that EPI is less a problem of institutional fragmentation than of effective management of institutional interplay. This paper examines the factors affecting EPI among MEAs by looking at experiences in the cluster of biodiversity-related multilateral agreements. The analysis is based on a series of interviews with MEA secretariat officials and international experts conducted between September 2011 and January 2012. The paper identifies institutional, political and cognitive barriers constraining interplay management efforts. While some have proposed regulatory changes in the cluster, national-level co-ordination appears to be the best way to advance EPI.     

Managing global change for sustainable development: technology,community and multilateral environmental agreements

The purpose of this paper is to consider how international law has sought to mediate between the promotion of environmentally sound technologies and local community participation. It will be suggested that the paradigm of sustainable development presents the most sensible framework through which to consider these issues. The paper will then present three short case studies centred around various aspects of the ongoing implementation of the Rio Conventions, namely the endorsement of sequestration activities within the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the development of an access and benefit sharing framework under the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity and further encouragement of community participation in the 1994 UN Convention to Combat Desertification. In conclusion, the paper will suggest that community participation must be given comparable status with the promotion of technological advances if long-term success is ever likely to be attained.

Correction to: Effects of funding mechanisms on participation in multilateral environmental agreements

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - In the original publication of the article, there were few mistakes in the text, tables and figure. The corrected text has been...     

The self-selection of democracies into treaty design: insights from international environmental agreements

Generally, democratic regime type is positively associated with participating in international environmental agreements. In this context, this study focuses on the legal nature of an agreement, which is linked to audience costs primarily at the domestic level that occur in case of non-compliance and are felt especially by democracies. Eventually, more legalized (“hard-law”) treaties make compliance potentially more challenging and as democratic leaders may anticipate the corresponding audience costs, the likelihood that democracies select themselves into such treaties decreases. The empirical implication of our theory is that environmental agreements with a larger share of democratic members are less likely to be characterized by hard law. Results from quantitative analyses strongly support our argument, shed new light on the relationship between participation in international agreements and the form of government, and also have implications for the “words-deeds” debate in international environmental policy-making.