Leadership in the WTO: Brazil,India and the Doha development agenda

The Doha round of multilateral negotiations has witnessed the relocation of Southern powers towards the core of the World Trade Organization (WTO) decision-making structure. Brazil and India are the only developing countries that have participated consistently in all major ministerial phases of the Doha round between 2001 and 2008. Their consolidation as trading powers cannot be attributed solely to their status as emerging economies. Their projected legitimacy as representatives of the global South has operated as a catalyst in facilitating their relocation. In various phases of negotiations, however, Brazil and India have refrained from playing a proactive role in driving negotiations forward. Their defensive stance has raised questions about the two countries' prospects for systemic leadership in world trade. In explaining this condition, this article will argue that Brazilian and Indian trade diplomacy is consistently directed towards maintaining broad bases of followership. Brazil and India are disposed to exercise assertive leadership only when that accommodates the expectations and preferences of their followership in the global South. Their preoccupation with constantly reasserting their Third World image often renders blocking agreement the preferable strategy to avoid paying a high price in terms of legitimacy.     

Seal the Deal: Bargaining Positions,Institutional Design,and the Duration of Preferential Trade Negotiations

Multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization have stalled. This has contributed to a steep rise in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). At the same time, negotiations for PTAs have not always proven quick and painless: While some treaties are sealed within a few months or days only, other agreements are preceded by protracted bargaining processes in trade and trade-related issue areas. In this article, we provide a theoretical explanation for this empirical variation. More specifically, we argue that PTA negotiations take longer the greater the distance between the prospective partners’ initial bargaining positions. Moreover, we contend that negotiation processes become more protracted the higher the relative ambition of the prospective PTA. Due to the limited links to the domestic political arena in autocracies, we expect this latter effect to play out for groups of democratic bargaining partners only. We test these two hypotheses for 198 preferential trade negotiations using novel measures for bargaining templates and the ambition of PTA clauses. In our two-stage survival models, we find support for our argument. In line with qualitative evidence from recent preferential trade initiatives, our models indicate that services, investment and intellectual property rights are particularly sticky agenda items for democratic leaders at the international bargaining table.     

From Lab Experiments to Real Negotiations: An Investigation of International Iron Ore Negotiations

Negotiation researchers have conducted a large number of experimental lab studies to identify the factors that affect negotiation outcomes, but it remains unclear whether those results can be generalized to real‐world negotiations. To explore this question, we analyzed the dynamic international iron ore annual negotiations that took place from 2005 to 2009. We found evidence that supports two important findings from previous experiments. Specifically, we focused on the impact of negotiators’ best alternatives and first offers on negotiation prices using multiple case study analysis. We found that iron ore prices increased more when the gap between the previous year's negotiated price and the price on the alternative spot market, a public market in which commodities are traded for immediate delivery, was larger, which suggested that buyers were sensitive to the strength of this alternative, supporting the literature on the role of alternatives. We also found that the first offer price significantly influenced the final price. Our findings extend two important experimental findings from the negotiation literature to large‐scale business negotiations in the real world.     

Book Review International Environmental Negotiations: The Current State of Empirical and Analytic Study

Negotiation Journal -     

Sharks, Saints, and Samurai: The Power of Ethics in Negotiations

In this article, I explore the notion that ethics, far from being a check or drag on negotiator power, can actually help to enhance it. As the example of Nelson Mandela negotiating with the South African government showed, ethics (or at least the perception of being ethical) can be a major source of power, diminishing or even neutralizing many other weaknesses. I explore some of the principal ethical dilemmas facing negotiators and illustrate the sometimes surprising ways that "right" ethical choices can actually increase negotiator power. This occurs not only in the more superficial case of instrumental or even prudential ethics, (the province of "saints" and "sharks"), where "right" behavior is employed to gain short-term advantage or to improve long-term negotiator reputation, but even more so in the case of intrinsic "principled" negotiation, where the "right" thing is done for its own sake. As in the case of the medieval Japanese samurai, ethics can be a major source of power. This thesis is then illustrated anecdotally in three practical examples, leading to a proposal for how to deepen and apply this lesson to negotiation analysis and practice.     

The European Union, the Doha Round, and Asia

Agriculture has been the most contentious issue in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, and the European Union (EU) intervenes substantially in agricultural markets. This paper reviews these interventions in light of the EU’s participation in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations with specific attention to Asia. It concludes that the offers made by the EU were designed precisely to avoid any real liberalization in its agricultural markets and have undermined the development aspirations of the round.

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"多哈回合"与非洲

关税与贸易总协定经过 8轮谈判不断得到补充和加强 ,直至创立世界贸易组织 ,成为规范国际贸易行为的框架。非洲日渐边缘化 ,既与世贸组织体制限制弱小国家的作用、使之处于被动地位这一弱点有关 ,也与昔日非洲国家主观上不够重视多边贸易谈判密不可分。西雅图会议是非洲国家改变其处理世贸组织问题方法的分水岭 ,非洲国家正在积极参与“多哈回合” ,争取和捍卫非洲国家应有的权益与地位。但近期在农业、纺织业、与贸易相关的知识产权和专利协议问题、谈判应对新议题的能力等诸多方面面临严峻的挑战。非洲国家必须格外小心地走好每一步。     

国际制度设计中的规范与理性

国际制度设计日益成为当代国际关系中一项重要的议事日程和研究议程.现有的研究成果主要集中在理性主义的研究范式之内,忽视了社会规范因素在国际制度设计中的重要作用.本文借鉴组织社会学中新制度学派的理论,探讨了规范在国际制度设计中的作用,指出强意义合法性机制与弱意义合法性机制是国际制度设计中规范与理性相互作用的两种形式.强意义合法性机制是指构成性规范通过塑造行为体的思维方式和社会身份,进而成为国际制度设计中行为体无需考虑就加以接受的"理性神话".弱意义合法性机制是指限制性规范通过影响行为体利益计算的方式作用于国际制度设计的过程,行为体出于对声誉和责任方面的考虑,会限制一些纯粹出于物质利益追求的国际制度设计行为.     

规范与国际制度安排:一种建构主义阐释

建构主义相信 ,国际制度像其它社会事物一样 ,也是由行为体在社会实践中建构出来的。因此 ,它在分析国际制度安排时 ,与强调物质力量的理性主义不同 ,注重信念的作用。它认为 ,信念根植于社会实践 ,并在社会实践中得以再塑 ,所以具有主体间性 ,而规范就是体现这种主体间性的信念的具体形式。规范是一个行为集体拥有的关于适当行为的共享期望 ,不但界定行为的合适性和有效性 ,还赋予行为体社会角色和建构社会环境 ,从而形塑行为体的收益 ,促使行为体重设目标和调整行为 ,最终影响国际制度的形成。     

论文化对国际制度创新的影响

在国际关系领域,国际制度创新的基本目标是使制度更加体现国际社会的基本政治认同与价值观念,更加促进地区稳定与世界和平。文化作为一种共有观念,对于国际制度创新具有更加明显的促进作用,这一作用通过在非传统安全领域形成全球集体认同,或在地区层面建构制度创新的共识等方式表现出来。通过文化与权力的结合、文化与利益的结合,并通过国际社会的长期实践,在一定的危机或者偶然因素的促动下,文化就有可能实现制度化,推动国际和地区的合作进程。     

The Doha Round impasse: A graphical account

Several factors potentially responsible for the failure to conclude the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations are analyzed. A two-stage negotiation and ratification game between the “North” (industrialized countries) and the “South” (developing countries) is employed and collapses into a single diagram. The choice of negotiating agenda, principles, and currency of the Doha Round interact with domestic political factors in leading WTO members, the fast growth of exports prior to 2007, and pervasive unilateral trade reform to eliminate the “landing zone” for this particular multilateral negotiation. Recent emphasis on differences between developing countries and on Chinese WTO accession as independent causes of the impasse seems misplaced.     

北极治理的国际制度竞争与权威构建

国际制度能够推动国家围绕某一北极治理议题进行合作与协调,从而规范国家行为。随着北极治理的实践理念从自助式的“丛林法则”向合作式的“制度法则”演变,国家面临遵循何种国际制度的选择困境,而对国家行为的约束力则是国际制度权威性的基础,这促使北极治理国际制度的主导国和参与国,都致力于提升国际制度的权威性,以维护本国的北极利益。“国际合法性”“国际认可度”与“制度刚性”是判断国际制度权威性的重要指标,而权威性差异造成北极治理国际制度体系呈现出层级结构。北极治理国际制度竞争分为国际规则竞争、国际组织竞争、国际秩序竞争三个阶段,当前北极治理国际制度竞争主要处于国际规则竞争阶段。由于北极治理具有议题局限性,国际规则供给呈现出相对过剩状态,这必然导致国际规则之间、倡导国际规则的国际行为体之间进行竞争,这亦是北极治理国际制度体系变迁的核心动力。未来权威型北极治理国际制度体系构建包括域内自理模式、公约治理模式和协商治理模式。北极利益攸关方之所以围绕国际规则设置权和国际组织主导权展开竞争,既是源于捍卫本国北极权益的考量,更是为了构建符合本国长远战略利益的国际秩序。     

战后国际秩序的演进与启示:制度改革的视角

战后全球性国际秩序及其制度载体几乎涉及国际关系的所有领域,总体上包括两大部分,一是国际政治和安全秩序,二是国际经济秩序。战后国际秩序的历史演进主要体现为国际制度的改革和发展,大致经历了四个阶段:美国主导时期、制度改革的源起和发展时期、自由市场转向时期和国际秩序改革新时期。在战后国际秩序及其制度规则的发展和演进过程中,发展中国家始终是推动改革的中坚力量。当今世界正经历百年未有之大变局,国际秩序进入改革和调整的新时期。在维护战后国际秩序的前提下,国际制度的改革和发展将是百年变局的一个核心议程。考察战后国际秩序的演进历程,将为思考新时期国际制度的改革和发展提供历史启迪。     

The Illusion of Transparency in Negotiations

The authors examined whether negotiators are prone to an illusion of transparency, or the belief that their private thoughts and feelings are more discernible to their negotiation partners than they actually are. In Study One, negotiators who were trying to conceal their preferences thought that their preferences had leaked out more than they actually did. In Study Two, experienced negotiators who were trying to convey information about some of their preferences overestimated their partners' ability to discern them. The results of Study Three rule out the possibility that the findings are simply the result of the curse of knowledge, or the projection of one's own knowledge onto others. Discussion explores how the illusion of transparency might impede negotiators' success.     

浅析沙特阿拉伯在国际气候变化谈判中的立场与策略

在应对气候变化的谈判中,作为世界上最大的产油国,沙特阿拉伯的立场十分引人注目。应对气候变化的措施对石油生产构成了制约,对沙特的经济发展也产生了负面影响。基于此,沙特确定了它在应对气候变化国际谈判中的基本立场。但由于自身的影响难以左右谈判的发展方向,因此该国时常采用同步前进、反复宣传负面影响、推迟谈判、对程序性规则作出自己的解释等杯葛策略,来表达和维护自己在气候谈判中的利益和诉求。     

The Curse of the Smartphone: Electronic Multitasking in Negotiations

In this study, we have explored the use of mobile phones during negotiations. Specifically, we examined the effects that multitasking — reading messages on a mobile phone while negotiating face to face — had on the outcome achieved in a negotiation, as well as on perceptions of professionalism, trustworthiness, and satisfaction. Using an experimental design in a face‐to‐face dyadic negotiation, we found that multitasking negotiators achieved lower payoffs and were perceived as less professional and less trustworthy by their partners.     

Sources of Power in Public Negotiations: A Framework Applied to Public-Public and Public-Private Negotiations

The negotiation literature has extensively examined the topic of power and how it can be wielded. Numerous frameworks have been created and utilized in the various treatises on negotiations; analyzing the power differential in any given situation is a common teaching technique. However, despite this focus on the topic, discussions of power have been mainly focused on negotiations in the private sector. As a result, many of the most common frameworks are oriented toward this type of situation, resulting in a clumsy application to a public-sector negotiation. Given the growing importance of negotiations to public-sector leaders, we provide a new structure for analyzing power that can be utilized in such situations. For a municipal leader confronted with a complex public-private partnership, it is important to have the right tools to use when examining the power dynamics at play. After examining several current models of power, as well as other writings on the topic in negotiation and strategy literature, we present a new model. This model divides power into different categories based on whether it stems from formal or informal mechanisms, and then offers several specific forms relevant to the public sector. We then use this new model to examine a case study involving the new mayor of Manchester, New Hampshire and her efforts to negotiate a better response to the opioid and homelessness crisis. This case study illustrates the unique nature of public sector negotiations and provides a roadmap for negotiators looking to use our new framework.     

Strategic Moral Diplomacy: Mandela, Qaddafi, and the Lockerbie Negotiations

Understanding and mitigating the consequences of clashing moral perceptions should be a primary goal of diplomacy and foreign policy analysis. Personal interviews and primary documents about the Lockerbie negotiations are used to illustrate the dangerous collision of different moral claims in the international arena, the mistakes made by the United States and United Kingdom in handling this aspect of the negotiations, and South African President Nelson Mandela's use of strategic moral diplomacy to resolve the stalemate between Libya, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Mandela's strategy in these negotiations is an example of how an intelligent and pragmatic moral position, rather than the conventional image of an enemy as evil, can produce the desired strategic results—in this case, Colonel Qaddafi's handover of the two Libyan citizens accused of the Lockerbie bombing.