Finding Out the Hard Way: Uncovering the Structural Foundations of Political Dissatisfaction in Italy, 1973–2013

In economic voting models, the electorate punishes governments associated with bad economic results and rewards those who provide prosperity. However, citizens do not always place the same weight on economic considerations when deciding their vote. This weight, it is argued, is a function of the degree to which governments can be deemed responsible for domestic economic outcomes. More precisely, the article hypothesises that when the economy is highly vulnerable to external economic conditions (and thus less controllable by the national government), voters will value less the information they receive on the state of the economy, and, as a consequence, electoral behaviour will be less influenced by economic performance. This conjecture is tested empirically using survey data from 15 European countries. Consistently with the prediction, it is found that employment expectations matter more the greater the degree of economic closeness of the country. General economic expectations have an impact on voting regardless of the level of economic openness, and no sign of pocketbook voting is detected. Also, the evidence seems to suggest that the internationalisation of the economy plays an exonerating role only under left-wing governments.     

The vulnerable populist right parties: No economic realignment fuelling their electoral success

Abstract.  The two occupational groups most likely to vote for populist right parties in Western Europe in the 1990s also disagree the most over issues relating to the economic dimension of politics. The two groups were: blue-collar workers – who support extensive state intervention in the economy – and owners of small businesses – who are against such state intervention. Proponents of economic realignment theories have held that both groups voted for the populist right because their economic preferences became aligned in recent decades. This article analyzes more detailed comparative data than has previously been available in the two cases held to be most propitious for the realignment hypotheses – France and Denmark – and finds strong evidence against them. The key mechanism for bringing together voters who disagree on state intervention in the economy is the populist right's appeal on issues cross-cutting the economic dimension, and these voters' willingness to grant such issues pre-eminence over economic ones. As a result, it is argued, populist right parties in Western Europe are limited by or vulnerable to the salience of the economic dimension.     

Economic vulnerability and economic voting in 14 OECD countries

The economic voting literature shows that good economic performance bolsters the electoral prospects of incumbents. However, disagreement persists as to whether voters in vulnerable economic conditions are more likely to engage in economic voting. It is argued in this article that a crucial factor in explaining individual‐level variation in economic voting is the degree of exposure to economic risks, because risk exposure affects the saliency of the economy in voting decisions. In particular, the focus is on job insecurity and employability as key determinants of economic voting patterns. The article hypothesises that the extent of economic voting is greater in voters who are more vulnerable to unemployment and less employable in case of job loss. Support for these hypotheses is found in a test with a dataset that combines survey data on incumbent support with occupational unemployment rates and other measures of exposure to economic risks.     

Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production

A central question in the international and comparative political economy literatures on globalization is whether economic integration increases worker insecurity in advanced economies. Previous research has focused on the role of international trade and has failed to produce convincing evidence that such a link exists. In this article, we argue that globalization increases worker insecurity, but that foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises (MNEs) is the key aspect of integration generating risk. FDI by MNEs increases firms' elasticity of demand for labor. More-elastic labor demands, in turn, raise the volatility of wages and employment, all of which tends to make workers feel less secure. We present new empirical evidence, based on the analysis of panel data from Great Britain collected from 1991 to 1999, that FDI activity in the industries in which individuals work is positively correlated with individual perceptions of economic insecurity. This correlation holds in analyses accounting for individual-specific effects and a wide variety of control variables.     

Workers, worries and welfare states: Social protection and job insecurity in 15 OECD countries

Abstract.  This article examines a model of the domestic political economy of subjective employment insecurity in advanced industrial societies. Based on data on people's attitudes toward their job as well as levels of and kinds of social protection collected in 15 OECD countries, it shows that there are distinct manifestations of job insecurity that are affected differently by distinct aspects of social protection programs. While the analysis shows that social protection measures reduce employment insecurity, it also reveals that overall levels welfare state generosity do not have any systematic effect on whether workers feel secure. The article's findings suggest the need to decompose the different components of employment insecurity as well as disaggregate national systems of social protection when examining the impact of welfare states on job insecurity.     

From disguised protectionism to rewarding regulation: The impact of trade‐related labor standards in the Dominican Republic

Policymakers in the Dominican Republic have responded to foreign pressure by rewriting their labor laws and revitalizing their labor ministry. What are the likely consequences? Is aggressive labor law enforcement more likely to protect vulnerable workers from abuse and exploitation or to undermine their ability to compete for labor‐intensive employment in an unforgiving world economy? And what are the broader implications of the answer? I address these questions by analyzing qualitative as well as quantitative data on workplace regulators empowered by the Dominican Republic in response to trade‐related labor standards imposed by the United States and find that they reconcile social protection with economic adjustment by simultaneously discouraging “low road” employment practices like informality, union‐busting, and the exploitation of child labor, and encouraging “high road” alternatives that link firms, farms, and families, on the one hand, to public educational, training, and financial institutions, on the other. The result is a potentially inclusive alternative to the repressive industrial relations regime that fueled export‐led development – and the East Asian “miracle” in particular – in the late twentieth century.     

The evolution of employment in Mexico: 1895-1980

Employment figures from the Mexican national census are the basis for this analysis of employment changes in Mexico between 1895-1980. The work identifies longterm trends in the volume and composition of employment and distinguishes 3 main periods in the evolution of employment. The first period, from 1895-1930, marked the end of a stage of development lasting until about 1907 in which sufficient internal stability was achieved to support Mexico's entrance into the world market. Export of agricultural products and metals was the principal focus of economic growth. Construction of roads and railroads was a central element of progress. But economic and social problems manifested in regional disparities, concentration of wealth, conflicts between economic sectors, low pay for agricultural workers, and fierce social and political control characterized the period and culminated in the Mexican Revolution. After the first decade of the 20th century the ability of the economy to absorb new workers began to decline, and the falling of crude activity rates was not reversed until the 1940s. During the 1920s, total employment increased less than 6%, reflecting a net increase of 403,000 male workers and a decrease of 110,000 female workers. The second major period of employment from 1930-1970 saw the change from an economy based on export of primary products to one based on manufacturing for the internal market. There were 2 subperiods, a stage of transition from 1930-50, the economy registered marked fluctuations, but by the 1940s the consolidation of state power and important reforms permitting expansion of the internal market were factors in an accelerated growth of employment relative to the preceding intercensal period. Despite considerable increases in agricultural employment, the relative share of the agricultural sector in total employment was beginning a decline. Employment registered the highest growth rates of the century in the 1940s and exceeded population growth. The increased employment was explained by accelerated growth and accumulation in manufacturing along with increases in commerce, services, construction, and agriculture. From 1950-70, industrial development was consolidated, and there was a generalized expansion in employment in manufacturing as well as in the secondary and tertiary sectors. The economy was less able to absorb new labor, primarily because the agricultural sector had reached the limits of expansion in both the commercial and peasant sector by 1965, at just the time that population growth was most rapid. During the 1970s, manufacturing employment grew less rapidly because of modernization, almost exclusive orientation to the internal market which limited expansion, and scarcity of funds for importing capital goods. A new model of growth will be needed if Mexico is to escape its present stagnation, and a significant share of economic activity will need to be oriented to export. Until this process is consolidated, the national economy is unlikely to show signs of sustained recuperation.     

Preferences for Employment Protection and the Insider–Outsider Divide: Evidence from France

Insider–outsider theory argues that in dual labour markets there are two groups with opposing preferences regarding protection against dismissal: (i) insiders with permanent work contracts who defend employment protection, because it increases their rents, and (ii) outsiders (temporary workers and the unemployed) who see protection as barriers to mobility and demand deregulation. Although this argument is influential in the political economy literature, there is little empirical research on outsiders’ preferences regarding employment protection. This article tests the argument using French data on support for a proposed reform of employment protection. The results show that permanent and temporary workers do not differ significantly in their support for employment protection, while some evidence indicates that the unemployed do show greater support for deregulation. The article concludes that insider–outsider theory overemphasises the relevance of employment protection for temporary workers and that care should be taken not to place these workers in a composite outsider group with the unemployed.     

Democracy,creeping socialism,and ideological socialism in rent-seeking societies

Rent-seeking societies suffer from a serious distortion of incentives. Incentives to engage in distributional struggles, to seek contrived transfers are strong, but incentives to engage in productive work are too weak. Stagnation and some unemployment should be expected. Long lasting democracies within unchanged borders create a permissive environment for rent-seeking. The provision of rents very much depends on government. The stronger the governmental involvement in the economy, the higher social security spending, the more rents the government is likely to generate. Therefore, creeping socialism understood as increased government control of the economy should reinforce the rent-seeking society and the corresponding negative effects on growth and employment. Whether such creeping socialism is backed by ideological socialism or not should make little difference for growth or employment. These ideas have been tested and partially supported by a 19 nation sample of industrial democracies, using data from the sixties and seventies. By and large, the rent-seeking approach is fairly successful in explaining national differences in economic growth rates, but receives ambiguous support or less for unemployment. Olson's (1982, 1983) proposition about the negative impact of long lasting democracy within unchanged borders on economic growth is much better supported than the growth-retarding effects of government revenues or social security spending are.     

Migrants' remittances and economic voting in the Mexican countryside

This study advances and tests hypotheses about the effects of migrants' remittances on political behavior. Analyzing new survey data from Mexico, I find that despite being very poor, respondents who receive remittances tend to view their income as more stable than neighbors who do not receive this money. As a result, remittance recipients have relatively fewer economic grievances and tend to feel more optimistic about economic matters than neighbors who do not receive remittances. According to the economic voter thesis, citizens who are more satisfied with the economy are also less likely to pressure and oppose politicians, particularly incumbents. Analyses indicate that respondents in this sample who receive remittances are indeed less likely to lobby local officials for economic assistance. They were also less likely to mobilize against and punish the incumbent party in the 2006 Mexican presidential election.     

Pathways to work for low‐income workers: The effect of work in the temporary help industry

This paper provides new evidence to inform the policy debate about the effect of a newly important industry—the temporary help industry—on the labor market outcomes of low‐income workers and those workers who are at risk of being on public assistance. The core issue of whether temporary help work harms the long‐term prospects of disadvantaged individuals depends critically on the alternatives available to the worker. Temporary employment results in labor market outcomes that are better than not working at all. For example, while nonemployed public assistance recipients have only a 35 percent chance of being employed a year later, those who were in temporary employment have almost twice the likelihood of being employed in the same period. These findings, if correct, would support the use of temporary agencies by welfare programs. © 2003 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

U.S. workers weigh‐in on the issue of portable benefits

As the sharing economy continues to grow and diversify, various institutes and members of government are contemplating the need for new employment regulations, including those related to portable benefits. However, there has been no known inquiry into this issue with those U.S. workers in the sharing economy. This paper presents exploratory research on the subject of portable benefits for workers engaged in the sharing economy and is intended to inform the development of future research questions and to determine the best research design and data collection method for a more extensive study. Arguably, rideshare drivers represent a large constituency of sharing economy workers in the United States and were utilized as the study population. Through authorized access to closed social media sites, this study explored the desire among rideshare drivers for portable benefits, how these benefits should be funded, and how such programs would be administered. The findings indicate that the majority of respondents were interested in the availability of portable benefits, although the preference for specific benefits varied widely among respondents. More than half believe companies, along with workers, should fund these benefits, and slightly less than half believe private sector third parties like insurance companies should administer these programs. However, given the transient nature of this workforce, administering such programs could prove to be quite challenging for organizations and plan administrators alike.     

Local Context, Retrospective Economic Evaluations, and Voting: The 1997 General Election in England and Wales

Local context is widely believed to influence voting behavior with, for example, the voters' evaluation of the state of their local economy affecting whether they choose to reward or punish the incumbent government. Such reward-punish models apply in the United Kingdom at the national scale: those who believe that the government has delivered prosperity vote for its return, whereas those who believe that its policies have produced a worsening economic situation vote against it. This article shows that the operation of this calculus varies spatially, according to the level of unemployment in the voter's home area: the higher the local level of unemployment the lower the probability of someone who thought that government polices had delivered national prosperity voting for the incumbent government. It also shows that this is a consequence of cross-pressured situations. Those who thought that the government's policies had delivered both national and local prosperity were very likely to vote for it; those who thought that the policies had delivered national but not local prosperity were less likely to vote for it—especially in areas of high unemployment.     

Clarity of responsibility and economic evaluations

Convincing scholarly evidence shows the economy directs the mass public's support for parties and leaders. But the extent of economic voting depends on a country's “clarity of responsibility.” According to several scholars, political clarity is important because it determines whether people link national economic performance to the parties in government. This study explores a potential second role, which involves how clarity moderates the strength of partisan-motivated reasoning. Clarity of responsibility makes the economy more or less central to party politics. It could therefore moderate people's motivation to rationalize economic facts in a biased direction. Using cross-national survey data, this study tests this possibility by examining economic disagreement between people who support a party in government and those who support the opposition. Results from a Bayesian multilevel regression show that partisan disagreement varies systematically with clarity of responsibility. This finding raises new questions about cross-national differences in economic voting.     

Economic voting in Sweden 1985–2010

Despite the fact that Sweden has the world’s second longest time-series of national election Studies, the standard model of micro-level economic voting has only been occasionally applied in Sweden. This study presents a long-term perspective on economic voting in Sweden and analyzes to what extent economic perceptions influence governmental support in general elections in Sweden at the eight latest parliamentary elections, 1985--2010. To this end, this article makes use of the rolling two-wave panels of the Swedish national election studies and estimates the probability of voting for the government depending on economic perceptions, previous vote, ideology and a set of SES controls. The results show that Swedish voting behaviour is no exception to that of most western democracies; subjective economic evaluations of the Swedish economy systematically influence government support. If voters feel the economy is improving they are more likely to vote for the incumbent government than when they feel the economy is getting worse.     

Physically demanding occupations, health, and work after retirement: findings from the New Beneficiary Survey

This article uses data on a recent cohort of Social Security retired-worker beneficiaries to examine the predictors of work after initial receipt of benefits. It focuses on two factors: an analysis of the effects of ill health and of employment in a physically demanding occupation in the year preceding receipt of benefits. Based on responses received during the Social Security Administration's New Beneficiary Survey, the employment of men in a physically demanding occupation is associated with a lower probability of work in retirement; the existence of a work-limiting health condition also lowers their probability of work. Full-time, full-year workers in 1979 who had changed jobs in the years just preceding the receipt of Social Security benefits were more likely to work after they became beneficiaries. It may be that workers anticipate constraints on their ability to continue working on a job and reduce the effect of those constraints through earlier job changes. The finding that the work effort of women beneficiaries is not affected by previous employment in occupations identified as physically demanding may signify the failure of customary physical demand indices to measure stress on those jobs in which women are most likely to be employed.     

Empirical investigation of party preferences and economic voting in Turkey

Abstract.  This article examines the factors that shape party preferences in Turkey by estimating an individual vote intention function that includes both economic and non-economic factors. The economic variables can be used to test the familiar hypotheses of economic voting theory – whether individuals vote retrospectively and/or prospectively, and whether they are sociotropic and/or egotropic. The non-economic factors include sociodemographic characteristics as well as identity and issue variables likely to be good predictors of party choice. The analysis focuses on comparing the characteristics of those who intend to vote for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) with those of other parties. According to multinomial logit estimates, young people, especially males, constitute the electoral base for the AKP. Those who have been affected adversely by recent economic developments, as well as those who are against Turkey's accession to the European Union are also more likely to vote for the AKP. The empirical work also provides evidence in support of economic voting hypotheses.     

Just work it out amongst yourselves: the implications of the private mediation of religious freedom

In its much-heralded report of 2008, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission struck by the Quebec government divided the resolution of contests involving religion-based claims into two realms: those which are solved in the courts and before human rights tribunals and therefore enter into formal determinations based on ‘reasonable accommodation’ and those disputes which are settled in private, with the guiding principle being responsabilisation dans la sphère privée' or ‘concerted adjustment’. In the report it is clear that the Commission prefers the second alternative for the resolution of disputes or disagreements about such things as prayer space, kirpans in schoolyards, serving pork at maple sugar farms, and religious needs in employment contexts. In this article I argue that encouraging the private resolution of issues around religious freedom, particularly in a social, legal and political climate in which there is fear and anxiety about the religious other, is an alternative that renders already vulnerable groups and individuals even more vulnerable. This in turn contributes to a situation in which they risk being oppressed and disadvantaged in a society which promises equality. Such a situation can create tension which could easily have been avoided if clear guidelines based on a beginning place of citizen equality were publicly and clearly stated by legal and political institutions.     

A note on the political economy of immigration

In this note it is shown that the different attitudes towards immigration can be explained in terms of economic interest, although the public immigration debate is dominated by moral and political arguments. On the one hand, immigration supporters are mainly found among those who may expect economic gains from immigration – skilled workers and especially members of certain professions. On the other hand, unskilled workers who stand to lose economically because they can be easily substitued for by immigrants are for the most part opposed to immigration.     

Lifetime earnings patterns, the distribution of future Social Security benefits, and the impact of pension reform

In order to assess the effect of Social Security reform on current and future workers, it is essential to accurately characterize the initial situations of representative workers affected by reform. For the purpose of analyzing typical reforms, the most important characteristic of a worker is the level and pattern of his or her preretirement earnings. Under the current system, pensions are determined largely by the level of the workers' earnings averaged over their work life. However, several reform proposals would create individual retirement accounts for which the pension would depend on the investment accumulation within the account. Thus, the pension would also depend on the timing of the contributions into the account and hence on the exact shape of the worker's lifetime earnings profile. Most analysis of the distributional impact of reform has focused, however, on calculating benefit changes among a handful of hypothetical workers whose relative earnings are constant over their work life. The earnings levels are not necessarily chosen to represent the situations of workers who have typical or truly representative earnings patterns. Consequently, the results of such analysis can be misleading, especially if reform involves introducing a fundamentally new kind of pension formula. This article presents two broad approaches to creating representative earnings profiles for policy evaluation. First, we use standard econometric methods to predict future earnings for a representative sample of workers drawn from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Our statistical estimates are based on a simple representation of typical career earnings paths and a fixed-effect statistical specification. Because our estimation file contains information on each worker's annual earnings from 1951 through 1996 as reported in the Social Security Administration's earnings files, we have a record (though an incomplete one) of the actual earnings that will be used to determine future benefit payments. Our estimates of the earnings function permit us to make highly differentiated predictions of future earnings for each member of our sample. By combining the historical information on individual earnings with our prediction of future earnings up through the normal retirement age, our first approach produces tens of thousands of predicted career earnings paths that can be used in microsimulation policy analysis. Our second approach to creating lifetime earnings profiles is similar in some ways to the traditional method. For example, it is based on the creation of only a handful of "stylized" career earnings patterns. An important difference with the traditional method, however, is that we define the career earnings patterns so that they are truly representative of patterns observed in the workforce. We use simple mathematical formulas to characterize each stylized earnings pattern, and we then produce estimates of the average path of annual earnings for workers whose career earning path falls within each of the stylized patterns we have defined. Finally, we calculate the percentage of workers in successive birth-year cohorts who have earnings profiles that match each of the stylized earnings patterns. Although this method may seem simple, it allows the analyst to create stylized earnings patterns that are widely varied but still representative of earnings patterns observed among sizable groups of U.S. workers. The effects of policy reforms can then be calculated for workers with each of the stylized earnings patterns. Our analysis of U.S. lifetime earnings patterns and of the impact of selected policy reforms produces a number of findings about past trends in earnings, typical earnings patterns in the population, and the potential impact of reform. The analysis focuses on men and women born between 1931 and 1960. Along with earlier analysts, we find that men earn substantially higher lifetime wages than women and typically attain their peak career earnings at a somewhat earlier age. However, the difference in career earnings patterns between men and women has narrowed dramatically over time. Workers with greater educational attainment earn substantially higher wages than those with less education, and they attain their peak career earnings later in life. For example, among men with the least education, peak earnings are often attained around or even before age 40, whereas many men with substantial postsecondary schooling do not reach their peak career earnings until after 50. Our tabulations of the lifetime earnings profiles of the oldest cohorts (born around 1930) and projections of the earnings of the youngest profiles (born around 1960) imply that the inequality of lifetime earnings has increased noticeably over time. Women in the top one-fifth of female earners and men in the top one-fifth of male earners are predicted to receive a growing multiple of the economy-wide average wage during their career. Women born between 1931 and 1935 who were in the top fifth of female earners had lifetime average earnings that were approximately equal to the average economy-wide wage. In contrast, women born after 1951 who were in the top fifth of earners are predicted to earn almost 50 percent more, that is, roughly 150 percent of the economy-wide average wage. Women with a lower rank in the female earnings distribution will also see gains in their lifetime average earnings, but their gains are predicted to be proportionately much smaller than those of women with a high rank in the distribution. Men with high earnings are also predicted to enjoy substantial gains in their relative lifetime earnings, while men with a lower rank in the earnings distribution will probably see a significant erosion in their typical wages relative to the economy-wide average wage. That is mainly the result of a sharp decline in the relative earnings of low-wage men born after 1950. In creating stylized earnings profiles that are representative of those of significant minorities of U.S. workers, we emphasized three critical elements of the earnings path: the average level of earnings over a worker's career, the upward or downward trend in earnings from the worker's 30s through his or her early 60s, and the "sagging" or "hump-shaped" profile of earnings over the worker's career. That classification scheme yields 27 characteristic patterns of lifetime earnings. Surprisingly, the differnce between men and women within each of those categories is quite modest. The main difference between men and women is in the proportions of workers who fall in each category. Only 14 percent of men born between 1931 and 1940 fall in earnings categories with the lowest one-third of lifetime earnings, whereas 53 percent of women born in those years have low-average-earnings profiles. On the other hand, women born in those years are more likely to have a rising trend in lifetime earnings, while men are more likely to have a declining trend. We find that the distribution of lifetime earnings contains relatively more workers with below-average earnings and relatively fewer with very high earnings than assumed in the Social Security Administration's traditional policy analysis. For example, the "low earner" traditionally assumed by the Office of the Chief Actuary is assigned a level of average lifetime earnings that we find to be higher than the average earnings of persons in the bottom one-third of the lifetime earnings distribution. The stylized earnings profiles developed here can be used for policy evaluation, and the results can be compared with those from the more traditional analysis. That comparison produces several notable findings. Because earnings profiles that are actually representative of the population tend to have lower average earnings than assumed in the traditional analysis, workers typically accumulate somewhat less Social Security wealth than implied in the traditional analysis. On the other hand, because the basic benefit formula is tilted in favor of lower-income workers, the internal rate of return on Social Security contributions is somewhat higher than detected in the traditional analysis. Moreover, the primary insurance amount measured as a percentage of the worker's average indexed earnings tends to be higher than implied by the traditional analysis. Finally, the stylized earnings patterns can be used to compare benefit levels enjoyed by workers under the traditional Social Security formula and under an alternative plan based on individual investment accounts. That comparison shows, as expected, that the traditional formula favors low-wage workers and one-earner couples, while an investment account favors single, high-wage workers. Comparing two workers with the same lifetime average earnings, the traditional formula favors workers with rising earnings profiles (that is, with lifetime earnings heavily concentrated at the end of their career), while investment account pensions favor workers with declining earnings profiles (that is, with earnings concentrated early in their career).